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RT HONBLE JOHN WYNNE.
HASLEWOOD.

THE
ROMAN HISTORY,
FROM THE
BUILDING OF ROME
TO THE
RUIN OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

ILLUSTRATED WITH MAPS.

BY NATH. HOOKE, Esq.

A NEW EDITION, IN SIX VOLUMES;

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THE HISTORY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE

FROM THE BUILDING OF ROME TO THE FALL OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE

BY HENRY BURNETT

IN SIX VOLUMES

VOLUME I

THE FOUNDATION OF THE EMPIRE

THE HISTORY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, FROM THE BUILDING OF ROME TO THE FALL OF THE WESTERN EMPIRE. BY HENRY BURNETT. IN SIX VOLUMES. VOLUME I. THE FOUNDATION OF THE EMPIRE. LONDON: PRINTED BY J. JOHNSON, ST. PAUL'S CHURCH-YARD, 1825.

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THE
ROMAN HISTORY.

BOOK IX.

CONTINUED.

CHAP. II.

Clodius, a tribune of the people, in the consulship of Piso and Gabinius, year of Rome 695, passes several new laws. He distresses Cicero, who being deserted by those from whom he expected support, is constrained to go into banishment. To get rid of Cato, the tribune engages the people to commission him to dethrone Ptolemy, king of Cyprus, and seize his treasures, which commission he executes with great punctuality. The next year (696) Lentulus Spinther and Metellus Nepos being consuls, Cicero is recalled home, and restored to his dignity and estates; on which occasion Clodius raises mischievous riots in the city.

THE consuls of the new year were L. Calpurnius Piso and A. Gabinius; the one the father-in-law of Cæsar; the other the creature of Pompey. Before their entrance into office, Cicero had conceived great hopes of both, on account of the influence they were under; but especially of Piso, to whom (by the marriage of his daughter Tullia to C. Piso) he was allied, and who had lately given him marks of confidence, having employed him, at the time of the election, to preside over the votes of the leading century; and when he entered into his office, on the 1st of January, asked his opinion the third in the senate, or the next after Pompey and Crassus: but he presently found himself deceived; for Clodius had already secured them to his measures, by a private contract, to procure for them, by a grant of the people, two of the best governments of the empire: for Piso, Macedonia, with Greece and Thessaly; for Gabinius, Cilicia: and when this last was not thought good enough,

Year of
R O M E
694.
B. C. 57.

394th consulship.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 1. 2.

Post Red.
in Sen. 7.
In Pis. 5. 6.

Pro Sext.
10.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Pro Dom 9.
Post Red.
in Sen. 4.

Vid. Orat.
in Pison. 4.
et notas.

Ascon.
Dio. l. 38.
p. 67.

and Gabinius seemed to be displeased with his bargain, it was exchanged soon after for Syria, with a power of making war upon the Parthians. For this price they agreed to serve him in all his designs, and particularly for the oppression of Cicero: who, on that account, often calls them not consuls, but brokers of provinces, and sellers of their country.^a

To gain the people, Clodius, early in the year (Jan. 3.) promulgated several new laws, contrived chiefly for their advantage. First, that corn should be distributed gratis to the citizens. Secondly, that no magistrate should take the auspices, or observe the heavens, when the people were actually assembled on public business. Thirdly, that the old companies or fraternities of the city, which the senate had abolished about nine years before, should be revived, and new ones instituted.

And, to please the citizens of higher rank, Clodius published a fourth law—that the censors should not expel from the senate, or inflict a mark of infamy upon any man, who was not first openly and in form accused, and convicted of some crime by their joint sentence.

Middl. 321.
Val. Max.
8. 1.

Pro Sext.
8, 9.

In Pis. 1.
Pro Sext.
9.

Pro Dom.
49.

^a Piso had been accused, the year before, by P. Clodius, of plundering and oppressing the allies: when, by throwing himself at the feet of his judges in the most abject manner, and in the midst of a violent rain, he is said to have moved the compassion of the bench, who thought it punishment enough for a man of his birth, to be reduced to the necessity of prostrating himself so miserably, and rising so deformed and besmeared with dirt.—Cicero says, that Piso, in his outward carriage, affected the mien and garb of a philosopher; and that his aspect greatly contributed to give him the credit of that character:—he was severe in his looks; squalid in his dress; slow in his speech; morose in his manners; the very picture of antiquity, and a pattern of the ancient republic; ambitious to be thought a patriot, and a reviver of the old discipline. But this garb of rigid virtue was only the covering of a dirty, sottish, stupid epicurean; wallowing in all the low and filthy pleasures of life; till a false opinion of wisdom, the splendor of his great family, and the smoky images of ancestors, whom he resembled in nothing but his complexion, recommended him to the consulship; which exposed the genuine temper and talents of the man.

His colleague Gabinius was no hypocrite, but a professed rake from the beginning: gay, foppish, luxurious; always curled and perfumed; and living in a perpetual debauch of gaming, wine, and women: void of every principal of virtue, honour, and probity; and so desperate in his fortunes, through the extravagance of his pleasures, that he had no other resource, or hopes of subsistence, but from the plunder of the republic. In his tribunate, when the law by him proposed, which gave the command of the war against the pirates, was depending, he, to pay his court to Pompey, exposed to the mob the plan of Lucullus's house, to shew what an expensive fabric one of the greatest subjects of Rome was building, as he would intimate, out of the spoils of the treasury: yet this vain man, oppressed with debts, and scarce able to shew his head, found means, from the perquisites of his consulship, to build a much more magnificent palace than Lucullus himself had done.

These laws, though generally agreeable, were highly unreasonable in Cicero's opinion ; who took them all to be levelled at himself, and contrived to pave the way to his ruin ; so that he provided his friend, L. Ninnius, one of the tribunes, to put his negative upon them, especially on the law of fraternities ; which, under colour of incorporating those societies, gave Clodius an opportunity of gathering an army, and enlisting into his service all the scum and dregs of the city. Dion Cassius says, that Clodius, in an amicable conference with Cicero, and by a promise not to make any attempt against him, persuaded him to withdraw his tribune, and give no interruption to the new laws proposed : but we find from Cicero's account, that, because the laws were popular, and did not personally affect him, his friends advised him to be quiet ; with which advice he complied, though contrary to his own judgment ; and we find likewise, that he blamed himself afterward for his indolence, and reproached Atticus particularly for having counselled him to let the law of fraternities pass ; by which it was quickly evident, that Clodius had gained great advantage. The vengeful tribune, become extremely popular on account of his new laws, eagerly seized the opportunity which this afforded him of driving his hated enemy into banishment : and, for this purpose, he provided a special law, which imported, that whoever had taken the life of a citizen uncondemned, and without a trial, should be prohibited from fire and water. The putting Catiline's accomplices to death, though not done by Cicero's single authority, but by a general vote of the senate, and after a solemn hearing and debate, was judged to be illegal, and contrary to the liberties of the people : and Cicero, though not named in the law, was the criminal manifestly marked out by it. Terrified, amazed, half out of his wits, he instantly changed his habit, and, as if he had been actually impeached, appeared about the streets in a sordid or mourning gown, to excite the compassion

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Middl. 524.

In Pis. 4.

Dio. l. 38.
p. 67.

Ad Att. 3.
15.

Vell. Pat.
2. 48.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Plut. Cic.
Middl. p.
325.

Post Red.
ad Qui. 3.

Pro Sext.
11—13.
It. Post
Red. in
Sen. 5.

of the people : whilst Clodius contrived to meet and insult him at every turn ; reproaching him for his meanness of spirit and unmanly dejection ; some of the populace even pelting him with dirt and stones. But he soon gathered friends enough about him to secure him from such insults, the whole body of the knights, and the young nobility, to the number of 20,000 with young Crassus at their head ; who all changed their habit, and perpetually attended him, to implore the protection and assistance of the people.

The city was now in great agitation, and every part of it engaged on one side or the other. The senate met in the temple of Concord ; while Cicero's friends assembled in the Capitol ; whence all the knights and young nobles went in their habit of mourning to throw themselves at the feet of the consuls, and beg their interposition in Cicero's favour. Piso kept his house that day on purpose to avoid them ; but Gabinius received them with intolerable rudeness, though their petition was seconded by the intreaties and tears of the whole senate : he treated Cicero's character and consulship with the utmost derision, and repulsed the whole company with threats and insults for their fruitless pains to support a sinking cause. This raised great indignation in the assembly : when the tribune Ninnius, instead of being discouraged by the violence of the consul, made a motion, that the senate also should change their habit with the rest of the city ; which was agreed to instantly by an unanimous vote. Gabinius, enraged at this, flew out of the senate into the Forum ; where he declared to the people from the rostra, that men were mistaken to imagine, that the senate had any power in the republic ; that the knights should pay dear for that day's work, when, in Cicero's consulship, they kept guard in the Capitol, with drawn swords ; and that the hour was now come, when those, who lived at that time in fear, should revenge themselves on their enemies. And to confirm

the truth of what he said, he banished L. Lamia, a Roman knight, 200 miles from the city, for his distinguished zeal and activity in Cicero's cause; an act of power, which no consul before him had ever presumed to exert on any citizen, which was followed presently by an edict from both the consuls, forbidding the senate to put their late vote into execution, and enjoined them to resume their former dress.^b

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Ep. Fam.
11. 16.
Pro Sext.
14.

Cicero's resolution of changing his gown was too hasty and inconsiderate, and helped to precipitate his ruin. He was not named in the law, nor personally affected by it: the terms of it were general, and seemingly just, reaching only to those, who had taken the life of a citizen illegally. Whether this was his case or not, was not yet the point in issue, but to be the subject of another trial: so that, by making himself a criminal before the time, he shortened the trouble of his enemies, discouraged his friends, and made his case more desperate than he needed to have done: whereas, if he had taken the part of commending or slighting the law, as being wholly unconcerned in it, and, when he came to be actually attacked by a second law, and brought to trial upon it, had stood resolutely upon his defence, he might have baffled the malice of his persecutors. He was sensible of his error when it was too late, and often reproached Atticus, that, being a stander-by, and less heated in the game than himself, he would suffer him to make such blunders.

Middl. 327.
Ad Att. 3.
15.

As the other consul, Piso, had not yet explicitly declared himself, so Cicero, accompanied by his son-in-law, who was the consul's near kinsman, took occasion to make him a visit, in hopes to move him to espouse his cause, and support the authority of the senate. They went to him about eleven in the morning, and

^b And "Where is there (says Cicero), in all history, a more illustrious testimony of any man, than that all the honest by private inclination, and the senate by a public decree, should change their habit for the sake of one single citizen?" But this was manifestly not the case: for the honest and the senate were as guilty as he, and had equal need of the people's indulgence. Pro Sext. 12.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

In Pis. 6.

found him, as Cicero afterward told the senate, “Coming from a little dirty hovel, fresh from the last night’s debauch, with his slippers on, his head muffled, and his breath so strong of wine, that they could hardly bear the scent of it. He excused his dress, and smell of wine, on account of his ill-health, for which he was obliged, he said, to take some vinous medicines; but kept them standing all the while in that filthy place, till they had finished their business. As soon as Cicero entered into the affair, he frankly told them, that Gabinius was so miserably poor, as not to be able to shew his head; and must be entirely ruined, if he could not procure some rich province; that he had hopes of one from Clodius, but despaired of any thing from the senate: that, for his own part, it was his business to humour him on this occasion, as Cicero had humoured his colleague in his consulship; and that there was no reason to implore the help of the consuls, since it was every man’s duty to look to himself.” Which was all they could get from him.

Pro Sext.
12.

Pro Mil.
14.

Post Red.
in Sen. 6.

In Pis. 6.
Post Red.
In Sen. 7.

Clodius, all this while, was not idle, but pushed on his law with great vigour; and calling the people into the Flaminian circus, summoned thither also the young nobles and the knights, who were so busy in Cicero’s cause, to give an account of their conduct to that assembly: but, as soon as they appeared, he ordered his slaves and mercenaries to fall upon them with drawn swords, and volleys of stones, in so rude a manner, that Hortensius was almost killed, and Vibienus, another senator, so desperately hurt, that he died soon after of his wounds. Here he produced the two consuls, to deliver their sentiments to the people on the merit of Cicero’s consulship; when Gabinius declared with great gravity, that he utterly condemned the putting citizens to death without a trial: Piso only said, That he had always been on the merciful side, and had a great aversion to cruelty. The reason of holding this assembly in the Flaminian

circus without the gates of Rome, was to give Cæsar an opportunity of assisting at it, who, being now invested with a military command, could not appear within the walls. Cæsar, therefore, being called upon, after the consuls, to deliver his mind upon the same question, declared, that the proceedings against Lentulus and the rest were irregular and illegal, but that he could not approve the design of punishing any body for them : that all the world knew his sense of the matter, and that he had given his vote against taking away their lives ; yet he did not think it right to propound a law at this time about things that were so long past.^c

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Dio. l. 38.
p. 69.

In this same assembly, Clodius obtained a repeal of the *Ælian* and *Fusian* laws,^d which had been in force about 100 years, and made it unlawful to act any thing with the people on the days called *fasti*,^e or while the augurs or consuls were observing the heavens, and taking the auspices. These laws were the main support of the aristocratical interest, as they proved of excellent use for checking any attempt of the popular magistrates, that gave the senate an alarm : Cicero, therefore, frequently laments the loss of them, and calls them the most sacred laws of the state, the fences and bulwarks of the public tranquillity. [But it is no wonder that Clodius, in the character of a popular tribune, should attempt the repeal of such laws, seeing the worthy consul Bibulus had, the very last year, in order to hinder the passing of certain laws beneficial to the people, most impudently proclaimed all the days of eight months together holy days.]

Pro Sext.
15. De
Harusp.
Resp. 27.

In Vatin. 9.
In Pis. 4.

Vid. b. 9.
c. 1.

^c This answer, says Dr. Middleton, was artful, and agreeable to the part which Cæsar was then acting : for, while it confirmed the foundation of Clodius's law, it carried a show of moderation towards Cicero ; or, as an ingenious writer expresses it, left appearances only to the one, but did real service to the other.

Exil. de
Cic. p. 133.

^d The authors of these laws are not certainly known. Manutius says, they were two tribunes of the people, about 100 years before Clodius's tribuneship. Hottomanus gives them different dates and different authors, ascribing the first to Q. Ælius Pætus, consul in 586 ; the second to P. Fusius or Furius, consul in 617.

^e The dies fasti were the days on which the courts of law were open, and the prætors sat to hear causes ; which days were marked for that purpose in the calendars.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Middl. p.
331—334.

Pro Dom.
11.
Pro Sext.
18.

“Pompey, who had hitherto been giving Cicero the strongest assurances of his friendship, and been frequent and open in his visits to him, began now, as the plot ripened towards a crisis, to grow cool and reserved; while the Clodian faction, fearing lest he might be induced at last to protect him, were employing all their arts to infuse jealousies and suspicions into him of a design against him from Cicero. They posted some of their confidants at Cicero’s house, to watch Pompey’s coming thither, and to admonish him by whispers, and billets put into his hands, to be cautious of venturing himself there, and to take better care of his life; which was inculcated to him so strongly at home by perpetual letters and messages from pretended friends, that he thought fit to withdraw himself from the city, to his house on the Alban hill. It cannot be easily imagined, that he entertained real apprehensions of Cicero: but, if he had any fear, it must, as Cicero says, have been of the common enemies of them both, lest they might possibly attempt somewhat in Cicero’s name; and, by the opportunity of charging it upon Cicero, hope to get rid of them both at the same time: but the most probable conjecture is, that, being obliged, by his engagement with Cæsar, to desert Cicero, and suffer him to be driven out of the city, he was willing to humour these insinuations, as giving the most plausible pretext of excusing his perfidy.”

In Pison.
31.

Before things came to extremity, Cicero thought it advisable to press Pompey in such a manner, as to know for certain what he had to expect from him. Some of his chief friends undertook the task; Lucullus, Torquatus, Lentulus, &c. who, with a numerous attendance of citizens, went to find him at his Alban villa, and to intercede with him, not to desert the fortunes of his old friend. He received them civilly, though coldly; referring them wholly to the consuls, and declaring, that he, being only a private man, could not pretend to take the

field against an armed tribune, without a public authority ; but if the consuls, by a decree of the senate, would enter into the affair, he would presently arm himself in their defence. With this answer they addressed themselves again to the consuls ; but with no better success than before ; Gabinius treated them rudely ; but Piso calmly told them, that he was not so stout a consul as Torquatus and Cicero had been ; that there was no need of arms or fighting ; that Cicero might save the republic a second time, if he pleased, by withdrawing himself ; for, if he stayed, it would cost an infinite quantity of civil blood ; and, in short, that neither he, nor his colleague, nor his son-in-law, Cæsar, would relinquish the party of the tribune.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th consulship.

After this repulse, Cicero resolved to make his last effort on Pompey, by throwing himself in person at his feet. Plutarch tells us, that Pompey slipped out at a back door, and would not see him : but it is certain, from Cicero's account, that he was admitted to an audience ; and, when he began to press, and even supplicate him, in a manner the most affecting, that Pompey flatly refused to help him ; alleging in excuse of himself, the necessity, which he was under, of acting nothing against the will of Cæsar. This experiment convinced Cicero, that he had a much greater power to contend with than what had yet appeared in sight : he called, therefore, a council of his friends, with intent to take his final resolution, agreeably to their advice. The question was, whether it was best to stay, and defend himself by force ; or to save the effusion of blood, by retreating, till the storm should blow over : Lucullus^f advised the first, but Cato, and, above all, Hortensius, warmly urged the last ; which, concurring with Atticus's advice, as well as the fears and entreaty of all his own family, made him

In Pison.
31.

Ad Att.
10. 4.

Plut. in
Cat.

^f Plutarch writes Lucullus without any prænomen ; and since the great Lucullus died mad very soon after the time we are speaking of, and was, therefore, probably, too weak now to be capable of public affairs, we may well suppose, that the historian means Marcus Lucullus, the brother of Lucius. Crevier.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

resolve to quit the field to his enemies, and submit to a voluntary exile.

394th con-
sulship.

A little before his retreat, he took a small statue of Minerva, which had long been revered in his family, as a kind of tutelar deity, and, carrying it to the capitol, placed it in the temple of Jupiter, under the title of Minerva, the guardian of the city, that, in the plunder of his goods, which was likely to ensue, this sacred guardian might not be profaned by impious hands.

De Leg. 2.
17.

“Nos, qui illam custodem urbis, omnibus ereptis nostris rebus et perditis, violari ab impiis passi non sumus.”

He departed from Rome in the night, escorted by a numerous guard of friends, who, after a day's journey or two, left him, with the greatest expressions of tenderness, to pursue his way towards Sicily, which he proposed as the place of his residence, and where, for his eminent services to the island, he assured himself of a kind reception and safe retreat.

Middl.
p. 338.

As soon as it was known that he was gone, Clodius published a second law, conceived in the following terms :

Pro Dom.
18—20.
Post Red.
in Sen. 2.
10.

“Whereas M. T. Cicero has put Roman citizens to death, unheard and uncondemned; and for that end forged the authority and decree of the senate: may it please you to ordain, that he be interdicted from fire and water: that nobody presume to harbour or receive him on pain of death: and that whoever shall move, speak, vote, or take any step towards recalling him, he shall be treated as a public enemy.”

Middl.
p. 339.

It is pretended, that this law was essentially null and invalid: for Cicero says, it was not properly a law, but

Ib.

It is said, likewise, that the terms of the law were so absurd, that they annulled themselves; for it enacted, not that Cicero may or should be, but that he be interdicted, which was impossible; since no power on earth, says Cicero, can make a thing to be done before it be done. “Non tulit ut ‘interdicatur;’ sed ut ‘interdictum sit.’—Sexte noster,—bona venia—quoniam jam dialecticus es,—quod factum non est, ut sit factum, ferri ad populum, aut verbis ullis sanciri, aut suffragiis confirmari potest?” Pro Dom. 18. “Quid si iis verbis scripta est ista proscriptio, ut se ipsa dissolvat?” Ib. 9.

N. B. The distinction, here intimated, between ‘interdicatur’ and ‘interdictum

a privilege; or an act to inflict penalties on a particular citizen by name without any previous trial; which was expressly prohibited by the most sacred and fundamental constitutions of the republic. “*Vetant leges sacratæ, vetant XII tabulæ leges privatis hominibus irrogari. Id est enim privilegium.*”

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Pro Dom.
17.

[This objection to the proceedings against Cicero seems fully to justify them; the thing there spoken of, as prohibited by the laws of the twelve tables and the fundamental constitutions of the state, being the very thing of which he had been notoriously guilty. And it ought to be observed, that the authority of the senate, upon which he acted, could not make his act legal; but, by a law of the twelve tables, whatever the people decreed last was law; and the votes of the people were their decree; so that Cicero was legally banished.]

With this law against Cicero there was another published at the same time, which granted to the two consuls the provinces above specified, with a provision of whatever troops or money they thought fit. Both the laws passed without opposition, and Clodius lost no time in putting the first of them in execution, but fell immediately to plundering, burning, and demolishing Cicero's houses both in the city and in the country. The best part of his goods was divided between the two consuls; the marble columns of his Palatine house were carried publicly to Piso's father-in-law; and the rich furniture of his Tusculan villa to his neighbour Gabinius; who removed even the trees of his plantations into his own grounds: and to make the loss of his house in Rome irretrievable, Clodius consecrated the area on which it

Liv. b. 7:
c. 17.

Middl.

p. 340.

Pro Sext.

10. 24.

In Pis. 16.

Post Red.
in Sen. 7.

Pro Dom.

24.

sit,' deserves the attention of all grammarians. They are commonly used indifferently, as terms wholly equivalent, yet, according to Cicero's criticism, the one, we see, makes the sense absurd, where the other is just and proper.

Farther, that the penal cause being grounded on a suggestion notoriously false, that Cicero had forged the decrees of the senate; it could not possibly stand for want of a foundation. Pro Dom. 19.

And lastly, though it provided that nobody should harbour him, yet it had not ordered him to be expelled, or enjoined him to quit the city. Ib. 20.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.
Pro Dom.
40.
Middl. p.
343—346.

Ad Quint.
Frat. 1. 3.

Ib. 4.

stood to the perpetual service of religion, and built a temple upon it to the goddess of Liberty.

“The desolation of Cicero’s fortunes at home, and the miseries which he suffered abroad, in being deprived of every thing that was dear to him, soon made him repent of the resolution of his flight; which he ascribes to the envy and treachery of his counsellors, who, taking advantage of his fears, and the perplexity which he was under, pushed him to an act both ruinous and inglorious. This he chiefly charges on Hortensius; and though he forbears to name him to Atticus, on account of the strict friendship between them, yet he accuses him very freely to his brother Quintus, of coming every day insidiously to his house, and, with the greatest expressions of zeal and affection, perpetually insinuating to his hopes and fears, that by giving way to the present rage, he could not fail of being recalled with glory in three days’ time. Hortensius was particularly intimate at this time with Pompey, and might possibly be employed to urge Cicero to this step, in order to save Pompey the disgrace of being forced to act against him with a very high hand. But let that be as it will, it was Pompey’s conduct which shocked Cicero the most: not for its being contrary to his oaths,^h which the ambitious can easily dispense with; but to his interest, which they never neglected, but through weakness. The consideration of what was useful to Pompey, made him depend on his assistance.—

In this ruffled and querulous state of mind, stung with the recollection of his own mistakes, and the perfidy of his friends, he often laments that he had not tried the fate of arms, and resolved either to conquer bravely, or die honourably; which he dwells so much upon in his letters, as to seem persuaded, that it would have been his

^h “I knew him (says Cicero in a letter to Atticus after Pompey’s death) to be an honest, grave, and worthy man.” “This (adds Dr. Middleton) was the short and true character of the man from one who perfectly knew him.” Midd. Life of Cic. vol. 2. p. 132. What inconsistencies are these!

wisest course. But this is a problem, not easy to be solved: it is certain, that his enemies were using all arts to urge him to the resolution of retreating: as if they apprehended the consequences of his stay; and the real aim of the triumvirate was, not to destroy, but to humble him: yet it is no less certain, that all resistance must have been vain, if they had found it necessary to exert their strength against him; and that they had already proceeded too far, to suffer him to remain in the city in defiance of them: and, if their power had actually been employed to drive him away, his return must have been the more desperate, and they the more interested to keep him out: so that it seems to have been his most prudent part, and the most agreeable to his character, to yield, as he did, to the necessity of the times.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

“ But we have a full [certainly not a true] account of the motives of his retreat, in the speeches, which he made after his return, both to the senate and the people. ‘ When I saw the senate (says he) deprived of its leaders, myself partly pushed and partly betrayed by the magistrates; the slaves enrolled by name, under the colour of fraternities; the remains of Catiline’s forces brought again into the field under their old chiefs; the knights terrified with proscriptions; the corporate towns with military execution, and with death and destruction; I could still have defended myself by arms, and was advised to do so by many brave friends; nor did I want that same courage, which you had all seen me exert on other occasions: but when I saw, at the same time, that, if I conquered my present enemy, there were many more behind, whom I had still to conquer; that, if I happened to be conquered, many honest men would fall both with me and after me; that there were people enough ready to revenge the tribune’s blood, while the punishment of mine would be left to the forms of a trial and to posterity; I resolved not to employ force in defending my private safety, after I had defended that of

Post Red.
in Sen. 13,
14.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

the republic without it; and was willing that honest men should rather lament the ruin of my fortunes, than make their own desperate by adhering to me: and if, after all, I had fallen alone, that would have been dishonourable to myself; if amidst the slaughter of the citizens, fatal to the republic.’”

Vid. supra,
p. 12.

His letters, written during his exile, to Terentia and Atticus, discover, that all he says here, of his courage being restrained by his patriotism, is false. The truth is, he had neither courage nor patriotism: he would have accepted the lieutenancy offered him by Cæsar, and have become an humble servant of the triumvirate, if Clodius had not outwitted him. And when, by refusing that lieutenancy, he had lost the protection of Cæsar, he would have commenced a civil war to preserve his station and his fortune, if he had not felt the want of courage in himself, and had not found, that, even in the opinion of his friends, he overrated his own importance.

Melm. vol.
1. p. 35.
note 1, on
Let. 8.

“Cicero (says a very candid and ingenious writer) is perpetually reproaching himself in these letters to Terentia, and those which he wrote at the same time to Atticus, for not having taken up arms, and resolutely withstood the violence of Clodius. He afterward, however, in several of his speeches, made a merit of what he here condemns, and particularly in that for Sextius he appeals to Heaven in the most solemn manner, that he submitted to a voluntary exile, in order to spare the blood of his fellow-citizens, and preserve the public tranquillity. ‘Te, te patria, testor, et vos, penates patriique Dii, me vestrarum sedum templorumque causa, me propter salutem meorum civium, quæ mihi semper fuit mea carior vita, dimicationem cædemque fugisse.’ But Cicero’s veracity, in this solemn asseveration, seems liable to be justly questioned. It is certain, that he once entertained a design of taking up arms in his own defence: and the single motive that appears to have determined him in the change of this resolution was, his

Pro Sext.
20.

finding himself most perfidiously deserted by Pompey. ‘ Si—quisquam fuisset (says he in a letter to Atticus) qui me Pompeii minus liberali responso perterritum a turpissimo consilio revocaret;—aut occubuissem honeste; aut victores hodie viveremus.’ Dion Cassius asserts, that Cicero, notwithstanding the unexpected desertion of Pompey, was preparing to put himself in a posture of defence; but that Cato and Hortensius would not suffer him to execute his purpose. Perhaps this author may be mistaken as to his having made any actual preparations of this kind: but that he had it in his intentions, seems clear beyond all reasonable contradiction. The French historian of our author’s banishment has relied therefore too much upon Cicero’s pompous professions after his return, when he maintains that nothing could be farther from his thought than a serious opposition. The contrary appears most evidently to have been the case; and that the patriot-motive, which he so often assigns in his subsequent orations, for leaving his country, was merely an after-thought, and the plausible colouring of artful eloquence. Why else, it may be asked, is there not the least hint of any such generous principle of his conduct, in all the letters he wrote during this period? Why else is he perpetually reproaching his friends for having suffered him to take that measure? And why, in a word, does he call it, as in the passage above cited, *turpissimum consilium*, the effect of a most ignominious resolution? But, were it to be admitted that a regard to his country determined him to withdraw from it, still, however, he could not with any degree of truth boast of his patriotism on that occasion: for the most partial of his advocates must acknowledge, that he no sooner executed this resolution, than he heartily repented of it. The truth is, how unwilling soever he might be to hazard the peace of his country in maintaining his post, he was ready to renounce all tenderness of that kind in recovering it; and he expressly desires

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Ad Att. 3.
15.
Lib. 38.

Hist. de
l’ Exil. de
Cic. p. 148.

Year of
R O M E
695.

B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Ad Att. 3.
23.

Middl. p.
347.

ProDom. 8.
Vid. vol. 4.
p. 421.
note "

Pro Sext.
26—29.
Dio. lib. 38.
p. 78.

Pro Sext.
27.
App. lib. 2.
p. 441.

Plut. in
Cat.

Atticus to raise the mob in his favour, if there were any hopes of making a successful push for his restoration :

‘ Oro te, ut, si qua spes erit, posse studiis bonorum, auctoritate, multitudine comparata, rem confici, des operam, ut uno impetu perfringatur.’ ” Dyrrachium, Nov. 26.

Clodius, having satiated his revenge upon Cicero, proposed another law [from a like spirit of revenge] against Ptolemy, king of Cyprus ; to deprive him of his kingdom, and reduce it to a Roman province, and confiscate his whole estate. This prince was brother to the king of Egypt, and reigning by the same right, in full peace and amity with Rome ; accused of no practices, nor suspected of any designs, against the republic ; whose only crime was to be rich and covetous ; so that the law was an unparalleled act of injustice, and what Cicero, in a public speech, did not scruple to call a mere robbery : but Clodius had an old grudge to the king, for refusing to ransom him when he was taken by the pirates ; and sending him only the contemptible sum of two talents : and what, says Cicero, must other kings think of their security, to see their crowns and fortunes at the disposal of a tribune and 600 mercenaries ? The law passed, however, without any opposition ; and, to sanctify it, as it were, and give it the better face and colour of justice, Cato was charged with the execution of it : which gave Clodius a double pleasure, by imposing so shamefulⁱ a task upon the gravest man in Rome. It was a part likewise of the same law, as well as Cato’s commission, to restore certain exiles of Byzantium, whom their city had driven out for crimes against the public peace. The engaging Cato in such dirty work was a masterpiece, and served many purposes of great use to Clodius : first, to get rid of a troublesome adversary for the remainder of his magistracy : secondly, to fix a blot on Cato himself,

ⁱ “ It is truly reckoned (says Dr. Prideaux) one of the unjustest acts that the Romans to this time ever did. For Ptolemy had been admitted as a friend and ally of the Roman people, and had never offended them, or done them any hurt or displeasure, whereby to deserve this usage from their hands.” Vol. 2. p. 448.

and shew, that the most rigid pretenders to virtue might be caught by a proper bait : thirdly, to stop his mouth for the future, as he openly bragged, from clamouring against extraordinary commissions : fourthly, to oblige him, above all, to acknowledge the validity of his acts, by submitting to bear a part in them. The tribune had the satisfaction to see Cato taken in his trap.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Cato, coming to Rhodes, in his way to Cyprus, sent to Ptolemy to persuade him quietly to recede, promising him, on that condition, the high-priesthood of Venus at Paphos, on the revenues of which he might be supported in a state of plenty and honour ; but of this he would not accept. To resist the Roman power he was not able, and to be less than king after he had so long reigned he could not bear, and therefore, resolving to make his life and reign end together, he put all his riches on shipboard, and, launching out into the sea, purposed, by boring his ship through, to make both his riches and himself sink into the deep, and there perish together. But, when it came to the execution, he could bear that his beloved treasure should be thus lost ; he continued still in the resolution to destroy himself, but he could not bring his heart to destroy that, which, to him, was far dearer than his dear self ; he carried it therefore all back to land, laid it up again in its former repository, and then put an end to his life by poison ; having this only comfort in death, that he left his treasure undiminished and undivided.

Prid.vol. 2.
p. 449.
Plut. in
Cat.
Val. Max.
Dio.
Strabo.
Appian.
Vell. Pat.

Cato executed his commission with fidelity ; and returned the year following, in a kind of triumph, to Rome, with all the king's effects reduced into money, amounting to about a million and a half sterling, which he delivered with great pomp into the public treasury.

Middl. p.
348.
Plut. in
Cat.

This proceeding was severely condemned by Cicero ; though he touches it in his public speeches with some tenderness for the sake of Cato, whom he labours to clear from any share in the iniquity : “ The commis-

Middl. p.
349.

Pro Sext.
28, 29.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Plut. in
Cat.
Dio. l. 39.
p. 100.

Ad Att. 3.
4.

Plut. in
Cic.
Pro Plan.
40, 41.

sion (says he), was contrived not to adorn, but to banish Cato; not offered, but imposed upon him——Why did he then obey it? Just as he was sworn to obey other laws, which he knew to be unjust, that he might not expose himself to the fury of his enemies, and, without doing any good, deprive the republic of such a citizen.—If he had not submitted to such a law, he could not have hindered it; the stain of which would still have stuck upon the republic, and he himself suffered for rejecting it; since it would have been a precedent for invalidating all the other acts of that year: he considered, therefore, that, since the scandal of it could not be avoided, he was the person the best qualified to draw good out of evil, and to serve his country well, though in a bad cause.” But, howsoever this may colour, it cannot justify Cato’s conduct; who valued himself highly upon his Cyprian transactions, and, for the sake of that commission, was drawn in, as Clodius expected, to support the authority from which it flowed, and to maintain the legality of Clodius’s tribunate in some warm debates even with Cicero himself.

It would seem that Cicero left Rome in the beginning of April; for on the 8th of that month he writes to Atticus, from the sea-coast of Lucania,^k being then on his way to Vibo, a town of Bruttium, the most southern part of Italy. At Vibo he spent several days with a friend named Sica; and here he received a copy of the law made against him, which fixed the limits of his exile to the distance of 400 miles from Italy. His thoughts at first had been wholly bent on Sicily;^l but no part of that island being within the distance specified by law, he was obliged to turn towards Brundisium, that he might thence pass into Greece. All the towns on his road received him with public marks of respect. When

^k Dat. 6. Id. Apr. in oris Luc. Ad Att. l. 3. ep. 2.

^l We are told, that, when Cicero arrived within sight of Sicily, the prætor, C. Virgilius, an old friend, who had been highly obliged to him, sent him word that he must not set foot in it. Plut. in Cic. Pro Plan. 40.

he came to Brundisium, where he arrived on the 17th of April, he would not enter within the walls of the city, but chose to lodge in the villa of his friend, M. Lenius Flaccus, not far from it. Flaccus was not deterred by the penalty of the law from performing towards him all the rights of friendship and hospitality; so that Cicero continued here thirteen days, after which he embarked for Dyrrhachium.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Ep. Fam.
14. 4.

During his stay with Flaccus, he was in no small perplexity about the choice of a convenient place for his residence abroad. Atticus offered him his house in Epirus, which was a castle of some strength, and likely to afford him a secure retreat. But, since Atticus could not attend him thither in person, he dropt all thoughts of that, and was inclined to go to Athens; till he was informed, that it would be dangerous for him to travel into that part of Greece, where all those who had been banished for Catiline's conspiracy, and especially Autronius, then resided.

Middl. p.
353.

Ad Att. 3.
7.

At Dyrrhachium he met with a confirmation of what he had heard before in Italy, that Achaia and the neighbouring parts of Greece swarmed with those outlaws, who had been driven from Rome on Catiline's account. This determined him to go into Macedonia, where his friend, C. Plancius, was then quæstor; who, upon the first notice of his landing, came directly, unattended by his lictors, and without any of the pomp of magistracy, to meet him; and from Dyrrhachium conducted him to his head-quarters at Thessalonica. L. Appuleius, the prætor or chief governor of the province, was Cicero's friend; yet he durst not venture to grant him his protection, or shew him any public civility, but contented himself with only conniving at what his quæstor Plancius did.

Pro Planc.
41.

Post Red.
in Sen. 14.

While Cicero staid at Dyrrhachium, he received two expresses from his brother Quintus, to inform him of his intended route, in returning homeward from Asia, and to settle the place of their meeting: "But Cicero had

Middl. p.
356, 357.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Ad Att. 3.
9.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 1. 3.

Pro Planc.
41.

Ep. Fam.
14. 1, 2.

Ad Att. 3.
7.

not resolution enough to see him ; finding himself unable to bear the tenderness of such a meeting, and much more the misery of parting ; and he was apprehensive besides, that, if they once met, they should not be able to part at all, whilst Quintus's presence at Rome was necessary to their common interests : so that, to avoid one affliction, he was forced, he says, to endure another most cruel one, that of shunning the embraces of a brother.

“ L. Tubero, however, his kinsman, and one of his brother's lieutenants, paid him a visit on his return towards Italy, and acquainted him with what he had learnt in passing through Greece, that the banished conspirators, who resided there, were actually forming a plot to seize and murder him ; for which reason he advised him to go into Asia, where the zeal and affection of the province would afford him the safest retreat, both on his own and his brother's account. Cicero was disposed to follow this advice, and leave Macedonia : for the prætor, Appuleius, though a friend, gave him no encouragement to stay ; and the consul Piso, his enemy, was coming to the command of it the next winter : but all his friends at Rome dissuaded his removal to any place more distant from them ; and Plancius treated him so affectionately,^m and contrived to make all things so easy to him, that he dropt the thoughts of changing his quarters. The only inconvenience that Cicero found in his present situation, was the number of soldiers and concourse of people, who frequented the place on account of business with the quæstor. For he was so shocked and dejected by his misfortune, that, though the cities of Greece were offering their services and compliments, and striving to do him all imaginable honours, yet he refused to see all company, and was

^m Cicero seems most unworthily to impute the kindness, which Plancius shewed him, to an interested view : “ Me adhuc Plancius liberalitate sua retinet.—Spes homini est injecta, non eadem, quæ mihi, posse nos una decedere: quam rem sibi magno honori sperat fore.” Ad Att. 3. 22.

so shy of the public, that he could hardly endure the light.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

“ For it cannot be denied, that, in this calamity of his exile, he did not behave himself with that firmness, which might reasonably be expected from one who had borne so glorious a part in the republic; conscious of his integrity, and suffering in the cause of his country :^a for his letters are generally filled with such lamentable expressions of grief and despair, that his best friends, and even his wife, were forced to admonish him sometimes, to rouse his courage, and remember his former character. Atticus was constantly putting him in mind of it ;^o and sent him word of a report, that was brought

394th consulship.

Ep. Fam.
14. 4.

^a Whether it was possible for Cicero to be conscious of integrity, and of suffering in the cause of his country, or in any cause but his own, the whole tenor of his conduct will best enable the reader to determine. Let the reader, if he pleases, compare Mr. Melmoth's remark, inserted above in the text, (p. 14.) with the following passages, extracted from some of Cicero's writings by his able panegyrist :—

“ I have twice saved the republic : once with glory, a second time with misery : for I will never deny myself to be a man ; or brag of bearing the loss of a brother, children, wife, country, without sorrow.—For what thanks had been due to me for quitting what I did not value?—I own my grief to have been extremely great ; nor do I pretend to that wisdom, which those expected from me, who gave out, that I was too much broken by my affliction : for such a hardness of mind, as of body, which does not feel pain, is a stupidity, rather than a virtue.—I am not one of those to whom all things are indifferent ; but love myself and my friends, as our common humanity requires : and he, who, for the public good, parts with what he holds the dearest, gives the highest proof of love to his country.”

Middl. p.

360.

Pro Sext.

22.

Pro Dom.

36, 37.

Middl. p.

361.

“ There was another consideration (says his English historian) which added no small sting to his affliction ; to reflect, as he often does, not only on what he had lost, but how he had lost it, by his own fault ; in suffering himself to be imposed upon and deluded by false and envious friends.—‘ Though my grief is incredible, yet I am not disturbed so much by the misery of what I feel, as the recollection of my fault.—Wherefore, when you hear how much I am afflicted, imagine that I am suffering the punishment of my folly, not of the event ; for having trusted too much to one whom I did not take to be a rascal.’—Atticus would never allow his suspicions to be just, not even against Hortensius, where they seemed to lie the heaviest. This is the substance of what Cicero himself says, to excuse the excess of his grief : and the only excuse indeed which can be made for him ; that he did not pretend to be a stoic, nor aspire to the character of a hero.” [Yet he often boasts of his prodigious courage.]

Ad Att. 3.

8.

Vid. 9. 14,

15. 19, &c.

Middl. p.

358.

^o These remonstrances did not please him : he thought them unkind and unseasonable, as he intimated in several of his letters, where he expresses himself very movingly on this subject. “ As to your chiding me (says he) so often and so severely, for being too much dejected ; what misery is there, I pray you, so grievous, which I do not feel in my present calamity ? Did ever any man fall from such a height of dignity, in so good a cause, with the advantage of such talents, experience, interest ; such support of all honest men ? Is it possible for me to forget what I was ? or not to feel what I am ? From what honour, what glory I am driven ? From what children ? what fortunes ? what a brother ? whom, though I love, and have ever loved, better than myself, yet (that you may perceive what a new sort of affliction I suffer) I refused to see ; that I might neither augment my own grief by the sight of his, nor offer myself to him thus ruined, whom he had left so flourishing : I omit many other things intolerable to me ; for I am hindered by my tears : tell me then,

Ad Att. 3.

10.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship

Ad Att. 3.
13.

Ib. 15.
Middl. p.
362—367.

Pro Dom.
25.

to Rome by one of Crassus's freedmen, that his afflictions had disordered his senses : to which he answered, that his mind was still sound, and he wished only that it had been always so, when he placed his confidence on those who perfidiously abused it to his ruin.

“ When he had been gone a little more than two months, his friend Ninnius, the tribune, made a motion in the senate to recall him, and repeal the law of Clodius ; to which the whole house readily agreed, with eight of the tribunes, till one of the other two, Ælius Ligus, interposed his negative : they proceeded, however, to a resolution, that no other business should be transacted till the consuls had actually prepared a new law for that purpose.—Clodius was now losing ground apace ; being grown so insolent on his late success, that even his friends could not bear him any longer : for, having banished Cicero, and sent Cato out of his way, he began to fancy himself a match for Pompey ; by whose help, or connivance at least, he had acquired all his power ; and, in open defiance of him, seized by stratagem, into his own hands, the son of king Tigranes, whom Pompey had brought with him from the east, and kept a prisoner at Rome in the custody of Flavius the prætor. Instead of delivering the prince up, when Pompey demanded him, he put him on board a ship, having undertaken, for a large sum of money, to give him his liberty, and transport him into Asia. This, however, did not pass without a sharp engagement between the tribune and Flavius : for, a storm arising at the instant the prince put off to sea, he was forced to take shelter in the harbour of Antium. Flavius had notice of this, and marched out of Rome with a body of men

Ad Att. 3.
11.

whether I am still to be reproached for grieving ; or for suffering myself rather to be deprived of what I ought never to have parted with but with my life ; which I might easily have prevented, if some perfidious friends had not urged me to my ruin within my own walls,” &c. In another letter, “ Continue (says he) to assist me, as you do, with your endeavours, your advice, and your interest ; but spare yourself the pains of comforting, and much more of chiding me : for, when you do this, I cannot help charging it to your want of love and concern for me : whom I imagined to be so afflicted with my misfortune, as to be inconsolable even yourself.”

well armed, to recover Tigranes by force. The battle was fought in the Appian way; many were killed on both sides, and Clodius proved victorious. Among the slain was Papirius, a Roman knight of Pompey's intimate acquaintance; and Flavius himself had some difficulty to escape with life.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Ascon. in
Milon. 14.

“ This affront roused Pompey to think of recalling Cicero; as well to correct the arrogance of Clodius, as to retrieve his own credit, and ingratiate himself with the senate: he dropped some hints of his inclinations to Cicero's friends, and particularly to Atticus, who presently imparted to him the agreeable news: upon which Cicero, though he had no opinion of Pompey's sincerity, was encouraged to write to him, and sent a copy of his letter to Atticus, telling him at the same time, that, if Pompey could digest the affront which he had received in the case of Tigranes, he should despair of his being moved by any thing. Varro likewise, who had a particular intimacy with Pompey, desired Atticus to let Cicero know, that Pompey would certainly enter into his cause, as soon as he had heard from Cæsar, which he expected to do every day.—This shews what an extraordinary deference Pompey paid to Cæsar, that he would not take a step in this affair at Rome, without sending first to Gaul, to consult him about it.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 1. 3.
Ad Att. 3.
8.

“ The city was alarmed, at the same time, by the rumour of a second plot against Pompey's life, said to be contrived by Clodius; one of whose slaves was seized at the door of the senate, with a dagger, which his master had given him, as he confessed, to stab Pompey: which, being accompanied with many daring attacks upon Pompey's person by Clodius's mob, made him resolve to retire from the senate and the Forum, till Clodius was out of his tribunate, and shut himself up in his own house, whither he was pursued, and actually besieged by one of Clodius's freedmen, Damio. An outrage so audacious could not be overlooked by the magistrates, who came

Pro Sext.
32.
In Pison.
12.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

out with all their forces to seize or drive away Damio; upon which a general engagement ensued, where Gabinius, as Cicero says, was forced to break his league with Clodius, and fight for Pompey; at first faintly and unwillingly, but at last heartily; while Piso, more religious, stood firm to his contract, and fought on Clodius's side, till his fasces were broken, and he himself wounded, and forced to run away.

“Whether any design was really formed against Pompey's life, or the story was contrived to serve his present views, it seems probable, at least, that his fears were feigned, and the danger too contemptible to give him any just apprehension; but the shutting himself up at home made an impression upon the vulgar, and furnished a better pretence for turning so quick upon Clodius, and quelling that insolence which he himself had raised: for this was the constant tenor of his politics, to give a free course to the public disorders, for the sake of displaying his own importance to more advantage; that when the storm was at the height, he might appear, at last, in the scene, like a deity of the theatre, and reduce all again to order; expecting still, that the people, tired and harassed by these perpetual tumults, would be forced to create him dictator, for settling the quiet of the city.

“The consuls elect were P. Cornelius Lentulus and Q. Metellus Nepos: the first was Cicero's warm friend, the second his old enemy; the same who put that affront upon him on laying down his consulship: his promotion, therefore, was a great discouragement to Cicero, who took it for granted, that he would employ all his power to obstruct his return:—but Metellus, perceiving which way Pompey's inclination, and Cæsar's also, was turning, found reason to change his mind, or, at least, to dissemble it; and promised, not only to give his consent, but his assistance, to Cicero's restoration. His colleague Lentulus, in the meanwhile, was no sooner elected, than he revived the late motion of Ninnius, and proposed a

vote to recall Cicero ; and when Clodius interrupted him, and recited that part of his law which made it criminal to move any thing about it, Lentulus declared it to be no law, but a mere proscription, and act of violence. This alarmed Clodius, and obliged him to exert all his arts to support the validity of the law ; he threatened ruin and destruction to all who should dare to oppose it : and, to imprint the greater terror, fixed upon the doors of the senate-house that clause which prohibited all men to speak or act in any manner for Cicero's return, on pain of being treated as enemies. This gave a farther disquiet to Cicero, lest it should dishearten his active friends, and furnish an excuse to the indolent for doing nothing : he insinuates, therefore, to Atticus, what might be said to obviate it : that all such clauses were only bugbears, without any real force ; or, otherwise, no law could ever be abrogated ; and, whatever effect this was intended to have, that it must needs fall of course with the law itself.

“ In this anxious state of mind, jealous of every thing that could hurt, and catching at every thing that could help him, another little incident happened, which gave him a fresh cause of uneasiness : for some of his enemies had published an invective oration, drawn up by him for the entertainment only of his intimate friends, against some eminent senator, not named, but generally supposed to be Curio, the father, who was now disposed and engaged to serve him : he was surprised and concerned, that the oration was made public ; and his instructions upon it to Atticus are somewhat curious ; and shew how much he was struck with the apprehension of losing so powerful a friend. ‘ You have stunned me (says he) with the news of the oration's being published : heal the wound, as you promise, if you possibly can : I wrote it long ago in anger, after he had first written against me ; but I had suppressed it so carefully, that I never dreamt of its getting abroad, nor can imagine how

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Post Red.
in Sen. 4.

Ad Att. 3.
15.

Ibid. 23.

Ibid. 12.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

it slipped out: but since, as fortune would have it, I never had a word with him in person, and it is written more negligently than my orations usually are, I cannot but think that you may disown it, and prove it not to be mine. Pray take care of this, if you see any hopes for me; if not, there is the less reason to trouble myself about it.'

"His principal agents and solicitors at Rome were his brother Quintus, his wife Terentia,^p his son-in-law Piso, Atticus, and Sextius, one of the tribunes elect.

Middl. p.
368.

^p "The brother and the wife, being both of them naturally peevish, seem to have given him some additional disquiet, by their mutual complaints against each other; which obliged him to admonish them gently in his letters, that, since their friends were so few, they ought to live more amicably among themselves.

"Terentia, however, bore a very considerable part of the whole affair; and, instead of being daunted by the depression of the family, and the ruin of their fortunes, seems to have been animated rather the more to withstand the violences of their enemies, and procure her husband's restoration.

"She had a particular estate of her own, not obnoxious to Clodius's law, which she was now offering to sale, for a supply of their present necessities." But we find that Cicero, in several of his letters, pressed her not to do it.

Post Red.
in Sen. 15.
Ep. Fam.
14. 1.

"His son-in-law, Piso, was extremely affectionate and dutiful, in performing all good offices, both to his banished father and the family; and resigned the quaestorship of Pontus and Bithynia, on purpose to serve them more effectually by his presence at Rome.

Corn. Nep.
Vit. Att. 4.

"Atticus had furnished Cicero, for the exigencies of his flight, with above 2,000*l.*; and, upon succeeding to the great estate of his uncle Cæcilius,* whose name he now assumed, made him a fresh offer of his purse: yet his conduct did not wholly satisfy Cicero; who thought him too cold and remiss in his services; and fancied, that it flowed from some secret resentment, for having never received from him, in his flourishing condition, any beneficial proofs of his friendship. In order, therefore, to rouse his zeal, he took occasion to promise him, in one of his letters, that, whatever reason he had to complain on that score, it should all be made up to him, if he lived to return: 'If fortune (says he) ever restore me to my country, it shall be my special care, that you, above all my friends, have cause to rejoice at it: and though, hitherto, I confess, you have reaped little benefit from my kindness, I will manage so far for the future, that whenever I am restored, you shall find yourself as dear to me as my brother and my children. If I have been wanting, therefore, in any duty to you, or rather, since I have been wanting, pray pardon me: for I have been much more wanting to myself.' But Atticus begged of him to lay aside all such fancies, and assured him, that there was not the least ground for them; and that he had never been disgusted by any thing, which he had either done, or neglected to do

Ad Att. 3.
15.

Ibid. 20.

Middl. 371.

* "This Cæcilius, Atticus's uncle, was a famous churl and usurer (sometimes mentioned in Cicero's letters), who adopted Atticus by his will, and left him three-fourths of his estate, which amounted to 80,000*l.* sterling. He had raised this great fortune by the favour chiefly of Lucullus, whom he flattered to the last with a promise of making him his heir, yet left the bulk of his estate to Atticus, who had been very observant of his humour; for which fraud, added to his notorious avarice and extortion, the mob seized his dead body, and dragged it infamously about the streets. (Val. Max. 7. 8.) Cicero, congratulating Atticus upon his adoption, addresses his letter to Q. Cæcilius, Q. F. Pomponianus Atticus. For, in assuming the name of the adopter, it was usual to add also their own family name, though changed in its termination, as from Pomponius to Pomponianus, to preserve the memory of their real extraction; to which some added also the surname, as Cicero does in the present case." Ad Att. 3. 20.

“Sextius took the trouble of a journey into Gaul, to solicit Cæsar’s consent to his restoration; which though

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

for him: entreating him to be perfectly easy on that head, and to depend always upon his best services, without giving himself the trouble even of reminding him.”

394th consulship.

Cicero’s letters to Terentia (so excellently well translated into English by Mr. Melmoth) mention the cordial zeal of Piso for his father-in-law, and acquaint us more perfectly than any historian can do with the state of Cicero’s mind in the time of his banishment.

Mr. Melmoth, in a note on the first of them, writes thus: “The following letters to Terentia were written in Cicero’s exile, and will prove, either that he was a philosopher only in speculation, or that philosophy itself pretends to more than it has power to perform. Perhaps they will prove both: for as, on the one hand, they discover the most unmanly dejection of spirit: so it is certain, on the other, that much weaker minds have been able, with the assistance of better principles, to support, with fortitude, far severer trials.”

Melm.
vol. 1. p.
25.

BOOK I. LETTER VI.

Ep. Fam.
l. 14. Ep. 4.
Ed. Græv.

“TO TERENTIA, TO MY DEAREST TULLIA, AND TO MY SON.

“If you do not hear from me so frequently as you might, it is because I can neither write to you, nor read your letters, without falling into a greater passion of tears than I am able to support: for, though I am at all times, indeed, completely miserable, yet I feel my misfortunes with a particular sensibility upon those tender occasions.

“Oh! that I had been more indifferent to life! Our days would then have been, if not wholly unacquainted with sorrow, yet by no means thus wretched. However, if any hopes are still reserved to us of recovering some part, at least, of what we have lost, I shall not think that I have made altogether so imprudent a choice. But, if our present fate is unalterably fixed—Ah! my dearest Terentia, if we are utterly and for ever abandoned by those gods whom you have so religiously adored, and by those men whom I have so faithfully served, let me see you as soon as possible, that I may have the satisfaction of breathing out my last departing sigh in your arms.

“I have spent about a fortnight at this place, with my friend Marcus Flaccus. This worthy man did not scruple to exercise the rites of friendship and hospitality towards me, notwithstanding the severe penalties of that iniquitous law against those who should give me reception. May I one day have it in my power to make him a return to those generous services, which I shall ever most gratefully remember.

“I am just going to embark, and purpose to pass through Macedonia in my way to Cyzicum. And now, my Terentia, thus wretched and ruined as I am, can I entreat you, under all that weight of pain and sorrow with which, I too well know, you are oppressed, can I entreat you to be the partner and companion of my exile? But must I then live without you? I know not how to reconcile myself to that hard condition; unless your presence at Rome may be a means of forwarding my return: if any hopes of that kind should indeed subsist. But should there, as I sadly suspect, be absolutely none, come to me, I conjure you, if it be possible: for never can I think myself completely ruined, whilst I enjoy my Terentia’s company. But how will my dearest daughter dispose of herself? A question which you yourselves must consider: for, as to my own part, I am utterly at a loss what to advise. At all events, however, that dear unhappy girl must not take any measures that may hinder her conjugal repose, or affect her in the good opinion of the world. As for my son—let me not at least be deprived of the consolation of folding him for ever in my arms. But I must lay down my pen a few moments; my tears flow too fast to suffer me to proceed.

“I am under the utmost solicitude, as I know not whether you have been able to preserve any part of your estate, or (what I sadly fear) are cruelly robbed of your whole fortune,—I hope Piso will always continue, what you represent him to be, entirely ours.—As to the manumission of the slaves, I think you have no occasion to be uneasy. For, with regard to your own, you may only promise them their liberty as they should deserve it: but, excepting Orpheus, there is none of them that have any great claim to this favour. As to mine, I told them, if my estate should be

Year of
R O M E
695.

B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

he obtained, as well by his own intercession as by Pompey's letters, yet it seems to have been with certain limit-

forfeited, I would give them their freedom, provided I could obtain the confirmation of that grant: but if I preserved my estate, that they should all of them, excepting only a few, whom I particularly named, remain in their present condition. But this is a matter of little consequence.

"With regard to the advice you give me of keeping up my spirits, in the belief that I shall again be restored to my country; I only wish that I may have reason to encourage so desirable an expectation. In the meantime I am greatly miserable, in the uncertainty when I shall hear from you, or what hand you will find to convey your letters. I would have waited for them at this place; but the master of the ship, on which I am going to embark, could not be prevailed upon to lose the present opportunity of sailing.

"For the rest, let me conjure you, in my turn, to bear up under our afflictions with as much resolution as possible. Remember that my days have all been honourable; and that I now suffer, not for my crimes, but my virtues. No, my Terentia, nothing can justly be imputed to me, but that I survived the loss of my dignities. However, if it was more agreeable to our children that I should thus live, let that reflection teach us to submit to our misfortunes with cheerfulness: insupportable as upon all other considerations they would undoubtedly be. But, alas! whilst I am endeavouring to keep up your spirits, I am utterly unable to preserve my own!

"I have sent back the faithful Philetærus: as the weakness of his eyes made him incapable of rendering me any service. Nothing can equal the good offices I receive from Sallustius. Pescennius likewise has given me strong marks of his affection. And I hope he will not fail in his respect also to you. Sica promised to attend me in my exile: but he changed his mind, and has left me at this place.

"I entreat you to take all possible care of your health: and be assured, your misfortunes more sensibly affect me than my own. Adieu, my Terentia, thou most faithful and best of wives: Adieu. And thou, my dearest daughter, together with that other consolation of my life, my dear son, I bid you both most tenderly farewell."

Brindisi.

Brundisium, April 30.

Ep. Fam.

l. 14.

Ep. 2.

Ed. Græv.

BOOK I. LETTER VII.

"TO TERENTIA, TO MY DEAREST TULLIA, AND TO MY SON.

"Imagine not, my Terentia, that I write longer letters to others than to yourself: be assured at least, if ever I do, it is merely because those I receive from them require a more particular answer. The truth of it is, I am always at a loss what to write: and as there is nothing in the present dejection of my mind that I perform with greater reluctance in general, so I never attempt it with regard to you and my dearest daughter, that it does not cost me a flood of tears: for how can I think of you without being pierced with grief in the reflection, that I have made those completely miserable whom I ought, and wished, to have rendered perfectly happy? And I should have rendered them so, if I had acted with less timidity.

"Piso's behaviour towards us, in this season of our afflictions, has greatly endeared him to my heart: and I have, as well as I was able in the present discomposure of my mind, both acknowledged his good offices, and exhorted him to continue them.

"I perceive you depend much upon the new tribunes: and, if Pompey perseveres in his present disposition, I am inclined to think your hopes will not be disappointed; though, I must confess, I have some fears with respect to Crassus. In the meanwhile I have the satisfaction to find, what indeed I had reason to expect, that you act with great spirit and tenderness in all my concerns. But I lament it should be my cruel fate to expose you to so many calamities, whilst you are thus generously endeavouring to ease the weight of mine. Be assured it was with the utmost grief I read the account which Publius sent me of the approbrious manner in which you were dragged from the temple of Vesta* to the office of Valerius. Sad reverse in-

* "Terentia had taken sanctuary in the temple of Vesta, but was forcibly dragged out from thence by the directions of Clodius, in order to be examined at a public office concerning her husband's effects." Mr. Ross.

ations, not agreeable to Cicero : for, on Sextius's return to Rome, when he drew up the copy of a law, which he

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

deed ! That thou, the dearest object of my fondest desires, that my Terentia, to whom such numbers were wont to look up for relief, should be herself a spectacle of the most affecting distress ! And that I, who have saved so many others from ruin, should have ruined both myself and my family by my own indiscretion !

394th consulship.

“ As to what you mention with regard to the area belonging to my house, I shall never look upon myself as restored to my country, till that spot of ground is again in my possession. But this is a point that does not depend upon ourselves. Let me rather express my concern for what does ; and lament that, distressed as your circumstances already are, you should engage yourself in a share of those expenses which are incurred upon my account. Be assured, if ever I should return to Rome, I shall easily recover my estate : but, should fortune continue to persecute me, will you, thou dear unhappy woman, will you fondly throw away, in gaining friends to a desperate cause, the last scanty remains of your broken fortunes ? I conjure you then, my dearest Terentia, not to involve yourself in any charges of that kind : let them be borne by those who are able, if they are willing, to support the weight. In a word, if you have any affection for me, let not your anxiety upon my account injure your health, which, alas ! is already but too much impaired. Believe me, you are the perpetual subject of my waking and sleeping thoughts ; and, as I know the assiduity you exert in my behalf, I have a thousand fears lest your strength should not be equal to so continued a fatigue. I am sensible, at the same time, that my affairs depend entirely upon your assistance ; and therefore, that they may be attended with the success you hope, and so zealously endeavour to obtain, let me earnestly entreat you to take care of your health.

“ I know not whom to write to, unless to those who first write to me, or whom you particularly mention in your letters.—As you and Tullia are of opinion that I should not retreat farther from Italy, I have laid aside that design. Let me hear from you both as often as possible, particularly if there should be any fairer prospect of my return. Farewell, ye dearest objects of my most tender affection. Farewell.”

Thessalonica, Oct. 5.

BOOK I. LETTER VIII.

“ TO TERENTIA, TO MY DEAREST TULLIA, AND TO MY SON.

“ I learn by the letters of several of my friends, as well as from general report, that you discover the greatest fortitude of mind, and that you solicit my affairs with unwearied application. Oh, my Terentia, how truly wretched am I, to be the occasion of such severe misfortunes to so faithful, so generous, and so excellent a woman ! And my dearest Tullia too !—That she, who was once so happy in her father, should now derive from him such bitter sorrows ! But how shall I express the anguish I feel for my little boy ! who became acquainted with grief as soon as he was capable of any reflection. Had these afflictions happened, as you tenderly represent them, by an unavoidable fate, they would have sat less heavy on my heart. But they are altogether owing to my own folly, in imagining I was loved where I was secretly envied, and in not joining with those who were sincerely desirous of my friendship. Had I been governed, indeed, by my own sentiments, without relying so much on those of my weak or wicked advisers, we might still, my Terentia, have been happy. However, since my friends encourage me to hope, I will endeavour to restrain my grief, lest the effects it may have on my health should disappoint your tender efforts for my restoration. I am sensible, at the same time, of the many difficulties that must be conquered ere that point can be effected ; and that it would have been much easier to have maintained my post than it is to recover it. Nevertheless, if all the tribunes are in my interest ; if Lentulus is really as zealous in my cause as he appears ; and if Pompey and Cæsar likewise concur with him in the same views, I ought not, most certainly, to despair.

“ With regard to our slaves, I am willing to act as our friends, you tell me, advise. As to your concern in respect to the plague which broke out here, it is entirely ceased : and I had the good fortune to escape all infection. However, it was my desire to have changed my present situation for some more retired place in Epirus, where I might be secure from Piso and his soldiers. But the obliging Plancius was unwilling to part with me ; and still, indeed, detains me here with the hope

Epist.
Fam. I. 14.
Ep. 1.
Ed. Grav.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

intended to propose upon his entrance into office, conformable, as we may imagine, to the conditions stipu-

that we may return together to Rome. If ever I should live to see that happy day; if ever I should be restored to my Terentia, to my children, and to myself, I shall think all the tender solitudes we have suffered, during this sad separation, abundantly repaid.

"Nothing can exceed the affection and humanity of Piso's behaviour towards every one of us: and I wish he may receive from it as much satisfaction as I am persuaded he will honour.—I was far from intending to blame you with respect to my brother: but it is much my desire, especially as there are so few of you, that you should live together in the most perfect harmony.—I have made my acknowledgment where you desired, and acquainted the persons you mention, that you had informed me of their services.

"As to the estate you propose to sell; alas! my dear Terentia, think well of the consequence: think what would become of our unhappy boy, should fortune still continue to persecute us. But my eyes stream too fast to add more: nor would I draw the same tender flood from yours. I will only say, that, if my friends should not desert me, I shall be in no distress for money: and if they should, the money you can raise by the sale of this estate will little avail. I conjure you then, by all our misfortunes, let us not absolutely ruin our poor boy, who is well nigh totally undone already. If we can but raise him above indigence, a moderate share of good fortune and merit will be sufficient to open his way to whatever else we can wish him to obtain. Take care of your health, and let me know by an express how your negotiations proceed, and how affairs in general stand.—My fate must now be soon determined. I tenderly salute my son and daughter, and bid you all farewell."

Durazzo.

Dyrrhachium, Nov. 26.

P. S. "I came hither not only as it is a free city, and much in my interest, but as it is situated likewise near to Italy. But, if I should find any inconvenience from its being a town of such great resort, I shall remove elsewhere, and give you due notice."

Epist.
Fam. l. 14.
Ep. 3.
Ed. Græv.

BOOK I. LETTER IX.

"TO TERENTIA.

"I received three letters from you by the hands of Aristocritus, and have wept over them, till they are almost defaced with my tears. Ah! my Terentia, I am worn out with grief: nor do my own personal misfortunes more severely torture my mind, than those with which you and my children are oppressed. Unhappy indeed as you are, I am infinitely more so; as our common afflictions are attended with this aggravating circumstance to myself, that they are justly to be imputed to my imprudence alone. I ought, most undoubtedly, either to have avoided the danger by accepting the commission which was offered me, or to have repelled force by force, or bravely to have perished in the attempt: whereas nothing could have been more unworthy of my character, or more pregnant with misery, than the scheme which I have pursued. I am overwhelmed, therefore, not only with sorrow, but with shame: yes, my Terentia, I blush to reflect that I did not exert that spirit I ought for the sake of so excellent a wife, and such amiable children. The distress in which you are all equally involved, and your own ill state of health in particular, are ever in my thoughts; as I have the mortification at the same time to observe, that there appear but slender hopes of my being recalled. My enemies, in truth, are many; while those who are jealous of me are almost innumerable: and though they found great difficulty in driving me from my country, it will be extremely easy for them to prevent my return. However, as long as you have any hopes that my restoration may be effected, I will not cease to co-operate with your endeavours for that purpose, lest my weakness should seem upon all occasions to frustrate every measure in my favour. In the meanwhile, my person (for which you are so tenderly concerned) is secure from all danger: as in truth I am so completely wretched, that even my enemies themselves must wish, in mere malice, to preserve my life. Nevertheless, I shall not fail to observe the caution you kindly give me.

"I have sent my acknowledgments by Dexippus to the persons you desired me;

lated with Cæsar, Cicero greatly disliked it, as being too general, and without the mention even of his name, not providing sufficiently either for his dignity or the restitution of his estate; so that he desires Atticus to take care to get it amended.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.
394th consulship.

“ In the meanwhile, on the 28th of October, eight of the tribunes jointly offered to the people a law in his favour. But Cicero was much more displeased with this, than with the law drawn up by Sextius: it consisted of three articles; the first of which restored him only to his former rank, but not to his estate: the second was only matter of form, to indemnify the proposers of it: the third enacted, that, if there was any thing in it which was prohibited to be promulgated by any former law, particularly by that of Clodius, or which involved the author

and mentioned, at the same time, that you had informed me of their good offices. I am perfectly sensible of those which Piso exerts towards us with so uncommon a zeal: as indeed it is a circumstance which all the world speaks of to his honour. Heaven grant that I may live to enjoy, with you and our children, the common happiness of so valuable a relation!

“ The only hope I have now left arises from the new tribunes; and that too depends upon the steps they shall take in the commencement of their office: for, if they should postpone my affair, I shall give up all expectations of its ever being effected. Accordingly I have dispatched Aristocritus, that you may send me immediate notice of the first measures they shall pursue, together with the general plan upon which they propose to conduct themselves: I have likewise ordered Dexippus to return to me with all expedition, and have written to my brother to request he would give me frequent information in what manner affairs proceed. It is with a view of receiving the earliest intelligence from Rome, that I continue at Dyrrhachium: a place where I can remain in perfect security, as I have upon all occasions distinguished this city by my particular patronage. However, as soon as I shall receive intimation that my enemies are approaching, it is my resolution to retire into Epirus.

“ In answer to your tender proposal of accompanying me in my exile, I rather choose you should continue in Rome: as I am sensible it is upon you that the principal burden of my affairs must rest. If your generous negotiation should succeed, my return will prevent the necessity of that journey: if otherwise—but I need not add the rest. The next letter I shall receive from you, or at most the subsequent one, will determine me in what manner to act. In the meantime I desire you would give me a full and faithful information how things go on: though, indeed, I have now more reason to expect the final result of this affair, than an account of its progress.

“ Take care of your health, I conjure you: assuring yourself that you are, as you ever have been, the object of my fondest wishes. Farewell, my dear Terentia! I see you so strongly before me whilst I am writing, that I am utterly spent with the tears I have shed. Once more, farewell.”

Dyrrhachium, Nov. 30.

[N. B. About eleven years after Cicero's return home, and when he was sixty-one years of age, he repudiated this most excellent, this dearly beloved wife, the object of his fondest wishes, on the pretence of her being peevish and expensive, and married a pretty young girl, with a good fortune, to whom he had been left guardian.] See Midd. vol. 2. p. 148.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Ad Att. 3.
23.

Middl.
p. 374.

Pro Dom.
16.

Ad Att. 3.
23.

of such promulgation in any fine or penalty, in such case it should have no effect. Cicero was surprised that his friends could be induced to propose such an act, which seemed to be against him, and to confirm that clause of the Clodian law which made it penal to move any thing for him : whereas no clauses of that kind had ever been regarded, or thought to have any special force, but fell of course when the laws themselves were repealed : he observes, that it was an ugly precedent for the succeeding tribunes, if they should happen to have any scruples ; and that Clodius had already taken the advantage of it, when, in a speech to the people, on the 3d of November, he declared that this act of the tribunes was a proper lesson to their successors, to let them see how far their power extended. He desires Atticus, therefore, to find out who was the contriver of it, and how Ninnius and the rest came to be so much overseen as not to be aware of the consequences of it.

“ The most probable solution of it is, that these tribunes hoped to carry their point with less difficulty, by paying this deference to Clodius’s law, the validity of which was acknowledged by Cato, and several others of the principal citizens ; and they were induced to make this push for it, before they quitted their office, from a persuasion, that, if Cicero was once restored on any terms, or with what restrictions soever, the rest would follow of course ; and that the recovery of his dignity would necessarily draw after it every thing else that was wanted ; Cicero seems to have been sensible of it himself on second thoughts, as he intimates in the conclusion of his letter : ‘ I should be sorry (says he) to have the new tribunes insert such a clause in their law ; yet let them insert what they please, if it will but pass, and call me home, I shall be content with it.’

“ In this suspense of his affairs at Rome, the troops, which Piso had prepared for his government of Macedonia, began to arrive in great numbers at Thessalonica.

This greatly alarmed him, and made him resolve to quit the place without delay : and, as it was not advisable to move farther from Italy, he ventured to come still nearer, and turned back again to Dyrrhachium : for though this was within the distance forbidden to him by law, yet he had no reason to apprehend any danger in a town particularly devoted to him, and which had always been under his special patronage and protection. He came thither on the 25th of November, and gave notice of his removal to his friends at Rome, by letters of the same date, begun at Thessalonica, and finished at Dyrrhachium : which shews the great haste which he thought necessary in making this sudden change of his quarters. Here he received another piece of news, which displeased him ; that, with the consent and assistance of his managers at Rome (and particularly of Atticus) the provinces of the consuls elect had been furnished with money and troops by a decree of the senate ; provisions which had never before been made until the entrance of the consuls into office.” This disturbed him extremely, fearing lest the tribunes elect, who had all professed good will to him, should be offended, because they had not been consulted in the affair, though they had undertaken his cause, and had desired the power of furnishing out the consuls, merely to have an opportunity of securing them to his interest ; whereas now, if the new consuls had a mind to be perverse, they might be so without any risk ; but, let them be never so well disposed, they could do nothing without the consent of the tribunes.—Another inconvenience followed from this measure, that the senate, having broken through that resolution which they had taken in his cause, that they would enter into nothing till his affair was settled, were now at liberty to proceed to any other business as they pleased. Cicero, nevertheless, in his letter to Atticus on this head, adds, “It is not, however, to be wondered at, that my friends, who were applied to, should consent to it ; for it was hard

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Ad Att. 3.
22.

Ep. Fam.
14. 1.

Ibid. 3.

Ad Att. 3.
24.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

for any one to declare openly against a motion so beneficial to the two consuls; it was hard, I say, to refuse any thing to Lentulus, who has always been my true friend; or to Metellus, who has given up his resentments with such humanity; yet I am apprehensive that we have alienated the tribunes, and cannot hold the consuls: write me word, I desire you, what turn this has taken, and how the whole affair stands: and write with your usual frankness; for I love to know the truth, though it should happen to be disagreeable. The 10th of December."

Middl.
p. 377.

P.378, 379.

Ad Att. 3.
25.

But Atticus, instead of answering this letter, or rather, indeed, before he received it, having occasion to visit his estate in Epirus, took his way thither through Dyrrhachium, on purpose to see Cicero, and explain to him in person the motives of their conduct. Their interview was but short; and after they parted, Cicero, upon some new intelligence, which gave him fresh uneasiness, sent another letter after him into Epirus, to call him back again: "After you left me (says he), I received letters from Rome, from which I perceive that I must end my days in calamity; and, to speak the truth (which you will take in good part), if there had been any hopes of my return, you, who love me so well, would never have left the city at such a conjuncture: but I say no more, lest I be thought either ungrateful, or desirous to involve my friends too in my ruin. One thing I beg; that you would not fail, as you have given your word, to come to me, wherever I shall happen to be, before the 1st of January."

While he was thus perplexing himself with perpetual fears and suspicions, his cause was proceeding very prosperously at Rome, and seemed to be in such a train, that it could not be obstructed much longer: for the new magistrates, who were coming on with the new year, were all, except the prætor Appius, supposed to be his friends; while his enemy Clodius was soon to resign his

office, on which the greatest part of his power depended: Clodius was sensible himself of the daily decay of his credit, through the superior influence of Pompey, who had drawn Cæsar away from him, and forced even Gabinius to desert him: so that, out of rage and despair, and the desire of revenging himself on these new and more powerful enemies, he would willingly have dropped the pursuit of Cicero; or consented even to recall him, if he could have persuaded Cicero's friends and the senate to join their forces with him against the triumvirate. For this end he produced Bibulus and the other augurs in an assembly of the people, and demanded of them, whether it was not unlawful to transact any public business, when any of them were taking the auspices? To which they all answered in the affirmative. Then he asked Bibulus, whether he was not actually observing the heavens as often as any of Cæsar's laws were proposed to the people? To which he answered in the affirmative: but, being produced a second time by the prætor Appius, he added, that he took the auspices also, in the same manner, at the time when Clodius's act of adoption was confirmed by the people: but Clodius, while he gratified his present revenge, little regarded how much it turned against himself; but insisted, that all Cæsar's acts ought to be annulled by the senate, as being contrary to the auspices; and on that condition declared publicly, that he himself would bring back Cicero, the guardian of the city, on his own shoulders.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 75.

394th con-
sulship.

Pro Dom.
16.

In the same fit of revenge he fell upon the consul Gabinius; and in an assembly of the people, which he called for that purpose, with his head veiled, and a little altar and fire before him, consecrated his whole estate. This had been sometimes done against traitorous citizens; and, when legally performed, had the effect of a confiscation, by making the place and effects ever after sacred and public: but in the present case it was considered only as an act of madness; and the tribune Ninnius, in

Ib. 47, 48.

Year of
R O M E
695.
B. C. 57.

394th con-
sulship.

Middl. p.
381—388.

ridicule of it, consecrated Clodius's estate in the same form and manner, that, whatever efficacy was ascribed to the one, the other might justly challenge the same.

All the ten new tribunes had solemnly promised to serve Cicero; yet Clodius found means to corrupt two of them, S. Attilius Serranus, and Numerius Quinctius Gracchus, by whose help he was enabled still to make head against Cicero's party, and retard his restoration some time longer: but Piso and Gabinius, perceiving the scene to be opening apace in his favour, and his return to be unavoidable, thought it time to get out of his way, and retire to their several governments: so that they both left Rome, with the expiration of their year; and Piso set out for Macedonia, Gabinius for Syria.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Post Red.
ad Quir. 5.
Pro Sext.
32.

Ib. 34.

On the 1st of January, the new consul Lentulus, after the ceremony of his inauguration, and his first duty paid, as usual, to religion, entered directly into Cicero's affairs, and moved the senate for his restoration; while his colleague Metellus declared, with much seeming candour, that though Cicero and he had been enemies, on account of their different sentiments in politics, yet he would give up his resentment to the authority of the fathers, and the interest of the republic. Upon which, L. Cotta, a person of consular and censorian rank, being asked his opinion first, said, "That nothing had been done against Cicero agreeably to right, or law, or the custom of their ancestors: that no citizen could be driven out of the city without a trial,^a and that the people could not condemn, nor even try a man capitally, but in an assembly of their centuries: that the whole was the effect of violence, turbulent times, and an oppressed republic: that, in so strange a revolution and confusion of things, Cicero had only stepped aside, to provide for his future tranquillity, by declining the impending storm; and, since he had freed the republic from no less danger by his absence

^a This seems to be a strange plea for Cicero, who had put citizens to death without trial.

than he had done before by his presence, that he ought not only to be restored, but to be adorned with new honours: that what his mad enemy had published against him was drawn so absurdly, both in words and sentiments, that, if it had been enacted in proper form, it could never obtain the force of a law: that, since Cicero, therefore, was expelled by no law, he could not want a law to restore him, but ought to be recalled by a vote of the senate."——Pompey, who spoke next, having highly applauded what Cotta had said, added, "That, for the sake of Cicero's future quiet, and to prevent all farther trouble from the same quarter, it was his opinion, that the people should have a share in conferring that grace, and their consent be joined to the authority of the senate." After many others had spoken likewise with great warmth in the defence and praise of Cicero, they all came unanimously into Pompey's opinion, and were proceeding to make a decree upon it, when Serranus, the tribune, rose up and put a stop to it: not flatly interposing his negative, for he had not the assurance to do that, against such a spirit and unanimity of the senate, but desiring only a night's time to consider of it. This unexpected interruption incensed the whole assembly; some reproached, others entreated him; and his father-in-law Oppius threw himself at his feet, to move him to desist: but all they could get from him, was a promise to give way to a decree the next morning; upon which they broke up. "But the tribune (says Cicero), employed the night, not, as people fancied he would, in giving back the money which he had taken, but in making a better bargain, and doubling his price; for the next morning, being grown more hardy, he absolutely prohibited the senate from proceeding to any act." This conduct of Serranus surprised Cicero's friends, being not only perfidious, and contrary to his engagements, but highly ungrateful to Cicero; who, in his consulship, had been his special encourager and benefactor.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th consulship.

Post Red.
ad Quir. 5.

Ib.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Pro Sext.
35—38.

The senate, however, though hindered at present from passing their decree, were too well united, and too strongly supported, to be baffled much longer by the artifices of Clodius : and having resolved to propound a law to the people for Cicero's restoration, they appointed the 22d of the month for the promulgation of it. When the day came, Fabricius, one of Cicero's tribunes, marched out with a strong guard, before it was light, to get possession of the rostra ; but Clodius was too early for him ; and, having seized all the posts and avenues of the Forum, was prepared to give him a warm reception : he had purchased some gladiators for the shows of his ædileship, to which he was now pretending, and borrowed another band of his brother Appius ; and with these well armed, at the head of his slaves and dependants, he attacked Fabricius, killed several of his followers, wounded many more, and drove him quite out of the place ; and happening to fall in at the same time with Cispus, another tribune, who was coming to the aid of his colleague, he repulsed him also with a great slaughter. The gladiators, heated with this taste of blood, opened their way on all sides with their swords in quest of Quintus Cicero, whom they met with at last, and would certainly have murdered, if, by the advantage of the confusion and darkness, he had not hid himself under the bodies of his slaves and freedmen, who were killed around him, where he lay concealed till the fray was over. The tribune Sextius was treated still more roughly : for, being particularly pursued and marked out for destruction, he was so desperately wounded as to be left for dead upon the spot ; and escaped death, only by feigning it : but while he lay in that condition, supposed to be killed, Clodius, reflecting that the murder of a tribune, whose person was sacred, would raise such a storm as might occasion his ruin, took a sudden resolution to kill one of his own tribunes, in order to charge it upon his adversaries, and to balance the account by making

both sides equally obnoxious. The victim doomed to this sacrifice was Numerius Quinctius, an obscure fellow, raised to this dignity by the caprice of the multitude, who, to make himself the more popular, had assumed the surname of Gracchus: but the crafty clown, says Cicero, having got some hint of the design, and finding that his blood was to wipe off the odium of Sextius's murder, disguised himself presently in the habit of a muleteer, the same in which he came to Rome, and with a basket upon his head, while some were calling out for Numerius, others for Quinctius, passed undiscovered by the confusion of the two names: but he continued in this danger till Sextius was known to be alive. According to the account of this day's tragedy, the Tiber and all the common sewers were filled with dead bodies, and the blood wiped up with sponges in the Forum, where such heaps of slain had never before been seen but in the civil dissensions of Cinna and Octavius.

Clodius, flushed with this victory, set fire with his own hands to the temple of the Nymphs, where the books of the censors and the public registers of the city were kept, which were all consumed with the fabric itself. He then attacked the houses of Milo the tribune, and Cæcilius the prætor, with fire and sword; but was repulsed in both attempts with loss: Milo took several of Appius's gladiators prisoners, who, being brought before the senate, made a confession of what they knew, and were sent to jail; but were presently released by Serranus. Upon these outrages, Milo impeached Clodius in form, for the violation of the public peace: but the consul Metellus, who had not yet abandoned him, with the prætor Appius, and the tribune Serranus, resolved to prevent any process upon it; and by their edicts prohibited either the criminal himself to appear, or any one to cite him. Their pretence was, that the quæstors were not yet chosen, whose office it was to make the allotment of the judges, while they themselves kept back

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Pro Mil.
27.
Parad. 4.
De Harusp.
Resp. 27.

Pro Sext.
39.

Ib. 41.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

the election, and were pushing Clodius at the same time into the ædileship; which would screen him of course for one year from any prosecution. Milo, therefore, finding it impracticable to bring him to justice in the legal method, resolved to oppose force to force, and for this end purchased a band of gladiators, with which he had daily skirmishes with him in the streets. “It was much to his honour (says Cicero, ridiculously enough) that he bought gladiators for the defence of the republic, whose preservation depended upon mine.”^r

Post Red.
in Sen. 3.

Ib. 9.

Pro Sext.
60.

Post Red.
in Sen. 11.
Pro Dom.
12.

This obstruction given to Cicero's return made the senate only the more resolute to effect it: they passed a second vote, therefore, that no other business should be done till it was carried; and to prevent all farther tumults, and insults upon the magistrates, ordered the consuls to summon all the people of Italy, who wished well to the state, to come to the assistance and defence of Cicero. This drew a vast concourse to Rome from all parts of Italy, where there was not a corporate town of any note which did not testify its respect to Cicero by some public act or monument. Pompey was at Capua, acting as chief magistrate of his new colony, where he presided in person at their making a decree to Cicero's honour, and took the trouble likewise of visiting all the other colonies and chief towns in those parts, to appoint them a day of general rendezvous at Rome, to assist at the promulgation of the law.

Lentulus, at the same time, was entertaining the city with shows and stage-plays, in order to keep the people in good humour, whom he had called from their private affairs in the country to attend the public business. The shows were exhibited in Pompey's theatre, while the senate, for the convenience of being near them, was held in the adjoining temple of Honour and Virtue, built by Marius out of the Cimbric spoils, and called, for that

^r Honori summo Miloni nostro nuper fuit, quod gladiatoribus emptis reipub. causa, quæ salute nostra continebatur, omnes P. Clodii conatus furoresque compressit. De Off. 2. 17.

reason, Marius's monument : here, according to Cicero's dream,^s a decree now passed in proper form for his restoration ; when, under the joint influence of those deities, Honour, says he, was done to virtue ; and the monument of Marius, the preserver of the empire, gave safety to his countryman, the defender of it.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Pro Sext.
54. 56.

Clodius had still the courage and address to hinder this decree of the senate from passing into a law : he took all occasions of haranguing the multitude against it, and used to demand of them aloud, whether they would have Cicero restored or not : upon which his mercenaries, says Cicero, answering with low feeble voices [*semivivis vocibus*] in the negative, he instantly declared the proposal to be rejected by the Roman people. But the senate, ashamed to see themselves thus baffled, resolved to take such measures in the support of their decrees, that it should not be possible to defeat them. Lentulus therefore, summoned them into the Capitol on the 25th of May ; where Pompey began the debate, and renewed the motion for recalling Cicero ; and in a grave and elaborate speech, which he had prepared in writing and delivered from his notes, gave him the honour of having saved his country. All the leading men of the senate spoke after him to the same effect ; but the consul Metellus, notwithstanding his promises, had been acting hitherto a double part ; and was all along the chief encourager and supporter of Clodius : when Servilius, therefore, a consular, who had been honoured with a triumph and the censorship, rose up, he addressed himself to his kinsman Metellus, and, having laid before him the glorious acts of his ancestors, together with the excellent conduct and unhappy fate of his

Ib. 59.

Middl.
p. 391.

Post. Red.
in Sen. 10.
Pro Sext.
61.

^s Cicero, at the time of his flight, being lodged in the villa of a friend, had a morning dream, which, when he awaked (about eight o'clock), he told to those about him. " That, as he seemed to be wandering disconsolate in a lonely place, C. Marius, with his fasces wreathed with laurel, accosted him, and demanded why he was so melancholy ; and when he answered, that he was driven out of his country by violence, Marius took him by the hand, and, bidding him be of good courage, ordered the next licitor to conduct him into his monument, telling him that there he should find safety." De Divin. 1. 28.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Pro Sext.
62.

Post Red.
in Sen. 10.

Middl.
p. 393.

Post Red.
ad Quir. 7.

Pro Sext.
60, 61.

brother Celer, Cicero's friend (supposed to have been poisoned by his wife, the sister of Clodius), pressed him so earnestly, and in such moving terms, to concur with the senate in their present measures, that he could not hold out any longer, but, with tears in his eyes, gave himself up to Servilius, and professed all future services to Cicero ; in which he proved very sincere, and from this moment assisted his colleague in promoting Cicero's restoration : so that in a very full house of 417 senators, when all the magistrates were present, the decree passed without one dissenting voice but Clodius's. It is probable that the two tribunes, who had hitherto been Cicero's enemies, were induced by Metellus's change of conduct to cease their opposition, and acquiesce.

The consul Lentulus assembled the senate again the next day, to concert some effectual method for preventing all farther opposition, and getting the decree enacted into a law : but, before they met, he called the people to the rostra, where all the principal senators in their turns repeated the substance of what they had said before in the senate, in order to prepare them for the business of the day : Pompey particularly exerted himself in the praise of Cicero ; declaring, that the republic owed its preservation to him, and that their common safety was connected with his ; exhorting them to defend and support the decree of the senate, the quiet of the city, and the fortunes of a man who had deserved so well of them : that this was the general voice of the senate ; of the knights ; of all Italy ; and, lastly, that it was his own earnest and special request to them, which he not only desired, but implored them to grant.

When the senate afterward met, they proceeded to several new and vigorous votes, to facilitate the success of their enterprize.

First, That no magistrate should presume to take the auspices, so as to disturb the assembly of the people, when Cicero's cause was to come before them : and that

if any one attempted it, he should be treated as a public enemy.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

Secondly, That if, through any violence or obstruction, the law was not suffered to pass, Cicero should then be at liberty to return without any farther authority.

395th consulship.

Thirdly, That public thanks should be given to all the people of Italy who came to Rome for Cicero's defence ; and that they should be desired to come again on the day when the suffrages of the people were to be taken.

Fourthly, That thanks should be given likewise to all the states and cities which had received and entertained Cicero ; and that the care of his person should be recommended to all foreign nations in alliance with them ; and that the Roman generals, and all who had commanded abroad, should be ordered to protect his life and safety.

The law, now prepared for Cicero's restoration, was to be offered to the suffrage of the centuries ; where a decree of the senate was previously necessary to make the act valid : in the present case there seem to have been four or five several decrees provided at different times, which had all been frustrated by the intrigues of Clodius and his friends : but these last votes proved effectual ; Clodius being left single in the opposition, after Metellus dropped him ; for even his brother Appius chose to be quiet : nevertheless it was above two months from the last decree before Cicero's friends could bring the affair to a general vote, which they effected at last on the 4th of August. The assembly was held in the field of Mars, for the more convenient reception of a great multitude ; and Cicero, after sixteen months' exile, was recalled by the unanimous suffrage of all the centuries.

Middl.
p. 395.

“ This (says Cicero's English historian) was one of the last genuine acts of free Rome ; one of the last efforts of public liberty, exerting itself to do honour to

Ib. p. 397.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

its patron and defender : for the union of the triumvirate had already given it a dangerous wound ; and the dissension, which not long after ensued, entirely destroyed it." By which words it would seem, that in the historian's opinion, the triumviral league did not destroy public liberty ; or, at least that Rome, even under the domination of the triumvirs, was sometimes free ; seeing it was free when the people recalled Cicero from banishment ; though it had been enslaved the year before, when, under the domination of the same triumvirate, the people banished him : for in the midst of all his joy, on his return home, he could not help grieving, he says, within himself, to reflect that a city, so grateful to the defender of its liberty, had been so miserably enslaved and oppressed.

Middl.
p. 394.

Post Red.
in Sen. 3.

" One cannot help pausing awhile (says the same historian a little before), to reflect on the great idea which these facts imprint of the character and dignity of Cicero ; to see so vast an empire in such a ferment on his account, as to postpone all their concerns and interests, for many months successively, to the safety of a single senator, who had no other means of exciting the zeal, or engaging the affections of his citizens, but the genuine force of his personal virtues, and the merit of his eminent services : as if the republic itself could not stand without him, but must fall into ruin, if he, the main pillar of it, was removed ; whilst the greatest monarchs on earth, who had any affairs with the people of Rome, were looking on, to expect the event, unable to procure any answer or regard to what they were soliciting, till this affair was decided. Ptolemy, the king of Egypt, was particularly affected by it, who, being driven out of his kingdom, came to Rome about this time, to beg help and protection against his rebellious subjects ; but, though he was lodged in Pompey's house, it was not possible for him to get an audience, till Cicero's cause was at an end."

Now, with regard to this unavoidable pause, and the great idea on which the historian reflects, I shall once more refer the reader to the passage above transcribed from M. Bayle.* Most certainly this shining piece of oratory *n'a rien de solide*. The fact was plainly this: the same triumvirs, who, to punish Cicero's incontinence of speech, gave him up to the fury of the enemy, and suffered him to be banished, did now call him home again to punish the insolence of Clodius, who affected an independency on those who had hitherto been his support.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

* Vid. b. 8.
c. 11. note.

If there be any thing in the transaction which should excite wonder, it is, that a man of such rare talents and transcendent merit as our eloquent consular, who is supposed to have been most unjustly banished for well-doing, could not, by the solicitation of all his friends, obtain a restoration, even after his cause was favoured by the triumvirs, the two consuls, the whole senate, and eight of the tribunes, until, through the influence of all these, such multitudes of voters flocked to Rome from the remote parts of Italy, as were sufficient to outvote those who resided in the city and in its neighbourhood: so that, according to what is said by the historian himself in another part of his work, it was impossible to know, whether the act in Cicero's favour had passed regularly by the genuine suffrage of the people. Vid. Middl. vol. 1. p. 21. and vid. supra, vol. 4. p. 165.

Cicero had resolved to come home, in virtue of the senate's decree, whether the law had passed or not: but perceiving, from the accounts of all his friends, that it could not be defeated any longer, he embarked for Italy on the 4th of August, the very day on which it was enacted, and landed the next day at Brundisium, where he found his daughter Tullia already arrived to receive him. He took up his quarters again with his old host Lenius Flaccus, and here in four days he received from Rome the welcome news, that the law was actually rati-

Ad Att. 3.
26.

Ib. 4. 1.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

In Pis. 22.
Post Red.
in Sen 17.
Pro Sext.
63.

fied by the people, with an incredible zeal and unanimity of all the centuries. This obliged him to pursue his journey without delay. The fame of his landing, and progress towards the city, drew infinite multitudes from all parts to see him as he passed, and congratulate him on his return : so that the whole road was but one continued street from Brundusium to Rome, lined on both sides with crowds of men, women, and children ; nor was there a præfecture, town, or colony, through Italy, which did not decree him statues, or public honours, and send a deputation of their principal members to pay him their compliments : that it was rather less than the truth, as Plutarch says, what Cicero himself tells us, that all Italy brought him back upon its shoulders. [Nor can this appear in any degree wonderful, if we consider, that, when consul, he had, in Pompey's opinion, preserved, not only the Roman empire, but the whole globe of the earth.]^t

Middl.
p. 401.

The modern historian, so often cited above, tells us, that “ Cicero's return was truly, what he himself calls it, the beginning of a new life to him ; which was to be governed by new maxims, and a new kind of policy, yet so as not to forfeit his old character. He had been made to feel in what hands the weight of power lay, and what little dependance was to be placed on the help and support of his aristocratical friends : Pompey had served him on this important occasion very sincerely, and with the concurrence also of Cæsar, so as to make it a point of gratitude, as well as prudence, to be more observant of them than he had hitherto been ; the senate, on the other hand, with the magistrates, and the honest of all ranks, were zealous in his cause ; and the consul Lentulus, above all, seemed to make it the sole end and glory of his administration. The uncommon consent of opposite parties in promoting his restoration drew

Post Red.
in Sen. 4.

^t — Pompeium adduxi in eam voluntatem, ut in senatu non semel, sed sæpe, multisque verbis, hujas mihi salutem imperii atque orbis terrarum adjudicaret. Ad Att. l. 1. ep. 19.

upon him a variety of obligations, which must needs often clash and interfere with each other, and which it was his part still to manage so, as to make them consistent with his honour, his private and his public duty : these were to be the springs and motives of his new life, the hinges on which his future conduct was to turn ; and to do justice severally to them all, and assign to each its proper weight and measure of influence, required his utmost skill and address.”

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Pro Plane.
3.

Another ingenious writer describes, in colours somewhat less favourable, the new life which Cicero entered upon at this time.

Crevier.
tom. 11.
in fine.

“ It was the case of this great man, as of many others, that his glory would have been brighter, if his life had been shorter. Had he died immediately after his consulship, no stain had remained upon his memory. But it cannot be concealed that his success elated him too much, and that he expected, on quitting his office, to be the soul of the public deliberations, and to govern the state by his counsels. His banishment dejected him entirely ; and his return did not reinstate him in that aristocratical constancy, by which he had acquired so much honour. He was reduced to submit to the yoke, make his court for awhile to Pompey, and then become the slave of Cæsar.”

Of the court which he paid to Pompey, we have a specimen in his speech to the people on the 6th of September, two days after his return home.

On the 5th he had, in the senate, professed his obligations to that august assembly in general, and to each magistrate by name. The number of his private friends was too great to make it possible for him to enumerate or thank them all, so that he confined himself to the magistrates, with exception only to Pompey, whom, for the eminence of his character, though at present only a private man, he took care to distinguish by a personal address and compliment. But as Lentulus was the first

Middl.
p. 402.
Pro Plane.
30.
Post Red.
in Sen. 12,

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Post Red.
in Sen. 4.

Middl.
p. 405.

Pro Dom.
5, 6.

in office, and had served him with the greatest affection, so he gives him the first share of his praise ; and, in the overflowing of his gratitude, styles him the parent and the god of his life and fortunes.

The next day he paid his thanks to the people in a speech from the rostra, where he celebrated the particular merits and services of his principal friends, especially of Pompey, whom he declares to be the greatest man for virtue, wisdom, glory, who was then living, or had lived, or ever would live ; and that it was but barely possible, scarce lawful, for one man to owe to another so much, as on this occasion, he owed to him.^u

This affair being happily over, the senate had leisure again to attend to public business ; and there was now a case before them of a very urgent nature, which required a present remedy—an unusual scarcity of corn and provisions in the city, which had been greatly increased by the late concourse of people from all parts of Italy on Cicero's account, and was now felt very severely by the poorer sort, who began to grow very clamorous. Clodius, to create fresh trouble to Cicero, charged the calamity to his score, and employed a number of young fellows to run all night about the streets and make a lamentable outcry for bread, calling upon Cicero to relieve them from the famine to which he had reduced them. Metellus having summoned the senate to the temple of Concord, Clodius's mob crowded thither ; but happening to meet with Metellus in the way, they presently attacked him with volleys of stones, and the consul was wounded. For the greater security, he immediately adjourned the senate into the Capitol. The leaders of this rabble were M. Lollius and M. Sergius ; the first had, in Clodius's tribunate, undertaken the task of killing Pompey ; Sergius had been captain of the guard to Catiline. But Clodius, encouraged by this hope-

^u Cn. Pompeius, vir omnium qui sunt fuerunt, erunt, princeps virtute, sapientia ac gloria.—Huic ego homini, quirites, tantum debeo, quantum hominem homini debere vix fas est. Post Red. ad Quir. 7.

ful beginning, put himself at their head in person, and pursued the senate into the Capitol, in order to disturb their debates, and hinder their providing any relief for the present evil.—But the people themselves, seeing through his design, were so provoked at it, that they turned universally against him, and drove him out of the field with all his mercenaries; when, perceiving that Cicero was not present in the senate, they called out upon him by name, with one voice, and would not be quieted till he came in person to undertake their cause, and propose some expedient for their relief. He had kept his house all that day, and resolved to do so, till he saw the issue of the tumult; but when he understood that the mob was repulsed and dispersed, and that his presence was universally required by the consuls, the senate, and the whole people, he came to the senate-house, in the midst of their debates, and, being presently asked^x his opinion, proposed, that Pompey should be engaged to undertake the province of restoring plenty to the city; and that, to enable him to do it effectually, he should be invested with an absolute power over all the public stores and corn-rents of the empire. The motion was readily accepted, and a vote immediately passed, that a law for that purpose should be offered to the people. Except Messala and Afranius, all the consular senators were absent: they pretended to be afraid of the mob; but the real cause was, their unwillingness to concur in granting this commission to Pompey. The consuls carried the decree with them into the rostra, and read it to the people; who, on the mention of Cicero's name, in which it was drawn, gave a universal shout of applause; upon which, at the desire of all the magistrates, Cicero made a speech to them, setting forth the reasons and necessity of the decree, and giving them the hope of a speedy relief, from the vigilance and au-

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Middl. p.
407, 408.

Pro Dom.
3. 7.

Ib. 7.

Ad Att.
4. 1.

Ib. 4. 1.

^x Veni expectatis multis jam sententiis dictis, rogatus sum sententiam; dixi reipub. saluberrimam, mihi necessariam.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Pro Dom.
4.
Ad Att. 4. 1.
Pro Dom.
4.

thority of Pompey. The absence, however, of the consular senators, who were the principal members of the house, occasioned some censure: it was said, that the senate's vote had not been free; that it had been extorted by fear; and the very next day a motion was made to revoke the decree: but though all the consular senators were then present, the motion was unanimously rejected; and the consuls were ordered to draw up a law, by which the whole administration of the corn and provisions of the republic was granted to Pompey for five years, with a power of choosing fifteen lieutenants to assist him in it.

Ib. 2.

This furnished Clodius with fresh matter for declaiming against Cicero, whom he charged with ingratitude towards the senate, which had always been firm to him, and which he now deserted, in order to pay his court to a man who had betrayed him: adding, that he was so silly as not to know his own strength and credit in the city, and how able he was to maintain his authority without the help of Pompey. Cicero defended himself by saying, "that they must not expect, now that he was restored, to deceive him by the same arts whereby they had ruined him before, raising jealousies between him and Pompey; that he had smarted for it too severely already, to be caught again in the same snare; that in decreeing this commission to Pompey, he had discharged both his private obligation to a friend, and his public duty to the state; that those who grudged all extraordinary power to Pompey, must grudge the victories, the triumphs, the accession of dominion and revenue, which their former grants of this sort had procured to the empire; that the success of those shewed what fruit they were to expect from this."^y

Ib. 8.

Ad Att.
4. 1.

However extensive an authority soever this law conferred on Pompey, he or his creatures were not satisfied with it; for Messius, one of the tribunes, proposed an-

^y Certainly this is not the language of a true republican.

other, to give him the additional power of raising what money, fleets, and armies, he thought fit ; with a greater command through all the provinces than their proper governors had in each. “ Our consular law (says Cicero) now seems modest ; that of Messius insufferable : Pompey declares for the first ; all his dependants are for the second. The consulars exclaim with indignation against it : I hold my peace ; and the rather as the pontifices have decreed nothing yet concerning my house.”^z

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Cicero does not tell us which of the two laws passed : but Dio, in comparing the command which was given to Pompey on this occasion, with that which he had in the war against the pirates, gives us reason to believe that it was the law of Messius.

Crevier,
tom. 12.

Pompey named Cicero for his first lieutenant, declaring that he should consider him as a second self, and act nothing without his advice. Cicero accepted the employment, on condition that he might be at liberty to use or resign it at pleasure, as he found it convenient to his affairs : and he soon after quitted it to his brother, and chose to continue in the city, where he had the pleasure to see the end of his law effectually answered ; for the credit of Pompey’s name immediately reduced the price of provisions in the market ; and his vigour and diligence in prosecuting the affair established at length a general plenty.

Middl.
p. 410.
Ad Att.
4. 2.

Plut. in
Pomp.

Cicero was restored to his former dignity, but not to his former fortunes, nor was any satisfaction yet made to him for the ruin of his houses and estates : a full restitution indeed had been decreed, but was reserved to his return ; which came now before the senate to be considered and settled by public authority, where it met still with great obstruction. The chief difficulty was about his Palatin house, which he valued above all the rest, and which Clodius for that reason had contrived to alien-

^z — Nos tacemus ; et eo magis, quod de domo nostra nihil adhuc pontifices res-ponderunt. Ad. Att. 4. 1.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 411.

Ad Att.
4. 1.

De Harusp.
Resp. 6, 7.

Middl.
p. 412.

Pro Dom.
13—17.
Vid. supr.
p. 25.

Middl.
p. 413.

Pro Dom.
38.

ate, as he hoped, irretrievably, by demolishing the fabric, and dedicating a temple upon the area to the goddess Liberty; where, to make his work the more complete, he pulled down also the adjoining portico of Catulus,^a that he might build it up anew, of the same order with the temple; and by blending the public with private property, and consecrating the whole to religion, might make it impossible to separate or restore any part to Cicero; since a consecration, legally performed, made the thing consecrated unapplicable ever after to any private use.

The affair was to be determined by the college of priests, who were the judges in all cases relating to religion: for the senate could only make a provisional decree, that if the priests discharged the ground from the service of religion, then the consuls should take an estimate of the damage, and make a contract for rebuilding the whole at the public charge, so as to restore it to Cicero in the condition in which he left it. The priests therefore of all orders were called together on the last of September, to hear this cause, which Cicero pleaded in person before them: they were men of the first dignity and families in the republic; and there never was, as Cicero tells us, so full an appearance of them in any cause since the foundation of the city; he reckons up nineteen by name, a great part of whom were of consular rank.—The question, on which the cause singly turned, was about the efficacy of the pretended consecration of the house, and the dedication of the temple: to shew the nullity therefore of this act, he endeavours to overthrow the foundation of it, “and prove Clodius’s tribunate to be originally null and void from the invalidity of his adoption, none of the conditions of a regular and legal adoption having been observed in his case—that, if the adoption was irregular and illegal, the tribu-

^a This portico was built on the spot where Fulvius Flaccus formerly lived, whose house was publicly demolished for the supposed treason of its master. Vid. vol. 3. Y. of R. 632.

nate must needs be so too, which was entirely built upon it : but granting the tribunate to be valid, because some eminent men would have it so, yet the act made afterward for his banishment could not possibly be considered as a law, but as a privilege only made against a particular person ; which the sacred laws and the laws of the twelve tables had utterly prohibited.—When he comes to speak of the dedication of the temple, he observes that the goddess Liberty, to which it was dedicated, was the known statue of a celebrated strumpet, which Appius brought from Greece for the ornament of his ædileship : and, upon dropping the thoughts of that magistracy, gave it his brother Clodius to be advanced into a deity : that the ceremony was performed without any licence, or judgment obtained from the college of priests, by the single ministry of a raw young man, the brother-in-law of Clodius, who had been made priest but a few days before ; a mere novice in his business, and forced into the service : but if all had been transacted regularly, and in due form, that it could not possibly have any force, as being contrary to the standing laws of the republic : for there was an old tribunician law, made by Q. Papirius, which prohibited the consecration of houses, lands, or altars, without the express command of the people ; which was not obtained, nor even pretended, in the present case : that great regard had always been paid to this law in several instances of the gravest kind,” which he cited, and then proceeded—“ that, after all this, it was to no purpose to mention, that the dedication was not performed with any of the solemn words and rites which such a function required ; but by the ignorant young man before mentioned, without the help of his colleagues, his books, or any to prompt him : especially when Clodius, who directed him, that impure enemy of all religion, who often acted the woman among men, as well as the man among women, huddled over the whole ceremony in a blundering precipitate manner,

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

De Leg.
3. 18.

Vid. supr.
p. 11.

Middl.
p. 415.

Pro Dom.
37, 38. 43.
45. 49. 54,
55.

Middl.
p. 416.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 417.

Vid. supr.
p. 14.

Ad Att.
4. 2.

Middl. p.
418, 419.

faultering and confounded in mind, voice, and speech ; often recalling himself, doubting, fearing, hesitating, and performing every thing quite contrary to what the sacred books prescribed : nor is it strange (says he), that in an act so mad and villanous, his audaciousness could not get the better of his fears : for what pirate, though never so barbarous, after he had been plundering temples, when, pricked by a dream or scruple of religion, he came to consecrate some altar on a desert shore, was not terrified in his mind, on being forced to appease that deity by his prayers, whom he had provoked by his sacrilege? In what horrors then, think you, must this man needs be, the plunderer of all temples, houses, and the whole city, when, for the expiation of so many impieties, he was wickedly consecrating one single altar?" Then [for to swear falsely was, by habitude, become easy to the orator] he makes a solemn invocation and appeal to all the gods, who peculiarly favoured and protected that city, to bear witness to the integrity of his zeal and love to the republic, and that, in all his labours and struggles, he had constantly preferred the public benefit to his own ; and concludes with committing the justice of his cause to the judgment of the venerable bench.

The sentence of the priests turned wholly on what Cicero had alleged about the force of the Papirian law, viz. that if he, who performed the office of consecration, had not been specially authorized and personally appointed to it by the people, then the area in question might, without any scruple of religion, be restored to Cicero. This, though it seemed somewhat evasive, was sufficient for Cicero's purpose ; and his friends congratulated him upon it, as upon a clear victory ; while Clodius interpreted it still in favour of himself ; and, being produced into the rostra by his brother Appius, acquainted the people, that the priests had given judgment for him ; but that Cicero was preparing to recover pos-

session by force, and exhorted them, therefore, to follow him and Appius in the defence of their liberties. But his speech made no impression on the audience; some wondered at his impudence, others laughed at his folly, and Cicero resolved not to trouble himself or the people about it, till the consuls, by a decree of the senate, had contracted for rebuilding the portico of Catulus.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.
395th con-
sulship.

The senate met the next day, in a full house, to put an end to this affair; when Marcellinus, one of the consuls elect, being called upon to speak first, addressed himself to the priests, and desired them to give an account of the grounds and meaning of their sentence: upon which, Marcus Lucullus,^b in the name of the rest, declared, that the priests indeed were the judges of religion, but the senate of the law; that they therefore had determined only what related to the point of religion, and left it to the senate to determine whether any obstacle remained in point of law: all the other priests spoke largely after him in favour of Cicero's cause: when Clodius rose afterward to speak, he endeavoured to waste the time so as to hinder their coming to any resolution that day; but, after he had been speaking for three hours successively, the assembly grew so impatient, and made such a noise and hissing, that he was forced to give over: yet, when they were going to pass a decree in the words of Marcellinus, Serranus put his negative upon it: this raised a universal indignation; and a fresh debate began, at the motion of the two consuls, on the merit of the tribune's intercession; when, after many warm speeches, they came to the following vote: "That it was the resolution of the senate, that Cicero's house should be restored to him, and Catulus's portico rebuilt, as it had been before; and that this vote should be defended by all the magistrates; and if any violence or obstruction was offered to it, that the senate would look

Ad Att.
4. 2.

^b The famous Lucius Lucullus died this year. He had fallen mad some short time before: but it is not known whether it was a natural disease, or the effect of some liquor given him by one of his freedmen. Plut. in Luc.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Ad Att.
4. 2.

upon it as offered by him who had interposed his negative." This staggered Serranus, and the late farce was played over again; his father threw himself at his feet, to beg him to desist; he desired a night's time; which at first was refused, but, on Cicero's request, granted; and the next day he revoked his negative, and, without farther opposition, suffered the senate to pass a decree, that Cicero's damage should be made good to him, and his houses rebuilt at the public charge.

The consuls began presently to put the decree in execution; and having contracted for the rebuilding of Catulus's portico, set men to work upon clearing the ground, and demolishing what had been built by Clodius: but as to Cicero's buildings, it was agreed to take an estimate of his damage, and pay the amount of it to himself, to be laid out according to his own fancy: in which his Palatin house was valued at 16,000*l.*; his Tusculan at 4,000; his Formian only at 2,000. This was a very deficient valuation; for the Palatin house had cost him not long before near twice that sum: but Cicero resolved to appear satisfied with the award, because he perceived, or imagined, that those who had clipped his wings had no mind to let them grow again.^c

Plut. in
Cic.
Dio, 100.

But, though Cicero acquiesced in the low valuation of his houses, he could not rest till he had destroyed all the public monuments of his late disgrace. It was insufferable, that the law of his exile should remain, with the other acts of Clodius's tribunate, hanging up in the Capitol, engraved, as usual, on tables of brass: watching therefore the opportunity of Clodius's absence, he went to the Capitol with a strong body of friends, and, taking the tables down, conveyed them to his own house. This occasioned a sharp contest in the senate between him and Clodius about the validity of those acts: and

^c *Iidem, mi Pomponi, iidem, inquam, illi, qui mihi pennas inciderunt, nolunt easdem renasci.* Ad Att. 4. 2.

It appears, by ep. 2. lib. 2. ad Q. Fr. that those of whom Cicero here complains, were Pompey and Lentulus, the persons who had been most instrumental in his restoration.

drew Cato also into the debate ; who, without defending the man, defended the legality of his tribunate, and of his acts in that magistracy : for otherwise his own Cyprian commission must be deemed null, and all he did in virtue of it as done without authority. This created a coldness between the two patriots. Dio speaks of a prior attempt by Cicero to take away the registers, which was defeated by Clodius, assisted by his brother Caius, then prætor : and that historian speaks of both attempts as made in the consulship of Marcellinus and Philippus (Year of Rome 697), when P. Clodius was ædile. But Dio's authority is not decisive for the order of events ; and it is more likely that Cicero, intoxicated with his prosperity, should venture to do this illegal riotous act before the two brothers entered on their magistracies, than when they were in office. Be that as it will, it is no wonder that Clodius's fury, when thus provoked, carried him to those acts of vengeful violence which are going to be related.

Catulus's portico and Cicero's house were rising again apace, and carried up almost to the roof ; when Clodius, without any warning, led thither, on the 2d of November, a band of armed men, who demolished the portico, drove the workmen out of Cicero's ground, and, with the stones and rubbish of the place, began to batter Quintus's house, with whom Cicero then lived, and at last set fire to it ; so that the two brothers, with their families, to save themselves, were forced to fly in the utmost haste. Milo had already accused Clodius for his former violences, and resolved, if possible, to bring him to justice : Clodius, on the other hand, was suing for the ædileship, to secure himself, for one year more at least, from any prosecution : he was sure of being condemned, if ever he was brought to a trial ; so that whatever mischief he did in the meantime was all clear gain, and could not make his cause the worse : he now, therefore, gave a free course to his natural fury ; was perpetually scour-

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.
395th con-
sulship.

Middl. p.
422—424.
Ad Att.
4. 3.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

ing the streets with his incendiaries, and threatened fire and sword to the city itself, if an assembly was not called for the election of ædiles. In this humour, about a week after his last outrage, on the 11th of November, happening to meet with Cicero in the sacred street, he presently assaulted him with stones, clubs, and drawn swords: Cicero was not prepared for the encounter, and took refuge in the vestibule of the next house; where his attendants, rallying in his defence, beat off the assailants, and could easily have killed their leader, but that Cicero was willing, he says, to cure by diet rather than surgery.^d The day following, Clodius attacked Milo's house with sword in hand and lighted flambeaux, with intent to storm and burn it: but Milo was never unprovided for him; and Q. Flaccus, sallying with a strong band of stout fellows, killed several of his men, and would have killed Clodius too, if he had not hid himself in the inner part of P. Sylla's house, which he made use of on this occasion as his fortress.

The senate met, on the 14th, to take these disorders into consideration; Clodius did not think fit to appear

Cibber,
Char. and
Cond. of
Cic. p. 153.

^d On this passage of Dr. Middleton's work, the poet-laureat (before cited) makes the following remark: "If we had not the evidence of Cicero's own words for this fact, would it be credible? But Cicero's behaviour and sentiments upon the occasion are almost as extraordinary; for though his attendants rallied where he was forced to take refuge and beat off the assailants, and could easily have killed their leader, yet I was willing, says he, to cure by diet rather than by surgery; *i. e.* he rather chose to cut him down with a long speech than a broad sword.—To be quite grave upon the matter, the fact will plainly stand thus: that Clodius was as desperate a ruffian as ever broke the peace upon the highway, and Cicero was afraid of him.

"This being the wretched state of affairs in Rome, how shall we unravel so perplexing a part of our history? How came this gigantic republic, these formidable Romans, that so strongly governed the world, so weakly to govern themselves? That, without regard to law, justice, humanity, or the public peace, every licentious leader of a faction might commit whatever convenient outrage his conscience had a mind to, without shame, punishment, or scarce public notice? Or if any notice at all happened to be taken of it, that very notice was more astonishing than the criminal complained of; for when at last (p. 423.) the senate were reduced to bear the public enormities of Clodius no longer, they manfully met upon it, and many severe speeches were made, and vigorous counsels proposed; and what was the end of them? Why, they vigorously resolved to adjourn, without coming to any resolution at all in the matter.—Now did not this government want a Cæsar? Yet these were the rough reformers, who have frequently been applauded for sacrificing the first Cæsar to their precious self-abused liberty; a worse tyranny than his condemned ambition ever wished to impose upon them. Yet were they not less rationally happy for forty following years, under their second absolute master Augustus—than they knew how to make themselves, when independent guardians of their native liberty."

there; but Sylla came, to clear himself probably of the suspicion of encouraging him in the violences, on account of the freedom which he had taken with his house. Many severe speeches were made, and vigorous councils proposed. Marcellinus's opinion was, that Clodius should be impeached anew for these last outrages; and that no election of ædiles should be suffered till he was brought to a trial: Milo declared, that as long as he continued in office, the consul Metellus should make no election; for he would take the auspices every day, on which an assembly could be held; but Metellus contrived to waste the day in speaking, so that they were forced to break up without making any decree. Milo was as good as his word, and, having gathered a superior force, took care to obstruct the election; though the consul Metellus employed all his power and art to elude his vigilance, and procure an assembly by stratagem; calling it to one place and holding it in another, sometimes in the field of Mars, sometimes in the Forum: but Milo was ever beforehand with him; and, keeping a constant guard in the field from midnight to noon, was always at hand to inhibit his proceedings, by obnouncing, as it was called, or declaring, that he was taking the auspices on that day; so that the three brothers were baffled and disappointed;^e though they were perpetually haranguing and labouring to inflame the people against those who interrupted their assemblies and right of electing; where Metellus's speeches were turbulent, Appius's rash, Clodius's furious. Cicero, who gives this account to Atticus, was of opinion, "That there would be no election; and that Clodius would be brought to trial, if he was not first killed by Milo, which was likely to be his fate: Milo (says he) makes no scru-

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

^e From these facts it appears, that what is said above, of Clodius's repealing the Middel. Ælian and Fusian laws, and prohibiting the magistrates from obstructing the assemblies of the people, is to be understood only in a partial sense; and that his new law extended no farther than to hinder the magistrates from dissolving an assembly after it was actually convened, and had entered upon business; for it was still unlawful, we see, to convene an assembly while the magistrate was in the act of observing the heavens. p. 425.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Prid.
part 2.
p. 422.

Vid. vol. 4.
p. 421.
note n.

Prid.
p. 450.
Plut. in
Cat.
Dio, l. 39.

Prideaux.

ple to own it; being not deterred by my misfortune, and having no envious or perfidious counsellors about him, nor any lazy nobles to discourage him. It is commonly given out by the other side, that what he does is all done by my advice; but they little know how much conduct, as well as courage, there is in this hero."

An affair which very much employed the public attention about this time, was the re-establishment of Ptolemy Auletes^f on the Egyptian throne.

Before Pompey left Asia, there had happened great disturbances and revolutions in Egypt. The Alexandrians, weary of Alexander their king, rose in mutiny against him, drove him out of the kingdom, and called to the crown Ptolemy Auletes, who was a bastard son of Ptolemy Lathyrus; for Lathyrus left no male issue by his wife, but several by his concubines. Alexander, on his expulsion, fled to Pompey, offered him great gifts, and promised him greater, on condition he would undertake his restoration: but Pompey refused to meddle in the matter, it being without the limits of his commission. Auletes got possession of the throne; but his title being precarious, he found means, by the interest of Cæsar and Pompey in the beginning of the triumvirate, to be declared an ally of the Roman republic; for which piece of service they were to receive no less than 1,162,500*l*.

While Cato was at Rhodes, in his way to Cyprus, Auletes came thither to him. For when the Alexandrians heard of the intention of the Romans to seize Cyprus, they pressed Auletes to demand the restoration of that island to Egypt, as being an ancient appendage of the kingdom; or, in case of denial, to declare war against

^f This Auletes had used himself to play on the flute or pipe called *aulous*, and was so vain of his skill therein, that he would expose himself to contend for victory in the public shows: hence he had the name of Auletes, *i. e.* the Piper. And he would often imitate the effeminacies of the Bacchanals, and, in a female dress, dance to the same measures as they; and from hence he was called Dionysius Neos, or the New Bacchus. He is reckoned to have as much exceeded all of his race that reigned before him, in the effeminacy of his manners, as his grandfather Physcon did in the wickedness of them.

them. Auletes refused to do either; and this refusal, joined with what they had suffered from him by his exactions in order to raise the money with which he had purchased the favour of Pompey and Cæsar, angered them so far, that they drove him out of the kingdom; and he was then going to Rome, there to solicit the assistance of the senate for his restoration. On his coming to Cato, and entering into discourse with him about his affairs, Cato blamed him for quitting that state of honour and happiness which he was possessed of in his kingdom, and thus exposing himself to the disgrace, trouble, and contempt, which, as an exile, he must expect to meet with. And as to the help he expected from Rome, he laid before him what great gifts and presents, for the obtaining of it, would be extorted from him by the great men of that city, whose greedy expectations, he freely told him, were such, that, although Egypt were to be sold, the purchase-money would not be sufficient fully to satisfy them. And therefore he advised him to return again into Egypt, and there make up all differences with his people; offering himself to go with him to help him herein. Ptolemy at first approved of the advice, and resolved to be guided by it; but, being afterward dissuaded from it by those about him, he went forward to Rome, where he soon found, by full experience, all to be true that Cato had told him.^g

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

When the Alexandrians learned that Ptolemy was at

^g The Alexandrians, after Auletes's departure, not knowing what was become of him, placed Berenice, his daughter, on the throne, for his two sons were yet very young, which made them prefer her. They sent an embassy into Syria, to Antiochus Asiaticus, who, by his mother Selene, was the next male heir of the family, to invite him to come into Egypt, and there marry Berenice, and reign with her; but the ambassadors, on their arrival in Syria, found him just dead.

Prid.p. 450,
451.
Dio, l. 39.
Strabo,
l. 17. p. 796.
Porphyr.

Understanding that Seleucus Cibiosactes, his brother, was still living, they sent an embassy to him with the same proposal, which he readily accepted of. Gabinius (who was now come into his province) at first hindered his going; however, either with or without the consent of the proconsul, he afterward went; but, being a very sordid and base-spirited man (of which he had given a special instance in robbing the sepulchre of Alexander of the golden case in which his body was deposited), Berenice soon grew weary of him, and caused him to be strangled, and she afterward married Archelaus, high-priest of the Moon, the great goddess of the Comanians in Pontus: he was the son of that Archelaus who had the chief command of Mithridates's forces in Greece, during his first war with the Romans; but after that, falling into disgrace with his master, fled to them.

in Græc.
Euseb.
Scalig.
Suet. in
Vesp.
Strabo,
l. 17.
Ib. l. 12.
p. 558.
Plut. in
Syll.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 427.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 2. 1.

Rome, they sent thither a numerous embassy, composed of 100 of their principal citizens, to plead their cause before the senate; but the king, having notice of this deputation, procured some of them to be assassinated on the road, others as soon as they arrived at Rome; and others he silenced by proper applications to their fears and their avarice. The senate ordered, that Dio, the chief of the embassy, an academic philosopher, should be called and heard. But this Dio was soon after assassinated; and Ptolemy's money, aided by the power of Pompey, who lodged the king in his own house, and openly protected him, stifled this odious affair almost entirely. Some persons, indeed, were brought to a trial, as having been concerned in the assassination of Dio; and this was one of the chief articles of accusation against Cœlius, whom Cicero defended the year following. These murders, and the notion of the king's having bribed all the magistrates, had raised so general an aversion to him among the people, that he found it advisable to quit the city, and leave the management of his interest to his agents. The consul Lentulus, who had obtained the provinces of Cilicia and Cyprus, whither he was preparing to set forward, was very desirous of the commission of replacing him on his throne: for which he had already procured a vote of the senate: the opportunity of a command, almost in sight of Egypt, made him generally thought to have the best pretensions to that charge; and he was assured of Cicero's warm assistance in soliciting the confirmation of it.

In this situation of affairs, the new tribunes entered into their office: Caius Cato, of the same family with his namesake Marcus, was one of the number: a bold, turbulent man, of no temper or prudence;^h yet a tolerable speaker, and generally on the side of the senate.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 1. 2.

^h Before he had borne any public office, he attempted to impeach Gabinius of bribery and corruption; but not being able to get an audience of the prætors, he had the hardiness to mount the rostra, which was never allowed to a private citizen, and in a speech to the people, declared Pompey dictator: but his presumption had like to

He opened his magistracy by declaring loudly against king Ptolemy, and all who favoured him; especially Lentulus, whom he supposed to be under some private engagement with him, and for that reason was determined to baffle all their schemes.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

The senate (as has been just mentioned) had granted to Lentulus the commission for restoring the king; yet it would seem that Pompey was intriguing to get it for himself. An accident, which happened at this time, threw an obstacle in the way of their ambition. The statue of Jupiter on Mount Alba having been struck by thunder, the books of the Sibyls were consulted; and there it was read, "If the king of Egypt comes to desire your help, deny him not your friendship; but aid him not with your forces; if you do, you shall have trouble and danger." This oracle, so pat to the purpose, left no room to doubt of its being forged; but Cato, who was fiercely zealous against restoring the king by any means, and had the greater part of the senate on his side, called up the guardians of the books into the rostra, to testify the passage to be genuine. To the people it was publicly read and explained: and then laid before the senate, who greedily received it: and after a grave debate on this scruple of religion, came to a resolution, that it seemed dangerous to the republic to restore the king by a multitude. It cannot be imagined, that they laid any real stress on this admonition of the Sibyl: but it was a fair pretext for defeating a project generally disliked: they were unwilling to gratify any man's ambition of visiting the rich country of Egypt at the head of an army; and were persuaded, that, without an army, no man would be solicitous about going thither.

Middl.
p. 430.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 2. 2.

Ep. Fam.
1. 4.

Lupus, likewise, one of C. Cato's colleagues, summoned the senate, and raised an expectation of some uncommon proposal from him; it was indeed of an extra-

Middl.
p. 428.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 2. 1.

have cost him dear; for it raised such an indignation in the audience, that he had much difficulty to escape with his life.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th con-
sulship.

ordinary nature ; to revise and annul that famed act of Cæsar's consulship, for the division of the Campanian lands : he spoke long upon it, and was heard with much attention ; gave great praises to Cicero, with severe reflections on Cæsar, and expostulations with Pompey, who was now abroad in the execution of his late commission ; in the conclusion he told them, that he would not demand the opinions of the particular senators, because he had no mind to expose them to the resentment and animosity of any ; but from the ill humour, which he remembered, when that act first passed, and the favour with which he was now heard, he could easily collect the sense of the house. Upon which Marcellinus said, that he must not conclude from their silence, either what they liked or disliked : that, for his own part, and he might answer too, he believed, for the rest, he chose to say nothing on the subject at present, because he thought that the cause of the Campanian lands ought not to be brought into debate in Pompey's absence.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 2. 1.

This affair being dropped, Racilius, another tribune, rose up and renewed the debate about Milo's impeachment of Clodius, and called upon Marcellinus, the consul elect, to give his opinion upon it ; who, after inveighing against all the violences of Clodius, proposed, that, in the first place, an allotment of judges should be made for the trial : and after that, the election of ædiles ; and if any one attempted to hinder the trial, that he should be deemed a public enemy. The other consul elect, Philippus, was of the same mind ; but the tribunes, C. Cato and Cassius, spoke against it, and were for proceeding to an election before any step towards a trial. When Cicero was called upon to speak, he ran through the whole series of Clodius's extravagances, as if he had been accusing him already at the bar, to the great satisfaction of the assembly ; Antistius, the tribune, seconded him, and declared, that no business should be done before the trial ; and when the house was going

universally into that opinion, Clodius began to speak, with intent to waste the rest of the day ; while his slaves and followers without, who had seized the steps and avenues of the senate, raised so great a noise of a sudden, in abusing some of Milo's friends, that the senate broke up in no small hurry, and with fresh indignation at this new insult.

Year of
R O M E
696.
B. C. 56.

395th consulship.

There was no more business done through the remaining part of December, which was taken up with holidays. Lentulus and Metellus, whose consulship expired with the year, set forward for their several governments ; the one for Cilicia, the other for Spain : Lentulus committed the whole direction of his affairs to Cicero ; and Metellus, unwilling to leave him his enemy, made up all matters with him before his departure, and wrote an affectionate letter to him afterward in Spain.

Ep. Fam.
5. 3.

CHAP. III.

Debates and contests in the senate about restoring king Ptolemy. Clodius is chosen ædile. He impeaches Milo. Pompey pleads Milo's cause. Clodius turns the fury of his anger against Pompey. Civil feuds and conflicts ensue. Cicero defends Sextius, inveighs against Vatinius, and moves to have Cæsar's act relating to the Campanian lands reconsidered : but soon desists from this pursuit. The senate refuses to decree a thanksgiving for a victory obtained by Gabinius in Judea. Prodigies are reported to have happened : various interpretations of them. Piso is recalled from his government of Macedonia. Cæsar is continued in his command in Gaul. He comes to Luca : Pompey and Crassus meet him there. The tribune Cato hinders the proceeding to an election of new consuls. The government falls into an interregnum.

IN the beginning of the new year, when the consular fasces were transferred to Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus, and L. Marcius Philippus, the question concerning the persons by whom, and the manner in which, king Ptolemy should be replaced on the throne of Egypt, came under deliberation. Cicero's letters to his friend Publius Lentulus Spinther (who had the best claim to the commission, and was proconsul of Cilicia), being almost wholly narrative of what passed at Rome in

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th consulship.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

relation to that affair, will probably be more satisfactory to the reader than any abridgment of the matter therein contained could be; especially as we have so good a translation of those letters into our language.

TO PUBLIUS LENTULUS, PROCONSUL.

Ep. Fam.
l. 1. Ep. 1.
Ed. Græv.
b. 1. let. 12.
Melmot.

“ I find it much easier to satisfy the world than myself, in those sacred offices of friendship I exert in your behalf. Numberless indeed are the obligations you have conferred upon me: and as you persevered with unwearied zeal till you had effected my recall from exile, I esteem it the greatest mortification of my life, that I cannot act in your affairs with the same success. The truth is, Ammonius, who resides here as ambassador from Ptolemy, defeats all my schemes, by the most shameless and avowed bribery: and he is supplied with money for this purpose, from the same quarter as when you were in Rome. The party in the king's interest (though their number, it must be owned, is inconsiderable) are all desirous that Pompey may be employed to reinstate him in his dominions. The senate, on the other hand, fall in with the pretended oracle; not, indeed, as giving any credit to its predictions, but as being in general ill-inclined to this prince, and detesting his most corrupt practices. In the meanwhile, I omit no opportunity of admonishing Pompey with great freedom, and conjuring him not to act such a part in this affair as would cast the deepest stain upon his character. I must do him the justice at the same time to acknowledge, that so far as his own conduct is concerned, there does not appear the least foundation for any remonstrances of this sort. On the contrary, he is perpetually expressing the highest zeal for your interest: as he lately supported it in the senate, with the utmost force of eloquence, and the strongest professions of friendship. Marcellinus,ⁱ I need not tell you, is a good deal

ⁱ One of the present consuls.

displeased at your soliciting this commission: in all other respects, I dare venture to say, he will very strenuously promote your interest. We must be contented to take him in his own way: for I perceive it is impossible to dissuade him from proposing, that the injunction of the oracle shall be complied with: and, in fact, he had already made several motions to that purpose.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

“ I write this early on the 13th, and I will now give you an account of what has hitherto passed in the senate. Both Hortensius and Lucullus agreed in moving, that the prohibition of the oracle should be obeyed: and, indeed, it does not seem possible to bring this matter to bear upon any other terms. But we proposed, at the same time, that, in pursuance of the decree, which was made on your own motion, you be appointed to re-establish Ptolemy in his kingdom; the situation of your province lying so conveniently for that purpose. In a word, we consented that army should be given up, in deference to the oracle; but insisted, nevertheless, that you should be employed in effecting this restoration. Crassus, on the other side, was for having this commission executed by three persons, to be chosen from among the generals: and, consequently, he did not mean to exclude Pompey. Marcus Bibulus joined with him as to the number; but thought, that the persons to be nominated should not bear any military command. All the rest of the consulars were in the same sentiments, except Servilius Afranius, and Volcatius. The first absolutely opposed our engaging in Ptolemy's restoration upon any terms whatsoever: but the two last were of opinion, that, agreeably to the motion of Lupus, this commission should be given to Pompey. This circumstance has increased the suspicion concerning the real inclination of the latter: as his most particular friends were observed to concur with Volcatius, they are labouring this point with great assiduity: and, I fear, it will be carried against us. Libo and Hypsæus are openly soliciting for Pom-

Vid. infr.
p. 70.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

pey: and, indeed, the conduct of all his friends at this juncture make it generally believed, that he is desirous of the office. Yet the misfortune is, those who are unwilling it should fall into his hands, are not the more inclined to place it in yours: as they are much displeased at your having contributed to the late advancement of his power.^k For myself, I find I have the less influence in your cause, as it is supposed I am solely governed by a principle of gratitude: at the same time, the notion which prevails, that this affair affords an opportunity of obliging Pompey, renders my applications likewise not altogether so effectual as they might otherwise prove. It is thus I am labouring in this perplexed business: which the king himself, long before you left Rome, as well as the friends and dependants of Pompey, had artfully embarrassed. To this I must add the avowed opposition I meet with from the consulars; who represent our assisting Ptolemy with an army, as a measure that would highly reflect upon the dignity of the senate: be assured, however, I shall employ every means in my power of testifying both to the world in general, and to your friends in particular, the sincerity of that affection I bear you. And were there any honour in those who ought to have shewn themselves influenced by its highest and most refined principles, I should not have so many difficulties to encounter. Farewell."

TO THE SAME.

L. 1. Ep. 2.
Ed. Græv.
b. 1. let. 14.
Melm.

"The senate met on the 13th of January, but came to no resolution; the greatest part of that day having been spent in some warm contests which arose between Marcellinus the consul, and Caninius, one of the tribunes of the people. I had myself also a very considerable share in the debates: and I represented the zeal you have always shewn towards the senate, in terms that in-

^k Lentulus, during his consulate, had proposed and carried that law, which, that Pompey might provide corn in time of scarcity, invested him with the whole power of the Roman empire.

fluenced them, I am persuaded, much to your advantage. The next day, therefore, we thought it sufficient briefly to deliver our opinions : as I perceived, not only by the favourable manner in which I was heard the day before, but also by inquiring into the sentiments of each particular member, that the majority was clearly on our side. The business of the day opened with reporting to the house the several opinions of Bibulus, Hortensius, and Volcatius. The respective questions, therefore, were,

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

“ In the first place, whether three commissioners should be nominated for restoring the king, agreeably to the sentiments of Bibulus ?

“ In the next, whether according to those of Hortensius, the office should be conferred upon you, but without employing any forces ?

“ Or, lastly, whether, in conformity to the advice of Volcatius, this honour should be assigned to Pompey ?

“ The points being thus stated, it was moved that the opinion of Bibulus might be referred to the deliberation of the house in two separate questions. Accordingly, as it was now in vain to oppose his motion so far as it related to paying obedience to the declaration of the oracle, the senate in general came into his sentiments : but as to his proposal of deputing three commissioners, it was rejected by a very considerable majority. The opinion next in order was that of Hortensius. But, when we were going to divide upon it, Lupus, a tribune of the people, insisted that in virtue of his office he had the privilege of calling to a division of the house, prior to the consuls ; and therefore demanded that the voices should be first taken upon the motion he had made in favour of Pompey. This claim was generally and strongly opposed : as indeed it was both unprecedented and unreasonable. The consuls themselves, however, did not greatly contest that point : nor did they absolutely give it up. Their view was to protract the debates : and they succeeded accordingly. They perceived, indeed, that,

Vid. supr.
p. 67.

Year of
R O M E
697.

B. C. 55.

596th con-
sulship.

notwithstanding the majority affected to appear on the side of Volcatius, yet, upon a division, they would certainly vote with Hortensius. Nevertheless, several of the members were called upon to deliver their opinions; though, in truth, much against the inclinations of the consuls, who were desirous that the sentiments of Bibulus should prevail. The debates continuing till night, the senate broke up without coming to any resolution. I happened to pass the same evening with Pompey: and as I had that day supported your cause in the senate with more than ordinary success, I thought it afforded me the most favourable opportunity of speaking to him in your behalf. And what I said seemed to make so strong an impression, that I am persuaded I have brought him wholly over to your interest. To say the truth, whenever I hear him mention this affair himself, I entirely acquit him of being secretly desirous of this commission. On the other hand, when I observe the conduct of his friends of every rank, I am well convinced (and indeed it is now evident likewise to the whole world) that they have been gained by the corrupt measures which a certain party, with the consent of Ptolemy and his advisers, have employed.—I write this before sunrise on the 16th of January: and the senate is to meet again on this very day. I hope to preserve my authority in that assembly, as far, at least, as is possible amidst such general treachery and corruption which has discovered itself upon this occasion. As to what concerns the bringing this matter before the people; I think we have taken such precautions as will render it impracticable, unless by actual violence, and in direct and open contempt both of our civil and religious institutions. For this purpose a very severe order of the senate¹ (which I imagine was

¹ “When an act passed the senate in a full house, held according to the prescribed forms, and without any opposition from the tribunes (who had the privilege of putting a negative upon all proceedings in the senate), it was called a *senatus consultum*, a decree of the senate: but if any of these essentials were wanting, or a tribune interposed, it was then only styled a *senatus auctoritas*, an order of the senate, and considered as of less authority.” Melm. from Manutius.

immediately transmitted to you) was entered yesterday in our journals, notwithstanding the tribunes, Cato and Caninius, interposed their negatives.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

“ You may depend upon my sending you a faithful account of every other occurrence which may arise in this affair : and be assured I shall exert the utmost of my vigilance and my credit, to conduct it in the most advantageous manner for your interest. Farewell.”

396th con-
sulship.

TO THE SAME.

“ When the senate met on the 16th of this month, your affair stood in a very advantageous posture. We had succeeded the day before against the motion of Bibulus for appointing three commissioners, and had now only to contend with Volcatius ; when our adversaries prevented the question from being put, by artfully protracting the debates. For, they saw we had in a very full house, and amidst great contrariety of opinions, carried our point, to the considerable mortification of those, who were for taking the king’s affairs out of your direction, and transferring them to another hand. Curio opposed us upon this occasion with great warmth ; while Bibulus spoke with more temper, and indeed seemed almost inclined to favour our cause. But Cato and Caninius absolutely refused to suffer any decree to pass, till a general assembly of the people should be convened.

L. 1. Ep. 4.
Ed. Græv.
b. 1. let. 16.
Melm.

“ By the Pupian law, as you well know, there cannot be another meeting of the senate till the 1st of February : nor indeed throughout that whole month, unless all the foreign ambassadors should have received, or be refused, audience. In the meanwhile, a notion prevails among the people, that your adversaries have insisted upon this pretended oracle, not so much with an intent of obstructing your particular views, as in order to disappoint the hopes of those who may be desirous of this expedition to Alexandria, merely from the ambition of

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

commanding an army. The whole world is sensible indeed of the regard which the senate has shewn to your character: and it is notoriously owing to the artifices of your enemies, that the house did not divide upon the question proposed in your favour. But should the same persons, under a pretended zeal for the public (though, in fact, upon the most infamous motives), attempt to bring this affair before a general assembly of the people, we have concerted our measures so well,^m that they cannot possibly effect their design without having recourse to violence; or at least without setting the ordinances of our country, both civil and religious, at avowed defiance——But—if methods of violence should be employed, I cannot pretend, in this general contempt of all legal authority, to answer for the event: in every other respect I will venture to assure you, that both the senate and the people will pay the highest attention to your dignity and character. Farewell.”

TO THE SAME.

L. 1. Ep. 5.
Ed. Græv.
b. 1. let. 17.
Melm.

Ad Q. Fr.
1. 3.

“——You are sensible, as I perceive by your last letter, that you have been treated with the same insincerity by those who ought to have concurred in supporting your dignities, as I formerly experienced from some of my pretended friends, in the affair of my banishment. Thus, whilst I was exerting the utmost efforts of my vigilance, my policy, and my interest, in order to serve you in the article relating to Ptolemy, I was unexpectedly alarmed in a point of much more important concern, by the infamous law which Cato has lately proposed to your prejudice.” [Caius Cato, to cut off all hopes at once from Lentulus of obtaining this commission, had proposed a law to the people for recalling him from his government.] “Where affairs are thus embroiled, every thing is, undoubtedly, to be feared: yet my principal

^m *i. e.* They had engaged some tribune to say Veto, or some magistrate to observe the heavens.

apprehension, I confess, arises from the treachery of your false friends. But however that may be, I am earnestly endeavouring to counteract the malevolent designs of Cato.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

“As to the Alexandrian commission, both yourself and your friends will, I trust, have abundant reason to be satisfied with my conduct. But at the same time I must say, I greatly fear it will either be taken out of your hands, or entirely dropped: and I know not which of these alternatives I should least choose.”

TO THE SAME.^a

“You are informed, I imagine, by many hands, of what passes here. I leave it therefore to your other friends to supply you with an account of our transactions, and content myself with only sending you my conjectures. To this end I must previously acquaint you, that, on the 6th of February, Pompey made a speech in a general assembly of the people in favour of Milo, during which he was insulted with much clamour and abuse. Cato afterward inveighed in the senate against Pompey with great acrimony, and was heard with the most profound silence and attention: both which circumstances seem to have affected him very sensibly. Now from hence I surmise, that he has laid aside all thoughts of being employed in the Alexandrian expedition. That affair remains as yet entirely open to us: for the senate has hitherto determined nothing to your prejudice but what they are obliged, in deference to the oracle, to refuse to every other candidate for this office. It is my present hope therefore, as well as endeavour, that the king may throw himself into your hands, when he shall find that he cannot, as he expected, be restored by Pompey; and that, unless he is replaced upon the throne by your assistance, his affair will

L. 1. Ep. 5.
Ed. Græv.
b. 1. let. 18.
Melm.

^a This and the foregoing letter are blended together in the common editions: but they are here separated upon the authority of Manutius and Gronovius. Melm.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

be entirely dropped. And this step he will undoubtedly take, if Pompey should give the least intimation of its being agreeable to him. But I need not tell you the difficulty of discovering the sentiments of a man of his reserve. However, I shall omit no method in my power to effect this scheme; as I shall easily, I trust, be able to prevent the injurious designs of Cato.

“I do not find that any of the consulars are in your interest, except Hortensius and Lucullus: all the rest of that rank, either openly, or in a more concealed manner, oppose your views. Nevertheless, my friend, be not discouraged: on the contrary, let it be still your hope, notwithstanding the attempts of the worthless Cato, that you will again shine out in all your former lustre. Farewell.”

TO THE SAME.

L. 1. Ep. 6.
Ed. Græv.
b. 1. let. 19.
Melm.

“You will receive a full account from Pollio of all that has been transacted in your affair, as he was not only present, but a principal manager. Believe me, I am much concerned at the unfavourable aspect of this business. However, it affords me a very sensible consolation, that there is strong reason to hope the prudence of your friends will be able to elude the force of those iniquitous schemes which have been projected to your prejudice. Even time itself will probably contribute to this end; as it often wears out the malevolence of those who either professedly or in a disguised manner mean one ill.”——

Middl.
p. 433.

The senate grew at length so weary of this affair, that they resolved to leave the king to shift for himself, without interposing at all in his restoration; and so the matter hung; whilst other affairs more interesting were daily rising at home, and engaging the attention of the city.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 2. 2.

The election of ædiles, which had been industriously postponed through all the last summer, could not easily

be kept off any longer: the city was impatient for its magistrates, and especially for the plays and shows with which they used to entertain them; and several also of the new tribunes being zealous for an election, it was held at last on the 20th of January, when Clodius was chosen ædile without opposition.^o

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

This magistracy, which freed him from all apprehension of judges and a trial, gave him a great advantage over his antagonist Milo, who was become a private man. He now accused Milo of the same crime of which Milo had accused him, of public violence and breach of the laws, in maintaining a band of gladiators to the terror of the city. Milo made his appearance to this accusation on the 2d of February, when Pompey, Crassus, and Cicero, appeared with him; and M. Marcellus, though Clodius's colleague in the ædileship, spoke for Milo at Cicero's desire; and the whole passed quietly and favourably for him on that day. The second hearing was appointed on the 9th, when Pompey undertook to plead his cause; but no sooner stood up to speak,

Middl. p.
436—440.

Ad Q. Fr.
2. 3.

^o It may justly seem strange, says Dr. Middleton, how a man so profligate and criminal as Clodius, whose life was a perpetual insult upon all laws divine and human, should be suffered not only to live without punishment, but to obtain all the honours of a free city in their proper course; and it would be natural to suspect that we had been deceived in our accounts of him by taking them from his enemies, did we not find them too firmly supported by facts to be called in question: but a little attention to the particular character of the man, as well as of the times in which he lived, will enable us to solve the difficulty.

Middl.
p. 434.

First, The splendour of his family—Cicero calls the nobles of this class prætors and consuls elect from their cradles by a kind of hereditary right, whose very names were sufficient to advance them to all the dignities of the state. [And therefore how worthless, how pestilent soever Clodius was, he did not fail to be defended and supported by the honest, the optimates, when his attempts were not against the interest of their faction.]

In Verr. 5.
70.

Pro Sext. 9.

Secondly, His personal qualities were peculiarly adapted to endear him to all the meaner sort; his bold and ready wit, his talent at haranguing, his profuse expense, and his pursuing popular measures contrary to the maxims of his ancestors, who had [almost] all been stern assertors of the aristocratical power.

Thirdly, The contrast of opposite factions, who had each of their ends in supporting him.—The senate particularly, whose chief apprehensions were from the triumvirate, thought that the rashness of Clodius might be of some use to perplex their measures, and stir up the people against them on proper occasions; or it humoured their spleen at least to see him insulting Pompey to his face. "Videtis igitur, hominem per seipsum jam pridem afflictum ac jacentem, perniciosus optimatum discordiis excitari.—Ne a republica reipub. pestis removeretur, restiterunt; etiam, ne causam diceret; etiam, ne privatus esset. Etiamne in sinu atque in deliciis quidam optimi viri viperam illam venenatam ac pestiferam habere potuerunt? Quo tandem decepti munere? 'Volo,' inquit, 'esse, qui in concione detrahat de Pompeio'."—De Harusp. Resp. 24. Beck. vol. 4. p. 596.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

than Clodius's mob, by a continual clamour of reproaches and invectives, endeavoured to hinder him from going on, or at least from being heard; yet Pompey, with a presence of mind which, in spite of their attempts, commanded silence, spoke for near three hours. When Clodius rose up to answer him, Milo's mob, in their turn, so disturbed and confounded him, that he was not able to speak a word; while a number of epigrams and lampoons upon him and his sister were thrown about, and publicly rehearsed among the multitude below, so as to make him quite furious; till recollecting himself a little, and finding it impossible to proceed in his speech, he demanded aloud of his mob, "Who it was that attempted to starve them by famine?" To which they presently cried out, "Pompey:" he then asked, "Who it was that desired to be sent into Egypt?" "Pompey," they cried out again. But when he asked, "Who it was that they themselves had a mind to send?" they answered, "Crassus:" for the old jealousy was now breaking out again between him and Pompey; and though he appeared that day on Milo's side, yet he was not, as Cicero says, a real well-wisher to him.

These warm proceedings among the chiefs brought on a fray below, among their partizans; the Clodians began the attack, but were repulsed by the Pompeians; and Clodius himself driven out of the rostra: Cicero, when he saw the affair proceed to blows, thought it high time to retreat towards home; but no great harm was done; for Pompey, having cleared the Forum of his enemies, presently drew off his forces to prevent any farther mischief or scandal on his side.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 2. 3.

The senate was presently summoned to provide some remedy for these disorders, where Pompey, who had drawn upon himself a fresh odium from his behaviour in the Egyptian affair, was severely handled by Bibulus, Curio, Favonius, and others: Cicero chose to be absent, since he must either have offended Pompey, by saying

nothing for him, or the honest party, by defending him. The same debate was carried on for several days, in which Pompey was treated very roughly by the tribune Cato, who inveighed against him with great fierceness, and laid open his perfidy to Cicero, to whom he paid the highest compliments, and was heard with much attention by all Pompey's enemies.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.
396th con-
sulship.

Pompey answered him with an unusual vehemence; and reflecting openly on Crassus, as the author of these affronts, declared, he would guard his life with more care than Scipio Africanus did, when Carbo murdered him.^p—These warm expressions seemed to open a prospect of some great agitation likely to ensue: Pompey consulted Cicero on the proper means of his security; and acquainted him with his apprehensions of a design against his life; that Cato was privately supported, and Clodius furnished with money by Crassus; and both of them encouraged by Curio, Bibulus, and the rest, who envied him; that it was necessary for him to look to himself, since the meaner people were wholly alienated, the nobility and senate generally disaffected, and the youth corrupted.

Cicero readily consented to join forces with him, and to summon their clients and friends from all parts of Italy. For, though he had no mind to fight his battles in the senate, he was desirous to defend his person from all violence, especially against Crassus, whom he never loved: they resolved likewise to oppose with united strength all the attempts of Clodius and Cato against Lentulus and Milo. Clodius, on the other hand, was not less busy in mustering his friends against the next hearing of Milo's cause: but as his strength was much inferior to that of his adversary, so he had no expectation of getting him condemned, nor any other view but to tease and harass him: for, after two hearings, the

Dio, p. 99.

^p N. B. That Scipio was murdered by Carbo, there is no shadow of proof. See vol. 3. b. 6. c. 9.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
salship.

Ad Q. Fr.
2. 6.

Ib. 2. 3.

Ep. Fam.
7. 1.

Middl.
p. 443.

affair was put off by several adjournments to the beginning of May ; from which time we find no farther mention of it.

The consul Marcellinus, who drew his colleague Philippus along with him, was a resolute opposer of the triumvirate, as well as of all the violences of the other magistrates : for which reason he resolved to suffer no assemblies of the people, except such as were necessary for the elections into the public offices : his view was to prevent Cato's law for recalling Lentulus, and the monstrous things (so Cicero calls them) which some were attempting at this time in favour of Cæsar. Cicero gives him the character of one of the best consuls that he had ever known, and blames him only in one thing ; for treating Pompey on all occasions so rudely ; which made Cicero often absent himself from the senate, to avoid taking part either on the one side or the other. For the support therefore of his dignity and interest in the city, he resumed his old task of pleading causes ;⁹ which was always popular and respectable, and in which he was sure to find full employment. His first cause was the defence of L. Bestia on the 10th of February, who, after the disgrace of a repulse from the prætorship in the last election, was accused of bribery and corruption in his suit for it ; and, notwithstanding the authority and eloquence of his advocate, was convicted and banished. He was a man extremely corrupt, turbulent, and seditious, had always been an enemy to Cicero, and supposed to be deeply engaged in Catiline's plot ; and is one instance of what Cicero says, that he was often forced, against his will, to defend certain persons who had not deserved it of him, by the intercession of those who had.

Cicero was about this time engaged in the defence of P. Sextius, the late tribune, accused of public violence, or breach of peace in his tribunate ; he had been a true

⁹ It is very remarkable that Cicero, to preserve his dignity, made himself advocate-general for all state-felons,

friend to Cicero in his distress, and borne a great part in his restoration: but fancying himself afterward neglected, or not sufficiently requited by him, had since his return been very cold to him, and even churlish. But Cicero, instead of resenting this, having heard that Sextius was indisposed, went in person to his house, and cured him of all his jealousies, by freely offering his assistance and patronage in pleading his cause; which he managed so well, that Sextius was acquitted, and in a manner the most honourable, by the unanimous suffrages of all the judges; and with a universal applause of Cicero's humanity and gratitude.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

Ad Q. Fr.
2. 3.

Ib. 4.

Pompey attended this trial as a friend to Sextius; while Cæsar's creature, Vatinius, appeared not only as an adversary, but as a witness against him: which gave Cicero an opportunity of exposing the whole course of his profligate life^r (as Sextius particularly desired), with all the keenness of his raillery, to the great diversion of the audience.^s Vatinius made some attempt in his turn to rally Cicero, and contemptuously reproached him with the baseness of changing sides, and becoming Cæsar's friend, on account of the fortunate state of his affairs.

Middl.
p. 444.

[For Cæsar, being in the career of his victories in Gaul,^t had lately sent a request to the senate, "that money might be decreed to him for the payment of his army; with a power of choosing ten lieutenants, for the better managing of the war, and the conquered provinces." It seemed strange, that, after all his conquests, he should not be able to maintain his army without money from home, at a time when the treasury was greatly exhausted: and the renewal of a commission, obtained at first by the people's favour, against the incli-

De Prov.
Cons. 12.
13.

^r We shall find that Cicero afterward, notwithstanding the profligacy of Vatinius's whole life, appeared as a witness to his general good behaviour.

^s This speech against Vatinius is still remaining, under the title of *the interrogation*; because it consists chiefly of a string of questions.

^t Cæsar's progress in conquest will be related hereafter, in an uninterrupted summary of his exploits.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 440.

nation of the senate, was of hard digestion. But Cæsar's interest prevailed, and Cicero himself was the promoter of it, and procured a decree to his satisfaction, yet not without disgusting the pretended patriots, those counterfeit republicans, scrupulously zealous against all extraordinary grants: but Cicero "alleged the extraordinary services of Cæsar, and that the course of his victories ought not to be checked by the want of necessary supplies, while he was so gloriously extending the bounds of the empire, and conquering nations whose names had never been heard before at Rome: and though it were possible for him to maintain his troops without their help, by the spoils of the enemy, yet those spoils ought to be reserved for the splendour of his triumph, which it was not just to defraud by their unseasonable parsimony."]

What Cicero says he replied to Vatinius, will be seen in a long letter he wrote two years after this time to Lentulus Spinther, which will be inserted in its proper year, with some observations upon it.

Ib. 445.

In the beginning of April, the senate granted the sum of 300,000*l.* to Pompey, to be laid out in purchasing corn for the use of the city, where there was still a great scarcity, and as great at the same time of money; so that the moving a point so tender could not fail of raising some ill-humour in the assembly: when Cicero, whose old spirit seems to have revived in him from his late success in Sextius's cause, surprised them by proposing, "that, in the present inability of the treasury to purchase the Campanian lands, which by Cæsar's act were to be divided to the people, the act itself should be reconsidered, and a day appointed for that deliberation:" the motion was received with a universal joy, and a kind of tumultuary acclamation: the enemies of the triumvirate were extremely pleased with it, in hopes that it would make a breach between Cicero and Pompey.

Ib. p. 446.

Pompey, whose nature was singularly reserved, ex-

pressed no uneasiness upon it, nor took any notice of it to Cicero, though they met and supped together familiarly, as they used to do: but he set forward soon after towards Afric, in order to provide corn; and, intending to call at Sardinia, proposed to embark at Pisa or Leghorn, that he might have an interview with Cæsar, who was now at Luca, the utmost limit of his Gallic government. He found Cæsar exceedingly out of humour with Cicero; for Crassus had already been with him at Ravenna, and greatly incensed him by his account of Cicero's late motion; which he complained of so heavily, that Pompey promised to use all his authority to induce Cicero to drop the pursuit of it; and for that purpose sent away an express to Rome, to entreat him not to proceed any farther in it till his return; and when he came afterward to Sardinia, where his lieutenant Quintus, the brother of Cicero, then resided, he entered immediately into an expostulation with him about it.—But of the effect of this remonstrance we shall have a full account in the long letter to Lentulus, just now referred to for another particular.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

Milo's trial being put off (as beforementioned) to the 5th of May, Cicero took the benefit of a short vacation to make an excursion into the country, and visit his estates and villas in different parts of Italy.—During this tour, his old enemy Gabinius, the proconsul of Syria, having gained some advantages in Judea against Aristobulus (who had been dethroned by Pompey, and carried prisoner to Rome, but had thence made his escape), sent public letters to the senate, to give an account of his victory, and to beg the decree of a thanksgiving for it. His friends took the opportunity of moving the affair in Cicero's absence, from whose authority they apprehended some obstruction; but the senate, in a full house, slighted Gabinius's letters, and rejected his suit: an affront which had never been offered before to any proconsul. Cicero was infinitely delighted with it, calls the

Middl.
p. 453.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 2. 8.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

Middl. p.
454, 455.

Vid. Argum.
Manutii in

Orat. de
Harusp.

Resp.

Dio, l. 39.
p. 100.

resolution divine, and was doubly pleased for its being the free and genuine judgment of the senate, without any struggle or influence on his part——.

Many prodigies were reported to have happened about this time in the neighbourhood of Rome; horrible noises under ground, with clashing of arms; and on the Alban hill, a little shrine of Juno, which stood on a table, facing the east, turned suddenly of itself towards the west. These terrors alarmed the city, and the senate consulted the haruspices, who were the public diviners or prophets of the state, skilled in all the Tuscan discipline of interpreting portentous events, who gave the following answer in writing, “That supplications must be made to Jupiter, Saturn, Neptune, and the other gods: that the solemn shows and plays had been negligently exhibited and polluted; sacred and religious places made profane; ambassadors killed contrary to law; faith and oaths disregarded; ancient and hidden sacrifices carelessly performed and profaned.—That the gods gave this warning, lest, by the discord and dissension of the better sort, dangers and destruction should fall upon the senate and the chiefs of the city; by which means the provinces would fall under the power of a single person, their armies be beaten, great loss ensue, and honours be heaped upon the unworthy and disgraced.”—

One may observe from this answer, that the diviners were under the direction of those, who endeavoured to apply the influence of religion to the cure of their civil disorders: each party interpreted it according to their own views: Clodius took a handle from it of venting his spleen afresh against Cicero; and, calling the people together for that purpose, attempted to persuade them, “that this divine admonition was designed particularly against him, and that the article of the civil and religious places referred to the case of his house, which, after a solemn consecration to religion, was rendered

again profane; charged all the displeasure of the gods to Cicero's account, who affected nothing less than a tyranny, and the oppression of their liberties."

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

Cicero made a reply to Clodius the next day in the senate, where, after a short and general invective upon his profligate life, "he leaves him (he says) a devoted victim to Milo, who seemed to be given to them by Heaven for the extinction of such a plague, as Scipio was for the destruction of Carthage: he declares the prodigy to be one of the most extraordinary which had ever been reported to the senate; but laughs at the absurdity of applying any part of it to him; since his house, as he proves at large, was more solemnly cleared from any service or relation to religion than any other house in Rome by the judgment of the priests, the senate, and all the orders of the city. Then running through the several articles of the answer, he shews them all to tally so exactly with the notorious acts and impieties of Clodius's life, that they could not possibly be applied to any thing else:—particularly, as to the violation of faith and oaths, that it related evidently to those judges who had absolved Clodius, as being one of the most memorable and flagrant perjuries which Rome had ever known; that the answer itself suggested this interpretation, when it subjoined that ancient and occult sacrifices were polluted, which could refer to nothing so properly as to the rites of the Bona Dea, which were the most ancient and the most occult of any in the city, celebrated with incredible secrecy to that goddess, whose name it was not lawful for them to know, and with ceremonies which no man ever pried into but Clodius."

396th consulship.

De Harusp.
Respons.
6. 10—18.

Middl.
p. 447.

About the middle of summer, and before the time of choosing new consuls, which was commonly in August, the senate began to deliberate on the provinces which were to be assigned to them at the expiration of their office. The consular provinces, about which the debate singly turned, were the two Gauls, which Cæsar now held;

Ib. p. 459.

De Prov.
Cons. 8, 9,
&c.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

Macedonia, which Piso ; and Syria, which Gabinius possessed. All who spoke before Cicero, excepting Servilius, were for taking one or both the Gauls from Cæsar ; which was what the senate generally desired : but when it came to Cicero's turn, he gladly laid hold on the occasion to revenge himself on Piso and Gabinius ; and exerted all his authority to get them recalled, with some marks of disgrace, and their governments assigned to the succeeding consuls ; but as for Cæsar, his opinion was, " That his command should be continued to him till he had finished the war, which he was carrying on with such success, and settled the conquered countries." This gave no small offence ; and the consul Philippus could not forbear interrupting and reminding him, " That he had more reason to be angry with Cæsar than with Gabinius himself ; since Cæsar was the author and raiser of all that storm which had oppressed him." But Cicero replied, " That, in this vote, he was not pursuing his private resentment, but the public good, which had reconciled him to Cæsar ; and that he could not be an enemy to one who was deserving so well of his country : that a year or two more would complete his conquests, and reduce all Gaul to a state of peaceful subjection : that the cause was widely different between Cæsar and the other two : that Cæsar's administration was beneficial, prosperous, glorious to the republic ; theirs scandalous, ignominious, hurtful to their subjects, and contemptible to their enemies."—In short, he managed the debate so, that the senate readily consented to leave Cæsar in the possession of his government, and to recall Piso from Macedonia ; but Gabinius was not now recalled from Syria.

Middl.
p. 465.

All people's eyes and inclinations began now to turn towards Cæsar, who, by the eclat of his victories,^x seemed to rival the fame of Pompey himself ; and by his address

^x Cæsar, in two campaigns (those of the years 695 and 696), had carried the Roman arms triumphantly through the very heart of Gaul, from the lake of Geneva to the German ocean ; and in the present year (697) had subdued the Veneti.

and generosity gained ground upon him daily in authority and influence in public affairs. After three prosperous campaigns, he spent the winter of 697 at Luca, whither a vast concourse of all ranks resorted to him from Rome. So great was the number of magistrates and other persons in command, who came to wait on him, that the lictors at his gate are reckoned to have amounted to 120.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th consulship.

Plut. in
Pomp. et
in Cæs.

At this interview of the triumvirs, it was privately agreed among them, that Pompey and Crassus, who were now again made friends by Cæsar, should jointly sue for the consulship, in order to defeat the hopes and designs of L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, one of the competitors, a professed enemy of the triumvirate; who, thinking himself sure of being elected, could not forbear boasting, “that he would effect, when consul, what he had not been able to do when prætor, rescind the acts of Cæsar, and recall him from his government:” for Cæsar had no sooner surrendered the consular fasces to his successors in that magistracy (the consuls of 695), than he was affronted and attacked by this same Domitius and C. Memmius, two of the then newly-chosen prætors (than whom Rome perhaps never produced two more consummate knaves^y), who called in question the validity of his acts, and made several rash efforts to get them annulled by public authority.

Sueton. in
Cæs. 24.

Ibid.

Pompey and Crassus, the better to conceal their design upon the consulship, let pass the time, when, according to custom, they should have put themselves among the candidates. And, because they thought it would be difficult to carry their point in an assembly where the consul Marcellinus presided, they laid a scheme to hinder all elections of magistrates during his

^y Of the impudent wickedness of these men we shall find a notable proof in one of Cicero's letters, when we come to the year 699. Yet, unworthy and detestable as Domitius was, Cicero thinks it a most sad thing, that this illustrious noble, a consul designed ever since he was born, should not be able at this time to obtain the consulship. “Quid enim hoc miserius, quam eum, qui, tot annos quot habet, designatus consul fuerit, consulem fieri non posse?” Ad Att. 4. 8. Dio, p. 103.

Year of
R O M E
697.
B. C. 55.

396th con-
sulship.

Dio, p. 103.
Ad Quint.
Fr. 2. 6.

year: their project happened to be favoured by the tribune C. Cato, the same who had formerly been so active in opposing the desires of Pompey with relation to the affair of king Ptolemy, and in endeavouring to get Lentulus Spinther recalled from Cilicia. Cato to revenge himself on Marcellinus for not suffering him to hold any assemblies of the people,^z for promulgating certain laws of his own fashion (disliked probably by the aristocratic worthies), would not suffer the consuls to hold any for the choice of the magistrates; and in this resolution he was supported by two of his colleagues, as well as by the triumvirate,^a till the year^b expired. The government fell into an interregnum.

Plut. in
Pomp.

^z It is likely, that the means employed by Marcellinus was to proclaim all the days on which assemblies of the people could lawfully be held, holidays. Crevier.

^a Plutarch tells us, that the secret treaty among the triumvirs having transpired, the partisans of the aristocracy were filled with indignation, and that the consul Marcellinus, to unmask Pompey, interrogated him in an assembly of the people, "Whether he had any intention to stand for the consulship?" Pompey answered, "that perhaps he would, and perhaps he would not:" but Crassus, when the same question was put to him by the consul, answered with more temper, "that he would do what should appear to him to be most for the benefit of the republic."

Val. Max.
6. 2.

Valerius Maximus writes, that, when Marcellinus was one day haranguing on the danger the city was in from the power of Pompey, and found himself encouraged by a general acclamation of the people, he said to them, "Cry out, citizens, cry out while you may; for it will not be long in your power to do so with safety."

Ib. 4.

He reports likewise, that Cn. Piso, a young nobleman, who had impeached Manilius Crispus, a man of prætorian rank, and notoriously guilty, being provoked by Pompey's protection of him, turned his attack against Pompey himself, and charged him with many crimes against the state: being asked therefore by Pompey, "Why he did not choose to impeach him rather than the criminal?" he briskly replied, "That if he would give bail to stand a trial, without raising a civil war, he would soon bring him before his judges."

Middl.
p. 460.

^b It was in this year, 697, that Cicero pleaded for Cornelius Balbus and M. Cœlius. Balbus was a native of Gades in Spain, of a splendid family in that city, who, for his fidelity and services to the Roman generals in that province, and especially in the Sertorian war, had the freedom of Rome conferred upon him by Pompey, in virtue of a law, which authorized him to grant it to as many as he thought proper. But Pompey's act was now called in question, as originally null and invalid, on a pretence, that the city of Gades was not within the terms of that alliance and relation to Rome which rendered the citizens capable of that privilege. Pompey and Crassus were his advocates: and, at their desire, Cicero also, who had the third place, or post of honour assigned him, to give the finishing hand to the cause. The prosecution was projected, not so much out of enmity to Balbus as to his patrons, Pompey and Cæsar, by whose favour he had acquired great wealth; being at this time general of the artillery to Cæsar, and the principal manager or steward of all his affairs. The judges gave sentence for him, and confirmed his right to the city; from which foundation he was raised afterward by Augustus to the consulate itself: his nephew also, young Balbus, who was made free with him at the same time, obtained the honour of a triumph for his victories over the Garamantes; and, as Pliny tells us, they were the only instances of foreigners and adopted citizens who had ever advanced themselves to either of these honours in Rome.

Pro Balb.
1, 2, &c.

Cœlius was a young gentleman of equestrian rank, of great parts and accomplish-

Hist. N.
7. 43.
Ib. 5. 5.
Middl.
p. 461.

CHAP. IV.

Pompey and Crassus are elected consuls for the year 698. The state of king Ptolemy's affairs at this time. Cato repulsed from the prætorship. Provinces assigned to the consuls, by the law of Trebonius, for five years. They attempt reformati-
 ons at home. Pompey's theatre. Piso returns to Rome ignominiously from his govern-
 ment of Macedonia. Crassus, in spite of bad omens, embarks for Syria (the pro-
 vince fallen to him by lot) even before the year of his consulship is expired. L.
 Domitius Ahenobarbus and Appius Claudius Pulcher are elected consuls for the
 year 699.

OF all those who had intended to present themselves
 candidates for the consulship of the year 698, L. Domi-
 tius alone persisted in the purpose of entering the lists
 against Pompey and Crassus; and his constancy per-

Year of
 R O M E
 698.
 B. C. 54.
 397th con-
 sulship.

ments, trained under the discipline of Cicero himself, to whose care he was committed
 by his father upon his first introduction into the Forum. Before he was of age to
 hold any magistracy, he had distinguished himself by two public impeachments: the
 one of C. Antonius, Cicero's colleague in the consulship, for the maleadministration
 of his province of Macedonia; the other of L. Atratinus, for bribery and corruption.
 Atratinus's son was now revenging his father's quarrel, and accused Cælius of pub-
 lic violence, for being concerned in the assassination of Dio, the chief of the Alex-
 andrian embassy; and of an attempt to poison Clodia, the sister of Clodius: he was
 a true libertine, and had been this lady's gallant; whose resentment, for her favours
 slighted by him, was the real source of all his trouble.—He was acquitted of both
 charges.

Vid. vol. 4.
 b. 9. c. 1.
 Vid. supr.
 p. 62.

Cicero seems to have composed a little poem about this time, in compliment to
 Cæsar; and excuses his not sending it to Atticus, "because Cæsar pressed to have
 it, and he had reserved no copy: though, to confess the truth (he says), he found it
 very difficult to digest the meanness of recanting his old principles. But adieu (says
 he), to all right, true, honest, counsels: it is incredible what perfidy there is in those
 who want to be leaders; and who really would be so, if there was any faith in them
 [he speaks of *the honest*]. I felt what they were to my cost, when I was drawn in,
 deserted, and betrayed by them: I resolved still to act on with them in all things,
 but found them the same as before; till by your advice I came at last to a better
 mind. You will tell me, that you advised me indeed to act, but not to write; it is
 true; but I was willing to put myself under a necessity of adhering to my new al-
 liance [with the triumvirs], and preclude the possibility of returning to those who,
 instead of pitying me, as they ought, never cease envying me.—But since those, who
 have no power, will not love me, my business is to acquire the love of those who
 have. You will say, I wish that you had done it long ago; I know you wished it;
 and I was a mere ass for not minding you."

Middl.
 p. 462.
 Ad Att. 4.
 5.
 Ad Quint.
 2. 15.

In this year also, Cicero wrote that celebrated letter to Lucceius, in which he
 presses him to attempt the history of his transactions. Lucceius had just finished
 the history of the Italic and Marian civil wars, with intent to carry it down through
 his own times, and, in the general relation, to include, as he had promised, a parti-
 cular account of Cicero's acts: but Cicero, who was pleased with his style and man-
 ner of writing, labours in this letter to engage him to postpone the design of his con-
 tinued history, and enter directly on that separate period: "from the beginning of
 his consulship to his restoration, comprehending Catiline's conspiracy and his own
 exile:" and he desires this historian-friend, "to allow so much to friendship and
 affection, as not to confine himself to the strict laws of history and the rules of truth,
 but to exceed those bounds in his praises." Ep. Fam. l. 5. 12.

Middl.
 p. 463.

A little before Cicero's return from exile, his son-in-law Piso Frugi died. Tullia,
 having lived a widow about two months, was married this year to Furius Crassipes;
 who, though little is said of him, seems to have been a nobleman of principal rank
 and figure. The wedding-feast was held at Cicero's house on the 6th of April.

Ib. p. 450.
 Ad Quint.
 2. 4.
 Ep. Fam.
 1. 7.

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th con-
sulship.

Plut. in
Cat.

haps was owing to Cato's management, whose sister Porcia he had married: Cato pressed him to perseverance, by saying, that not his own elevation, but the liberty^c of the Romans, was the interest in question.

Plutarch reports, that when Domitius, accompanied by Cato, went before day to the Campus Martius to solicit votes, he fell into an ambush prepared by his rivals: the slave who carried the flambeau before him was killed, and Cato wounded in the arm: the latter nevertheless exhorted Domitius to fight it out to his last breath; but the intimidated candidate thought it more prudent to go home. So that Pompey and Crassus, without farther opposition, were elected consuls.^d

Pompey, when, in concert with his two associates, he had entertained new schemes of ambition, laid aside all thoughts of obtaining for himself the commission to restore king Ptolemy; and, in appearance at least, became willing to serve Lentulus in that affair. This change of his disposition gave occasion to the two following letters from Cicero to that proconsul. The first was probably written (if not in the end of 697) in the beginning of 698, during the interregnum, and before the election of Pompey and Crassus to the consulship; the second after that election.

TO PUBLIUS LENTULUS, PROCONSUL.

L. 1. Ep. 7.
Ed. Græv.
b. 2. let. 2.
Melm.

“ I have received your letter, wherein you assure me, that the frequent accounts I send of your affairs, together with the convincing proofs I have given you of my friendship, are circumstances extremely agreeable to you. — If you do not hear from me as frequently as you wish, it is solely because I dare not trust my letters to every conveyance. — —

^c What a worthy champion this Domitius was of the laws and liberties of Rome, we shall see presently: but the villain was Cato's brother-in-law, and Cæsar's enemy: and there we find his merit.

^d This was the second time of their being consuls: in their first consulship they were colleagues, as now.

“ It is not easy to give a satisfactory answer to your inquiry concerning the sincerity of your professed friends, and the disposition of others in general towards you. This only I will venture to say, that a certain party, and particularly those who have the strongest obligations, as well as the greatest abilities, to distinguish themselves in your service, look upon you with envy : that (agreeably to what I have myself experienced upon a different occasion) those whom, in justice to your country, you have necessarily offended, are your avowed opposers ; as others, whose interest and honours you have generously supported, are much less inclined to remember your favours than to oppose your glory. These are circumstances, indeed, which I long suspected, and have often intimated to you ; but of which I am now most thoroughly convinced. I observed upon the same occasion (and I believe I told you so in a former letter), both Hortensius and Lucullus to be extremely in your interest : as among those who were in the magistracy, Lucius Racilius^e appeared very sincerely and affectionately to espouse your cause. But, excepting the two former, I cannot name any of the consulars who discovered the least degree of friendship towards you when your affair was before the senate. As for my own endeavours, they might perhaps be generally considered as flowing rather from those singular favours I have received at your hands, than from the uninfluenced dictates of my real sentiments. With regard to Pompey, he seldom attended the house at that season : but I must do him the justice to say, he often takes an opportunity, without my previously leading him into the subject, of discoursing with me concerning your affair ; as well as very willingly enters into the conversation, whenever I start it myself. Your last letter, I perceived, was extremely agreeable to him : and I could not but observe, with equal admira-

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th con-
sulship.

Tribune in
697. Pigh.

^e Dr. Middleton dates this letter in 697, Mr. Melmoth in 698. If this was written in 697, it would seem to have been in December, after the tribuneship of Racilius was expired.

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th con-
sulship.

Vid. supr.
p. 71.

tion and pleasure, the polite and most judicious manner in which you addressed him. Before he received this letter, he seemed a little inclined to suspect, that the notion which some had entertained, of his inclination to be your competitor, had alienated you from him. But you have now wholly fixed that excellent man in your interest; who, in truth, had all the antecedent reasons for being so, that an uninterrupted series of the highest services could possibly give him.^f I must confess he always appeared to me, even when the conduct of Caninius had raised the strongest suspicions of the contrary,^g to favour your interest: but I can now assure you, that I found him, after he had perused your letter, entirely disposed to promote whatever may contribute either to your interest or your honour. You may consider then what I am going to offer as his immediate sentiments and advice: as indeed it is the result of frequent consultations which we have held together.

“We are of opinion, that it may be proper for you to consider, whether any advantages may be derived from your being in possession of Cilicia and Cyprus. For if there should appear a sufficient probability of being able to make yourself master of Alexandria and Egypt, we think it equally for your honour, and that of the republic, to march thither with your army, supported by your fleet;^h having first left the king at Ptolemais, or some

Vid. supr.
p. 49.

Melm.
p. 95.

Ib. p. 96.

^f Lentulus, during his consulate, had proposed and carried that law in favour of Pompey, by which he was commissioned to provide corn in a time of scarcity, a commission which in effect invested him with the whole power of the Roman empire.

^g “It was a usual artifice with Pompey to employ his friends in soliciting those honours in his behalf, to which he affected to appear himself perfectly indifferent, or even averse. This was his policy in the present instance: and at the same time that he pretended to serve Lentulus, in this affair, his creature Caninius, a tribune of the people, was practising every stratagem to procure the commission for Pompey.—But when Pompey found that this was impracticable, he pretended a friendship for Lentulus, and joined with Cicero in giving the advice which makes a great part of this letter.”

^h It is very remarkable, that “Cicero makes the very measures, which he here so strongly recommends to Lentulus, an article of his charge against Antony. For when the senate, after various debates, had resolved entirely to drop the affair of the king’s restoration, Ptolemy applied himself to Gabinius, proconsul of Syria, who, upon the promise of 10,000 talents, and at the recommendation of Pompey, boldly undertook and effected his restoration, without being authorized by any legal commission for that purpose: and it was by the persuasion of Antony, who commanded

other convenient place in that neighbourhood. By these means, when you shall have quieted the disturbances in Alexandria, and secured it by a proper number of forces, Ptolemy may safely take possession of his kingdom. Thus he will be restored by you, as the senate had once decreed: and restored too without an army, agreeably to the sentiments of those who insist upon observing the injunctions of the oracle. We are the rather confirmed in recommending this measure, as there is no decree of the senate subsisting, which particularly prohibits you from replacing Ptolemy on his throne. As to the order, which absolutely forbids all assistance whatever to be given to him, you know it was not only protested against, when it was voted, but is generally looked upon rather as the warm dictates of an exasperated faction, than as having the full authority of a decree of the senate. However, we deem it necessary to add, that we are sensible the world will judge of the propriety of this scheme entirely by the event. Should it succeed as we wish, your policy and resolution will universally be applauded: on the other hand, should it miscarry, it will undoubtedly be condemned as an action of ill-considered and unwarrantable ambition. How far this enterprise may be practicable, you, who are situated almost within view of Egypt, are the most competent judge. If, therefore, you are well satisfied of being able to render yourself master of that kingdom, we are clearly of opinion you should not delay your march one moment: but if you are doubtful of the success, it is our advice that you by no means make the attempt. This I will venture to assure you, that, should you execute this project in the manner we wish, there will be a very considerable party

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th con-
sulship.

the Roman cavalry, that Gabinius engaged in that enterprise. This affords a topic of great indignation in one of the Philippics; and Cicero there speaks of this transaction as a most impudent violation of all authority, both sacred and civil: 'Inde iter (says he) ad Alexandriam contra senatus auctoritatem, contra rempublicam et religiones.' Philip. 2. 19. But what opinion must every unprejudiced reader conceive of our author, when he finds him condemning and approving the same transactions, and advising his friend to pursue a step which he afterward publicly and justly reproached in his adversary?"

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th con-
sulship.

to give it applause, even during your absence; as all Rome will unite in the same approbation, the moment you shall return amongst us. Nevertheless I am persuaded, if this scheme should not take the desired effect, it may be attended with very disagreeable consequences to yourself; not only upon account of that order of the senate which I just now mentioned, but likewise in regard to the oracle. When, therefore, I recommend such measures as you shall have full assurance will terminate in your glory, I must at the same time strongly dissuade you from engaging in them, if you should have the least reason to apprehend an opposition. For (I repeat it again) the world will be determined in their opinion of this whole transaction, not as it is reasonable, but as it shall be successful. If the method here proposed should appear too dangerous to be hazarded in your own person, we think it may at least be advisable to assist the king with a number of your forces, provided he shall give sufficient security to your friends in the province, for repaying them the money they have advanced in support of his cause. And the circumstances and situation of your government render it extremely easy either to promote or obstruct his restoration, as you shall see proper. After all, you are the best judge what method will be most expedient to pursue: I thought it my part, however, to inform you of these our concurrent sentiments." [N. B. Lentulus, wisely judging the affair too hazardous for one of his dignity and fortunes, left it to a man of a more desperate character, Gabinius.]

"You congratulate me on the present situation of my affairs in general, and particularly on the friendship of Milo, together with the vain and ineffectual schemes of the worthless Clodius. It is no wonder you should rejoice in these the generous effects of your own amicable offices. But to say truth, such an incredible perverseness (not to give it a more severe appellation) prevails amongst a certain party, that they rather choose to ali-

enate me by their jealousies from the common cause, than to retain me in that interest by their favour and encouragement.¹ I will own to you, their malice has almost driven me from those principles which I have so long and so invariably pursued. At least, if they have not provoked me so far, as to make me forget the dignity of my character, they have taught me that it is high time I should act with a view likewise to my own safety. I might, consistently with the highest views of patriotism, reconcile both these distinct ends, were there any honour or fortitude in those of consular rank [the venerable bench of consulars]. But such a meanness of spirit in general prevails among them, that, instead of applauding the resolution with which my actions have been ever uniformly directed in the cause of the commonwealth, they look with envy upon those dignities to which my public services have advanced me. I the rather mention this, as it is to you that I am principally indebted, not only for the happiness of being restored to my country, but almost for my very first successful steps in the paths of patriotism and of glory.—

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th con-
sulship.

“As to your inquiry concerning the situation of public affairs, there are great divisions amongst us; but the zeal and prudence of the respective parties are by no means equal. Those who enjoy the largest share of wealth and power have gained a superiority of credit likewise by the folly and instability of their antagonists; they have obtained from the senate, with very little opposition, what they had no hopes of receiving even from the people, without raising great disturbances. Accordingly the house has voted Cæsar a sum of money for the payment of his army, together with a power of nominating ten lieutenants; as they have also, without the least

¹ Cicero at this time was falling into the measures of Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus; measures which he thought to be contrary to the true interest of his country: he endeavours here therefore to palliate, as well as he can, this unworthy conduct: but as he enters more fully into the motives of it in Ep. Fam. l. 1. 9. the reader is referred to that epistle, which will be presently inserted. Melm.

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th con-
sulship.

difficulty, dispensed with the Sempronian law^k for appointing him a successor.¹ [‘—Et stipendium Cæsari decretum est, et decem legati; et ne lege Sempronia succederetur, facile perfectum est.’]

“ I do but slightly touch upon these particulars, as I cannot reflect on our affairs with any satisfaction. However, I mention them as suggesting a useful caution to both of us, to preserve a proper poise between our interest and our honour, and not to advance one by an undue depression of the other. A maxim this, which I have learned, not so much from my favourite philosophy, as from sad experience; and which I would recommend to you ere you are taught it by the same displeasing method of conviction.”—

TO THE SAME.

L. 1. Ep. 8.
Ed. Græv.
b. 2. let. 4.
Melm.

“ Marcus Plætorius will fully inform you of the promises we have received from Pompey, together with every thing that has hitherto been attempted or effected in your favour. He was not only present indeed, but a principal agent throughout the whole proceedings; as he acted in every article of your concerns agreeably to what might be expected from a judicious, vigilant, and an affectionate friend. To him likewise I must refer you for an account of public affairs; as I know not well what to say of them myself. Thus much, however, I can assure you, that they are in the hands (and in the

Vid. supr.
vol. 4. b. 9.
c. 1.

Plut. in
Cæs.

Melm.
p. 104.

^k What Cicero here means by saying the senate had dispensed with the Sempronian law for appointing a successor to Cæsar, I confess I understand not. The government of Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum had been granted to Cæsar, at the motion of the tribune Vatinius, by a law of the people, for the term of five years. It would seem therefore, that the senate could have no right, in virtue of the Sempronian law, or any other law, to appoint him a successor before the expiration of that term.

¹ —“ Cicero was the chief adviser and promoter of these very measures, which he here condemns. If this were a fact which stood upon the credit of historians, the passage before us would strongly incline one to suspect that they had misrepresented the truth. But we have a testimony to produce, which, though of undoubted authority, is the last one should have expected in the case: for it is the testimony of Cicero himself. In a speech which he pronounced at the bar, either a little before or soon after the date of this letter, he mentions each of these particular grants, which he enumerates to Lentulus, and then adds: ‘Harum ego sententiarum et princeps et auctor fui.’” Orat. pro Balb. 27.

hands they are likely to remain) of our professed friends.^m As for myself, both gratitude and prudence, together with your particular advice, have determined me, as they ought, to join in hisⁿ interest, whom you were formerly desirous of associating with you in mine. You are sensible, nevertheless, how difficult it is to renounce our old and habitual notions of politics; especially under a full persuasion of their rectitude. However, I conform myself to his system, since I cannot with any decency oppose him: and, whatever some may perhaps imagine, I am by no means acting in this a counterfeit part. The truth of it is, Pompey has gained such an absolute possession of my esteem, that I begin to look upon every thing as just and reasonable which falls in with his interest or inclination. I should think too it would be no imprudent resolution, even in his adversaries themselves, to desist from an opposition to which they are evidently unequal. In the meantime, I have the satisfaction to find the world in general agreed, that my character requires I should support, or, at least, not obstruct, the measures of Pompey: while some are even of opinion, I may reasonably retire from all public business to my favourite pursuits of a literary kind. And, indeed, were I not prevented by my friendship to Pompey, I should most certainly adopt this latter scheme, as of all others the most suitable to my inclinations. For I can now no longer maintain that dignity in the senate, and that freedom in the commonwealth, which was the single motive of my ambition, and the sole end I proposed to myself in all my labours: a misfortune, however, which is not peculiar to myself, but extends to every Roman in general. In a word, I am under the sad necessity, either of tamely submitting to the sentiments of those few who lead the republic, or of imprudently joining in a weak and fruitless opposition.^o I the rather mention this,

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th consulship.

^m Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus.

ⁿ Pompey.

Melm.

^o A determined patriot could not have been reduced to the alternatives which Cicero here mentions, as there was a third expedient, which every man of strict politi-

p. 113.

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th con-
sulship

Vid. vol. 4.
b. 8. c. 11.
Y. R. 692.

that you may deliberate, before you return amongst us, what part it may be advisable for you to act in the present conjuncture. To speak freely, the measures both of those of senatorian and equestrian rank, and, indeed, the whole system of the commonwealth in general, are totally changed. All, therefore, that I have now to wish, is the preservation of the public tranquillity; which those who are in the administration seem to give us a prospect of enjoying, if a certain party could be prevailed upon to submit with less impatience to their power. As to any hopes of supporting in the senate that true consular character of a firm and inflexible patriot, it is in vain now to expect it: every means for that purpose is totally lost, by the mistaken conduct of those who disobliged Pompey,^p and dissolved that strong union which subsisted between the senate and the equestrian order.

“But to return to what more immediately relates to your own private affairs:—Pompey is extremely your friend: and, by all that I can observe, you may obtain any thing you shall desire during his consulship.^q At least I shall solicit him very strenuously for that purpose: as you may rely on my most active offices in every instance where you are concerned. I am well persuaded my assiduity on this occasion will not be disagreeable to him: on the contrary, he will receive it with pleasure, were it for no other reason than as affording him a proof of my grateful disposition. In the meantime I entreat you to believe, that whatever bears the least connexion

Vid. vol. 4.
p. 130.

cal integrity, who dared to act up to his principles, would undoubtedly have embraced. “An honest physician (says Sir William Temple) is excused for leaving his patient when he finds the disease grown desperate, and can by his attendance expect only to receive his own fees, without any hopes or appearance of deserving them.” Our author, in one of his orations, mentions it to the immortal honour of the celebrated Metellus, that “*de civitate decedere quam de sententia maluit*,” and he who is actuated by the same sublime patriotism, will never find himself under the poor necessity of justifying wrong measures by the impossibility of enforcing right ones.

^p Cato, Metellus, Celer, Lucullus, and others, had opposed Pompey's desire of having his acts in Asia confirmed by the senate.

^q Pompey and Crassus were at this time consuls.

with your interest, is of more importance to me than my own. From these sentiments it is that I despair, not only of being able to return, but, even sufficiently to acknowledge, the infinite obligations I owe you. Though at the same time I am conscious of having exerted, on all occasions, the most unwearied endeavours in your service.

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th con-
sulship.

“It is rumoured here, that you have obtained a complete victory:” and we impatiently expect an express with the confirmation of this agreeable news. I have already talked with Pompey upon this subject: and, as soon as your courier arrives, I shall employ my utmost diligence in convening the senate. In fine, were I to perform much more for your interest than lies within the narrow compass of my present power, I should still think I had fallen far short of what you have a right to expect. Farewell.”

DURING the continuance of the tumults occasioned by the election of new consuls, Cicero retired into the country to one of his villas on the delightful shore of Baiae, the chief place of resort and pleasure for the great and rich. Pompey came thither in the month of April, and no sooner arrived than he sent his compliments to Cicero; and he spent his whole time with him: they had much discourse on public affairs, in which Pompey expressed great uneasiness, and owned himself dissatisfied with his own part in them: but Cicero, in his account of the conversation, intimates some suspicion of his sincerity.—In the same letter he mentions a current report at Puteoli, that king Ptolemy was restored, and desires to know what account they had of it at Rome. The report was very true: for Gabinius, tempted by Ptolemy’s gold, and the plunder of Egypt, and encouraged also, as some write, by Pompey himself, under-

Ad Att. 4.
10.

Ib. 9.

Middl.
p. 469.

Dio, l. 39.
p. 116, &c.

* By a posterior letter from Cicero to Lentulus it appears, that this proconsul was saluted imperator by his soldiers: it was probably for the victory here mentioned: 1. 9. but against what power the battle was fought is no where said.

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th con-
sulship.

Vid. vol. 4.
p. 375.

Vid. vol. 4.
p. 362. 371.
374.

Jos. Antiq.
l. 4. 10.
et de Bell.
Jud. 1. 6.
Vid. supr.
p. 81.

Dio. l. 39.
App. in
Parth. et
Syr.
Plut. in
Crass. et
in Anton.

Vid. supr. p.
61. note (g).

took to replace him on the throne with his Syrian army; which he executed with a high hand and the destruction

* Scaurus, whom Pompey left in Syria, did nothing there to gain him much honour. Neither did Philippus nor Marcellinus, who had the province of Syria successively after Scaurus, distinguish themselves by any considerable exploits. The incursions and depredations of the Arabs, whom those commanders could not totally suppress, served for a pretext to Clodius to make Syria a consular province, and he recompensed Gabinus with it, who, during his consulship, had so well served him in his attack upon Cicero.

Judea, dependent on the government of Syria, was agitated by great commotions when Gabinus arrived there. It has been mentioned that Pompey decided the quarrel between the two brothers, Hyrcanus and Aristobulus, in favour of the former, to whom he gave the office of high-priest, and the authority of command, but without the diadem; and that he carried away Aristobulus, with his two sons, Alexander and Antigonus, and two daughters, prisoners. Alexander made his escape on the road, returned into Judea, and after concealing himself some time, got together a sufficient number of his father's party to dispossess Hyrcanus. He thought likewise of fortifying himself against the power of the Romans, by building the walls of Jerusalem which Pompey had thrown down.

Gabinus quickly reduced Alexander to sue for favour: nor did he refuse him his life and liberty. But though he brought back Hyrcanus to Jerusalem, and put him again in possession of the high-priesthood, he gave a new form to the government of the nation, making it aristocratical. He divided all the country into five provinces, and in each of these created a sovereign council.

It was on his pacification of Judea, that Gabinus made application to the senate to be honoured with a public thanksgiving, called supplications, and met with a refusal.

He was preparing to carry the war into the country of the Arabs, when the hopes of a richer booty than he could find among them, made him turn towards Parthia.

Phraates, king of Parthia, had been murdered by his own sons, Orodes and Mithridates, who afterward contended with one another for the crown. Mithridates, finding himself the weaker, had recourse to Gabinus. He came to the Roman camp, accompanied by Orsanes, the most illustrious of the Parthian nobles; and by presents and promises he engaged the proconsul to undertake his cause: but when Gabinus had passed the Euphrates with his army, the prospect of a yet richer prey, and more easy to be acquired, brought him quickly back again. For Ptolemy Auletes came to him with recommendatory letters from Pompey, and with a promise from himself of 10,000 talents, on condition that he would replace him on the throne of Egypt. The greater part of the Roman officers did not approve of the enterprise, as being prohibited by a decree of the senate, and the oracle of the Sibyl. But Mark Antony [the future triumvir], who commanded the cavalry, being gained by Ptolemy, and not being religiously scrupulous, counselled and determined Gabinus to the undertaking.

After the death of Seleucus Cybiosactes, whom his queen Berenice put to death, as has been before mentioned, Archelaus (the son of that Archelaus who had commanded Mithridates's army, but pretending to be that king's son) offered himself to the Alexandrians to be their king, and was accepted of by them. The only difficulty was how to get away from the Roman army, which he had joined, with the intention of accompanying Gabinus into Parthia; for Gabinus, having been informed of what was in agitation, kept a watch upon him. However, he made his escape; and, if we may believe Dio, by connivance of the Roman commander, who was willing that Egypt, by possessing an able general, might be in a condition to make the greater resistance, and thereby furnish him with a pretence to raise the price of his services. Archelaus came to Alexandria, married queen Berenice, was recognized king, and made preparations to defend his crown.

On Gabinus's arrival on the borders of Egypt, he detached Antony with the horse to seize the passes, and open the way for the army to follow. Antony was greatly assisted by Antipater the Idumean, who not only furnished him with money, arms, and provisions, but made the conquest of Pelusium,* the key of Egypt on that side, easy to him, by gaining the Jews, who were settled in the neighbourhood of it.†

* Damietta.

† They had here a temple, built by Onias, after the model of that at Jerusalem.

of all the king's enemies, in open defiance of the authority of the senate, and the direction of the Sibyl. This made a great noise at Rome; and irritated the people to such a degree, that they resolved to make him feel their displeasure for it very severely at his return.

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th con-
sulship.

Cicero stayed in the country till the beginning of May, much out of humour, and disgusted both with the republic and himself. Atticus's constant advice to him was, to consult his safety and interest, by uniting himself with the men of power; and they, on their part, were as constantly inviting him to it, by all possible assurances of their affection: but in his answers to Atticus he observes, "That their two cases were very different; that Atticus, having no peculiar character, suffered no peculiar indignity; nothing but what was common to all the citizens; whereas his own condition was such, that if he spoke what he ought to do, he should be looked upon as a madman; if what was useful only to himself, as a slave; if nothing at all, as quite oppressed and subdued: that his uneasiness was the greater, because he could not shew it without being thought ungrateful.— Shall I withdraw myself then (says he) from business, and retire to the port of ease? That will not be allowed me. Shall I follow those leaders to the wars, and, after having refused a command, submit to be commanded? I will do so; for I see that it is your advice, and wish that I had always followed it. Or shall I resume my post, and enter again into affairs? I cannot persuade myself to that, but begin to think Philoxenus in the right, who chose to be carried back to prison, rather than commend the tyrant's verses. This is what I am now meditating, to declare my dislike at least of what they are doing."

Middl.
p. 467.

Ad Att.
4. 6.

Diod. Sic.
l. 15.
p. 331.

The proconsul arrived at this place, entered Egypt with all his forces, fought several battles, and at length, by the death of Archelaus, who was killed in the last action, remained master of Alexandria, and the whole kingdom of Egypt, which he surrendered to Ptolemy. Antony caused funeral honours to be performed for Archelaus: but the king put his own daughter, queen Berenice, to death; as also the richest of the Alexandrians, that with their spoils he might be the better able to satisfy the engagements he had entered into with Gabinus.

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 476.
Plut. in
Cat.

Ad Quint.
2. 9.

Plut. in
Cat. et in
Pomp.

Val. Max.
7. 5.

Plut. in
Pomp.

Dio, l. 39.
p. 109.

The city continued, for a great part of this summer, without its inferior annual magistrates: for the elections, which had been postponed from the last year, were still kept off by the consuls till they could settle them to their minds, which they effected at last, excepting in the case of two tribunes. But the most remarkable repulse was of M. Cato from the prætorship: for the consuls, apprehending the trouble which in that office he might give them, resolved to disappoint him, if possible: and, in order to secure his competitors from impeachments for bribery, engaged the senate to decree, that the new prætors should enter upon their office without an interval of sixty days between the nomination and the taking possession; an interval usually allowed for examining whether bribery had been practised in the election, and for prosecuting the guilty. The pretence for this decree was, that, so much of the year being spent, the whole would pass without any prætors at all, if a liberty of impeaching was allowed. "From this moment (says Cicero) they have given the exclusion to Cato, and, being masters of all, resolve that all the world shall know it."

The first century, without a bribe, gave their votes for Cato. Pompey hereupon pretended that he saw something inauspicious in the heavens, and broke up the assembly. The two consuls afterward bestirred themselves so successfully, as to get Cato excluded, and Vatinius chosen, who had been repulsed the year before with disgrace from the ædileship.

In the assemblies for the election of ædiles, the conflict between the contending parties proved to be a bloody one. It is said, that Pompey's robe was stained with the blood of some that were slain near him; and that sending it home, when they had brought him another, his wife was so frightened at the sight of it, that she miscarried.

When all the magistrates were chosen, the tribune

Trebonius proposed to the people a law for the assignment of provinces to the consuls for the term of five years, with the power of raising what forces they thought fit. Pompey took upon himself to propose a law in favour of Cæsar, that after the expiration of the five years which had been already granted him, he should hold the government of the Gauls for five years more. This law was opposed by the generality of the senate, and above all by Cato, Favonius (his great admirer and imitator), and two of the tribunes, C. Ateius Capito, and P. Aquilius Gallus: but the superior force of the consuls and the other tribunes prevailed.

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th consulship.

Plut. in
Cat. in
Pomp. et
in Crass.

The consuls applied themselves, in the beginning of their administration, to the work of reformation. With a view to remedy the most scandalous practice of corruption in judiciary affairs, they made several new laws, and with more rigorous penalties than those already denounced; and they ordained, that the judges should be taken from the richest of the citizens; imagining, doubtless, that poverty had induced some judges to suffer themselves to be gained by presents: but could a strict regard to justice be with more reason expected from those who were become rich by all sorts of crimes? The consuls prepared likewise certain sumptuary laws. What animated their zeal in this particular was, perhaps, the excessive luxury in which their principal adversaries lived, the chiefs of the aristocratic faction. Hortensius did not conceal his taste, but took upon him boldly to defend the excess in question, by calling it magnificence and nobleness becoming the grandeur of the commonwealth. Notwithstanding this spirit of reformation, which animated the consuls, Pompey transgressed the ancient discipline by the construction, at his own expense, of a permanent theatre: for, till that time, there had never been any theatre built in Rome to continue longer than while the shows lasted that were to be then exhibited.*

Freinshem.

Ep. Fam.
7. 26.
Crevier,
tom. 12.
p. 445.

Plut. in
Pomp.

* Pompey's theatre is much celebrated by the ancients for its grandeur and mag-

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th con-
sulship.

Vid. supr.
p. 84.
Middl. p.
470.
In Pison.
16, &c.

It has been mentioned, that a decree of the senate had passed for recalling Piso from his government of Macedonia. He returned to Rome about this time, after an inglorious administration of a province, whence no consular senator had ever returned but to triumph. For though, on account of some trifling advantage in the field, he had procured himself to be saluted emperor by his army, yet the occasion was so contemptible, that he durst not send any letters upon it to the senate: but, after oppressing the subjects, plundering the allies, and losing the best part of his troops against the neighbouring barbarians, who invaded and laid waste the country, he ran away in disguise from a mutiny of the soldiers, whom he disbanded at last without their pay. When he arrived at Rome, he stripped his fasces of their laurels, and entered the city obscurely and ignominiously, without any other attendance than his own retinue. On his first appearance in public, trusting to the authority of his son-in-law Cæsar, he had the hardiness to attack Cicero, and complain to the senate of his injurious treatment of him: but when he began to reproach

Middl.
p. 473.
Pliny, Hist.
7. 3.

Ad Att.
4. 9.
Aul. Gell.
10. 1.
Vid. Tert.
de Spectac.
Plin. l. 8. 7.
Dio, p. 107.
Plut. in
Pomp.

De Off.
2. 16.

nificence: the plan was taken from the theatre of Mitylene, but greatly enlarged, so as to receive commodiously 40,000 people. It was surrounded by a portico to shelter the company in bad weather, and had a curia or senate-house annexed to it; with a basilica also, or grand hall, proper for the sitting of judges, or any other public business: which were all finished at Pompey's cost, and adorned with a great number of images of men and women, famed for something very remarkable or prodigious in their lives and characters. Atticus undertook the care of placing all these statues; for which Pompey charged Cicero with his thanks to him. What made this fabric the more surprising and splendid, was a beautiful temple, erected at one end of it to Venus the Conqueress: and so contrived, that the seats of the theatre might serve as stairs to the temple. This was designed, it is said, to avoid the reproach of making so vast an expense for the mere use of luxury; the temple being so placed, that those who came to the shows might seem to come to worship the goddess. At the solemnity of this dedication, Pompey entertained the people with the most magnificent shows, which had ever been exhibited in Rome: in the theatre, were stage-plays, prizes of music, wrestlings, and all kinds of bodily exercise: in the circus, the horse-races, and huntings of wild beasts for five days successively, in which 500 lions were killed; on the last day twenty elephants; whose lamentable howlings, when mortally wounded, raised such a commiseration in the multitude, from a vulgar notion of their great sense and love to man, that it destroyed the whole diversion of the shows, and drew curses upon Pompey himself for being the author of so much cruelty. So true it is, what Cicero observes of this kind of prodigality, that there is no real dignity or lasting honour in it; that it satiates while it pleases, and is forgotten as soon as it is over. It gives us, however, a genuine idea of the wealth and grandeur of those principal subjects of Rome, who, from their private revenues, could raise such noble buildings, and provide such shows, from the several quarters of the world, which no monarch on earth is now able to exhibit.

him with the disgrace of his exile, he was interrupted by a loud and general clamour of the assembly.^u

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

The consuls having drawn lots for the provinces assigned them by the law of Trebonius, Syria fell to Crassus, agreeably to his wishes; Spain to Pompey, who was no less pleased with his fortune, having no mind to a command that would carry him far out of the way. His scheme was constantly to conduct the affairs of the city; and this scheme he pursued so faithfully, that for the six years during which he was proconsul of Spain, he never set foot in his province, but governed it by his lieutenants; a thing without example in the commonwealth: but the superintendence of provisions, with which he was charged, furnished him with a specious pretence to continue at Rome.

397th consulship.

Dio, Plut.
in Crass. et
in Pomp.

As for Crassus, whose heart was now fixed on the imagined boundless wealth of Parthia, he was in such haste to set forward on his eastern expedition, that he left Rome above two months before the expiration of his consulship: but his eagerness to involve the republic in a desperate war, for which the Parthians had given no pretext, was generally detested. The tribune Ateius declared it impious, and prohibited by all the auspices: and when he found Crassus determined to march, he waited for him at the gates of the city, and having there ready a kind of chafing-dish, with fire in it, he threw thereon perfumes, and poured libations; and invoking certain gods with frightful names, devoted him, as he passed by, to destruction.^x

Middl.
p. 478.

Plut. in
Crass.

^u Among other things with which he upbraided Cicero, he told him, that it was not any envy for what he had done, but the vanity of what he had said, which had driven him into exile; and that a single verse of his,

Middl.
p. 471.

“Cedant arma togæ, concedat laurea linguæ,”

was the cause of all his calamity; by provoking Pompey to make him feel how much the power of the general was superior to that of the orator: he put him in mind also, that it was mean and ungenerous to exert his spleen only against such whom he contemned, without daring to meddle with those who had more power, and where his resentment was more due. Cicero made a reply to him upon the spot, in an invective speech, the severest perhaps that ever was spoken by any man, on the person, the parts, the whole life and conduct, of Piso.

^x Ateius was afterward turned out of the senate by Appius, when he was censor, for falsifying the auspices on this occasion; but the miserable fate of Crassus sup-

Middl.
p. 479.

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 479.

Ep. Fam.
1. 9.

De Divin.
1. 16.

Crassus was desirous, before he left Rome, to be reconciled to Cicero: they had never been real friends, but generally opposite in party; and Cicero's early engagements with Pompey kept him of course at a distance from Crassus: their coldness was still increased on account of Catiline's plot, of which when Crassus was, by some, strongly suspected, he charged Cicero with being the author of that suspicion: they carried it however on both sides with much decency, out of regard to Crassus's son, Publius, a professed admirer and disciple of Cicero; till an accidental debate in the senate blew up their secret grudges into an open quarrel. The debate was upon Gabinius, whose conduct in relation to king Ptolemy Crassus undertook to defend, and in that defence, made many severe reflections upon Cicero; who replied with no less acrimony, and gave a free vent to that old resentment of Crassus's many injuries, which had been gathering, he says, several years, but lain dormant so long, that he took it to be extinguished, till, from this accident, it burst out into a flame. The quarrel gave great joy to the chiefs of the senate, who highly applauded Cicero, in hopes to embroil him with the triumvirate: but Pompey laboured hard to make it up: and Cæsar also by letter expressed his uneasiness upon it, and begged it of Cicero, as a favour, to be re-

ported the credit of them; and confirmed the vulgar opinion of the inevitable force of those ancient rites, in drawing down the divine vengeance on all who presumed to condemn them. Appius was one of the augurs, and the only one of the college who maintained the truth of their auguries, and the reality of divination; for which he was laughed at by the rest; who charged him also with an absurdity in the reason which he subscribed for his censure upon Ateius, viz. that he had falsified the auspices, and brought a great calamity on the Roman people: for if the auspices, they said, were false, they could not possibly have any effect, or be the cause of that calamity. But, though they were undoubtedly forged, it is certain, however, that they had a real influence on the overthrow of Crassus; for the terror of them had deeply possessed the minds of the soldiers, and made them turn every thing which they saw, or heard, to an omen of their ruin; so that, when the enemy appeared in sight, they were struck with such a panic, that they had not courage or spirit enough left to make a tolerable resistance.

No people were ever more superstitious than the ancient Romans. When Crassus embarked his troops at Brundisium, there happened to be a man at the port who cried Figs of Caunus to sell, in Latin *Cauneas*, a word which, by the manner of pronouncing, might be mistaken for *Cave ne eas*, "Beware of going." This was thought to be a warning from the gods to Crassus not to pursue his enterprise. Cic. de Divin. 11. 40.

conciled with Crassus : so that he could not hold out against an intercession so powerful, and so well enforced by his affection to young Crassus : their reconciliation was confirmed by mutual professions of a sincere friendship for the future ; and Crassus, to give a public testimony of it to the city, invited himself just before his departure to sup with Cicero, who entertained him in the gardens of his son-in-law Crassipes, which were upon the banks of the Tiber, and seem to have been famous for their beauty and situation.

Year of
R O M E
698.
B. C. 54.

397th consulship.

Ad Quint.
3.7.

Ad Att.
4. 12.

The consuls, Pompey and Crassus, having reaped all the fruit which they had proposed from the consulship, the securing to themselves the provinces which they wanted, were not much concerned about the choice of their successors ; so that, after postponing the election to the end of the year,^y they gave way at last to their enemy, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, being content to have joined with him their friend, Appius Claudius Pulcher.

Middl.
p. 484.

CHAP. V.

Cicero defends, in the senate, the interests of Crassus absent, and enters into a correspondence and intimacy of friendship with Cæsar. Unprecedented knavery of the consuls and consular candidates. The tribunitian candidates do honour to Cato's virtue. Cicero defends several persons accused ; and amongst the rest, Vatinius : in justification of this, and of the whole change of his political conduct, he writes a long letter to Lentulus Spinther.

CRASSUS had been gone but a very little time, when he was attacked in the senate by his enemies : their design was, probably, to revoke his commission,^z or at least

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th consulship.

^y Cicero, being a great part of the summer of this year in the country, put the last hand to his piece on the Complete Orator. This admirable work remains entire, a standing monument of Cicero's parts and abilities ; which, while it exhibits to us the idea of a perfect orator, and marks out the way by which Cicero formed himself to that character, explains the reason likewise why nobody has since equalled him, or ever will, till there be found again united, what will hardly be found single in any man, the same industry, and the same parts.

Middl.
p. 483.

Ep. Fam.
1. 9.

He returned to Rome about the middle of November, to assist at Milo's wedding, who married Fausta, the daughter of Sylla the dictator, a rich and noble lady, with whom, as some writers say, he found Sallust the historian in bed not long after, and had him soundly lashed, before he dismissed him.

Ad Att.
4. 13. et
5. 8.

^z Manutius is of this opinion.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

Ep. Fam.
l. 5. ep. 8.
Ed. Græv.
b. 2. let. 7.
Melm.

abridge it of the power of making war upon the Parthians : but Cicero exerted himself so strenuously in his defence, that he baffled their attempts, after a warm contest with the consuls themselves, and several of the consular senators. He gave Crassus an account of the debate by the following letter.

TO MARCUS LICINIUS CRASSUS.

“ I am persuaded that all your friends have informed you of the zeal with which I lately both defended and promoted your dignities ; as indeed it was too warm and too conspicuous to have been passed over in silence. The opposition I met with from the consuls, as well as from several others of consular rank, was the strongest I ever encountered : and you must now look upon me as your declared advocate upon all occasions where your glory is concerned. Thus have I abundantly compensated for the intermission of those good offices, which the friendship between us had long given you a right to claim ; but which, by a variety of accidents, have lately been somewhat interrupted. There never was a time, believe me, when I wanted an inclination to cultivate your esteem, or promote your interest. Though it must be owned, a certain set of men,^a who are the bane of all amicable intercourse, and who envied us the mutual honour that resulted from ours, have, upon some occasions, been so unhappily successful, as to create a coolness between us.^b It has happened, however (what I rather wished than expected), that I have found an opportunity, when even your affairs were in the most

^a He means, I presume, those whom he often styles the *honest*.

Melm.

^b “ How effectually soever Cicero might have served Crassus upon the occasion to which this letter relates, it is most certain his good offices did not proceed from a principle of friendship. It is extremely probable indeed, that his supporting the cause of Crassus in the senate is one of those instances of our author’s subjection, of which he complains” in some of his letters : “ and that it was entirely in compliance with the inclinations of Cæsar and Pompey, with whom Crassus was now united.” — “ It is certain that Crassus, from the time of Catiline’s conspiracy, conceived a strong and lasting aversion to our author : as, on the other hand, that Cicero, after the death of Crassus, published an oration, in which he expressly charged him with being engaged in that conspiracy.”

prosperous train, of giving a public testimony, by my services to you, that I always most sincerely preserved the remembrance of our former amity. The truth is, I have approved myself your friend, not only to full conviction of your family in particular, but of all Rome in general: in consequence of which, that most valuable of women, your excellent wife, together with those illustrious models of virtue and filial piety, your two amiable sons, have perpetual recourse to my assistance and advice: as the whole world is sensible, that no one is more zealously disposed to serve you than myself.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

“Your family correspondents have informed you, I imagine, of what has hitherto passed in your affair, as well as of what is at present in agitation. As for myself, I entreat you to do me the justice to believe, that it was not any sudden start of inclination, which disposed me to embrace this opportunity of vindicating your honour: on the contrary, it was my ambition, from the first moment I entered the Forum, to be ranked in the number of your friends. And I have the satisfaction to reflect, that I have never, from that time to this hour, failed in the highest sentiments of esteem for you: as I doubt not you have always retained the same affectionate regard for me. If the effects of this mutual disposition have been interrupted by any little suspicions (for suspicions only I am very sure they were), be the remembrance of them for ever blotted out of our hearts. I am persuaded indeed from those virtues which form your character, and from those which I am desirous should distinguish mine, that our friendly union in the present conjuncture cannot but be attended with equal honour to us both. What instances you may be willing

^c What credit is it possible to give to the professions, asseverations, or even oaths, of this saint of Dr. Middleton's canonization? In a letter to Atticus, written soon after this to Crassus, Cicero thus expresses himself concerning the latter: “Our friend Crassus, they say, did not set out from Rome in his general's robe, with so much dignity as Paulus Æmilius heretofore, though, like him, a second time consul. Oh, the worthless man!—Crassum quidem nostrum minore dignitate aiunt profectum paludatum, quam olim æqualem L. Paullum, iterum consulem. O hominem nequam!” Ad Att. 4. 13.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

to give me of your esteem, must be left to your own determination: but they will be such, I flatter myself, as may tend most to advance my dignities. For my own part, I faithfully promise the utmost exertion of my best services in every article wherein I can contribute to increase yours. Many, I know, will be my rivals in these amicable offices: but it is a contention in which all the world, I question not, and particularly your two sons, will acknowledge my superiority. Be assured, I love them both in a very uncommon degree: though I will own Publius is my favourite: from his infancy he discovered a singular regard to me; as he particularly distinguishes me at this time with all the marks even of filial respect and affection.

“Let me desire you to consider this letter, not as a strain of unmeaning compliment, but as a sacred and solemn covenant of friendship, which I shall most sincerely and religiously observe. I shall now persevere in being the advocate of your honours, not only from a motive of affection, but from a principle of constancy: and, without any application on your part, you may depend on my embracing every opportunity, wherein I shall think my services may prove agreeable to your interest, or your inclination. Can you once doubt then, that any request to me for this purpose, either by yourself or your family, will meet with a most punctual observance? I hope, therefore, you will not scruple to employ me in all your concerns, of what nature or importance soever, as one who is most faithfully your friend: and that you will direct your family to apply to me in all their affairs of every kind, whether relating to you or to themselves, to their friends or their dependants. And be assured, I shall spare no pains to render your absence as little uneasy to them as possible. Farewell.”

Cicero, whose brother Quintus was one of Cæsar's lieutenants in Gaul, began now likewise to enter into a

particular intimacy and correspondence with Cæsar. Quintus, to pay his court the better to his general, had earnestly pressed his brother to a union with him, instead of adhering so obstinately to Pompey, who, as he tells him, was neither so sincere nor so generous a friend as Cæsar. To Cæsar, therefore, Cicero, not disliking the advice, wrote a letter in the familiar style; which Cæsar answered with all imaginable kindness, and the offer of every thing in which his power could serve him.—Cicero, in his account of this letter to his brother, says, “It is kind in you, and like a brother, to press me to this friendship: though I am running that way apace myself, and shall do what often happens to travellers, who, rising later than they intended, yet, by quickening their speed, come sooner to their journey’s end than if they had set out earlier; so I, who have overslept myself in my observance of this man, though you were frequently rousing me, will correct my past laziness, by mending my pace for the future.” —With regard to Cæsar’s professions of service, he adds, “Believe me, you who know me, I have from him already, what I most value, the assurance of his affection, which I prefer to all the great things he offers me.” In another letter he says [doubtless with equal sincerity], “I lay no great stress on his promises, want no farther honours, nor desire any new glory, and wish nothing more than the continuance of his esteem; yet live in such a course of ambition and fatigue, as if I were expecting what I really do not desire.”

But, though he made no use of Cæsar’s generosity for himself, yet he used it freely for his friends:^d Cæsar, nevertheless, was chiding him all the while for his reservedness in asking.

^d Particularly for Trebatius the lawyer, Orfius, and Curtius. For the last of these he procured a regiment. Cicero, concerning Cæsar’s kindness to his brother Quintus, writes thus to Atticus: “Perspice—cum Cæsare suavissimam conjunctionem, (hæc enim me una ex naufragio tabula delectat) qui quidem Quintum meum tuumque, Dii boni! quemadmodum tractat honore, dignitate, gratia! non secus ac si ego essem imperator. Hiberna legionum eligendi optio delata commodum, ut ad me scribit. Hunc tu non ames? Quem igitur istorum?” Ad Att. 4. 18.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 488.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 2. 13.

Middl.
p. 489.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 2. 15.

Ib. 3. 5.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 3. 1.
Middl.
p. 497.
Ad Quint.
2. 16.

Ib. 3. 1.

Ib. 2. 9.

Middl. p.
499—504.
Ad Quint.
2. 15.

Ad Att. 4.
15. 18.

Cicero had sent Cæsar a Greek poem, in three books, on the history of his consulship, and Cæsar's judgment upon it was, that the beginning of it was as good as any thing which he had ever seen in that language; but the following lines to a certain place were not equal in accuracy and spirit. Cicero desires therefore to know of his brother, what Cæsar really thought of the whole, whether the matter or the style displeased him, and begs that he would tell him the truth freely; since, whether Cæsar liked it or not, he should not, he says, be a jot the less pleased with himself. He began however another poem, at his brother's earnest request, to be addressed to Cæsar; but, after some progress, was so dissatisfied with it, that he tore it: yet Quintus still urging, and signifying that he had acquainted Cæsar with the design, he was obliged to resume it, and actually finished an epic poem in honour of Cæsar! which he promises to send, as soon as he could get a proper conveyance, that it might not be lost, as Quintus's tragedy of Eri-gone was in coming from Gaul; the only thing, says he, which had not found a safe passage, since Cæsar governed that province.

In a letter, which Cicero wrote this summer to his brother, he tells him, that there were some hopes of an election of magistrates, but those uncertain; some suspicion of a dictator, yet that not more certain; a great calm in the Forum; the calm of a city, that seemed to be quieted, rather by age and decay, than concord: that his own conduct, as well in public as in private, was just what Quintus had advised, softer than the tip of his ear; and his votes in the senate such as pleased others rather than himself.—That bribery was never^e carried so high as at this time by the consular candidates, Memmius, Cn. Domitius, Scaurus, Messala; that they were all alike; no eminence in any; for money levelled the dignity of them all: that above 80,000*l.* was pro-

^e “ Ambitus redit immanis. Nunquam fuit par.”

mised to the first tribe: and money grown so scarce by this profusion of it, that interest was risen from four to eight per cent.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

Memmius and Cn. Domitius, who joined their interests, made a strange sort of contract with the consuls, L. Domitius and Appius Claudius, which was drawn up in writing, and attested in proper form by many of their friends on both sides; by which the consuls obliged themselves to serve them with all their power in the ensuing election; and they on their parts undertook, when elected, to procure for the consuls what provinces they desired; and gave a bond of above 3,000*l.* to provide three augurs, who should testify, that they were present at making a law for granting them those provinces, when no such law had ever been made; and two consular senators, who should affirm, that they were present likewise at passing a decree of the senate, for furnishing the same provinces with arms and money, when the senate had never been consulted about it.^f

398th consulship.

Memmius, finding some reason to dislike his bargain, resolved to break it, and, by Pompey's advice, gave an account of it to the senate. Pompey was pleased with the opportunity of mortifying the consul Domitius, and willing likewise to take some revenge on Appius, who, though his near relation, did not enter so fully as he expected into his measures. Appius never changed countenance, nor lost any credit by the discovery; but his colleague Domitius, who affected the character of a pa-

Dio, l. 39.
p. 118.
Ad Att.
4. 18.

^f "This detestable bargain of forging laws and decrees at pleasure, in which so many of the first rank were concerned, either as principals or witnesses, is alleged by an ingenious French writer as a flagrant instance of that libertinism which hastened the destruction of Rome. This great republic, of all others the most free and flourishing, owed the loss of its liberty to nothing else but a general defection of its citizens from the probity and the discipline of their ancestors. Cicero often foretells their approaching ruin from this very cause."

Middl.
p. 501.
Montes-
quieu, c. 10.
sur les cau-
ses de la
grandeur,
&c.

I confess, I see not the propriety of these expressions, "hastened the destruction of Rome," "the approaching ruin of the Roman citizens." Was not Rome already totally ruined? But by the ruin of the state, Cicero seldom means any thing else but the loss of his own influence in the government. To an impartial eye was Rome in a worse condition, were the Roman citizens more ruined, when Julius Cæsar became their lord and master, than they were at this time? Cicero himself, as we shall see presently, intimates that a dictator was really wanted [but then he must be a dictator, who would so regulate matters, that Cicero might resume his former dignity].

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

Ad Quint.
3. 1.

Ad Alt.
4. 16.

Ad Quint.
3. 2.
Ad Alt.
4. 16.

Ib. 15, 16.
Ad Quint.
2. 15.

Vid. supr.
p. 85. 87.

triot,^s was extremely discomposed; and Memmius, now grown desperate, resolved to promote the general disorder, and the creation of a dictator.

Quintus sent his brother word from Gaul, that it was reported there, that he was present at this contract: but Cicero assures him that it was false; and that the bargain was of such a nature, as Memmius had opened it to the senate, that no honest man could have been present at it. The senate was highly incensed; and, to check the insolence of the parties concerned, passed a decree that their conduct should be inquired into by what they called a private or silent judgment; where the sentence was not to be declared till after the election, yet so as to make void the election of those who should be found guilty: this they resolved to execute with rigour, and made an allotment of judges for that purpose: but some of the tribunes were prevailed with to interpose their negative, on pretence of hindering all inquisitions not specially authorized by the people.

The candidates, however, were all publicly impeached by different prosecutors, and the city was now in a great ferment about them; “since (as Cicero says) either the men or the laws must necessarily perish; yet they will all (says he) be acquitted; for trials are now managed so corruptly, that no man will ever be condemned for the future, unless for murder.” But Q. Scævola, one of the tribunes, took a more effectual way to mortify them, by resolving to hinder any election of consuls during his magistracy, in which he persevered, and by his authority dissolved all the assemblies convened for that purpose. The tribunitian candidates, however, were remarkably modest this year; for they made an agreement among themselves, which they all confirmed by an oath, that, in prosecuting their several interests, they would submit their conduct to the judgment of Cato, and deposit

^s Caesar had the honour to have this worthy patriot (Cato's friend and brother-in-law) for his avowed enemy, as we have formerly seen.

4,000*l.* apiece in his hands, to be forfeited by those whom he should condemn of any irregular practice. “If the election proves free (says Cicero), as it is thought it will, Cato alone can do more than all the laws and all the judges.”

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

A great part of this year was taken up in public trials: Suffenas and C. Cato, who had been tribunes two years before, were tried in the beginning of July, for violence and breach of peace in their magistracy, and both acquitted: but Procilius, one of their colleagues, was condemned for killing a citizen in his own house: “whence we are to collect (says Cicero), that our Areopagites value neither bribery nor elections, nor interregnums, nor attempts against the state, nor the whole republic, a rush: we must not murder a man indeed in his own house, though that perhaps might be done moderately, since twenty-two acquitted Procilius, when twenty-eight condemned him.”

Ad Att. 4.
15, 16.

Cicero had no concern in these trials; yet he was continually employed in others through the rest of this summer. He defended Messius, one of Cæsar’s lieutenants, who came from Gaul on purpose to take his trial; then Drusus, accused of prevaricating, or betraying a cause which he had undertaken to defend; of which he was acquitted by a majority only of four voices. After that, Vatinius, the last year’s prætor, and Æmilius Scaurus, one of the consular candidates, accused of plundering the province of Sardinia; and, about the same time likewise, his old friend Cn. Plancius, who had entertained him so generously in his exile, and, being now chosen ædile, was accused by a disappointed competitor, M. Laterensis, of bribery and corruption. All these were acquitted; but the orations for them are lost, except that for Plancius.

Ad Att.
4. 15.
Ad Quint.
2. 16.

Ib. 3. 1.

The reasons which induced Cicero to defend Vatinius, who had been one of his fiercest enemies, and against whom he had made that bitter invective before men-

Vid. supr.
p. 79.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

Vid. supr.
p. 90.

tioned, we shall find in the following letter* from the orator to his friend Lentulus; a most curious piece, where he gives us his own picture at full length as a patriot and politician. We have already had him admirably well drawn by himself as a casuist in points of religious scruple.

TO LENTULUS.

Ep. Fam.
l. 1. Ep. 9.
Ed. Græv.
b. 2. let. 17.
Melm.

“ ——— Though I had much rather you should gain experience by my misfortunes than your own, yet it affords me some consolation under your present disappointment,^h that you have not paid so severe a fine as I did for being taught the little dependance there is upon the professions of the world. A reflection this, which may very properly serve as an introduction to the account you require of the motive of my late transactions.

“ You are informed then, it seems, that I am reconciled with Cæsar and Appius: a step, you assure me, you do not disapprove. But you are at a loss to guess what reasons could induce me to appear at the trial of Vatinius, not only as an advocate, but as a witness in his favour.ⁱ To set this matter in the clearest light, it will be necessary to trace back the motives of my conduct to their original source. Let me observe then, my Lentulus, that, when I was recalled from exile by your generous offices, I considered myself as restored, not only to my friends and to my family, but to the commonwealth in general. And as you had a right to the best returns of my affection and gratitude for the distinguished part you acted in that affair, so I thought there was something more than ordinary due from me to my country,

* N. B. This is the letter above referred to in p. 93.

^h In not obtaining a commission to replace Ptolemy on his throne.

Melm.

ⁱ A very learned and polite author [Dr. Middleton], whose just esteem for Cicero's writings has betrayed him perhaps into some partiality towards his actions, acknowledges that “ the defence of Vatinius gave a plausible handle for some censures upon Cicero.” The truth of it is, the censure was more than plausible: for nothing certainly could discover more meanness of spirit than thus, in compliance with those in power, not only to defend Vatinius as an advocate, but to bear public testimony likewise to his general good conduct.

which had so singularly co-operated with you upon this occasion. I often took an opportunity, during your consulate, of publicly declaring these my sentiments in the senate: as I always, you well know, expressed myself to the same purpose in our private conversation. Nevertheless I had many reasons at that time to be highly disgusted. I could not, in truth, but observe the disguised malice of some, and the coolness of others, when you were endeavouring to procure a decree for restoring the inscription of that honourable monument of my public services, which had been erected by the senate. But it was not only in this instance, that those who had many obligations to concur in your good offices towards me, acted a part I had little reason to expect. They looked, indeed, with much ungenerous indifference on the cruel outrage which was offered to my brother and myself under our own roof; and the estimate they made, in pursuance of the senate's order, of the damages I had sustained by these acts of violence, was far unequal to my real loss. This last article of their injustice, though least indeed in my concern, I could not but very sensibly feel amidst the general wreck of my fortunes. But, though these mortifying marks of their disposition towards me were much too notorious to escape my observation, they could not efface the more agreeable impressions of their former friendship. For this reason, notwithstanding those high obligations I had to Pompey, of which you yourself were witness, and have often mentioned: notwithstanding also the affection and esteem which I always entertained for him, yet I still firmly adhered to my political principles; nor suffered these considerations of private amity to influence me in favour of his public measures. Accordingly, when Vatinius (who at the trial of P. Sextius was examined as a witness against him) intimated that Cæsar's successes had reconciled me to his party, I told him, in the presence of Pompey, that I preferred the fate of Bibulus,

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th consulship.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

Vid. supr.
p. 80.

unhappy as he might esteem it, to all the splendid triumphs of the most victorious general.^k I asserted, likewise, upon another occasion (and asserted too in the hearing of Pompey), that the same persons who confined Bibulus to his house had driven me from mine. Indeed the whole series of those interrogatories, which I put to Vatinius at this trial, was entirely designed as an invective against his tribunate: and I particularly exposed, with much freedom and indignation, his contempt of the auspices, his corrupt distribution of foreign kingdoms, together with the rest of his violent and illegal proceedings. But it was not only upon this occasion that I spoke thus unreservedly: I frequently avowed my sentiments with the same resolute spirit in the senate. Thus, when Marcellinus and Philippus were consuls, I carried a motion, that the affair of the Campanian lands should be referred to the reconsideration of a full house on the 15th of May following. Now tell me, my friend, could I possibly have made a bolder or more formidable attack upon this party? Could I possibly have given a more convincing evidence that I had not departed from my old principles, notwithstanding all I had formerly suffered for their sake? The truth of it is, this motion greatly exasperated not only those whom it was reasonable to expect it would offend, but others upon whom I did not imagine it would have had any such effect. Pompey, soon after this decree had passed, set forward upon his expedition into Sardinia and Africa, without giving me the least intimation of his being disgusted. In his way thither he had a conference with Cæsar at Luca, who made great complaints of this motion. He had before, it seems, been informed of it by Crassus at Ravenna, who took that opportunity of incensing him against me. And it appeared afterward that Pompey

Melm.

^k N. B. This letter was written two years after the trial of Sextius; and perhaps Cicero never said what he here pretends to have said, "That he preferred the glory of Bibulus to the glory of Pompey and that of Cæsar," &c. I cannot think he had the boldness to speak so.

was much dissatisfied upon the same account. This I learned from several hands, but particularly from my brother, who met him in Sardinia a few days after he had left Luca. Pompey told him he was extremely glad of that accidental interview, as he wanted much to talk with him. He began with saying, That, as my brother stood engaged^l for my conduct, he should expect him to exert all his endeavours to influence me accordingly. Pompey then proceeded very warmly to remonstrate against my late motion in the senate, reminding my brother of his services to us both, and particularly of what had passed between them concerning Cæsar's edicts, and of those assurances, he said, my brother had given him of the measures I would pursue with respect to that article. He added, that my brother himself was a witness, that the steps he had formerly taken for procuring my recall were with the full consent and approbation of Cæsar. Upon the whole therefore, he entreated him, if it were either not in my power or my inclination to support the interest and dignity of the latter, that he would at least prevail with me not to oppose them. The account which my brother gave me of this conversation, together with a message I had before received from Pompey by Vibullius, to request that I would not proceed any farther in the affair of the Campanian lands till his return, threw me into a very serious train of reflections. I could not but think, after having performed and suffered so much for my country, that I might now at least be permitted to consider what was due to gratitude and to the honour of my brother: and as I had ever conducted myself with integrity towards the republic, I might be allowed, I hoped, to act the same honest part in my more private connexions.^m

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

^l "This alludes to those engagements which Quintus Cicero entered into in behalf of his brother, in order to induce Pompey to favour his recall from banishment. And it appears by what follows, that he promised, on the part of Cicero, an unlimited resignation to the measures of that ambitious chief." Melm.

^m "Had Cæsar and Pompey indeed been never so much his real friends, no considerations of amity ought to have prevailed with him to have acquiesced in a scheme Ib,

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

“ During the time I was engaged in these votes, and other proceedings with which Pompey appeared thus dissatisfied, I was informed of what passed in the conversation of a set of men, whom you will now guess without my naming them. This party, though they approved of my public measures, as being agreeable to what had ever been their professed sentiments, were yet so ungenerous as to express great satisfaction in believing, that my conduct would by no means please Pompey, at the same time that it would highly exasperate Cæsar. Well might I resent, indeed, so injurious a treatment; but much more when I saw them, even before my face, maliciously encouraging and caressing my avowed enemy: — Mine do I call him? rather let me say, an enemy to the laws and tranquillity of his country, and to every character of worth and virtue amongst us.

“ Their malevolence, however, had not the effect intended, and it could not warm me into those transports of indignation, of which my heart is now, indeed, no longer susceptible. On the contrary, it only induced me to examine my situation in all its various circumstances and relations, with the greatest coolness and impartiality: the process and result of which I will lay before you in as few words as I am able.

“ There have been times, as experience no less than history has taught me, when the power of the commonwealth was in worthless and wicked hands. In such a conjuncture, no hope of interest (which I have at all

which was contrary to the sentiments of all the real patriots of the republic, and contrary likewise to his own: a scheme which he himself tells Atticus was formed for the destruction of the commonwealth. Ad Att. 2. 17. Had he attended to the indisputable maxim which he himself lays down in one of his philosophical treatises, it would have decided at once the conduct which became him to observe upon an occasion where private friendship interfered with more extensive obligations: ‘*Hæc prima lex in amicitia sancietur* (says he) *ut neque rogemus res turpes, nec faciamus rogati.*’ But the truth of it is, private friendship was not concerned in the case: for he well knew that neither Pompey nor Cæsar had any attachments to him of that kind. It was fear alone that determined his resolution: and having once already suffered in [what he called] the cause of liberty, he did not find himself disposed to be twice a martyr. The awkward manner, however, in which he attempts to justify himself throughout this letter, very evidently shews how impossible it is to bid farewell to integrity with a good grace.”

times most heartily condemned) nor fear of danger (which upon some occasions, however, has influenced the greatest minds) should prevail with me to co-operate in their measures : no, not though I were attached to them by the strongest ties of friendship and gratitude. But when a man of Pompey's distinguished character presides over the republic, a man who has acquired that eminence of power and honour by the most heroic actions, and the most signal services, I could not imagine it would be imputed to me as a levity of disposition, if in some few instances I declined a little from my general maxims, and complied with his inclinations.ⁿ But my justification, I thought, would still rise in its strength, when it should be remembered that I favoured his credit and dignity even from the earliest part of my life ; as I particularly promoted them in my prætorship and consulate : when it should be remembered, that he not only assisted me with his vote and his influence in the senate during my adversity, but joined his counsels and his efforts with yours, for the same generous purpose : in a word, when it should be remembered, that he has no other enemy in the whole commonwealth except [Clodius] the man who is my professed adversary. In consequence of these sentiments it was absolutely necessary for me, you see, to unite with Cæsar, as one who was joined in the same views and the same interest. His friendship likewise, which you are sensible my brother and I have long shared, together with his humane and generous disposition, which I have abundantly experienced both by his late letters and his good offices towards me, contributed greatly to confirm me in these

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

Vid. vol. 4.
p. 305.
Vol. 4.
p. 376.

ⁿ "Cicero's compliance can by no means be considered in the favourable light Melm. wherein he represents it ; but was in reality a confession most injurious to his honour. It is certain likewise, that it was not from any advantageous opinion of Pompey's political character and designs that he was induced to fall in with his measures. On the contrary, Cicero most undoubtedly had no esteem for him ; and as to his political views, he saw and acknowledged, long before the date of this letter, that they were turned on the destruction of the republic. Ὁμολογουμένως (says he in one epistle to Atticus) τυραννίδα συσκευάζεται ; as in another, written upon the breaking out of the civil war, he calls him *hominem απολιτικώτατον*, a man utterly unacquainted with the arts of government." Ad Att. 2. 17. 8. 16.

Year of
R O M E
699.

B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

resolutions. To which I must add, that the commonwealth in general seemed to be most strongly averse from giving any opposition to these extraordinary men; more especially after Cæsar had performed such glorious exploits for the honour of his country. But what had still a farther and very powerful weight in my deliberations, was Pompey's having engaged his word for me to Cæsar, as my brother had given the same assurances to Pompey.

“ Plato, I remember, lays it down as a maxim in his divine writings, that ‘ the people generally model their manners and their sentiments by those of the great.’ A maxim which at this juncture, I thought, merited my particular attention. I was convinced indeed of its truth, when I reflected on the vigorous resolutions which were taken in the senate on the memorable nones of December : and it seemed no wonder so noble a spirit should appear in that assembly, after the animating example I had given them upon my first entering on the consular office. I recollected also, that, during the whole time which intervened between the expiration of my consulship and that of Cæsar and Bibulus, when I still retained a very considerable authority in the senate, all the better part of the republic were united in their sentiments. On the other hand, about the time you took possession of your government in Spain, the commonwealth could not so properly be said to be under the administration of consuls as of infamous barterers of provinces,^o and the mean vassals and ministers of sedition. It was then that discord and faction spread through all ranks amongst us : and I was marked out as the victim of party and rage. In this critical season, however, not only every man of worth, but the greater part of the senators, and indeed all Italy in general, rose up with remarkable unanimity in my cause.^p What the event

^o Piso and Gabinius. Vid. supr. p. 1.

^p It is strange, that being thus defended, he should nevertheless be banished.

proved I forbear to mention; as, in truth, it is to be imputed to a complication of errors and artifices. But this I will say, it was not forces, so much as leaders to conduct them, that were wanting to me in this crisis. I must add, that whatever censure may justly fall on those who refused me their assistance, most certainly they who first promised it, and then deserted me, are not less to be blamed.⁹ In a word, if some of my friends may well be reproached for the timid though sincere counsels they gave me, how much more severe must their condemnation prove, who artfully alarmed me with their pretended fears? Let it be noted at the same time to my honour, that, zealous as my fellow-citizens shewed themselves to rise up in the defence of a man who had formerly stood forth in theirs, yet I would not suffer them to be exposed (unsupported as they were by those who ought to have been their protectors) to the barbarous insults of lawless banditti. On the contrary, I rather chose the world should judge, by the power of my friends in recalling me from my exile, what their honest humanity could have effected, had I permitted them to have drawn their swords to prevent it.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th consulship.

“ You were sensible of this general zeal in my favour, when you undertook my cause: and you not only encouraged but confirmed it by your influence and authority. I shall always most willingly acknowledge, that you were assisted upon this occasion by some of the most considerable persons in Rome; who, it must be owned, exerted themselves with much greater vigour in procuring my return, than in preventing my banishment: and had they persisted in the same resolute dis-

⁹ “ In this number was Pompey himself, who, though he had given Cicero the most solemn assurances that he would at the hazard of his life protect him against Clodius, yet, when afterward our author solicited the execution of this promise, he absolutely refused to concern himself in the affair. Ad Att. 2. 20. 10. 4. It seems altogether unaccountable, that Cicero should be so injudicious as to touch upon a circumstance that destroys the whole force of his apology; so far, I mean, as he intended to justify his conduct by his friendship to Pompey. For it exceeds all power of credulity to imagine, that he could really be influenced by a motive of that kind with respect to a man whose insincerity he had so lately and so severely experienced.”

Melm.

Vid. supr.

P. 8.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

Vid. supr.
p. 79. 84,
85.

Milo.

position, they might have recovered their own authority at the same time that they obtained my restoration. The spirits, in truth, of the aristocratical part of the republic were at this time greatly raised and animated by the inflexible patriotism of your conduct during your consulship, together with Pompey's concurrence in the same measures. Cæsar likewise, when he saw the senate distinguishing his glorious actions by the most singular and unprecedented honours, joined in adding weight to the authority of that assembly. Had these happy circumstances, therefore, been rightly improved, it would have been impossible for any ill-designing citizen to have violated the laws and liberties of the commonwealth. But let me entreat you to reflect a moment on the subsequent conduct of my political associates. In the first place, they screened from punishment that infamous intruder on the matron-mysteries, who shewed no more reverence for the awful ceremonies of the goddess, in whose honour these secret solemnities are celebrated, than for the chastity of his three sisters. And thus, by preventing a worthy tribune of the people from obtaining that justice upon Clodius which he endeavoured to procure, they deprived future times of a most salutary example of chastised sedition. Did not they suffer likewise that monument, that glorious monument, which was erected, not indeed with the spoils I had gained in foreign wars, but by the generosity of the senate for my civil services; did they not most shamefully suffer it to be inscribed with the name of the cruel and avowed enemy of his country? Obligated most certainly I am to them for having restored me to the commonwealth: but I could wish they had conducted themselves, not only like physicians whose views terminate

r "After the suppression of Catiline's conspiracy, the senate decreed that a temple should be erected to Liberty, as a public monument of their late happy deliverance. This temple was raised at the foot of Mount Palatine, near Cicero's house. And as the inscription fixed thereon undoubtedly mentioned Cicero with honour, Clodius erased those words, and placed his own name in their stead." Melm. from Manutius.

merely in the health of their patients, but like the aliptæ^s also, who endeavour to establish the spirits and vigour of those under their care. Whereas they have acted with regard to me, as Apelles did in relation to his celebrated picture of Venus; they have finished one part of their work with great skill and accuracy, but left all the rest a mere rude and imperfect sketch.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

“In one article, however, I had the satisfaction to disappoint my enemies. They imagined my banishment would have wrought the same effect on me, which they falsely supposed a calamity of a like kind produced formerly in Quintus Metellus. This excellent person, whom I look upon to have been a man of the greatest fortitude and magnanimity of any in his time, they represented as broken and dispirited after his return from exile. But if broken he really were, it could not be the effect of his adversity, as it is certain he submitted to his sentence without the least reluctance, and lived under it, not only with indifference, but with cheerfulness. The truth is, no man ever equalled him in the strength and heroism of his mind: no, not even the celebrated Marcus Scaurus^t himself. Nevertheless, such as they had heard, or at least chose to imagine Metellus to have been, they figured me to themselves: or, if possible indeed, even yet more abject. The reverse, however, proved to be the case: and that general concern which the whole republic expressed at my absence, inspired me with more vigorous spirits than I had ever before enjoyed. The truth is, the sentence of banishment against Metellus was repealed by a law proposed only by a single tribune of the people: whereas I was recalled from mine upon the motion of the consul himself, and by a law in which every magistrate of Rome concurred. Let me add, likewise, that each order and

Vid. vol. 4.
p. 77.

^s “The aliptæ were persons who prepared the athletic combatants by unctions, and other proper methods, for rendering them vigorous and active in their gymnastic exercises.” Melm.

^t As infamous a hypocrite and traitor as ever lived. Vid. vol. 4. p. 27, and 31.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

degree in the commonwealth, headed by the senate and supported by all Italy, zealously united in one common effort for recovering me to my country.^t Yet high as these unexampled honours were, they have never elated my heart with pride, or tempted me to assume an air which could give just offence even to the most malevolent of my enemies. The whole of my ambition is, not to be wanting either in advice or assistance to my friends; or even to those whom I have no great reason to rank in that number: it is this, perhaps, which has given the real ground of complaint to those who view only the lustre of my actions, but cannot be sensible of the pains and solicitude they cost me. But whatever the true cause may be, the pretended one is, my having promoted the honours of Cæsar: a circumstance which they interpret, it seems, as a renunciation of my old maxims. The genuine motives, however, of my conduct in this instance are, not only what I just before mentioned, but particularly what I hinted in the beginning of my letter, and will now more fully explain.

“ You will not find then, my friend, the aristocratical part of the republic disposed to pursue the same system as when you left them: that system, I mean, which I endeavoured to establish when I was consul, and which, though afterward occasionally interrupted, and at length entirely overthrown, was again fully restored during your administration. It is now, however, totally abandoned by those who ought most strenuously to have supported it. I do not assert this upon the credit only of appearances, in which it is exceedingly easy to dissemble: I speak it upon the unquestionable evidence of facts, and the public proceedings of those who were styled patriots in my consulate. The general scheme of politics, therefore, being thus changed, it is time most certainly for every man of prudence (in which number I have the

^t If this was the case; whom had his friends to struggle with, in order to obtain his restoration?

ambition to be justly accounted) to vary likewise his particular plan. Accordingly, that chief and favourite guide of my principles, whom I have already quoted, the divine Plato himself, advises, not to press any political point farther than is consonant to the general sense of the community: for methods of violence, he maintains, are no more to be used towards one's country than one's parent. Upon this maxim, he tells us, he declined engaging in public affairs: and as he found the people of Athens confirmed by long habit in their mistaken notions of government, he did not think it lawful to attempt by force what he despaired of effecting by persuasion. My situation, however, is in this respect different from Plato's: for, on the one hand, as I have already embarked in public affairs, it is too late to deliberate whether I should now enter upon them or not; so, on the other, the Roman people are by no means so incapable of judging of their true interests as he represents the Athenians. It is my happiness indeed to be able, by the same measures, to consult at once both my own and my country's welfare.^u To these considerations I must add those uncommon acts of generosity, which Cæsar has exerted both towards my brother and myself: so much indeed beyond all example, that even whatever had been his success, I should have thought it incumbent on me at least to have defended him. But now, distinguished as he is by such a wonderful series of prosperity, and crowned with so many glorious victories, I cannot but esteem it a duty which I owe to the republic, abstracted from all personal obligations to himself, to promote his honours as far as lies in my power. And believe me, it is at once my confession and my

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

^u It is not very easy to see how Cicero can be justified according to his own principles, in being accessory to the cementing a union between Pompey and Cæsar. "For he assures Atticus, in a letter which was written at the breaking out of the civil war, that he foresaw the storm that had been gathering to destroy the republic fourteen years before it fell; and calls the union of these ambitious chiefs *sceleratæ consensionis fides*, a wicked confederacy. To which he adds, that they had upon all occasions preferred the interest of their families, and the advancement of their power, to the honour and welfare of their country." Plut. in vit. Pomp. Ad Att. 10. 4.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

glory, that next to you, together with the other generous authors of my restoration, there is not a man in the world from whom I have received such amicable offices.

“ And now, having laid before you the principal motives of my conduct in general, I shall be the better able to satisfy you concerning my behaviour with respect to Crassus and Vatinius in particular: for, as to Appius and Cæsar, I have the pleasure to find that you acquit me of all reproach.

“ My reconciliation then with Vatinius was effected by the mediation of Pompey, soon after the former was elected prætor. I must confess, when he petitioned to be admitted a candidate for that office, I very warmly opposed him in the senate: but it was much less from my resentment to the man himself, than in order to support the honour and interest of Cato. Soon after this he was impeached: and it was in compliance with the earnest solicitation of Cæsar that I undertook his defence. But you must not inquire why I appeared at this trial, or indeed at any other of the same kind, as a witness in favour of the accused, lest I should hereafter have an opportunity of retorting the question upon you. Though, to say truth, I may fairly ask it even now: for do you not remember, my friend, in whose behalf it was that you formerly transmitted certain honourable testimonials even from the utmost limits of the Roman empire? You need not scruple, however, to acknowledge the fact: for I have acted, and shall continue to act, the same part towards those very persons. But to return to Vatinius: besides the reasons I have already assigned, I was provoked to engage in his defence by an opposition of the same sort which the parasite recommends to the amorous soldier in the play. The obsequious Gnatho, you know, advises his friend the captain, whenever his mistress endeavours to pique his jealousy by mentioning his rival Phædria, to play off

Pamphila upon her in return. Thus, as I told the judges at this trial, since certain honourable persons, who were formerly much in my interest, had thought fit, by many little mortifying instances in the senate, to caress my avowed enemy before my face, I thought it but equitable to have a Clodius on my part, in opposition to the Clodius on theirs. Accordingly I have, upon many occasions, acted suitably to this declaration: and all the world acknowledges I have reason.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

“Having thus explained my conduct with regard to Vatinius, I will now lay before you those motives which determined me in respect to Crassus. I was willing, for the sake of the common cause, to bury in oblivion the many and great injuries I had formerly received from him. Agreeably to this disposition, as we were then upon good terms, I should have borne his unexpected defence of Gabinius (whom he had very lately with so much warmth opposed) if he had avoided all personal reflections on myself. But when, with the most unprovoked violence, he broke in upon me whilst I was in the midst of my speech, I must confess it raised my indignation: and perhaps I took fire so much the sooner, as possibly there remained in my heart some latent sparks of my former resentment. However, my behaviour in the senate upon this occasion was much and generally applauded. Among the rest, I was complimented likewise by the same men whom I have often hinted at in this letter; and who acknowledged I had rendered a very essential service to their cause, by the spirit which I had thus exerted. In short, they affected to speak of me in public, as being now indeed restored to the commonwealth in the best and most glorious sense. Nevertheless, they had the malice in their private conversations (as I was informed by persons of undoubted honour) to express singular satisfaction in the new variance that had thus happened between Crassus and myself: as they pleased themselves with imagin-

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

ing it would for ever throw me at a distance from those who were joined with him in the same interest. Pompey in the meantime employed incredible pains to close this breach : and Cæsar also mentioned it in his letters as an accident that gave him much concern. Upon these considerations, therefore, I thought it expedient to act agreeably both to the dictates of my natural temper, and to that experience which I had gained by my former misfortunes. In pursuance of these sentiments, I consented to a reconciliation ; and, in order to render it more conspicuous to the world, Crassus set out for his government almost from under my roof: for having invited himself to spend the preceding night with me, we supped together in the gardens of my son-in-law Crassipes. It was for these reasons that I thought my honour obliged me to defend his cause in the senate : and I confess I mentioned him with that high applause of which, it seems, you have been informed.

“ Thus I have given you a full detail of the several views and motives by which I am governed in the present conjuncture, as well as of the particular disposition in which I stand with respect to the slender part I can pretend to claim in the administration of public affairs. And, believe me, I should have judged and acted in the same manner, had I been totally free from every sort of amicable bias. For, on the one hand, I should have esteemed it the most absurd folly to have attempted to oppose so superior a force ; and, on the other, supposing it possible, I should yet have deemed it imprudent to weaken the authority of persons so eminently and so justly distinguished in the commonwealth.* Be-

Melm.

* “ It will appear very evident perhaps from the foregoing observations, that what Cicero here asserts could not possibly be his real sentiments. That it was not practicable to bring down Cæsar and Pompey from that height of power to which they were now arrived, will not, probably, be disputed : though at the same time it is very difficult to set limits to what prudence and perseverance may effect. This at least seems undeniable, that, if their power were absolutely immoveable, Cicero’s conduct was in the number of those causes which contributed to render it so. However, one cannot but be astonished to find our author seriously maintaining, that, granting it had not been impossible, it would yet have been impolitic, to have checked

sides, it appears to me to be the dictates of sound policy to act in accommodation to particular conjunctures, and not obstinately persevere in one invariable scheme, when public circumstances, together with the sentiments of the best and wisest members of the community, are evidently changed.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

“In conformity to this notion, the judicious reasoners on the great art of government have universally condemned an inflexible perseverance in one uniform tenor of measures. The skill of the pilot is shewn in weathering the storm at least, though he should not gain his port: but if shifting his sails, and changing his direction, will infallibly carry him into the intended harbour, would it not be an instance of most unreasonable tenaciousness, to continue in the more hazardous course wherein he began his voyage? Thus (and it is a maxim I have often had occasion to inculcate) the point we ought all of us to keep in view, in our administration of the commonwealth, is the final enjoyment of an honourable repose; but the method of securing to ourselves this dignity of retreat, is by having been inflexible in our intentions for the public welfare, and not by a positive perseverance in certain favourite modes of obtaining it.”

these towering chiefs in their ambitious flight. For it is plain, from a passage already cited out of his letters to Atticus, that he long foresaw their immoderate growth of power would at last overrun the liberties of the commonwealth.* It had already indeed destroyed his own; this too by the confession of himself. For in a letter which he writes to his brother, taking notice of the strong application that Pompey had made to him to defend Gabinius, he declares he never will comply with that unworthy request, so long as he retained the least spark of liberty. But comply, however, he actually did: equally, in truth, to his own disgrace and the confutation of the doctrine he here advances.” Ad Q. Fr. 3. 1.

Ad Att.
10. 4.

“The reasoning which Cicero here employs is certainly just, considered abstractedly: but by no means applicable to the present case. The question between the aristocratical party and those who were favourers of Cæsar and Pompey, was not what road should be taken to the same end; but whether Rome should be free or enslaved.”

Melm.

I must here take the liberty to differ from the ingenious and judicious gentleman, to whom I am so much indebted for these translations and remarks. The question at this time does not seem to have been, whether Rome should be free or enslaved; but whether Rome should be under the domination of the triumvirate, or of the fishpond-men, the venerable bench of consulars, such monsters as the consuls and consular candidates of this year 699; or, if you please, whether anarchy should prevail in the empire, or a government by three men.

Vid. supr.
p. 110.

* *i. e.* would extinguish the detestable aristocratical tyranny under which Rome had unhappily fallen.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

To repeat, therefore, what I just now declared, had I been absolutely uninfluenced by every motive of friendship, I should still have pursued the same public measures in which I am now engaged. But when gratitude and resentment both conspire in recommending this scheme of action to me, I cannot hesitate a moment in adopting it; especially since it appears most conducive to the interest of the republic in general, as well as to my own in particular. To speak freely, I act upon this principle so much the more frequently, and with the less reserve, not only as my brother is lieutenant under Cæsar, but as the latter receives the slightest action, or even word of mine in his favour, with an air that evidently shews, that he considers them as obligations of the most sensible kind. And, in fact, I derive the same benefit from that popularity and power which you know he possesses, as if they were so many advantages of my own. The sum of the whole in short is this: I imagined I had no other method of counteracting those perfidious designs with which a certain party were secretly contriving to undermine me, than by thus uniting the friendship and protection of the men in power with those internal aids which have never yet been wanting to my support.”^z

Melm.

^z “ There is no character in all antiquity that lies so open to discovery as that of Cicero, and yet there is none at the same time which seems to be less generally understood. Had there been no other of his writings extant, however, but this single letter, the patriot character, one should have imagined, would have been the last that the world would ever have ascribed to our author. It is observable (and it is an observation for which I am obliged to a gentleman, who, amidst far more important occupations, did not refuse to be the censorer of these papers), that ‘ the principles by which Cicero attempts to justify himself in this epistle are such as will equally defend the most abandoned prostitution and desertion in political conduct. Personal gratitude and resentment; an eye to private and particular interests, mixed with a pretended regard to public good; an attention to a brother’s advancement and farther favour; a sensibility in being caressed by a great man in power; a calculation of the advantages derived from the popularity and credit of that great man to one’s own personal self; are very weak foundations indeed to support the superstructure of a true patriot’s character. Yet these are the principles which Cicero here expressly avows and defends!’ ”

CHAP. VI.

The trial of Gabinius for treasonable conduct in king Ptolemy's affair. He is brought to trial a second time for plundering his province of Syria. Cicero defends him at this second trial, and defends likewise Rabirius accused of being an accomplice in Gabinius's treason. Julia, the daughter of Cæsar, and wife of Pompey, dies. Pontinius fights his way to the Capitol, in triumph. Cicero accepts, and presently after resigns a lieutenancy under Pompey. The election of new consuls is obstructed by the tribunes. A design is started to create Pompey dictator, but is quickly dropped. An interregnum during the first six months of the year 700. M. Messala and Cn. Domitius are chosen consuls.

CICERO'S English historian observes, that the long and elaborate answer of the patriot to his friend Lentulus's inquiry, concerning the change in his political conduct, was written before Cicero's defence of Gabinius: otherwise he would have had a still harder task to make an apology for himself.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th consulship.

The recall of Gabinius from his government of Syria had been decreed the last year; but he did not return to Rome till about the end of September in the present year. He boasted every where on his journey that he was going to demand a triumph; and, to carry on that farce, continued awhile without the gates, till, perceiving how odious he was to all within, he stole privately into the city by night to avoid the disgrace of being insulted by the populace. There were three different impeachments provided against him; the first, for treasonable practices against the state; the second, for plundering his province; the third, for bribery and corruption: and so many persons offered themselves to be prosecutors, that there was a contest among them before the prætor, how to adjust their several claims.

Middl. p.
506—510.
Ad Quint.
Fr. 3. 1.
Ibid. 2.

The first indictment fell to L. Lentulus, who accused him the day after he entered the city, that, in defiance of religion and the decree of the senate, he had restored the king of Egypt with an army, leaving his own province naked, and open to the incursion of enemies, who had made great devastations in it.—Gabinius durst not shew his head for the first ten days, till he was obliged

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

to come to the senate, in order to give them an account, according to custom, of the state of his province and the troops which he had left in it. As soon as he had told his story, he was going to retire; but the consuls detained him, to answer to a complaint brought against him by the publicans, or farmers of the revenues, who were attending at the door to make it good. This drew on a debate, in which Gabinius was so urged and teased on all sides, but especially by Cicero, that, trembling with passion, and unable to contain himself, he called Cicero a banished man: upon which, says Cicero, in a letter to his brother, “nothing ever happened more honourable to me: the whole senate to a man left their seats, and with a general clamour ran up to his very face; while the publicans also were equally fierce and clamorous against him, and the whole company behaved themselves just as you yourself would have done.”

Ad Quint.
Fr. 3. 2.

Cicero had been deliberating for some time, whether he should not accuse Gabinius himself; but, out of regard to Pompey, was content to appear only as a witness against him, and, when the trial was over, gives the following account of it to his brother.

Ib. 4.

“Gabinius is acquitted: nothing was ever so stupid as his accuser, L. Lentulus; nothing so sordid as the bench: yet, if Pompey had not taken incredible pains, and the rumour of a dictatorship had not infused some apprehensions, he could not have held up his head even against Lentulus: since, with such an accuser and such judges, of the seventy-two, who sat upon him, thirty-two condemned him. The sentence is so infamous, that he seems likely to fall in the other trials; especially that for plundering. But there is no republic, no senate, no justice, no dignity, in any of us: what can I say more of the judges? there were but two of them of prætorian rank; Domitius Calvinus, who acquitted him so forwardly, that all the world might see it; and C. Cato, who, as soon as the votes were declared, ran offi-

ciously from the bench, to carry the first news to Pompey. Some say, and particularly Sallust, that I ought to have accused him: but should I risk my credit with such judges? What a figure should I have made, if he had escaped from me? But there were other things which influenced me: Pompey would have considered it as a struggle, not about Gabinius's safety, but his own dignity: it must have made a breach between us: we should have been matched like a pair of gladiators; as Pacidianus with Æserninus the Samnite; he would probably have bit off one of my ears, or have been reconciled at least with Clodius.—For, after all the pains which I had taken to serve him, when I owed nothing to him, he every thing to me, yet he would not bear my differing from him in public affairs, to say no worse of it: and when he was less powerful than he is at present, shewed what power he had against me in my flourishing condition, why should I now, when I have lost even all desire of power, when the republic certainly has none, when he alone has all, choose him of all men to contend with? For that must have been the case: I cannot think that you would have advised me to it. Sallust says, that I ought to have done either the one or the other, and, in compliment to Pompey, have defended him; who begged it of me indeed very earnestly.—A special friend this Sallust! to wish me to involve myself in a dangerous enmity, or perpetual infamy. I am delighted with my middle way; and when I had given my testimony faithfully and religiously, was pleased to hear Gabinius say, that, if it should be permitted to him to continue in the city, he would make it his business to give me satisfaction; nor did he so much as interrogate me——.” He gives the same account of this trial to his other friends: “How Lentulus acted his part so ill, that people were persuaded that he prevaricated—and that Gabinius's escape was owing to the indefatigable industry of Pompey, and the corruption of the bench.”

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th consulship.

Ad Att.
4. 16.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

Ad Q. Fr.
3. 7.

About the time of this trial there happened a terrible inundation of the Tiber, which did much damage at Rome; many houses and shops were carried away by it, and the fine gardens of Cicero's son-in-law, Crassipes, demolished. It was all charged to the absolution of Gabinius, after his daring violation of religion, and contempt of the Sibyl's books: Cicero applies to it the following passage of Homer:

“ As when in autumn Jove his fury pours,
And earth is loaden with incessant showers;
When guilty mortals break th' eternal laws,
And judges brib'd betray the righteous cause;
From their deep beds he bids the rivers rise,
And opens all the floodgates of the skies.” Mr. Pope, *Il.* 16. 466.

But Gabinius's danger was not yet over: he was to be tried a second time, for the plundering his province, where C. Memmius, one of the tribunes, was his accuser, and M. Cato his judge, with whom he was not likely to find any favour: Pompey pressed Cicero to defend him, and would not admit of any excuse; and Gabinius's humble behaviour in the late trial was intended to make way for Pompey's solicitation. Cicero stood firm for a long time: “ Pompey (says he) labours hard with me, but has yet made no impression; nor, if I retain a grain of liberty, ever will:

Ib. 1.

‘ Oh! ere that dire disgrace shall blast my fame,
O'erwhelm me, earth!’ — *Il.* 4. 218.

But Pompey's incessant importunity, backed by Cæsar's earnest request, made it vain to struggle any longer; and forced him, against his judgment, his resolution, and his dignity, to defend Gabinius; at a time when his defence at last proved of no service to him; for he was found guilty by Cato, and condemned of course to a perpetual banishment.

The trial of C. Rabirius Posthumus, a person of equestrian rank, was an appendix to that of Gabinius. It was one of the articles against Gabinius, that he had received about 2,000,000 for restoring king Ptolemy;

yet all his estate that was to be found, was not sufficient to answer the damages in which he was condemned; nor could he give any security for the rest: in this case, the method was, to demand the deficiency from those through whose hands the management of his money affairs had passed, and who were supposed to have been sharers in the spoil: this was charged upon Rabirius, and “that he had advised Gabinius to undertake the restoration of the king, and accompanied him in it, and was employed to solicit the payment of the money, and lived at Alexandria for that purpose, in the king’s service, as the public receiver of the taxes, and wearing the pallium or habit of the country.”

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 515.

Cicero urged in defence of Rabirius, “that he had borne no part in that transaction; but that his whole crime, or rather folly, was, that he had lent the king great sums of money for his support at Rome; and ventured to trust a prince, who, as all the world then thought, was going to be restored by the authority of the Roman people: that the necessity of going to Egypt for the recovery of that debt, was the source of all his misery; where he was forced to take whatever the king would give or impose: that it was his misfortune to be obliged to commit himself to the power of an arbitrary monarch: that nothing could be more mad, than for a Roman knight, and citizen of a republic of all others the most free, to go to any place where he must needs be a slave to the will of another; and that all who ever did so, as Plato and the wisest had sometimes done too hastily, always suffered for it: this was the case of Rabirius; necessity carried him to Alexandria; his whole fortunes were at stake, which he was so far from improving by his traffic with that king, that he was ill-treated by him, imprisoned, threatened with death, and glad to run away at last with the loss of all: and at that very time, it was wholly owing to Cæsar’s generosity, and regard to the merit and misfortunes of an old friend,

Pro C. Rab.
8, 9. 15.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

Pro C. Rab.
12.

Middl.
p. 517.

Ad Quint.
3. 5.

Vell. Pat.
2. 47.
Val. Max.
4. 6.
Plut. in
Cæs.

that he was enabled to support his former rank and equestrian dignity.—”

Gabinus's trial had so near a relation to this, and was therein so often referred to, that the prosecutor could not easily neglect the fair opportunity of rallying Cicero for the part which he had acted in it: Memmius observed, that the deputies of Alexandria had the same reason for appearing in behalf of Gabinus, which Cicero had for defending him, the command of a master.—

“ No, Memmius (replied Cicero), my reason for defending him, was a reconciliation with him; for I am not ashamed to own, that my quarrels are mortal, my friendships immortal: and if you imagine that I undertook that cause for fear of Pompey, you neither know Pompey nor me; for Pompey would neither desire it of me against my will, nor would I, after I had preserved the liberty of my citizens, ever give up my own.”

Whatever Cicero might say for himself in the flourishing style of an orator, it is certain, that he knew and felt his defence of Gabinus to be, what it really was, an indignity and dishonour to him, which he was forced to submit to by the iniquity of the times, and his engagements with Pompey and Cæsar, as he often laments to his friends in a very passionate strain: “ I am afflicted (says he), my dearest brother, I am afflicted, that there is no republic, no justice in trials; that this season of my life, which ought to flourish in the authority of the senatorian character, is either wasted in the drudgery of the bar, or relieved only by domestic studies; that what I have ever been fond of from a boy,

“ In every virtuous act and glorious strife
To shine the first and best”——

is wholly lost and gone; that my enemies are partly not opposed, partly even defended by me; and neither what I love nor what I hate left free to me.”

About this time, and while Cæsar was engaged in his second expedition into Britain, his daughter Julia, Pom-

pey's wife, died^a in child-bed at Rome, having been first delivered of a son, which died also soon after her. Her loss was not more lamented by the husband and father, who both of them tenderly loved her, than by all their common friends, and the well-wishers to the public peace, who considered it as a source of fresh disturbance to the state, from the ambitious views and clashing interests of the two chiefs, whom the life of one so dear, and the relation of son and father, seemed hitherto to have united by the ties both of duty and affection.—The jealousies and separate interests of the triumvirs had obliged them to manage their power with some decency, and to extend it but rarely beyond the then customary forms; but whenever that league, which had made them already too great for private subjects, should happen to be dissolved, it was thought that the next contest must of course be for dominion, and the single mastery of the empire.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 519.

On the 2d of November, C. Pontinius triumphed over the Allobroges: he had been prætor when Cicero was consul, and, at the end of his magistracy, obtained the government of that part of Gaul, which, some time after, provoked by oppression, broke out into rebellion, but was reduced by the vigour of this general. For this service he demanded a triumph, but met with great opposition, which he surmounted with incredible patience: for he persevered in his suit for five years successively; residing all that while, according to custom, in the suburbs of the city, till he gained his point at last by a kind of violence. Cicero was his friend, and continued in Rome on purpose to assist him; and the consul Appius served him with all his power; but Cato protested that Pontinius should never triumph while he lived; “though this (says Cicero), like many of his other threats, will end in nothing.” The prætor Galba, who had been

Ad Quint.
3. 5.
Ad Att.
4. 16.
Dio, p. 120.

^a Cæsar is said to have borne the news of her death with an uncommon firmness. Senec. Consol. ad Helv. p. 116.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
salship.

Ad Att.
4. 18.

Ad Quint.
2. 15.

Ib. 3. 1.

Middl.
p. 522.

Ad Quint.
3. 8.

Pontinius's lieutenant, having procured by stratagem an act of the people in his favour, he entered the city in his triumphal chariot, where he was so rudely received and opposed in his passage through the streets, that he was forced to make his way with his sword, and the slaughter of many of his adversaries.

In the end of the year Cicero consented to be one of Pompey's lieutenants in Spain, which he began to think convenient to the present state of his affairs, and resolved to set forward for that province about the middle of January: but this seeming to give some umbrage to Cæsar, who in his letters desired him to continue at Rome, he soon changed his mind, and resigned his lieutenancy: to which he seems to allude in a letter to his brother, where he says, that he had no second thoughts in what concerned Cæsar; that he would make good his engagements to him; and, being entered into his friendship with judgment, was now attached to him by affection.

The prodigious unprecedented knaveries of the consuls and consular candidates, and what followed thereupon, so retarded the elections, that the year expired before the state was provided with new consuls; and the tribunes, whose authority, while there were no consuls to control them, was in a manner absolute, did for that reason, perhaps, keep off all assemblies for the election of those magistrates: but it seems more probable that Pompey was at the bottom of this opposition, having entertained the fond desire of being appointed dictator. He chose, however, to keep himself out of sight; and retired into the country, to avoid the suspicion of affecting a sovereignty which Sylla had made so odious. "The rumour of a dictatorship (says Cicero) is disagreeable to the honest; but the other things which they talk of^b are more so to me. The whole affair is

^b What these other things were does not appear. Dio says, that some of the tribunes proposed, that, instead of consuls, military tribunes with consular power should

dreaded, but flags : Pompey flatly disclaims it, though he never denied it to me before. The tribune Hirrus will probably be the promoter. Good gods ! how silly and fond of himself without a rival ! At Pompey's request I have deterred Crassus Junianus, who pays great regard to me, from meddling with it. It is hard to know whether Pompey really desires it or not ; but he will not convince us that he is averse to it, if Hirrus stir in the affair." In another letter—" Nothing is yet done as to the dictatorship ; Pompey is still absent ; Appius in a great bustle ; Hirrus preparing to propose it ; but several are named, as ready to interpose their negative : the people do not trouble their heads about it ; the chiefs are against it ; I keep myself quiet."

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 3. 9.

The tribune Hirrus,* mentioned in these letters, did actually drop some hints leading to a dictatorship ; for which Cato treated him so roughly, that he was almost reduced to throw up his office. Q. Pompeius Rufus, another of the tribunes, the grandson of Sylla, and the most warm espouser of a dictator, was, by a decree of the senate, committed to prison.^c This checked all proceeding in that project : and Pompey himself finding the greater part of the leading men utterly averse to his dictatorship, he yielded at last, after an interregnum of six months, that Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Messala, two of the four candidates (who, Cicero tells us, were all alike) should be declared consuls. Domitius was one of the contractors for forging decrees, and was without

* Called
Lucilius
by Plut. in
Pomp.

Dio, l. 40.
p. 141.

Vid. supr.
p. 110.

be once again placed at the head of the republic. But if by other things he meant nothing worse than this proposal, I cannot guess why Dr. Middleton says, that Cicero judged rightly in thinking, that there were other things, which, in the present situation of the senate and the honest, were of more dangerous consequence than a dictatorship. Indeed, the doctor is of opinion, that there was no great reason to be afraid of a dictatorship at this time. " For the republic (says he) was in so great a disorder, that nothing less than the dictatorial power could reduce it to a tolerable state." [I pray the reader to remember this concession.]

P. 524.

^c This is a fact, says M. Crevier, I can scarce believe, as it is not to be paralleled in all the history of the Roman republic. The persons of the tribunes were sacred.— Besides, it is clear from the testimony of Asconius Pedianus, that this Pompeius Rufus was tribune the year following the present. Now it was no longer the custom for the same magistrates to be continued in office several years : and if there had been an exception in favour of Rufus, Asconius would probably have taken notice of it.

Year of
R O M E
699.
B. C. 53.

398th con-
sulship.

Ad Quint.
Fr. 3. 8.

doubt supported in this election by the interest of his kinsman, L. Domitius, the consul, another of the contractors : as for Messala, Cicero had particularly recommended him to Cæsar ; as appears by what he writes to his brother Quintus : “ As to your reckoning Messala and Calvinus sure consuls, you agree with what we think here ; for I will be answerable to Cæsar for Messala.”

CHAP. VII.

Crassus makes war upon the Parthians ; the enterprise unjust, the event unfortunate. Cicero, at Rome, is elected into the college of augurs.

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

Plut. in
Crass.

Appian in
Parth.

Dio, l. 40.

Prid. vol. 3.
p. 460—
464.

THE first news from abroad, after the inauguration of the consuls, was of the ill success of Crassus's hostile expedition into the Parthian^d territories ; a war commenced without any order or explicit permission from the senate, and to which the insatiable avarice of the Roman general was the sole motive. The republic had, first by Sylla, and afterward by Pompey, made leagues of peace and amity with the Parthians, and had never complained of any infraction of them ; so that this people, having no reason to apprehend an invasion, had made no preparations against it. Crassus, therefore,

Justin,
l. 41. c. 1.

Ib. 4, 5.

Strabo,
16. 743.

^d We are told that the Parthians were originally a people of Scythia, from whence being banished, they, for that very reason, called themselves Parthians, which word in the Scythian language signifies exiles. The country to which they retired for a settlement, was a small tract, lying to the south of Hyrcania, and to the east of Media, and consisted chiefly of barren mountains and sandy plains. During the empires of the Assyrians, Medes, and Persians, and the first Macedonian kings of Syria, scarce any mention is made of the Parthians. It was about the year of Rome 502, 250 years before the beginning of the Christian æra, and while Antiochus, surnamed the God, was king of Syria, that, wearied out with the oppressive tyranny of the Macedonian governors, the Parthians revolted, under the leading of Arsaces. Who Arsaces was, is not agreed, but it is certain that he was always considered as the founder of the Parthian empire, and that his memory was in such veneration among them, that all his successors took his name. Arsaces extended the Parthian dominion beyond the limits of Parthia ; and in length of time it became so far enlarged by the conquests of the following kings, as to include almost all the country between the Oxus and the Euphrates. Its royal cities were Ctesiphon upon the Tigris, and Ecbatana in Media. The Parthian soldiery were almost all horsemen. Some, clad in complete armour, made use of long spears in fight. The rest had scarce any other offensive weapons than the bow and arrow : but they were so dexterous in the management of these, as to be no less formidable when they turned their backs upon their enemies than when they faced them.

beginning his march^e soon after his arrival in the east, passed the Euphrates, over a bridge of boats, without opposition, overran a great part of Mesopotamia, and possessed himself of several towns; which being most of them Grecian colonies, averse to the Parthian government, readily submitted to him.

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

It is said, that for vanquishing a small body of horse, commanded by a Parthian officer, and for reducing by force an inconsiderable fortress, called Zenodotia, Crassus had the weakness to suffer himself to be saluted imperator by his soldiers, who at the same time despised him for his vanity.

But his greatest folly (says Plutarch) next to the enterprise itself, was, that, instead of pursuing his advantage, and pushing on to Seleucia and Babylon, he re-passed the Euphrates, leaving behind him only 7,000 foot and 1,000 horse to garrison the places he had taken, and retired into Syria, for his winter-quarters; thereby giving leisure to the Parthians to prepare an army against the next year's campaign. Nor did Crassus, during the winter, take the prudent care to see his troops well exercised, and well provided for the war, but acted the part of a publican rather than a general, examining into the revenues of the province, screwing them up to the utmost height, and using all other methods of exaction whereby to enrich himself. Being told of immense treasures deposited in the temple of Jerusalem, thither he impatiently hasted, with a part of his army, to seize so delicious and so easy a prey. Eleazer, one of the priests, was then treasurer of the temple. Among other things, which he had under his charge, was a bar of gold of the weight of 300 Hebrew minæ. This, for the better securing of it, he had put into a beam, which

^e Plutarch relates, that Crassus, crossing Galatia in the way to his province, and finding king Dejotarus, who was advanced in years, employed in building a new city, said to him pleasantly, "Why, king, you begin your day's work at the twelfth hour." The king instantly replied, "And you, general, methinks you are not too early in your expedition against the Parthians." Crassus was past sixty, and looked much older than he was.

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

he had caused to be made hollow for that purpose ; and placing this beam over the entrance, which was from the Holy Place into the Holy of Holies, caused the veil, which parted these two places, to be fastened to it, and to hang down from it. Perceiving Crassus's design of plundering the temple, he endeavoured to compound the matter with him, and therefore telling him of such a bar of gold in his custody, promised to discover and deliver it to him, upon condition that he would be satisfied with it, and spare all the rest : Crassus accepted of the proposal, and solemnly promised with an oath, that, on having this bar of gold delivered to him, he would be contented with it, and meddle with nothing else. Relying on this promise, Eleazer put him in possession of the gold. Crassus had no sooner received it, but, forgetting his oath, he not only seized the 2,000 talents which Pompey had left untouched, but ransacked the temple all over, and robbed it of every thing he thought worth taking away, to the value of 8,000 talents more ; so that the whole of what he took from thence amounted to 10,000 talents, which is above 2,000,000 of our money.^f [Joseph. Antiq. lib. 14. et de Bell. Jud. lib. 1.]

As soon as the season of the year permitted, Crassus, strengthened by 1,000 Gallic horse, which his son Publius brought him from Cæsar's army, drew all his forces together, in order to prosecute the war against the Parthians, who had now got ready a very great army for their defence. But, before they entered upon action, ambassadors were sent from Orodes, the Parthian king, to the Roman general, to ask for what reason he made war upon

Prid.vol. 3.
p. 461.

^f The plundering of the temple at Jerusalem [which I do not find any where mentioned by the Greek historians] was not the only sacrilege committed by Crassus. He acted the like part all over the province, wherever any riches were to be got, particularly at Hierapolis. For there being in that city an ancient temple of the Syrian goddess, called Atergetis, where much treasure was laid up, as having been the collection of many years, he seized it all, and was so greedy of securing the whole of it, that, lest any should be detained or embezzled, he spent a great deal of his time to see it all told out and weighed before him. On his last coming out of this temple, his son going before him stumbled at the threshold, and he immediately after it upon him. This was afterward interpreted as an ill omen, that foreboded what soon happened.

him. Crassus answered with haughtiness, that he would declare his reason when he should come to Seleucia. The king, on the return of his ambassadors, finding war to be unavoidable, divided his army into two parts, marched in person with one of them towards the borders of Armenia, and sent the other under the command of Surenas,^g the most illustrious of all his nobles, and a most accomplished general, into Mesopotamia; who, immediately after his arrival there, retook some of those places of which Crassus had possessed himself the year before. The garrisons, that escaped to the Roman camp, filled it with a terrible report of the number, power, and strength of the enemy; which cast a damp upon the whole army, and sunk the courage, not only of the common soldiers, but of the general officers. Cassius (the same who was afterward concerned in the murder of Cæsar) was at this time Crassus's quæstor, and endeavoured to dissuade him from proceeding any farther in his enterprise, till he had well considered it again. At the same time came to him Artabazes,* king of Armenia, who had lately succeeded his father Tigranes in that kingdom. He brought with him 6,000 horse, which were only his lifeguard. Besides these, he told Crassus, he had 10,000 cuirassiers, and 30,000 foot, ready for his service: but advised him by no means to march his army through the plains of Mesopotamia, but to take his way through Armenia into the Parthian dominions. His reasons for it were, that Armenia being a rough mountainous country, the Parthian horse, of which their army almost wholly consisted, would there be useless; and he could take care that the Roman army should be there plentifully provided with all necessaries: both which advantages he would fail of, if he led his army through Mesopotamia, where he would often meet with sandy deserts, and be distressed for want both of

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

* Or Artav-
asdes.

^g This is said to be the name, not of a person, but of a dignity, and equivalent to that of grand vizir.

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

water and other provisions. This was the best advice that could be given him; yet Crassus answered, that, having left many brave Romans to garrison the towns which he had taken last year in Mesopotamia, he was under a necessity of going that way, that they might not be abandoned to the mercy of the enemy: but he accepted of the auxiliaries which the king offered him, and desired they might be speedily brought to him. The prospect of so considerable a reinforcement was, perhaps, what chiefly encouraged Crassus, contrary to the advice of the wisest about him, to proceed on his expedition, and, without farther delay, to pass the Euphrates,^h and again enter Mesopotamia with his army. But Artabazes, on his return, finding Orodes with a great army near his borders, was forced to stay at home to defend his own country, and therefore, could not give Crassus the assistance he had promised him.

After Crassus had thus re-entered Mesopotamia, Cassius advised him to put in at some of his garrisoned towns, and there rest and refresh his army till he should have got certain intelligence of the number and strength of the enemy, and in what place and posture they were; or, if he thought not fit to make that delay, he should at least take his march to Seleucia, along the banks of the Euphrates. For, by keeping close to that river, he would avoid being surrounded by the Parthians, and might be constantly supplied with provisions, and all other necessaries, from his barks that were upon it: but, while Crassus was considering on this advice, there came to him a crafty Arabian, who diverted him entirely from following it. He was the head of an Arabian tribe (such as the Greeks called Phylarchs, and the present Arabs, Sheks), and having formerly served under Pompey, was well known to many in the Roman army, and looked on as their friend; for which reason he had been

^h He passed the river at a town in the province of Comagena, called Zeugma, which word signifies a bridge.

made choice of, and sent by Surena to act this part. He is, by different authors, called by different names;ⁱ but whatever his name was, he effectually dissuaded Crassus from following the good advice given him by Cassius. He told the Roman general, that the Parthians durst not stand before him; that he had nothing to do, for the gaining an absolute victory over them, but to march on; and he offered himself for a guide to conduct him the shortest way to the enemy. Crassus, deceived by the fair words, and fooled by the flattery, of this man, accepted of his offer; and so was led by him into the open plains of Mesopotamia: and although Cassius and others suspected the guide of treachery, and therefore pressed Crassus to follow him no longer, but to retreat to the mountains, where he might best be able to baffle the power of the Parthian horse; and though messengers came to his camp from Artabazes, on purpose to persuade him to the same thing, yet he still continued in his delusion, till at length the traitor, having brought him into a sandy desert, where the Parthians might have all the advantage in a battle, rode off to Surenas, and acquainted him with what he had done: adding, that now was the time to attack the Romans, who were come to deliver themselves into his hands. Nor was it very long before Crassus perceived his error. While he was making forced marches, fearing nothing but that the enemy should escape him, his scouts came back full speed to inform him, that the Parthians were advancing in prodigious numbers, in good order, and with much confidence.

This report threw the whole army into a consternation,^k and especially the general, who now began, though

ⁱ By Dio Cassius he is called Augarus, or Abgarus; by Plutarch, Ariamnes; by Florus, Mazeres; and by Appian, Acbarus.

^k According to Plutarch (whom Appian copies all along) the Roman soldiers had been already terrified with about a dozen bad omens; of which the most worthy to be remembered (or, if you please, most worthy to be forgot) was, that when, in order to begin their march, they were going to pull up the foremost standard, the eagle upon it turned its head about, and looked back, as if it had no mind to go forward.

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

with a good deal of irresolution, to put his troops in order of battle. At first, following the advice of Cassius, he drew up his infantry in one line, extended to a great length, that the Parthian horse might not be able easily to surround it; and he placed all his cavalry in the wings: then, altering his mind, he formed the foot into a square body, having twelve cohorts in each of its four sides; and he flanked each cohort with a squadron; to the end that every part of his battalion, being supported by cavalry, might charge with the more safety and confidence. To his son he gave one of the wings, to Cassius the other, and placed himself in the centre.

In their march towards the enemy, they came to a rivulet, the sight of which, though its waters were not very abundant, greatly comforted and rejoiced the soldiers, after their long march over so parched and sandy a soil. Most of the officers were for passing the night in that place, and for endeavouring, before they proceeded farther, to get more exact information of the number and posture of the enemy: but Publius Crassus, full of ardour and confidence, persuaded his father to advance: so that he only made a short halt, to give those who needed refreshment time for a scanty meal, as they stood in their ranks; after which he pursued his march, pushing on with great haste and precipitation.

When the two armies were near enough to engage, the Parthian pikemen soon perceived, that the Roman battalion, which they had hoped to break by the force of their ponderous and well-steeled lances, was too deep, compact, and firm, to be by them easily penetrated and dissolved. They retreated therefore, and, by their dispersion and feigned confusion, seemed as if they meant to quit the field: but the Romans, presently after, to their great astonishment, found themselves entirely surrounded by the Parthian cavalry. Crassus ordered out against them his dartmen, and other light-armed in-

fantry. These, meeting with a flight of arrows, quickly recoiled, fell back on the legions, disordered them in some degree, and terrified them still more : for the Romans now became sensible that they had no defensive armour that was proof against the force of those murderous arrows, which the enemy incessantly showered upon them. Nor had they any means to revenge themselves ; because as soon as they advanced with that intent, the enemy fled, and, even in flying, continued to gall them with the same weapons.

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

The Romans for some time entertained hopes that the Parthians would at length exhaust their stock of arrows, and then be obliged either to run away or come to a close fight ; hopes ill-grounded ; for the bowmen were supplied with arrows as fast as they wanted them, from a great number of camels loaded with them, and placed in the rear of the army for that purpose : which, when Crassus understood, he ordered his son to attempt, at all hazards, a close engagement with those troops of the enemy which had approached the nearest to him. Publius, therefore, with the 1,000 Gallic horse he had brought from Cæsar, 300 other horse, 500 archers, and eight cohorts of legionary foot, advanced to the attack. The Parthians instantly gave ground, and even fled before him ; and the sanguine young warrior, imagining himself victorious, pursued them with his whole detachment, horse and foot. Soon he perceived that the enemy's flight had been only feigned. The runaways stopped on a sudden, and, rallying, boldly returned upon him. The pikemen, in good order, faced the Romans ; while the bowmen, without observing any order, galloped round them, and raised such a mighty dust, as deprived them at once both of sight and respiration : exposed to the Parthian arrows, and unable to make any defence against enemies whom they saw not, they now perished in great numbers, and by very painful deaths ; and those who remained alive

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

were in no condition to fight. When their commander urged them to advance against the pikemen of the enemy, some shewed him their hands nailed to their bucklers, others their feet pinned to the ground, so that they could neither defend themselves nor fly.

In this extremity, young Crassus, who manifested throughout the engagement an heroic bravery, had recourse to his Gallic cavalry as his last resource ; and so well managed, as with these to force the Parthian pikemen to a close fight. But the match was very unequal. The Gallic javelins, or half-pikes, had little effect on troopers covered almost from head to foot with iron : whereas the long, stout lances of the Parthians proved fatal to the Gauls, whose defensive armour, if indeed they had any, was very slight. They are said to have performed wonders in the action ; but being distressed by the excessive heat and drought, to which they were not accustomed, and having lost most of their horses (transfixed by the Parthian lances), they at length resolved to rejoin, if possible, the main body of the army. Carrying with them young Crassus, grievously wounded in many places, they made to a small sandy hill, not far from them. Here tying their horses one to another, and placing them in the midst, they formed themselves into a circle, and made a rampart of their shields, hoping to find it an effectual defence against the arrows of the barbarians. But herein they fatally mistook : for on even ground, the foremost rank in some measure defended those that were behind it ; whereas on an ascent, the hinder ranks standing necessarily higher than those before, all were equally exposed to the enemies' arrows : so that they quickly found their case desperate, and that they must perish without glory, and almost without resistance. The young general, disdaining to desert his troops, and attempt a precipitate flight, to which some advised him, and being deprived by a wound of the use of his own hand, commanded his armour-bearer to run

him through.¹ Most of the nobles who had accompanied him killed themselves. The rest were all slain by the enemy, except about 500, who fell alive into their hands. The Parthians cut off the head of young Crassus, and, taking it with them, marched to attack the proconsul.

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

Publius, from the beginning of his distress, had dispatched messengers to his father, to give him notice of the difficulties and dangers he had run himself into, by his inconsiderate pursuit of the Parthians. The first messengers were intercepted and killed: others reached the army. Crassus remained awhile unresolved what to do. He feared the loss of all, if he marched to the succour of his son; yet his affection for his son urged him irresistibly to it. He moved forward: the enemy presently appeared, and, by their terrible shouts and exulting noises, proclaimed their recent victory. Before them, as they approached, was carried upon the end of a lance, the head of Publius Crassus, whilst scoffingly they asked aloud, "Of what family was that young man? who were his parents?" A scene which sunk the spirits of the Roman soldiers more than all the calamities they had before suffered. Crassus is reported to have acted the hero upon this occasion. Riding through the ranks, as the army marched on, he said aloud: "This misfortune, fellow-soldiers, concerns me only: the glory

¹ "Publius Crassus was a youth of an amiable character; educated with the strictest care, and perfectly instructed in all the liberal studies; he had a ready wit and easy language; was grave without arrogance, modest without negligence, adorned with all the accomplishments proper to form a principal citizen and leader of the republic: by the force of his own judgment he had devoted himself very early to the observance and imitation of Cicero, whom he perpetually attended, and revered with a kind of filial piety. Cicero conceived a mutual affection for him, and observing his eager thirst of glory, was constantly instilling into him the true notion of it, and exhorting him to pursue that sure path to it, which his ancestors had left beaten and traced out to him, through the gradual ascent of civil honours. But, by serving under Cæsar in the Gallic wars, he had learned, as he fancied, a shorter way to fame and power than what Cicero had been inculcating; and, having signalized himself in a campaign or two as a soldier, was in too much haste to be a general; when Cæsar sent him at the head of 1,000 horse to the assistance of his father in the Parthian war."—But, "while he aspired (as Cicero says) to the fame of another Cyrus or Alexander, he fell short of that glory which many of his predecessors had reaped from a succession of honours conferred by their country as the reward of their services." Ep. Fam. 3. 8. and ib. 13. 16. Vid. Brut. p. 407. It. Plut. in Crass. Melm. 527.

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

and felicity of our country remain yet entire, so long as you are in a condition to defend them. And, if you compassionate me for having lost so brave a son, let your concern be shewn, by punishing the cruelty of our enemies." The soldiers gave a shout; but with a voice so faint and languid, as spoke more of dejection than courage.

The fight presently began. The Parthian bowmen, wheeling about the Romans, galled them in flank with showers of arrows, while the pikemen, assailing them in front, made them recoil and crowd closer together, which hastened their destruction. Night coming on, the Parthians retired, it being contrary to their custom to pass the night near an enemy, because they never fortified their camps, and because their horses and arrows could be but of little use in the dark. Their retreat, however, did not kindle in the Romans the least spark of hope. Giving all for lost, they had no attention to bury their dead, to console the dying, or succour the wounded: every one bewailed his own fate: for, should they remain where they then were till daylight, or should they set forward in the dark to traverse an almost boundless plain; in neither supposition did they see any chance of escaping. They were much perplexed likewise on account of their wounded men. If they took these with them, it would retard their flight; if they forsook them, the cries of the wretched, so abandoned, would publish the departure of the army. Though the soldiers knew their general to be the faulty cause of all their calamities, yet they wished to see him, and to hear him. But Crassus had not the confidence to appear. He had cast himself on the ground, and there he lay, as a man quite stunned and senseless.^m Octavius and Cas-

In Crass.

^m What a striking example of the short-sightedness of man, the instability of human grandeur, and the madness of unbounded ambition! Plutarch tells us, that when the province of Syria fell by lot to Crassus, he thought, that fortune had never, in any instance, been so favourable to him. Transported with his good luck, he could not, even in the company of strangers, contain his joy; but, to his familiar friends and confidants, he blurted out many extravagant and childish boastings; a folly

sius (the one his lieutenant, and the other his quæstor), having found him in this posture of dejection, endeavoured to rouse him to a more manly deportment ; but without success. They took upon themselves therefore to hold a council of war ; and it was resolved to retire immediately. The troops decamped in silence. Doleful and affecting were the lamentations of the miserable men, whom necessity constrained their fellows to abandon. The care of such of the wounded, who, having some strength left, dragged themselves along with the army ; the apprehension of being pursued and overtaken ; and the drawing up frequently in battalia upon false alarms, made the march of the army very slow. A certain officer named Egnatius, at the head of 300 horse, leaving the main body, and pushing forward with all diligence, arrived under the walls of Carræⁿ about midnight. Calling out to the guard, he bade them tell Coponious, the governor, that there had been a great battle between the Romans and the Parthians. He said no more, nor discovered himself, but immediately pursued his route to Zeugma : and by this he saved indeed his 300 horse ; yet was much blamed for deserting his general. The message, however, which he sent to Coponius, proved of service to the army ; for the governor, conjecturing from the words and manner of Egnatius that affairs went ill, sallied out with his garrison, met Crassus and his troops, and conducted them safely into the city.

The Parthians, though apprised of Crassus's retreat, waited for day, according to their custom. Then entering the Roman camp, they massacred the sick and wounded to the amount of about 4,000 men. Many of the Roman soldiers they likewise overtook and slaugh-

which he had never been guilty of in the former part of his life. Lucullus had done nothing against Tigranes ; Pompey nothing against Mithridates : but, as for himself, the limits of Parthia should not be the limits of his conquests ; the Roman eagles, under his conduct, were to fly triumphant over Bactria and India, quite to the great ocean and the extremities of the east.

ⁿ The Haran or Charran of the Holy Scriptures, where Abraham sojourned.

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

tered in the plain ; particularly four cohorts, which had lost their way in the dark. Out of these, only twenty men escaped. It is said, that the invincible courage, with which they defended themselves, struck their assailants with such admiration, that they voluntarily opened to them a free passage to Carræ.

Surena being told, as he approached that city, of a rumour which prevailed, that Crassus and the principal men of the Romans had all made their escape, began to fear the loss of what he esteemed the chief fruit of his victory. To know the truth, he ordered one of his people, who could speak Latin, to go near the walls ; and in his name invite Crassus and Cassius to a conference with him. This messenger was attended by some Arabians, who, having formerly served in the Roman army, knew the persons of both. Cassius appeared upon the walls, and was told, that Surena consented to make peace with the Romans, on the condition of their evacuating Mesopotamia. The proposal, as affairs then stood, appeared to the Roman quæstor far from being disadvantageous : he promised therefore to report it to the general. The Parthian, having thus learned what he wanted to know, laughed at the credulity of the Romans ; and the next day, while he was preparing to attack the place, gave them to understand, that, if they would obtain leave to retire in safety, they must deliver up to him Crassus and Cassius. No thought remained now but of running away in the dark ; and it was necessary to keep this resolution concealed till the moment of execution. Crassus, once more fatally deceived, imparted the secret to a traitor, named Andromachus, and even took the same traitor for his guide. Andromachus sent advice to Surena of what was intended ; and, in order to complete the destruction of the Roman army, contrived to lead them by ways so indirect, such windings and turnings, that they gained but little ground in a long march ; and at length he brought them into a

place full of ditches and enclosures. Many began now to suspect treachery, and would follow him no farther. Cassius, with 500 horse, returning to Carræ, provided himself there with some Arabian guides,^o who faithfully conducted him and his followers into Syria. Octavius too, the general's lieutenant, convinced of Andromachus's perfidy, made a timely retreat, leading off 5,000 men to a hilly ground, where they could not be much annoyed by the enemy's cavalry. Yet, when he learnt that Crassus had somehow gained an eminence, about a mile off, where he was in great danger from the Parthians, whom daylight had brought upon him, he boldly marched thither, followed by his 5,000 men; who, encompassing Crassus, and making a rampart for him of their shields and bodies, vowed that no arrows should reach their general, so long as a man of them remained alive to defend him. Surena, perceiving the ardour of his own soldiers to abate, and apprehending, that, if the Romans should spin out the battle till night, they might then gain the mountains and be safe, for the future, from his attacks, had again recourse to his wonted craft. He suffered some prisoners to escape, before whom the Parthians, discoursing with one another, had designedly said, that their king was far from intending an implacable war with the Romans, and would be glad to regain their friendship by treating Crassus with generosity. That this stratagem might more easily take effect, he ceased hostilities, and, attended by his principal officers, advanced in pacific guise towards the hill, having his bow unbent, and holding out his hand, as a friend, to Crassus, whom he invited to a treaty of accommodation. "The king (he said) having, much against his will, made the Romans sensible of his power, and of the bravery of his troops, is

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

^o It is related, that these Arabians, being superstitious about the moon, exhorted Cassius earnestly not to advance, till the moon had passed Scorpio. To which Cassius answered, that he was much more afraid of Sagittarius; alluding to the Parthian arrows.

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

now disposed to give them proofs of his clemency and goodness, by suffering them to retire in safety." Crassus, who saw no reason for so sudden a change, was not deceived; his soldiers were: and, notwithstanding all he could say to persuade them to have patience till night, when they might make a retreat to the mountains, they seditiously, and with threats, compelled him to accept of Surena's invitation (a behaviour strangely ill suiting with what has been just related of their zeal and fidelity). At going from them, he is reported to have said: "Octavius and Petronius, and you the rest of the commanders here present, you are witnesses of the violence offered me: nevertheless, for the honour of the Roman name, I desire you will declare to all the world, that Crassus perished by the craft of his enemies, not by the perfidy of his soldiers and fellow-citizens."

Octavius and Petronius, and some other officers, not enduring the thought, that their general should go alone, descended the hill with him; but he sent back his lictors. Certain heralds from Surena, having accosted him with profound respect, desired him, in the Greek language, to send somebody before, to see that the Parthian general and his retinue were without arms. Crassus answered, that, if he had retained the least concern for his life, he would never have put himself into their hands. However, to learn what appearance things had, he sent forward two men, who were to bring him word. These were instantly seized, by Surena's order; who then, attended by his principal officers, coming up to him, with an air of astonishment, said, "How! what an indecent sight is this! a Roman general on foot, and we on horseback!" "No error committed on either side (answered Crassus); each follows the custom of his country." "From this moment (said the Parthian) there is a league of amity between the king my master and the Roman people; but it must be put in writing; for you, Romans, are very apt to forget your engage-

ments and covenants. Let us go, therefore, and finish the treaty on the banks of the Euphrates." Crassus hereupon ordered a horse to be brought him. "There is no need (said Surena), the king makes you a present of one;" and immediately a horse, with rich trappings, was led to him; and he was forcibly put into the saddle: some of Surena's attendants switching the horse, to hasten him forward. The Romans now saw plainly, that the purpose of the Parthian was to take Crassus alive. Octavius therefore seized the bridle of the horse, and stopped him. Petronius and the other officers surrounded their general, putting themselves in a posture to defend him. A tumult and scuffle ensued. Octavius killed one of the Parthian grooms, and was himself killed by a stroke of a lance run into his back. Crassus himself fell dead quickly after; but whether he was dispatched, by the hand of an enemy, or of a friend, who would preserve him from the disgrace of becoming a prisoner, is uncertain.

Surena, by fair words, notwithstanding the experience which the Romans had of his perfidy, decoyed many of those who had remained on the hill to surrender themselves prisoners. The most courageous waited for the night to attempt a retreat; but of these few escaped, the rest being intercepted by the Arabs, who scoured the country with that intent. In the several actions and disasters of this war, the Romans are said to have lost 20,000 men killed, and 10,000 taken prisoners. It was one of the greatest blows that Rome had ever received from a foreign enemy, and for which she was ever after meditating revenge.

Orodes, at the time of Crassus's death, was in Armenia, having there made peace with Artabazes. For this prince, on the return of the messengers which he last sent to the Roman camp, finding, by the account which they brought of the measures which Crassus took in the Parthian war, that he must necessarily be undone, com-

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

Dio, l. 40.
Florus, 3.
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Middl.
p. 526.

Middl.
p. 526.

Connex.
part 2. p.
465. 8vo.
Ed. 1718.

Prideaux,
part 2.
p. 474.
Vid. vol. 4.
p. 374.
Tom. 13.
p. 71.

Prideaux,
part 1.
p. 171. 173.

pounded all matters with Orodes ; and by giving one of his sisters in marriage to Pacorus, the son of the Parthian, restored himself to full amity with him. And while they were sitting together at the nuptial-feast, in came a messenger, who presented Orodes with the head and hand of Crassus, which Surena had caused to be cut off with that intent.^p This much increased the mirth and joy of the feast. And it is said, that melted gold was then poured into the mouth of the lifeless head by way of mockery ; as if they would thus satiate that thirst after riches, for which Crassus had been so remarkable.

The chief and immediate concern which the city felt on the news of Crassus's death, and the destruction^q of his forces, was for the detriment that the republic had suffered, and the dangers to which it was exposed, by the loss of so great an army ; yet the principal mischief lay in what they did not at first regard, and seemed ra-

^p Surena did not long rejoice in his victory : for Orodes, envying him the glory of it, and growing jealous of the great augmentation of his power and interest from his late successes, soon after caused him to be put to death. Plut. in Crass.

^q The Roman writers generally imputed this disaster to Crassus's contempt of the auspices ; “ as some Christians have since charged it to his sacrilegious violation of the temple of Jerusalem—both of them with equal superstition (says Dr. Middleton) pretending to unfold the counsels of Heaven, and to fathom those depths, which are declared to be unsearchable.”

Dr. Prideaux is one of the Christians here referred to ; his words are these—“ Crassus made a great number of false steps in the whole conduct of this war ; and although he was often warned, yet, being deaf to all good advice, he obstinately followed his own delusions, till he perished in them. For being, for his impious sacrilege at Jerusalem, justly destined to destruction, God did cast infatuations into all his counsels, for the leading him thereto.”

The same author, speaking afterward of the deplorable end of Pompey the Great, writes thus : “ No man had enjoyed greater prosperity till he profaned the temple of God at Jerusalem : after that, his fortunes were in a continual decline, till at length, to expiate for that impiety, he was thus vilely murdered in the confines of that country where he had committed it.”

M. Crevier, another Christian, speaks to the same effect with regard to both these Roman generals. But it would seem, that Dr. Prideaux delivered these opinions not as peculiar to a believer of the Holy Scriptures, but as proper to every religious philosopher : for, having related how Cambyses, king of Persia, in a rage drew out his dagger, and ran it into the thigh of the sacred bull, the Egyptian god Apis, of which wound the god died, he afterward relates the death of Cambyses in the following words—“ As he mounted his horse, his sword, falling out of the scabbard, gave him a wound in the thigh, of which he died a few days after. The Egyptians remarking, that it was in the same part of the body where he had wounded the Apis, reckoned it as an especial judgment from Heaven upon him for that fact ; and perchance they were not much out in it. For it seldom happening in an affront given to any particular mode of worship, how erroneous soever it may be, but that religion is in general wounded hereby ; there are many instances in history, wherein God hath very severely punished the profanations of religion in the worst of times, and under the worst mode of heathen idolatry.”

ther to rejoice at, the loss of Crassus himself. For, after the death of Julia, Crassus's authority was the only means left of curbing the power of Pompey and the ambition of Cæsar, being ready always to support the weaker against the encroachments of the stronger, and keep them both within the bounds of a decent respect to the laws: but this check being now taken away, and the power of the empire thrown, as a kind of prize, between two, it gave a new turn to their several pretensions, and created a fresh competition for the larger share.

Year of
R O M E
700.
B. C. 52.

399th con-
sulship.

By the death of young Crassus, a place became vacant in the college of augurs, for which Cicero declared himself a candidate: nor was any one so hardy as to appear against him, except Hirrus the tribune, who, trusting to the popularity of his office, and Pompey's favour, had the vanity to pretend to it: but a competitor so unequal furnished matter of raillery only to Cicero, who was chosen without any difficulty or struggle, with the unanimous approbation of the whole body.^r

Middl.
p. 529.

Philip. 2. 2.
Ep. Fam.
83.

^r This college, from the last regulation of it by Sylla, consisted of fifteen, who were all persons of the first distinction in Rome: it was a priesthood for life, which no crime or forfeiture could efface: the priests of all kinds were originally chosen by their colleges, till Domitius, a tribune, about fifty years before, transferred the choice of them to the people, whose authority was held to be superior in sacred as well as civil affairs. This act was reversed by Sylla, and the ancient right restored to the colleges; but Labienus, when tribune, in Cicero's consulship, repealed the law of Domitius, to facilitate Cæsar's advancement to the high-priesthood. It was necessary, however, that every candidate should be nominated to the people by two augurs, who gave a solemn testimony upon oath of his dignity and fitness for the office: this was done in Cicero's case by Pompey and Hortensius, the two most eminent members of the college; and, after the election, he was installed with all the usual formalities by Hortensius.

Middl.
p. 529.

De Leg.
Agr. 2. 7.

Brut. init.

CHAP. VIII.

Scandalous proceedings of the candidates for the consulship. Milo, who is one of them, has a fatal rencounter with Clodius on the Appian way, which occasions terrible tumults and mischiefs in the city. To remedy these disorders, Pompey is elected sole consul: he publishes several new laws. Milo is brought to trial, and, though defended by Cicero, is condemned. Cicero's conduct in relation to the sale of Milo's effects. Two of the late candidates for the consulship are tried for bribery by Pompey's new laws. His shameful partiality on this occasion. Two of the late tribunes are sentenced to banishment for their riotous proceedings in their magistracy. The government of Cilicia falls by lot to Cicero. The usurious extortion practised by M. Brutus, the renowned patriot-assassin. Cicero's military achievements. His excellent conduct in the civil government of his province. Appius and Piso are chosen censors, the last who bore that office during the republican state of Rome.

Year of
R O M E
701.
B. C. 51.

400th con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 530.
Plut. in
Cat.

Ad Quint.
3. 9.
Ep. Fam.
2. 6.

Middl.
p. 534.

THE candidates for the consulship of the coming year were T. Annius Milo, Q. Metellus Scipio, and P. Plautius Hypsæus, who pushed on their several interests with such open violence and bribery, as if the consulship was to be carried only by money or arms. Clodius was putting in at the same time for the prætorship, and employing all his credit and interest to disappoint Milo. Pompey was wholly averse to Milo, who did not pay him that court which he expected, but seemed to affect an independency, and to trust to his own strength, while the other two competitors were wholly at his devotion: Hypsæus had been his quæstor, and always his creature; and as for Scipio, Pompey designed to become his son-in-law, by marrying his daughter Cornelia, a lady of celebrated accomplishments, the widow of young Crassus. Cicero, on the other hand, served Milo to the utmost of his power, and ardently wished his success. — In the heat of this competition, Curio was coming home from Asia, and expected shortly at Rome; whence Cicero sent an express to meet him on the road, or at his landing in Italy, with a most earnest and pressing letter to engage him to Milo's interest.

The senate and the aristocratical party were generally for Milo: but three of the tribunes were violent against him, Q. Pompeius Rufus, Munatius Plancus Bursa, and Sallust the historian; the other seven were his fast

friends, but above all M. Cœlius, who, out of regard to Cicero, served Milo with a particular zeal. But while all things were proceeding very prosperously in his favour, and nothing seemed wanting to crown his success, but to bring on the election, which his adversaries for that reason laboured to keep back, all his hopes and fortunes were blasted at once by an unhappy rencounter with his old enemy Clodius.

Year of
R O M E
701.
B. C. 51.

400th con-
sulship.

Quintil. l. 6.
c. 5.

Their meeting was wholly accidental on the Appian road, not far from the city; Clodius coming home from the country towards Rome, Milo going out about three in the afternoon; the first on horseback, with three companions, and thirty servants well armed; the latter in a chariot with his wife and one friend, but with a much greater retinue, and among them some gladiators. The servants on both sides began presently to insult each other; when Clodius, turning briskly to some of Milo's men, who were nearest to him, and threatening them with his usual fierceness, received a wound in the shoulder from one of the gladiators; and, after receiving several more in the general fray, which instantly ensued, finding his life in danger, was forced to fly for shelter into a neighbouring tavern. Milo, heated by this success, and the thoughts of revenge, and reflecting that he had already done enough to give his enemy great advantage against him, should he be left alive to pursue it, resolved, whatever was the consequence, to have the pleasure of destroying him, and ordered the house to be stormed, and Clodius to be dragged out and murdered; the master of the tavern was likewise killed, with eleven of Clodius's servants, while the rest saved themselves by flight: so that Clodius's body was left in the road where it fell, till S. Tedi-
us, a senator, happening to come by, took it up into his chaise, and brought it with him to Rome; where it was exposed in that condition, all covered with blood and wounds, to the view of the populace, who

Dio, l. 40.
p. 143.
Ascon.
Argum.
in Mil.

Year of
R O M E
701.
B. C. 51.

400th con-
sulship.

flocked about it in crowds to lament the miserable fate of their leader. The next day the mob, headed by S. Clodius, a kinsman of the deceased, and one of his chief incendiaries, carried the body naked, so as all the wounds might be seen, into the Forum, and placed it on the rostra, where the three tribunes, Milo's enemies, were prepared to harangue upon it, in a style suited to the lamentable occasion; by which they inflamed the multitude to such a height of fury, that, snatching up the body, they ran away with it into the senate-house, and, tearing up the benches, tables, and every thing combustible, dressed up a funeral pile upon the spot, and, together with the body, burnt the house itself, with a basilica also, or public hall adjoining, called the Porcian; and in the same fit of madness proceeded to storm the house of Milo, and of M. Lepidus the interrex, but were repulsed in both attacks with some loss.

These extravagances raised great indignation in the city, and gave a turn in favour of Milo; who, looking upon himself as undone, was meditating nothing before but a voluntary exile: but now taking courage, he appeared in public, and was introduced into the rostra by Coelius, where he made his defence to the people; and, to mitigate their resentment, distributed through all the tribes above 3*l.* a man to every poor citizen. But all his pains and expense were to little purpose; for the three tribunes made it their business to keep up the ill humour of the populace; and, what was more fatal, Pompey would not be brought into any measures of accommodating the matter; so that the tumults still increasing, the senate passed a decree, that the interrex, assisted by the tribunes and Pompey, should take care that the republic received no detriment; and that Pompey in particular should raise a body of troops for the common security; which he presently drew together from all parts of Italy. In this confusion the rumour of a dictator was again industriously revived, and gave a

fresh alarm to the senate, who, to avoid the greater evil, came to the resolution of creating Pompey consul without a colleague. Bibulus had made the motion; assigning for his reason, that by this means the commonwealth would be freed from its present confusion; or, if it must be enslaved, would have the best master it could hope for. Every body was surprised at this language from Bibulus, who had always shewed himself an enemy of Pompey: but they were yet more surprised by what Cato said on this occasion: he declared, that, though he could never have prevailed with himself to be the author of such an advice, nevertheless, since it had been moved by another, his opinion was, that it should be followed. That any government was preferable to anarchy; and that he thought no man better qualified than Pompey to hold the reins of government in a time of so great disorder. Hereupon the senate passed a decree, that Pompey should be sole consul; and accordingly, on the 25th of February, he was, by Servius Sulpicius the interrex, declared elected alone to that magistracy. Pompey, highly pleased with the honour which Cato had done him, returned him abundant thanks for it; requesting at the same time, that he would in private give him his advice and assistance for the worthy discharge of his office. Cato answered: "Pompey, you owe me no thanks: what I said in the senate was with a view to serve the commonwealth, not to serve you; if you consult me in private, I will freely give you my advice: and, in public, I shall always speak my opinion, though you should not ask it."

Dio tells us that the senate, and Bibulus in particular, were apprehensive at this time, lest Cæsar should be chosen one of the consuls at the next election, and for that reason took this unprecedented step: which, if true, sufficiently accounts for Cato's favour to Pompey; for the reader must have already observed, and will hereafter have fresh occasion to observe, that the main

Year of
R O M E
701.
B. C. 51.

400th con-
sulship.

Plut. in
Pomp. et
in Cat.

Year of
R O M E
701.
B. C. 51.

400th con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 537.
Dio, l. 40.
143.
Ascon.
Argum. in
Mil.

spring of some of Cato's political movements, was neither the love of virtue, nor the love of his country, but a personal hatred to Cæsar.

Pompey applied himself immediately to calm the public disorders, by the promulgation of several new laws,^s prepared by him for that purpose. One of them was, to appoint a special commission to inquire into Clodius's death, the burning of the senate-house, and the attack on M. Lepidus; and to appoint an extraordinary judge of consular rank to preside in it: a second was against bribery and corruption in elections, with the infliction of new and severer penalties on those who had been guilty. Cato, according to Plutarch, objected to this law, as unjust with regard to past offences: and he advised him to provide only for the future. Appian reports, that, by Pompey's new law, all who, from the time of his first consulate (twenty years before), had been in any public office, might be called to account for corruption in obtaining it, or male-administration in the exercise of it. As this space of time comprised the consulate of Cæsar, those of his party imagined there was a design to affront him; and they hinted what they thought to Pompey.—He answered them, that their suspicion was injurious to Cæsar, whose conduct, being out of the reach of censure, secured him from all danger. Appian adds, that Pompey shortened the retrospect to his second consulate; but would not entirely drop the new law. [App. de Bell. Civ. lib. 2. p. 441.]

Middl.
p. 537.

By these laws the method of trials was altered, and the length of them limited: three days were allowed for the examination of witnesses, and the fourth for the sentence; on which the accuser was to have two hours only to enforce the charge; the criminal three for his defence.^t Coelius opposed his negative to these laws, as

Middl.
p. 548.
Ib. p. 537.

^s Cicero seems to have written his Treatise on Laws soon after the death of Clodius.

^t Tacitus seems to consider this regulation as the first step towards the ruin of the Roman eloquence, by imposing reins, as it were, upon its free and ancient course.

being rather privileges than laws, and provided particularly against Milo; but he was soon obliged to withdraw it, upon Pompey's declaring that he would support them by force of arms.

Year of
R O M E
701.
B. C. 51.

Pompey was the only man in Rome who had the power to bring Milo to a trial. He was not concerned for Clodius's death, or for the manner of it, but rather pleased that the republic was freed from so pestilent a demagogue; yet he resolved to take the benefit of the occasion for getting rid of Milo too, from whose ambition and high spirit he had cause to apprehend no less trouble. He would not listen therefore to any overtures from Milo's friends; and when Milo offered to drop his suit for the consulship, if that would satisfy him, he answered, that he would not concern himself with any man's suing or desisting, nor give any obstruction to the power and inclination of the Roman people. He attended the trial in person with a strong guard, to preserve peace, and prevent any violence from either side.

400th consulship.

Middl.
p. 439.

When the examination was over (in which many clear and positive truths were produced against Milo) Manutius Plancus called the people together, and exhorted them to appear in a full body the next day, when judgment was to be given, and to declare their sentiments in so public a manner, that the criminal might not be suffered to escape; which Cicero, in his defence of Milo, reflects upon as an insult on the liberty of the bench.

Early in the morning, on the 11th of April, the shops were all shut, and the whole city gathered into the Forum, where the avenues were possessed by Pompey's soldiers, and he himself seated in a conspicuous part, to overlook the whole proceeding, and hinder all disturbance.

Ascon.
Argum.

The accusers were young Appius, the nephew of Clo-

"Primus tertio consulatu Cn. Pompeius astringit, imposuitque veluti frænos eloquentiæ,"—&c. Dialog. de Orator. 38.

Year of
R O M E
701.
B. C. 51.

400th con-
sulship.

dius, M. Antonius, and P. Valerius ; who, according to the new law, employed two hours in supporting their indictment.

Cicero was the only advocate on Milo's side ; but, as soon as he rose up to speak, he was received with so rude a clamour by the Clodians, that he was much discomposed and daunted at his first setting out ; yet recovered spirit enough to go through his speech of three hours ; which was taken down in writing, and published as it was delivered ; though the copy of it now extant, is supposed to have been retouched and corrected by him afterward [or rather a new composition] for a present to Milo in his exile.

In the council of Milo's friends, several were of opinion, that he should defend himself by avowing the death of Clodius, and pleading that it was an act of public benefit : but Cicero thought that defence too desperate, as it would disgust the grave, by opening so great a door to licence ; and offend the powerful, lest the precedent should be extended to themselves. But young Brutus [discovering from his early years an apt and promising genius for the glorious business of assassination], in an oration, which he composed and published in vindication of Milo, maintained the killing of Clodius to be right and just, and of great service to the republic.

Middl.
p. 541.

Pro Mil. 9.

It was notorious that they had often threatened death to each other : Clodius had declared several times, both to the senate and the people, that Milo ought to be killed, and that, if the consulship could not be taken from him, his life could : and when Favonius asked him once, what hopes he could have of playing his pranks while Milo was living ; he replied, that in three or four days at most he should live no more ; which was spoken just three days before the fatal rencounter, and attested by Favonius. Since Milo then was charged with being the contriver of their meeting, and the aggressor in it, and several testimonies were produced to that purpose,

Cicero chose to risk the cause on that issue, in hopes to persuade, that Clodius actually laid wait for Milo, and contrived the time and place; and Milo's part was but a necessary act of self-defence. This had somewhat of a plausibility, from the nature of the equipage, and the circumstances in which they met: for though Milo's was the more numerous, yet it was much more encumbered and unfit for an engagement than his adversary's; he himself being in a chariot with his wife, and all her women along with her; while Clodius with his followers were on horseback, as if prepared and equipped for fighting. He did not preclude himself however by this from the other plea,^u which he often takes care to insinuate, that if Milo had really designed and contrived to kill Clodius, he would have deserved honours instead of punishment, for cutting off so desperate and dangerous an enemy to the peace and liberty of Rome.

Year of
R O M E
701.
B. C. 51.

400th con-
sulship.

Pro Mil.
10. et 21.

Ib. 28, &c.

Of one-and-fifty judges, who sat upon Milo, thirteen only acquitted and thirty-eight condemned him: the votes were usually given by ballots; but Cato, who absolved him, chose to give his vote openly; and, if he had done it earlier, says Velleius, would have drawn others after him.

Middl.
p. 544.

Milo went into exile at Marseilles a few days after his condemnation; and his whole estate was sold by public auction for the satisfaction of his creditors.^x

Philotimus, a freedman of Cicero's wife, bought this estate, in partnership with some others, at an under value. It was thought strange, that Cicero should suf-

Melm.
vol. 1.
p. 298.

^u Asconius speaks as if Cicero approved neither the use of this plea in the present case, nor the doctrine itself whereon the plea is founded.—“Respondit his [accusatoribus] unus M. Cicero, et cum quibusdam placuisset, ait defendi crimen, interfici Clodium pro republica fuisse (quam formam Marcus Brutus secutus est in ea oratione quam pro Milone composuit et edidit, quamvis non egisset) Ciceroni id non placuit, quod quis bono publico damnari, idem etiam occidi indemnatus posset.” Nevertheless Cicero, in the case of Catiline's accomplices, seems to have followed this maxim, That whoever may, for the public good, be justly condemned, may, for the same public good, be justly put to death without trial and condemnation.

^x Milo had wasted three estates in giving plays and shows to the people; and when he went into exile was found to owe above half a million of our money. Plin. lib. 16. 15. Ascon. Argum. in Milon. Middl. p. 531.

Year of
R O M E
701.
B. C. 51.

400th con-
sulship.

fer Philotimus, who acted as a sort of steward in his family, to engage in the purchase of a banished man's estate, such purchases being always looked upon as odious; and this was particularly so, Cicero having received great obligations from Milo. Accordingly the latter complained of it in the letters he wrote to his friends at Rome. This alarmed Cicero for his reputation; and he seems to have written to Cœlius, as he did to several others of his correspondents, to accommodate this affair in the way that would be most for his honour. He pleaded in his justification an intent of serving Milo; yet it appears very evident, from the following letters to Atticus on this subject, that he shared with Philotimus in the advantages of the purchase.

Ad Att.
5. 8.

“ They write to me from Rome, that they have seen letters from Milo, who complains of my having suffered Philotimus to enter into partnership with those who bought his estate: yet I did it by the advice of Duronius, Milo's particular friend, and whom you know to be an honest man. Our view was to hinder his falling into the hands of strangers, and oppressive people, who might have demanded a great number of slaves that he has with him. We were, in the next place, desirous, that the provision which he intended should be made for his wife might be secured. We likewise thought, that, if there was a possibility of saving any thing for him, we could manage that matter better than any body else. Endeavour, I beseech you, to search this whole matter to the bottom; for things are often magnified in the relation. But if it be true that Milo complains, and writes to his friends on this head, and if Fausta be of the same mind, Philotimus shall not have any concern in the purchase; for I made him promise, before I left Rome, that, without Milo's consent, he would not. The profit has not been any thing considerable: but you will judge. Talk with Duronius. I have writ to Camillus and to Lamia, being uncertain whether you were at Rome. In

a word, you will resolve to act as honesty, reputation, and my interest, shall require."

Year of
R O M E
701.
B. C. 51.

[We see here, says an ingenious writer, Cicero's reasons for his friendly officiousness; but I doubt whether they will convince any body, that interest was not his principal motive; and the rather, as Milo's goods were sold greatly under value. It appears by two other letters to Atticus, and by one from Cœlius to Cicero, that Philotimus restored to Milo the estates he had bought, on condition of allowing him a certain profit, in which Cicero was a sharer.]

400th consulship.

Mong.
tom. 3.
p. 22.

"I have one thing more to mention to you. I shall write mysteriously, but you will guess my meaning. My wife's freedman (you know whom I speak of) has embezzled, as I judge by his lame account, part of the profit made by the purchase of the estate of the Crotoniate tyrant-killer.^y If you guess the meaning of this last word, you will understand all the rest. I dare not be more explicit."

Ad Att.
6. 4.

"Do not forget the affair I wrote to you about in my last letter; where I told you, that I have for some time suspected, from the confused inconsistent talk of my wife's freedman in several companies, that he has not given me a faithful account of the profits arising to me from the purchase of the Crotoniate's estate.—While I suffered him to be here, I was constantly upon my guard: for he came to sound me, in the hopes that I would remit somewhat of what he owes me; but finding himself disappointed, he flung away at once——'I will be gone; it would be shameful for me to stay any longer, and at last go away with empty hands:' and he twitted me with the old proverb, 'A gift admits of no accounting;'" or, as Mongault translates the passage, 'We should be content with what is given.' By this (says the ingenious French writer) Philotimus intimated

Ibid. 5.

^y Milo, who carried an ox upon his back at the Olympic games, was of Crotona. The Milo, now in question, is called tyrant-killer, because he killed Clodius.

Year of
R O M E
701.
B. C. 51.

400th con-
sulship.

to Cicero, that he ought to be satisfied with his yielding to him part of the profit he had made by the purchase of Milo's estate, since his name had never been mentioned in the purchase. The proverb, of which Cicero cites here only the first words, *τα μὲν διδόμενα*—is in the *Gorgias* of Plato, and answers to the English proverb, "We should not look a gift-horse in the mouth." From all this, I think, we may conclude, that Philotimus had Cicero in his power.

M. CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam.
l. 8. ep. 3.

—"As to what concerns the behaviour of Philotimus, in relation to Milo's estate, I have endeavoured that he shall act in such a manner as to give full satisfaction to Milo and his friends, and at the same time clear your character from all imputation."

Middl. p.
545—547.

The next trial before the same tribunal, and for the same crime, was of M. Saufeius, one of Milo's confidants, charged with being the ringleader in storming the house and killing Clodius. Cicero defended him, and he was acquitted by one vote only: but being accused a second time on the same account, though for a different fact, and again defended by Cicero, he was acquitted by a great majority. But Sex. Clodius, the captain of the other side, was condemned and banished, with several others of that faction, for burning the senate-house, and the other violences committed upon Clodius's death.

Pompey no sooner published his new law against bribery, than the late consular candidates, Scipio and Hypsæus, were severally impeached upon it, and, being both of them notoriously guilty, were in great danger of being condemned: but Pompey, calling the judges together, begged it of them as a favour, that out of the great number of state criminals they would remit Scipio to him: whom, after he had rescued from the prosecu-

tion, he declared his colleague in the consulship for the last five months of the year;² having first made him his father-in-law, by marrying his daughter Cornelia, a lady of fine accomplishments. The other candidate Hypsæus was left to the mercy of the law, and being likely to fare the worse for Scipio's escape, he watched an opportunity of access to Pompey, as he was coming out of his bath; and, throwing himself at his feet, implored his protection: but, though he had been his quæstor, and ever obsequious to his will, yet Pompey is said to have spurned him away with great haughtiness and inhumanity, telling him, that he would only spoil his supper by detaining him.³

Year of
R O M E
701.
B. C. 51.

400th con-
sulship.

Before the end of the year, two of the late tribunes, whose office was just expired, Q. Pompeius Rufus, and T. Munatius Plancus Bursa, were tried, condemned, and banished, for the violences of their tribunate, and burning the senate-house. Coelius accused the first, Cicero the second, the only cause, excepting that of Verres, in which he ever acted the part of an accuser. It seems Bursa had been formerly defended by him, and had proved ungrateful. Pompey, before judges of his own appointing, pleaded the cause of Bursa: yet he was condemned by a unanimous vote of the whole bench.

² Pompey was preparing an inscription this summer for the front of the new temple, which he had lately built to Venus the Conqueress, containing, as usual, the recital of all his titles: but in drawing it up, a question happened to be started about the manner of expressing his third consulship, whether it should be by *Consul*, *Tertium*, or *Tertio*. This was referred to the principal critics of Rome, who could not, it seems, agree about it. Pompey therefore left it to Cicero to decide the matter: but Cicero, being unwilling to give judgment on either side, when there were great authorities on both, and Varro among them, advised Pompey to order *Tert.* only to be inscribed, which fully declared the thing, without determining the dispute.

Middl.
p. 550.
A. Gell.
10. 1.

³ "Cn. autem Pompeius quam insolenter! Qui balneo egressus, ante pedes suos prostratum Hypsæum ambitus reum, et nobilem virum, et sibi amicum, jacentem reliquit, contumeliosa voce proculcatum. Nihil enim eum aliud agere, quam ut convivium suum moraretur, respondit.—Ille etiam in foro non erubuit vero P. Scipionem socerum suum, legibus noxium, quas ipse tulerat, in maxima quidem reorum et illustrium ruina, muneris loco a iudicibus deprecere."—Val. Max. 9. 5. 3. It, Plut. in Pomp.

This is that Pompey, of whom Cicero says, that he knew him to be a man of integrity, an honest, sincere, and grave man—*hominem integrum, et castum, et gravem, cognovi*. And Dr. Middleton is of opinion, that this was his true character. Nevertheless the reader, I imagine, will not judge that this grave Pompey was a proper person to be invested with that dictatorial power, which the Doctor thinks was necessary, in the present disorders of the republic, to reduce it to a tolerable state.

Ad Att.
11. 6.
vol. 2.
p. 132.
Vid. supr.
p. 139.
note.

Year of
R O M E
701.
B. C. 51.

400th con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 550.
Dio, p. 142.

Ad Att.
7. 1.
Suet. J.
Cæs. 26.

Among the other acts of Pompey, in this his third consulship, there was a new law against bribery, contrived to strengthen the old ones that were already subsisting against it, by disqualifying all future consuls and prætors from holding any province till five years after the expiration of their magistracies; for this was thought likely to give some check to the eagerness of suing and bribing for those great offices, when the chief fruit and benefit of them was removed to such a distance. But, before the law passed, Pompey took care to provide an exception for himself, and to get the government of Spain continued to him for five years longer, with an appointment of money to pay his troops: and, lest this should give offence to Cæsar, if something of an extraordinary kind was not provided for him too, he proposed a law to dispense with Cæsar's presence in suing for the consulship, of which Cæsar at that time seemed very desirous. Cœlius was the promoter of this law, engaged to it by Cicero, at the joint request of Pompey and Cæsar; and it was carried with the concurrence of all the tribunes, though not without difficulty and obstruction from the senate.

Middl.
p. 551.

Ad Att.
5. 15.

By Pompey's law, just now mentioned, it was provided, that, for a supply of governors for the interval of five years, in which the consuls and prætors were disqualified; the senators of consular and prætorian rank, who had never held any foreign command, should divide the vacant provinces among themselves by lot: in consequence of which, Cicero, who was obliged to take his chance with the rest, obtained the government^b of Cili-

Middl.
vol. 2.
p. 1, 2.

^b These preferments were, of all others, the most ardently desired by the great, for the advantages which they afforded both of acquiring power and amassing wealth; for their command, though accountable to the Roman people, was absolute and uncontrollable in the province; where they kept up the state and pride of sovereign princes, and had all the neighbouring kings paying a court to them, and attending their orders. If their genius was turned to arms, and fond of martial glory, they could never want a pretext for war, since it was easy to drive the subjects into rebellion, or the adjoining nations to acts of hostility by their oppressions and injuries, till, from the destruction of a number of innocent people, they had acquired the title of emperor, and with it the pretension to a triumph, without which scarce any pro-

cia, now in the hands of Appius, the late consul. This province included also Pisidia, Pamphilia, and three diocesses, as they are called, or districts of Asia, together with the island of Cyprus; for the guard of all which a standing army was kept of two legions, or about 12,000 foot, with 2,600 horse. But, whatever benefit or glory this government seemed to offer, it had no charms for Cicero: the thing itself was disagreeable to his temper, nor worthy of his talents, which (in his own opinion) were formed to sit at the helm, and shine in the administration of the whole republic; so that he considered it only as an honourable exile, or a burden imposed by his country, to which his duty obliged him to submit. His first care therefore was to provide, that this command might not be prolonged to him beyond the usual term of a year. Before his departure he solicited all his friends not to suffer such a mortification to fall upon him. He left the city about the 1st of May, attended

Year of
R O M E
701.
B. C. 51.

400th con-
sulship.

Middl.
vol. 2.
p. 3.
Ep. Fam.
2. 11.
Ad Att. 5.
10. et 15.

consul was ever known to return from a remote and frontier province.* Their opportunities of raising money were as immense as their power, and bounded only by their own appetites: the appointments of the treasury, for their equipage, plate, and necessary furniture, amounted, as it appears from some instances, to near 150,000*l.*: and besides the revenues of kingdoms, and pay of armies, of which they had the arbitrary management, they could exact what contributions they pleased, not only from the cities of their own jurisdiction, but from all the states and princes around them, who were under the protection of Rome. But, while their primary care was to enrich themselves, they carried out with them always a band of hungry friends and dependants, as their lieutenants, tribunes, præfects, with a crew of freedmen and favourite slaves, who were all likewise to be enriched by the spoils of the province, and the sale of their master's favours. Hence flowed all those accusations and trials for the plunder of the subjects, of which we read so much in the Roman writers; for as few or none of the proconsuls behaved themselves with that exact justice as to leave no room for complaint, so the factions of the city, and the quarrels of families, subsisting from former impeachments, generally excited some or other to revenge the affront in kind, by undertaking the cause of an injured province, and dressing up an impeachment against their enemy.

* While the ancient discipline of the republic subsisted, no general could pretend to a triumph who had not enlarged the bounds of the empire by his conquests, and killed at least 5,000 enemies in battle, without any considerable loss of his own soldiers. This was expressly enacted by an old law: in support of which a second was afterward provided, that made it penal for any of their triumphal commanders to give a false account of the number of slain either on the enemies' side or their own, and obliged them, upon their entrance into the city, to take an oath before the quæstors, or public treasurers, that the accounts which they had sent to the senate of each number was true. [Val. Max. 2. 8.] But these laws had long been neglected, and treated as obsolete: and the honour of a triumph usually granted, by intrigue and faction, to every general of any credit who had gained some little advantage against pirates or fugitives, or repelled the incursions of the wild barbarians who bordered upon the distant provinces.

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

by his brother, and their two sons: for Quintus, in order to accompany him in the post of lieutenant, had quitted his lieutenancy under Cæsar.

401st con-
sulship

S. Sulpicius
and M. Mar-
cellus,
consuls.
Middl. p. 7.
Ad Att. 5.
6—9.

When Cicero arrived at Tarentum, he made a visit to Pompey, who was taking the benefit of that soft air for the recovery of his health at one of his villas in those parts, and had invited and pressed him to spend some days with him upon his journey: they proposed great satisfaction on both sides from this interview, for the opportunity of conferring together with all freedom on the present state of the republic, which was to be their subject: and Cicero expected likewise to get some lessons of the military kind from this renowned commander. He promised Atticus an account of this conference; but, the particulars being too delicate to be communicated by letter, he acquainted him only in general, that he found Pompey an excellent citizen, and provided for all events that could possibly be apprehended.

Vid. supr.
p. 137.

After three days' stay with Pompey, he proceeded to Brundusium, where he was detained for twelve days by a slight indisposition, and the expectation of his principal officers, particularly of his lieutenant Pontinius, an experienced leader, the same who had triumphed over the Allobroges, and on whose skill he chiefly depended in his martial affairs. From Brundusium he sailed to Actium on the 15th of June; whence, partly by sea, and partly by land, he arrived on the 26th, at Athens, where he spent ten days, and where Pontinius at length joined him.

Middl.
p. 10.

Upon leaving Italy he charged his friend Cœlius with the task^c of sending him the news of Rome; and

Melm.

^c Cœlius (who by his father had been introduced to Cicero's acquaintance and friendship) performed the task very punctually, in a series of letters, which make a considerable part in the collection of his familiar epistles; and as they contain the jealousies and fears which gave birth to the civil war which soon broke out, it may not be disagreeable to the reader to present him with some extracts of them. He had been tribune of the people in 701, the year before this letter was written, and had distinguished himself in that office, by zealously supporting the interests of the aristocratical faction. His morals were suitable to the degenerate age in which he lived; luxurious and dissolute; and his temper was remarkably inflammable, and apt to kindle into the most implacable resentment. Vid. Ad Att. 5. 2.

while he was at Athens, he received from him the first letter of intelligence.

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

401st con-
sulship.

“ Agreeably to my promise when we parted, I have sent you a full account of every event that has happened since you left Rome. For this purpose I employed a person to collect the news of the town, and am only afraid you will think he has executed his office much too punctually, &c. &c.

Ep. Fam.
8. 1.
Melm.
3. 25.

“ M. Marcellus [the consul] not having yet moved that Cæsar may be recalled from his government in Gaul, and intending to defer it, as he told me himself, to the 1st of June, it has occasioned the revival of those suspicions to his disadvantage, which so strongly prevailed when you were here. If you saw Pompey, as you designed to do, pray send me word in what temper you found him; what conversation he had with you; and what you could discover of his designs; for, though he seldom speaks his real sentiments, he has not wit enough to conceal them. As for Cæsar, there are many ugly reports about him; but propagated only in whispers: some say that he has lost all his cavalry; which I take indeed to be true: others, that the seventh legion has been beaten, and that he himself is so surrounded and besieged by the Bellovaci,* that he cannot receive succours from the main body of his army. There is nothing yet certain; nor are these uncertain stories publicly talked of; but among a few, whom I need not name, told openly by way of secrets; Domitius^d never mentions them without clapping his hand to his mouth,” &c.

* A people
of the Bel-
gic Gaul.

M. T. CICERO TO M. CÆLIUS.

“ Could you seriously then imagine, my friend, that I commissioned you to send me the idle news of the

Ep. Fam.
2. 8.
Melm. 3.
28. [dated
July 6,
702.]

^d This is Domitius, the decree-forging consul, and the declared enemy of Cæsar. Vid. supra, p. 111.

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

town ; matches of gladiators, adjournments of causes, robberies, &c.——? Far other are the accounts which I expect from your hand, as I know not any man whose judgment in politics I have more reason to value.—— I passed several days with Pompey, conversing with him on nothing else but the republic : but it is neither prudent nor possible to give you the particulars in a letter. Take this only from me, that Pompey is an excellent citizen,^e prepared both with courage and counsel for all events which can be foreseen : wherefore give yourself up to the man ; believe me he will embrace you ; for he now holds the same opinion with us of good and bad citizens. I have been ten days at Athens, and am just now leaving it, this 6th of July. As I earnestly recommend all my affairs to your care, so nothing more particularly, than that the time of my provincial command be not prolonged.——Farewel.”

Middl.
p. 14.

Ad Att. 1.
13. et 15.

Cicero set sail for Asia the 6th of July, and landed at Ephesus on the 22d, after a slow^f but safe passage of fifteen days. Having reposed himself for three days at Ephesus, he marched forwards towards his province ; and on the last of July arrived at Laodicea, one of the capital cities of his jurisdiction. From this moment the date of his government commenced ; which he bids Atticus take notice of, that he might know how to compute the precise extent of his annual term.

Middl.
p. 14.

Melm.
vol. 1.
p. 290.

It was Cicero's resolution, in his provincial command,

^e “ Cicero so often changed his opinion, or at least his language in regard to Pompey, that it is difficult to determine what his true sentiments of him were. It is probable, however, that he here speaks the dictates of his real thoughts, not only as he gives the same account to Atticus, but because Pompey received him with particular civility ; a circumstance which seems at all times to have had a very considerable influence upon Cicero's judgment concerning the characters and designs of men.” Vid. Ad Att. 5. 6, 7.

Middl.
p. 14.

^f The tediousness of this voyage was agreeably relieved by touching on the way at several of the islands of the Ægean sea, of which he sends a kind of journal to Atticus. Many deputations from the cities of Asia, and a great concourse of people, came to meet him as far as Samos ; but a much greater still was expecting his landing at Ephesus : the Greeks flocked eagerly from all parts to see a man, so celebrated through the empire for the fame of his learning and eloquence ; so that all his boastings, as he merrily says, of many years past, were now brought to the test.

to practise those admirable rules which he had drawn up formerly for his brother; and, from an employment wholly tedious and disagreeable to him, to derive fresh glory upon his character, by leaving the innocence and integrity of his administration as a pattern of governing to all succeeding proconsuls.

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

When any governors went abroad to their provinces, the custom had always been, that the countries through which they passed should defray the charges of their journey: but Cicero no sooner set his foot on foreign ground, than he forbade all expenses whatsoever, public or private, to be made either upon himself or any of his company; which raised a great admiration of him in the cities of Greece. In Asia he did the same, not suffering his officers to accept, what was due to them even by law, forage and wood for firing, nor any thing else, but mere house-room, with four beds; which he remitted also, as oft as was practicable, and obliged them to lodge in their tents; and, by his example and constant exhortations, brought his lieutenants, tribunes, and præfects, so fully into his measures, that they all concurred with him he says, wonderfully in a jealous concern for his honour.

Ad Att. 5.
9—11.

Ib. 16, 17.

About the 24th of August he went to the camp of Iconium in Lycaonia, where he had no sooner reviewed the troops than he received an account from Antiochus, king of Comagene, which was confirmed from the other princes of those parts, that the Parthians had passed the Euphrates with a mighty force, under the conduct of Pacorus, the king's son, in order to invade the Roman territory. Upon this news he marched towards Cilicia, to secure his province from the inroads of the enemy, or any commotions within: but as all access to it was difficult, except on the side of Cappadocia, an open country, and not well provided, he took his route through that kingdom, and encamped in that part of it which bordered upon Cilicia, near to the town of Cybistra, at the foot of Mount Taurus. His army,

Middl.
p. 16.

Ep. Fam.
15. 1.

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

Ep. Fam.
15. 2—4.

as it is said above, consisted of about 12,000 foot and 2,600 horse, besides the auxiliary troops of the neighbouring states, and especially of Dejotarus, king of Galatia, the most faithful ally of Rome, and Cicero's particular friend; whose whole forces he could depend upon at any warning.

While he lay in this camp he had an opportunity of executing a special commission, with which he was charged by the senate; to take Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, under his particular protection; and provide for the security of his person and government: in honour of whom the senate had decreed, what they had never done before to any foreign prince, that his safety was of concern to the senate and people of Rome. His father had been killed by the treachery of his subjects, and a conspiracy of the same kind was apprehended against the son: Cicero therefore, in a council of his officers, gave the king an account of the decree of the senate, and that, in consequence of it, he was then ready to assist him with his troops and authority in any measures that should be concerted for the safety and quiet of his kingdom.—The king, after great professions of his thanks and duty to the senate for the honour of their decree, and to Cicero himself for his care in the execution of it, said, that he knew no occasion for giving him any particular trouble at that time, nor had any suspicion of any design against his life or crown: upon which Cicero, after congratulating him upon the tranquillity of his affairs, advised him however to remember his father's fate, and from the admonitions of the senate, to be particularly vigilant in the care of his person; and so they parted. But the next morning the king returned early to the camp, attended by his brother and counsellors, and with many tears implored the protection of Cicero, and the benefit of the senate's decree, declaring, “that he had received undoubted intelligence of a plot, which those, who were privy to it, durst not

venture to discover till Cicero's arrival in the country ; but trusting to his authority, had now given him information of it ; and that his brother, who was present, and ready to confirm what he had said, had been solicited to enter into it by the offer of the crown : he begged, therefore, that some of Cicero's troops might be left with him for his better guard and defence." Cicero told him, " that, under the present alarm of the Parthian war, he could not possibly lend him any part of his army ; that since the conspiracy was detected, his own forces would be sufficient for preventing the effects of it ; that he should learn to act the king, by shewing a proper concern for his own life, and exert his regal power in punishing the authors of the plot, and pardoning all the rest ; that he need not apprehend any farther danger, when his people were acquainted with the senate's decree, and saw a Roman army so near to them, and ready to put it in execution." And having thus encouraged and comforted the king, he marched towards Cilicia, and gave an account of this accident, and of the motions of the Parthians, in two public letters to the consuls and senate.^g

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st consulship.

^g He added a private letter also to Cato who was a particular favourer of Ariobarzanes, in which he informed him, " that he had not only secured the king's person from any attempt, but had taken care that he should reign for the future with honour and dignity, by restoring to his favour and service his old counsellors, whom Cato had recommended, and who had been disgraced by the intrigues of his court ; and by obliging a turbulent young priest of Bellona, who was the head of the malecontents, and the next in power to the king himself, to quit the country."

Ep. Fam.
15. 4.

This king, Ariobarzanes, seems to have been poor even to a proverb :—

Middl.
p. 18.

" Mancipiis locuples, eget æris Cappadocum rex." Hor. Ep. 1. 6.

For he had been miserably squeezed and drained by the Roman generals and governors, to whom he owed vast sums, either actually borrowed, or stipulated to be paid for particular services. It was a common practice with the great men of Rome to lend money, at an exorbitant interest, to the princes and cities dependant on the empire. The ordinary interest of the provincial loans was one per cent. by the month, with interest upon interest : this was the lowest ; but it was frequently four times as much. Pompey received monthly, from this very king, above 6,000*l.* sterling ; which yet was short of his full interest. Brutus also had lent him a very large sum, and earnestly desired Cicero to procure the payment of it, with the arrears of interest : but Pompey's agents were so pressing, and the king so needy, that though Cicero solicited Brutus's affair very heartily, he had little hopes of getting any thing for him. When Ariobarzanes came, therefore, to offer him the same present of money which he had usually made to every other governor, he generously refused, and desired only, that, instead of giving it to him, he would pay it to Brutus : but the poor prince was so distressed, that he excused himself by the necessity which he was un-

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

While he lay encamped in Cappadocia, expecting what way the Parthians would move, he received an account that they had taken a different route, and were advanced to Antioch in Syria, where they held C. Cassius blocked up; and that a detachment of them had actually penetrated into Cilicia, but were routed and cut off by those troops which were left to guard the country. Upon this he presently decamped, and, by great journeys over Mount Taurus, marched in all haste to possess himself of the passes of Amanus, a great and strong mountain, lying between Syria and Cilicia, and the common boundary of them both. By this march, and the approach of his army to the neighbourhood of Syria, the Parthians, being discouraged, retired from Antioch, which gave Cassius an opportunity of falling upon them in their retreat, and gaining a considerable advantage, in which one of their principal commanders, Osaces, was mortally wounded.

In the suspense of the Parthian war, which the late disgrace of Crassus had made terrible at Rome, Cicero's friends, who had no great opinion of his military talents,

der of satisfying some other more pressing demands; so that Cicero gives a sad account of his negotiation in a long* letter to Atticus, who had warmly recommended Brutus's interest to him.

Ad Att.
6. 1.
Y. 703.

* ——"I come now to Brutus, whom, by your authority, I embraced with inclination, and began even to love: but—what am I going to say? I recall myself, lest I offend you.—Do not think that I ever entered into any thing more willingly, or took more pains, than in what he recommended to me. He gave me a memorial of the particulars which you have talked over with me before: I pursued your instructions exactly: in the first place I pressed Ariobarzanes to give to Brutus that money which he promised to me. As long as the king continued with me, all things looked well; but he was afterward teased by 600 of Pompey's agents; and Pompey, for other reasons, can do more with him than all the world besides; but especially when it is imagined that he is to be sent to the Parthian war: they now pay Pompey thirty-three Attic talents per month out of the taxes; though this falls short of a month's interest: but our friend Cneius takes it calmly; and is content to abate somewhat of the interest without pressing for the principal. As for others, he neither does nor can pay any man: for he has no treasury, no revenues: he raises taxes by Appius's method of capitation: but these are scarce sufficient for Pompey's monthly pay: two or three of the king's friends are very rich; but they hold their own as closely as either you or I.—I do not forbear however to ask, urge and chide him by letters: king Deiotarus also told me, that he had sent people to him on purpose to solicit for Brutus; but they brought him word back, that he had really no money: which I take indeed to be the case; that nothing is more drained than his kingdom; nothing poorer than the king."

were in some pain for his safety and success, as appears by the following letter from Cœlius.

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

MARCUS CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

401st con-
sulship.

“ We have received an express from Caius Cassius, and another from Deiotarus, which greatly alarm us. The former writes that the Parthian army had passed the Euphrates, and the latter, that they are actually marching towards your province, by the way of Comagene. As I well know how ill provided you are with troops, the principal concern I feel from this invasion, with respect to you, is, lest you should be a loser by it in point of reputation. Had you been better prepared indeed to receive the enemy, I should have been in great pain for your life : but, as the very small number of your forces will incline you, I imagine, rather to think of a retreat than an engagement, I am only anxious concerning your honour. For how far the world may consider the necessity of the case, and approve of your thus declining a battle, is a point, I confess, which gives me much uneasy reflection. In short, I shall be in continual anxiety, till I hear of your arrival in Italy. In the mean time, this news of the Parthians has occasioned a variety of speculations. Some are of opinion that Pompey ought to be sent against them : and others, that it is by no means convenient that he should leave Rome. A third party is for assigning this expedition to Cæsar and his army : whilst a fourth names the consuls as the most proper persons to be employed. But all agree, however, in being silent as to any decree of the senate for placing this command in private hands. The consuls, in the apprehension that they shall either be nominated to a commission which they do not relish, or suffer the disgrace of its being given from them, forbear to convene the senate : and by this means incur the censure of neglecting the public interest. But whether indolence or pusillanimity be the real motive of their

Ep. Fam.
8. 10.

Melm. 4.
14. (dated
Nov. 18.)

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

declining the conduct of this war, it is concealed under the specious appearance however of modesty.

“ As we have received no courier from you, it was suspected, till the dispatch from Deiotarus arrived, that the whole was an invention of Cassius, who, it was thought, in order to colour his own rapine, had suffered a parcel of Arabs to make an incursion into the province, and then represented them to the senate as a formidable body of Parthians. Whatever, therefore, may be the true state of the affair, let me persuade you to be extremely circumspect in giving a faithful and accurate account of it to the senate: that you may neither be reproached with magnifying matters, in order to gratify the private purposes of Cassius, nor with concealing any thing which may be of importance for the public to know.

“ It is now the 18th of November; and as we are advanced thus far towards the end of the year, I do not see that any thing can be done in this affair till the 1st of January. For you know how slow and inactive Marcellus is upon all occasions, and are no stranger to the dilatory disposition of Sulpicius: you will easily judge, therefore, what is to be expected from two men of this unperforming cast; and that those who usually act with so much coldness as to make one doubt their inclinations, even in points they really desire to effect, will not be very warm in forwarding a business to which they are certainly averse.

“ If the Parthian war should become a serious matter, the new magistrates will be engaged for the first two or three months of their office in adjusting the proper measures to be taken in this conjuncture. On the other hand, if it should appear to be an invasion of no consequence, or such, at least, as, with the supply of a few additional troops, may easily be repelled by you and the other proconsuls already in those provinces, or by your successors: Curio, I foresee, will begin to play his dou-

ble game; that is, he will in the first place attempt to weaken the authority of Cæsar; and, in the next, endeavour to throw some little advantages on the side of Pompey. As for Paullus,* he declares most vehemently against suffering Cæsar to continue in Gaul: and our friend Furnius is the only tribune whom I suspect of obstructing his measures for that purpose. You may depend upon these articles as certain: but beyond these I cannot with any assurance pronounce. Time, indeed, may produce much; as many schemes I know are concerted: but they all turn upon the points I have already specified.—I forgot to mention, that Curio designs to make an attempt to procure a division of the lands in Campania. It is pretended that Cæsar does not concern himself in this matter: certain, however, it is, that Pompey is very desirous of having the distribution settled before Cæsar's return, that he may be precluded from applying them to his own purposes.

“As to what concerns your leaving the province, I dare not promise that you shall be relieved by a successor: but you may rely upon my endeavouring all I can, that your administration shall not be prolonged. Whether you will think proper to remain in your government, if affairs should be so circumstanced as to render it indecent for me to oppose any decree of the senate for that purpose, depends upon yourself to determine: as it does upon me to remember how warmly you made it your request, when we parted, that I would prevent any such resolution from being taken. Farewell.”

It is no wonder that Cicero's friends should be in pain for him, when they thought he would have to do with the Parthians: nevertheless, when he found himself engaged, and pushed to the necessity of acting the general, he wanted (by his own account) neither the courage nor conduct of an experienced leader. In a letter to Atticus, dated from his camp: “We are in great spirits

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

* One of
the con-
suls elect.
Middl.
p. 25.

Ad Att.
5. 15.

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

(says he), and, as our counsels are good, have no distrust of an engagement: we are securely encamped, with plenty of provisions, and in sight almost of Cilicia; with a small army indeed, but, as I have reason to believe, entirely well affected to me: which I shall double by the accession of Deiotarus, who is upon the road to join me. I have the allies more firmly attached to me than any governor ever had: they are wonderfully taken with my easiness and abstinence: we are making new levies of citizens, and establishing magazines: if there be occasion for fighting, we shall not decline it; if not, shall defend ourselves by the strength of our posts. Wherefore be of good heart; for I see, as much as if you were with me, the sympathy of your love for me."

The danger of the Parthians being over, Cicero, unwilling to dismiss his army without attempting something, led it against an untamed race of banditti, or freebooters, inhabiting the mountains, close to which he now lay. They had never submitted to the Roman power, but lived in defiance of it. Cicero thought the reduction of them a matter of importance. To take them unprovided, he drew off his forces, on pretence of marching to the distant parts of Cilicia: but, after a day's journey, stopped short, and, having refreshed his army and left his baggage behind, turned back again in the night with the utmost celerity, and reached Amanus before day on the 13th of October. Coming upon the natives by surprise, he easily killed or made them all prisoners. Erana, indeed, the capital of the mountain, made a brave resistance; for it held out almost a whole day. Upon this success, Cicero was saluted emperor.

It appears, by a letter from the victorious emperor, that he thought his victory gave him a just claim to a triumph.

CICERO TO M. CÆLIUS, CURULE ÆDILE ELECT.

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

“ I wish you would inquire the reason that your letters miscarry ; for I cannot be induced to think that you have not once written to me since your election. But to turn to the principal purpose of this epistle.—Your wish has succeeded, and I have just had employment enough of the military kind to entitle me to a triumph. You were under some apprehensions, I perceive, about the Parthians, as being diffident of my forces. I must acquaint you then, that, having received advice, that the Parthians had committed hostilities, I took the advantage of some defiles, and of the neighbouring mountains, to lead my army, supported by a tolerable number of auxiliaries, to Amanus. The reputation of my name was of some benefit to me likewise in my march : as you cannot imagine of what importance it is, in places of this kind, to have the populace ask, ‘ Is this the consul that saved Rome ? Is this he that was so honoured by the senate ? ’ Together with other questions of the same import, which I need not add. When I approached to Amanus, a mountain which separates Cilicia from Syria, I had the satisfaction to hear that Cassius had obliged the enemy to abandon the siege of Antioch ; and that Bibulus had taken upon himself the command of the province. However, I employed my army in harassing the Amanienses, our eternal enemies : and, having put many of them to the sword, as well as taken a great number of prisoners, and entirely dispersed the rest, I surprised and burnt some of their fortresses. Having thus obtained a complete victory, I was saluted with the title of imperator by the whole army at Issus, the very place where Alexander defeated Darius. From thence I marched into the most infested parts of Cilicia, where I am now before Pindenissum ; a city of great strength, and which I have already been battering above these

401st consulship.

Ep. Fam.
Melm. 4.
13. [written about
the end of
Novem.]

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

three weeks.^h The garrison makes a most obstinate and vigorous defence : so that nothing seems wanting to complete the glory I shall here obtain, but that the name of this place were less obscure.ⁱ If I should make myself master of it, as I trust I shall, I will send an immediate express to the senate. In the meantime, I have given this general account of my operations, to let you see there is some foundation to hope that your good wishes will be accomplished. But, to return to the Parthians : this summer's campaign has proved, you find, tolerably successful : I am in great pain, however, for the next. Let me entreat you, therefore, my dear friend, to endeavour that a successor be appointed to my government : but, if that should prove a matter of too much difficulty (as you intimate in one of your letters, and as I am myself inclined to suspect), be careful at least to guard against what may easily be prevented, I mean the prolongation of my residence.^k

^h The siege was begun about the 1st of November : so that this letter was written towards the end of November : if he began to batter in a few days after his investing the place.

Ad Att.
5. 20.

ⁱ Cicero, in a letter to Atticus, speaking of this siege, writes thus : " What the plague, you will say, are these Pindenissians ? I never heard their names before.—How can I help that ? Could I turn Cilicia into Ætolia or Macedonia ? Take this, however, for certain, that no man could do more than I have done with such an army," &c.

^k Cicero wrote, about the same time, a letter of congratulation to Curio, on his being elected to the tribunate ; and presses him to be steady to the interests of the senate, and to employ his tribunitian power in his favour, that he may not be continued in his government beyond his year.

CICERO TO CURIO, TRIBUNE OF THE PEOPLE.

Ep. Fam.
2. 7.
Melm.
4. 16.

" The congratulations of a friend are not usually considered as too late, if they are paid as early as possible : my great distance therefore from Rome, together with the slow progress with which news travels into this corner of the world, will excuse me for not sooner sending you mine. But now I sincerely give them you : and most ardently wish you may obtain immortal honour by your administration of the tribunate. To this end, I must exhort you not to suffer yourself to be turned aside from your natural bias, in compliance with the sentiments and advice of others : on the contrary, let me entreat you to be directed in your ministry by the faithful light of your own superior wisdom. No man indeed is capable of giving you more prudent counsels than will arise from the suggestions of your own good sense : and, believe me, you can never be misguided, so long as you pursue the honest dictates of your uninfluenced judgment. I say not this inconsiderately, but as perfectly well knowing the genius and principles of him to whom I am addressing myself. Yes, my friend, I can never be apprehensive that you will act either weakly or irresolutely, whilst you support the measures your heart approves. It was neither chance nor ignorance that led you to solicit the magistracy in so important a crisis. It was a deliberate and well-considered resolution that engaged you in this design : and you were perfectly sensible of the great and general confusion in which the commonwealth

“ I expect from your letters (as I mentioned in one of my former) not merely an account of what is at present going forward in the republic, but a clear prospect of what is likely to happen. Farewell.”

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

To satisfy the earnest desire which Cicero had formerly expressed (and which he here again expresses) of being informed of what passed at Rome in his absence, his correspondent wrote several letters to him concerning the state of public affairs ; particularly one of the 1st of August, and, a short time after, another, which refers to it, and which Cicero, by some words in the beginning of the letter now before us, appears to have received : but it is not improbable, that a letter from Coelius, dated the 2d of September, and another written in October, full of intelligence, were not yet come to Cicero's hands ; and as to that (above transcribed) of the 18th of No-
vember, he had unquestionably not received it ; and this perhaps occasioned his apprehensions, that some of Coelius's letters had miscarried.

P. 179.

is involved, together with the utter uncertainty in what manner these our unhappy divisions will finally be terminated. You frequently reflect, I doubt not, on the vain, the treacherous, and the pliant dispositions of the present generation. To repeat then what I just now mentioned : let me conjure you to persevere steadfastly in your old principles, to consult the dictates of your own breast, and faithfully to comply with its wise and worthy admonitions. Hardly, perhaps, is any man more qualified than yourself to direct the conduct of others : none, I am sure, to steer your own. Good gods ! why am I thus prevented from being a witness of your glorious actions, and an associate of your patriot designs ? The latter, I am persuaded, you are far from wanting : however, the strength and warmth of my affection might possibly render the conjunction of my counsels with yours not altogether unprofitable.

“ You will hear from me again very soon, as I purpose in a few days to send an express to the senate, with particulars of the success of my arms during the last summer's campaign. In the meantime you will perceive, by the letter which I delivered to your freedman Thraso, with what zealous pains I have solicited your election to the pontifical dignity : an election indeed which will be attended with much difficulty. I conjure you, in return, my dear Curio, not to suffer this my very troublesome provincial administration to be lengthened out beyond the usual period : and I entreat it by all the strong and tender ties of our mutual friendship. When I first made this request to you in person, and several times afterward repeated it by letter, I had not the least imagination of your being tribune. I then indeed only entreated your good offices as an illustrious senator, and one who stood high in the favour and esteem of every Roman. But I now apply to Curio, not only as my noble friend, but as a powerful tribune. I do not desire, however (what indeed would be more difficult to obtain), that any thing unusual should be decreed in my favour : but, on the contrary, that you would support that decree, and maintain those laws, by which I was appointed to this government. In a word, my single and most earnest request is, that the terms upon which I set out for this province may not be changed. Farewell.”

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

I doubt not but the reader has a portion of the same curiosity which Cicero had ; nor do I know how it can be better gratified, than by adding here, to the letter of the 18th of November, the other four, just above mentioned of dates prior to that ; or so much of them, at least, as is to the purpose. There will be occasion hereafter to refer to them as the best vouchers of the facts they relate.

M. CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam.
8. 4.
Melm. 3.
32. [dated
Aug. 1,
702.]

——“ Curio is a candidate [for the tribuneship]. This greatly alarms those who are unacquainted with the real good qualities of Curio’s heart. I hope, and indeed believe, he will act agreeably to his professions, and join with the senate in supporting the friends of the republic : I am sure, at least, he is full of these designs at present ; in which Cæsar’s conduct has been the principal occasion of engaging him. For Cæsar, though he spares no pains or expense to gain over even the lowest of the people to his interest, has thought fit to treat Curio with singular contempt. The latter has behaved himself with so much temper upon this occasion, that he, who never acted with artifice in all his life, is suspected to have dissembled his resentment, in order the more effectually to defeat the schemes of those who oppose his election ; I mean the Lælii and the Antonii, together with the rest of that wonderful party.

“ I have been so much engaged by the difficulties which have retarded the several elections, that I could not find leisure to write to you sooner : and, indeed, as I every day expected they would be determined, I waited their conclusion, that I might give you at once an account of the whole. But it is now the 1st of August, and they are not yet over ; the elections of prætors having met with some unexpected delays. As to that in which I am a candidate [the curule ædileship], I can give no account which way it is likely to be decided : only it

is generally thought that Hirrus will not be chosen. This is collected from the fate that has attended Vincianus, who was candidate for the office of plebeian ædile. That foolish project of his, for the nomination of a dictator¹ (which we formerly, you may remember, exposed to so much ridicule), suddenly turned the election against him; and the people, by the loudest acclamations, expressed their joy at his repulse. At the same time Hirrus was universally called upon by the populace to give up his pretensions at the ensuing election. I hope, therefore, you will very soon hear, that this affair is determined in the manner you have wished with regard to me, but have scarce^m dared to wish with regard to him.

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

——“As to the state of the commonwealth, we begin to give up all expectation that the face of public affairs will be changed. However, at a meeting of the senate, held on the 22d of the last month, in the temple of Apollo, upon a debate relating to the payment of the forces commanded by Pompey,ⁿ mention was made of that legion, which, as appeared by his accounts, had been lent to Cæsar: and he was asked of what number of men it consisted, and for what purposes it was borrowed. In short, Pompey was pushed so strongly upon this article, that he found himself under a necessity of promising to recall this legion out of Gaul: but he added, at the same time, that the clamours of his enemies should not force him to take this step too precipitately.

“It was afterward moved, that the question might be put concerning the election of a successor to Cæsar. Accordingly the senate came to a resolution, that Pompey (who was just going to the army at Ariminum,^o and

¹ Vincianus and Hirrus, elected tribunes for the year 700, were the chief promoters of the project of making Pompey dictator. Vide supra, p. 138. and 160. And vid. Ad Q. Fr. 3. 8.

^m Because Hirrus was supported by Pompey. Melm.

ⁿ “Pompey, though he remained in Rome, was at this time governor of Spain; which had been continued to him for four years at the end of his late consulship. It was the payment of his troops in that province which was under the consideration of the senate.” Plut. in Pomp. Melm. vol. 1. p. 309.

^o “Now called Rimini, situated upon the Rubicon, a river which divides Italy from that part of the Roman province called Cisalpine Gaul. The army here men-

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

is now actually set out for that purpose) should be ordered to return to Rome with all expedition; that the affair relating to a general election of governors for all the provinces might be debated in his presence. This point, I imagine, will be brought before the senate on the 13th of this month, when, if no infamous obstacles should be thrown in the way by the tribunes,^p the house will certainly come to some resolution; for Pompey, in the course of the debate, let fall an intimation, that he thought every man owed obedience to the authority of that assembly. However, I am impatient to hear what Paullus, the senior consul elect, will say, when he delivers his opinion upon this question, &c.—Farewell.”

MARCUS CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam.
8.5.
Melm. 3.
33. written
in August.

“How far you may be alarmed at the invasion which threatens your province and the neighbouring countries, I know not; but for myself, I confess, I am extremely anxious for the consequence. Could we contrive indeed, that the enemy's forces should be only in proportion to yours, and just sufficient to entitle you to the honour of a triumph, there could not be a more desirable circumstance. But the misfortune is, if the Parthians should make any attempt, I well know it will be a powerful one: and I am sensible, at the same time, that you are so little in a condition to oppose their march, that you have scarce troops to defend a single defile. But the world in general will not be so reasonable as to make the proper allowances for this circumstance. On the contrary, it is expected from a man in your station, that he should be prepared for every occurrence that may arise: without once considering whether he be furnished

tioned is supposed to be part of those four legions, which were decreed to Pompey for the support of his government in Spain.” Plut. *ibid.*

Melm.

^p “Some of the tribunes, together with Sulpicius, one of the present consuls, were wholly in Cæsar's interest. They thought, or pretended to think, that it was highly unjust to divest Cæsar of his government before the time was completed for which it had been decreed; of which there remained about two years unexpired.” Dio, 40. p. 148.

with the necessary supplies for that purpose. I am still the more uneasy on your account, as I foresee the contest concerning affairs in Gaul will retard the nomination of your successor: and, though I dare say you have already had this contingency in your view, yet I thought proper to apprize you of its probability, that you might be so much the more early in adjusting your measures accordingly. I need not tell you the usual artifices will undoubtedly be played off. A day will be appointed for considering of a successor to Cæsar; upon which some tribune will interpose his negative; and that a second will probably declare, that, unless the senate shall be at liberty to put the question freely concerning all the provinces in general, he will not suffer it to be debated with regard to any in particular. And thus shall we be trifled with for a considerable time: possibly, indeed, two or three years may be spun out by these contemptible arts.

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

“If any thing new had occurred in public affairs, I should, as usual, have sent you the account, together with my sentiments thereupon: but at present the wheels of our political machine seem to be altogether motionless. Marcellus is still pursuing his former designs concerning the provinces: but he has not yet been able to assemble a competent number of senators. Had this motion been brought on the preceding year, and had Curio at the same time been tribune, it would probably have succeeded: but, as affairs are now circumstanced, you are sensible how easy it will be for Cæsar, regardless as he is of the public interest, when it stands in competition with his own, to obstruct all our proceedings. Farewell.”

M. CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

——“I mentioned, in one of my former, that the affair of the provinces would come before the senate on the 13th of the last month: nevertheless, by the inter-

Ep. Fam.
8. 9.
Melm. 3.
34. [dated
Sept. 2,
702.]

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

vention of [Caius] Marcellus, the consul elect, it was put off to the 1st of this instant. But, when the day arrived, they could not procure a sufficient number of senators to be present. It is now the 2d of September, and nothing has yet been done: and I am persuaded it will be adjourned to the following year. As far as I can see, therefore, you must be contented to leave the administration of your province in the hands of some person whom you shall think proper to appoint for that purpose, as I am well convinced you will not soon be relieved by a successor. For, as Gaul must take the same fate with the rest of the provinces, any attempt that should be made for settling the general succession will certainly be obstructed by Cæsar's party. Of this I have not the least doubt: and therefore I thought it necessary to give you notice, that you might be prepared to act accordingly. * * * * *

Your friend Pompey openly declares, that Cæsar ought not to be admitted as a candidate for the consulship while he retains his command in the province.^a He voted, however, against the passing a decree for this purpose at present. Scipio moved, that the 1st of March next might be appointed for taking into consideration the nominating a successor in the Gallic provinces; and that this matter should be proposed to the house separately, and without blending it with any other question. Balbus Cornelius was much discomposed at this motion: and I am well assured he has complained of it to Scipio in very strong terms."

M. CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam.
8. 8.

Melm. 4. 7.
written in
October.

Melm.

—"As to public affairs, we had waited several days in expectation that something would be determined

^a "Pompey, who contributed more than any man to the advancement of Cæsar's power, had lately procured a law, by which the personal appearance of the latter was dispensed with, in soliciting the consular office. But Pompey now began to repent:—not that his own designs were more favourable to the liberties of Rome than those of Cæsar: but as discovering at last, that they could not both subsist together."

concerning Gaul; frequent motions having been made in the senate for this purpose, which were followed by very warm debates. At length, however, it plainly appearing, agreeable to Pompey's sentiments, that Cæsar's command in Gaul should not be continued longer than the 1st of March, the senate passed the following orders and decrees.^r

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

“ By authority of the senate, held in the temple of Apollo, on the 30th day of September. Signed L. Domitius Ahenobarbus; Q. Cæcilius; Metellus Pius Scipio; L. Villius Annalis; C. Septimius; Caius Lucceius Hirrus; C. Scribonius Curio; L. Atteius Capito; M. Oppius. Whereas a motion was made by Marcus Marcellus, the consul, concerning the consular provinces; it is ordered, that Lucius Paullus and Caius Marcellus, consuls elect, shall, on the 1st of March, next following their entering upon their office, move the senate concerning the consular provinces: at which time no other business shall be proceeded upon, nor any other motion made in conjunction therewith. And for this purpose the senate shall continue to assemble, notwithstanding the comitial^s days, and until a decree shall be passed.

“ Ordered, That, when the consul shall move the senate upon the question aforesaid, they shall be empowered to summon such of the 300 judges, who are members of the senate, to attend.

“ Resolved, That if any matters shall arise upon the

^r When an act passed the senate in a full house, held according to the prescribed Melm. forms, and without any opposition from the tribunes (who had the privilege of putting a negative upon all proceedings in the senate), it was called a *senatus consultum*, a decree of the senate. But if any of those essentials were wanting, or a tribune interposed, it was then only styled a *senatus auctoritas*, an order of the senate, and considered as of less authority. Manut. vol. 1. p. 64.

^s “ The comitial days were those on which the comitia or assemblies of the people were held: and on these days the law prohibited the senate to be convened. The senate, however, in the present instance, and upon many other occasions, took upon themselves to act with a dispensing power.” See Middl. on the Rom. Sen. p. 121. They had the impudence, as we see, to resolve, that if the tribunes made use of their legal privilege, they should be deemed enemies to the republic. And, what is worthy to be observed, the tribunes, in the present case, were using their legal privilege in support of justice; the senate were dispensing with the laws in order to injure and oppress. The reader will remark, that Curio is one of those who sign this resolution of the house. Ib.

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

question aforesaid, which shall be necessary to be laid before the people, that Servius Sulpicius and Marcus Marcellus, the present consuls, together with the prætors and tribunes of the people, or such of them as shall be agreed upon, shall call an assembly of the people for that purpose: and if the magistrates aforesaid shall fail herein, the same shall be proposed to the people by their successors.

“The 30th day of September, in the temple of Apollo. Signed; L. Domitius Ahenobarbus; Q. Cæcilius; Metellus Pius Scipio; L. Villius Annalis; C. Septimius; C. Scribonius Curio; M. Oppius.

“The consul, Marcus Marcellus, having moved the senate concerning the provinces.

“Resolved, That it is the opinion of the senate, that it will be highly unbecoming any magistrate, who has a power of controlling their proceedings, to occasion any hinderance, whereby the senate may be prevented from taking the aforesaid motion into consideration as soon as possible: and that whosoever shall obstruct or oppose the same, shall be deemed an enemy to the republic.

“Ordered, That if any magistrate shall put a negative upon the foregoing resolution, the same shall be entered as an order of the senate, and again referred to the consideration of this house.

“This resolution was protested against by Caius Cælius, Lucius Vinicius, Publius Cornelius, and Caius Vibius Pansa.

“Resolved, That the senate will take into consideration the case of such of the soldiers under Cæsar’s command who have served out their legal time,^t or who, for other reasons, are entitled to a discharge; and make such order thereupon as shall be agreeable to equity.

“Resolved, That, if any magistrate should put his negative upon the foregoing decree, the same shall stand

Melm.

^t As the strength of Cæsar’s army in Gaul consisted principally in his veterans, this clause was added, as Gronovius observes, with a view of drawing off those soldiers from his troops.

as an order of the senate, and be again referred to the consideration of this house.

“ This resolution was protested against by Caius Cœlius and Caius Pansa, tribunes of the people.

—— “ In the debates which preceded these decrees, Pompey let fall an expression that was much observed, and gave us confident hopes of his good intentions. He could not, without great injustice, he said, determine any thing in relation to the provinces under Cæsar’s command, before the 1st of March: but after that time, he assured the senate he should have no sort of scruple. Being asked, ‘ What if a negative should then be put upon a decree of the senate for recalling Cæsar?’ Pompey answered, ‘ He should look upon it as just the same thing, whether Cæsar openly refused to obey the authority of the senate, or secretly procured some magistrate to obstruct their decrees.’ ‘ But suppose (said another member) Cæsar should insist upon being a candidate for the consulship, and, at the same time, of retaining his command?’ ‘ Suppose (replied Pompey, with great temper) my own son should take a stick and beat me?’ From expressions of this kind the world has conceived a notion, that a rupture will undoubtedly ensue between Pompey and Cæsar. I am of opinion,^u however, that the latter will submit to one of these two conditions: either to give up his present pretensions to the consulate, and continue in Gaul; or to resign his command of the province, provided he can be assured of his election. Curio is preparing most strongly to oppose his demands. What he may be able to effect I know not; but sure I am, that a man who acts upon such patriot principles must gain honour at least, if he gain nothing else

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st consulship.

^u It is remarkable that Cœlius, the writer of this letter, whom Cicero judged to be an able politician, and to have a longer foresight than any body, was mistaken in almost all his conjectures; mistaken concerning Cæsar, concerning Curio, and concerning himself. For Cæsar did not submit, &c. and Curio took Cæsar’s part; and so did Cœlius himself in the beginning of the civil war. Cœlius obtained the ædileship this year [702] from his competitor Hirrus, formerly Cicero’s competitor for the augurate.

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 27.
Ep. Fam.
15. 4.

From Amanus, Cicero led his army to another part of the highlands, the most disaffected to the Roman name, possessed by a stout and free people, who had never been subject even to the kings of that country. Their chief town was called Pindenissum, situated on a steep and craggy hill: it was the constant refuge of all deserters, and the harbour of foreign enemies, and at that very time was expecting and prepared to receive the Parthians. Cicero laid siege to it in form: and though he attacked it with all imaginable vigour, and a continual battery of his engines, yet it cost him above six weeks to reduce it to the necessity of surrendering at discretion. The inhabitants were sold for slaves; all the other plunder, excepting the horses, was given to the soldiers.

After this action, another neighbouring nation, called Tiburani, terrified by the fate of Pindenissum, voluntarily submitted, and gave hostages; so that Cicero sent his army, under the command of his brother, into winter-quarters, in those parts of the province which were thought the most turbulent.

Middl.
p. 29.
Ad Att.
5. 20.

These martial exploits spread Cicero's fame into Syria, where Bibulus was just arrived to take upon him the command; but kept himself close within the gates of Antioch till the country was cleared of all the Parthians: his envy of Cicero's success and title of emperor, made him impatient to purchase the same honour by the like service on the Syrian side of the mountain Amanus: but he had the misfortune to be repulsed in his attempt, with the entire loss of the first cohort, and several officers of distinction, which Cicero calls an ugly blow, both for the time and the effect of it.

Though Cicero, for his victory (which he calls a just victory) at Amanus, had been saluted emperor, and had ever since assumed that appellation, yet he sent no public account of it to Rome till after the affair of Pindenissum, an exploit of more eclat and importance; for which he expected the honour of a thanksgiving, and

began to entertain hopes even of a triumph. His public letter is lost, but that loss is supplied by a particular narrative of the whole action in a private letter to Cato. His design, in paying Cato this compliment, was to engage his vote and concurrence to the decree of the sup-
plication.^x

After a detail of his proceedings, and successes, from the time of his arrival in the province, he thus continues —“And now, if a motion should be made in the senate concerning the honours due to the success of my arms, I shall esteem it the highest glory to be supported in my pretensions by your suffrage. I am sensible it is usual for the gravest characters to request, as well as to be requested for, favours of this nature, in the strongest terms: but I persuade myself it will be more proper for me to remind than to solicit you in the present instance. You have frequently indeed, not only distinguished me with your vote, but with your highest applause, both in the senate and the assemblies of the people. And, believe me, I have ever thought there was so much weight and authority in all you uttered, that a single word of yours in my favour was the highest honour I could possibly receive. I remember upon a certain occasion, when you refused to vote for a public thanksgiving, which was proposed in favour of a very worthy and illustrious citizen, you told the senate, you should willingly have given your suffrage in support of the honour in question, had it been designed as a reward for any civil services which that consul had performed in Rome. Agreeably to this maxim, you formerly concurred in voting that a public thanksgiving should be decreed to me, not indeed for having advanced the glory of our country by my military achievements (for that would have been a circumstance nothing uncommon), but for having, in a most singular and unexampled manner, preserved the liberties of the

Year of
R O M E
702.
B. C. 50.

401st con-
sulship.
Ad Att.
7. 1. and
Vid. supr.
p. 182.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.
Melm.
b. 5. let. 1.
Ep. Fam.
15. 4.
Ed. Græv.

^x Cicero wrote at the same time, for the same end, to C. Claudius Marcellus, and P. Æmilius Paullus, the two consuls of the present year, 703.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

Vid. supr.
p. 9, &c.

* Clodius.

whole commonwealth without drawing a sword. I forbear to mention the general share you have taken in all the envy, the difficulties, and the dangers, to which my life has been exposed: and a far greater you were willing to have taken, if I could have been prevailed upon to have consented.^y I forbear to mention likewise that you considered my enemy* as your own: and that, in order to give me a convincing proof of your great regard, you scrupled not to shew your approbation even of his death, by defending Milo in the senate. In return (and I speak of it, not as a favour for which you are indebted to me, but as a tribute which I owed to truth), I have been no silent admirer of your virtues: for who indeed can suppress his applause of them? In all my speeches, both in the Forum and in the senate, as well as in the several pieces I have published, either in our own language or in Greek, I have ever represented your character as superior, not only to the noblest amongst our contemporaries, but to the most celebrated in history.

“After all, you will wonder, perhaps, what should induce me to set so high a value upon these little transient honours of the senate. I will acknowledge then the whole truth, and lay open my heart before you with a freedom becoming that philosophy we cultivate, and that friendship we profess: a friendship delivered down to us from our parents, and improved by many reciprocal good offices.

“Let me previously observe, that, if ever any man was a stranger to the desire of empty applause and vulgar admiration, it is myself: and this frame of mind, which I possess by temper, has been still strengthened (if I am not deceived) by reason and philosophy. As an evidence of this, I appeal to my consulate; in which, as in every other part of my life, though I pursued that

^y This seems to import, that Cato would have concurred in measures to defend Cicero by arms, against the sovereign authority of the people, if Cicero had followed that counsel. But Plutarch reports, that Cato advised Cicero to submit. Plut. in Cat.

conduct, I confess, from whence true honours might be derived, yet I never thought they were of themselves an object worthy of my ambition. On the contrary, I refused the government of a very noble province: and, notwithstanding it was highly probable I might have obtained a triumph, yet I forbore to prosecute my pretensions of that kind. I forbore too the offering myself as a candidate for the office of augur: though you are sensible, I dare say, that I might have succeeded without much difficulty. But I will acknowledge, that the injurious treatment I afterward suffered, though you always speak of it indeed as a circumstance which reflects the highest honour upon my character, and as a misfortune only to the republic, has rendered me desirous of receiving the most distinguished marks of my country's approbation. For this reason, I solicited the office of augur, which I had before declined: and, as little as I once thought the military honours deserved my pursuit, I am now ambitious of that distinction which the senate usually confers on its successful generals. I will own, I have some view by this means of healing the wounds of my former unmerited disgrace: and therefore, though I just now declared that I would not request your aid on this occasion, I recall my words, and do most earnestly request your suffrage and assistance; upon the supposition, however, that what I have performed in this campaign shall not appear contemptible in your eyes, but, on the contrary, far superior to the actions of many of those generals who have obtained the most glorious rewards from the senate.

“I have observed (and you are sensible I always listen with great attention whenever you deliver your opinions), that as often as any question of this nature has come before the senate, you were less inquisitive into the military than civil conduct of the proconsul. It was the political ordinances he had established, and the moral qualities he had displayed, that seemed to have the prin-

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

principal weight in determining your vote. If you should examine my pretensions in this view, you will see, that, with a weak and inconsiderable army, I found a strong defence, against the danger of a very formidable invasion, in the lenity and justice of my government. By these aids I effected what I never could by the most powerful legions: I recovered the friendship of our alienated allies, firmly strengthened their allegiance to the republic, and conciliated their affection at a time when they were waiting the opportunity of some favourable revolution to desert us. But perhaps I have expatiated farther upon this subject than was necessary; especially to you, before whom all our allies in general are accustomed to lay their complaints. To them therefore I refer you for an account of the benefits they have received by my administration. They will all of them, as with one voice, I am persuaded, give you the most advantageous testimony in my favour; but particularly those illustrious clients of yours, the Cyprians^z and Cappadocians: to

Vid. supr.
p. 177.
Middl. p.
21—27.

^z The debt above mentioned, that was owing from Ariobarzanes to Brutus, was not the only affair which the latter had recommended to Cicero: he had burdened him with another much more troublesome.

Ad Att.
6. 1.

The city of Salamis in Cyprus owed to two of his friends, as he pretended, Scaptius and Martinius, above 20,000*l.* sterling upon bond, at a most extravagant interest; and he begged of Cicero to take their persons and concerns under his special protection. Appius, who was Brutus's father-in-law, had granted every thing which was asked to Scaptius, a prefecture in Cyprus, with some troops of horse, with which he miserably harassed the poor Salaminians, in order to force them to comply with his unreasonable demands: for he shut up their whole senate in the council-room, till five of them were starved to death with hunger. Brutus laboured to place him in the same degree of favour with Cicero: but Cicero, being informed at Ephesus of this violence, by a deputation from Salamis, made it the first act of his government to recall the troops from Cyprus, and put an end to Scaptius's prefecture, having laid it down for a rule, to grant no command to any man who was concerned in trade, or negotiated money in the province: to give satisfaction however to Brutus, he enjoined the Salaminians to pay off Scaptius's bond, which they were ready to do according to the tenor of his edict, by which he had ordered, that no bond in his province should carry above one per cent. by the month. Scaptius refused to take the money on those terms, insisting on four per cent. as the condition of his bond expressed; which by computation almost doubled the principal sum; while the Salaminians, as they protested to Cicero, could not have paid the original debt, if they had not been enabled to do it by his help, and out of his own dues, that he had remitted to them, which amounted to somewhat more than Scaptius's legal demand.

Ib.

This extortion raised Cicero's indignation; and, notwithstanding the repeated instances of Brutus and Atticus, he was determined to overrule it: though Brutus, in order to move him the more effectually, thought proper to confess, what he had all along dissembled, that the debt was really his own, and Scaptius only his agent in it. This surprised Cicero still more, and though he had a warm inclination to oblige Brutus, yet he could not consent to so flagrant an injustice, but makes frequent and

whom I may likewise add your great and royal friend, prince Deiotarus. If thus to act is a merit of the most superior kind, if, in all ages, the number has been far less considerable of those who knew how to subdue their desires than to vanquish their enemies, he that has given an instance of both cannot certainly but be deemed, in Cato's estimation at least, to have strengthened his claim to the honours of his country, and to have improved the splendour of his military achievements, by the more unusual lustre of his civil conduct.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

“ Let me in the last place, and as in diffidence of my own solicitations, call in philosophy for my advocate : than which nothing has afforded me a more valuable satisfaction. The truth is, she is one of the noblest blessings that the gods have bestowed on man. At her

heavy complaints of it in his letters to Atticus. In one of them he says, “ You have now the ground of my conduct ; if Brutus does not approve it, I see no reason why we should love him ; but I am sure it will be approved by his uncle Cato.”* In another, “ If Brutus thinks that I ought to allow him four per cent. when by edict I have decreed but one through all the provinces, and that to the satisfaction of the keenest usurers ; if he complains, that I denied a prefecture to one concerned in trade, which I denied for that reason to your friend Lanius, and to Sex. Statius, though Torquatus solicited for the one, and Pompey himself for the other, yet without disgusting either of them ; if he takes it ill, that I recalled the troops out of Cyprus,—I shall be sorry indeed, that he has any occasion to be angry with me ; but much more, not to find him the man that I took him to be.—I have not forgot, however, what you intimated to me in several of your letters, that if I brought back nothing else from the province but Brutus's friendship, that would be enough : let it be so, since you will have it so ; yet it must always be with this exception, as far as it can be done, without my committing any wrong.”—In a third, “ How, my dear Atticus, you who applaud my integrity and good conduct, and are vexed sometimes, you say, that you are not with me, how can such a thing, as Ennius says, come out of your mouth, to desire me to grant troops to Scaptius, for the sake of extorting money? Could you, if you were with me, suffer me to do it, if I would?—If I really had done such a thing, with what face could I ever read again, or touch those books of mine, with which you are so much pleased?” He tells him likewise in confidence, that all Brutus's letters to him, even when he was asking favours, were unmannerly, churlish, and arrogant, without regarding either what or to whom he was writing ; and, if he continued in that humour, “ you may love him alone (says he), you shall have no rival of me ; but he will come, I believe, to a better mind.” But to shew, after all, what a real inclination he had to oblige him, he never left urging king Ariobarzanes till he had squeezed from him 100 talents, in part of Brutus's debt, or about 20,000*l.* ; the same sum, probably, which had been destined to Cicero himself.

Ad Att.
6. 2.

Ib. 6. 1.
et 3.

* It is very difficult to suppose that Cato was ignorant of his nephew's infamous extortion, and the horrible proceedings of his nephew's agent. For Cato (as Plutarch informs us) having settled a correspondence throughout all the Roman provinces, received constant intelligence of the conduct of the several governors in their respective commands. And the Cyprians had a particular claim to the patronage of Cato, as he had been employed in executing a commission, by which the island was annexed to the dominions of the republic. Cicero, in a letter to Cato, calls them (as we see) “ those illustrious clients of yours”—and refers him to them for a testimony of his good conduct in his government, of which Cyprus was a part.

See Melm.
vol. 1. p.
426. note
12 and 13.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

shrine we have both of us, from our earliest years, paid our joint and equal adorations: and, while she has been thought, by some, the companion only of indolent and secluded speculatists, we (and we alone I had almost said) have introduced her into the world of business, and familiarized her with the most active and important scenes. She therefore it is that now solicits you in my behalf; and when philosophy is the suppliant, Cato, surely, can never refuse. To say all in one word: be well assured, if I should prevail with you to concur in procuring a decree I so much wish to obtain, I shall consider myself as wholly indebted for that honour to your authority and friendship. Farewell."

Middl.
p. 29.

Ep. Fam.
15. 6.

But Cato was not to be moved from his purpose by these compliments, or motives of friendship: he was an enemy by principle to all decrees of this kind, and thought them bestowed too cheaply, and prostituted to occasions unworthy of them; so that, when Cicero's letters came under deliberation, though he spoke with all imaginable honour and respect of Cicero, and highly extolled both his civil and military administration, yet he voted against the supplication,^a which was decreed, however, without any other dissenting voice, except that of Favonius, who loved always to mimic Cato, and of Hirrus, who had a personal quarrel with Cicero: yet, when the vote was over, Cato himself assisted in drawing up the decree, and had his name inserted in it, which was the usual mark of a particular approbation of the thing, and friendship to the person in whose favour it passed. But Cato's answer to Cicero's letter will shew the temper of the man, and the grounds on which he acted on this occasion.

Melm.

vol. 2. p. 51.

^a Cicero had undoubtedly no claim to the honour he demanded; and for this reason, among others, because the number of the slain, on the side of the enemy, was not so great as the laws in these cases required; as is evident from a letter of Cælius to Cicero on the subject. Vid. Ep. Fam. 8. 2. Melm. 6. 6.

M. CATO TO M. T. CICERO, EMPEROR.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

“ Not only my regard for the republic, but my affection for you, makes me very sincerely rejoice in finding, that you exercise the same integrity and vigilance in the conduct of our arms abroad, as distinguished our administration of your most important affairs at home. I have, therefore, paid your actions that honour, which, according to my best judgment, was due to them : and, in speaking of them before the senate, as well as afterward, when I assisted in drawing up the decree in your favour, I ascribed to your probity and prudent conduct the defence of your province, the preservation of the crown and person of Ariobarzanes, and the recovery of the allies to their duty and affection to our empire. If you rather choose, however, that we should ascribe to the gods those advantages, for which the republic is not at all indebted to fortune, but wholly to your moderation and consummate wisdom, I am glad that the senate has decreed a thanksgiving. But if your willingness to let fortune have the credit of your actions, be for this reason, that you imagine a thanksgiving necessarily opens your way to a triumph, I must observe, that the latter is not always a consequence of the former. Yet granting it were, is it not far more to the honour of a general to have it declared, by a vote of the senate, that he preserved his province by the mildness and equity of his administration, than that he owed it either to the strength of his troops, or to the favour of the gods ? Such, at least, were my sentiments when this question came before the house : and if I have employed more words than usual in explaining them, it was from a desire of convincing you, that, though I proposed to the senate what I thought would be most for the advantage of your reputation, I rejoice that they have determined what is most agreeable to your wishes. I have only to request the continuance of your friendship ; and to entreat you

402d consulship.

Ep. Fam.
15. 5.

Melm. 5. 2.

Year of
R O M E
703
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 31.
Ad Att.
7. 2.

Melm.
vol. 1. p.
431. n. 1.

Ep. Fam.
15. 6.
Melm.
6. 10.

steadily to persevere in those paths of integrity, which you have hitherto pursued, both in respect to our allies, and to the republic.^b Farewell."

Cæsar was not displeased, perhaps, to hear of Cato's stiffness, as it might naturally create a coldness between him and Cicero: for, in a congratulatory letter to Cicero upon the success of his arms, and the supplication decreed in his honour, he aggravated the rudeness and ingratitude of Cato. Cicero himself was highly disgusted at it, especially when Cato soon afterward voted a supplication to his son-in-law Bibulus. "Cato (says Cicero) was shamefully malicious; he gave me what I did not ask, a character of integrity, justice, and clemency,

^b "This letter (to speak in virtuoso language) is a unique, and extremely valuable, as being the only composition that has been transmitted to us from the hands of Cato. It confirms what Plutarch expressly asserts, that Cato's manners were by no means of a rough and unpolished cast, as no refusal could have been drawn up in more decent and civil terms. A judicious eye, however, cannot but discern, through this veil of politeness, the nice touches of a delicate and concealed raillery."—Nevertheless, as Cicero had a farther suit to make to the senate, in the demand of a triumph, he chose to dissemble his resentment, and returned the following civil answer to Cato:—

TO MARCUS CATO.

" 'Praise from thy lips 'tis mine with joy to boast:
He best can give it who deserves it most:'

"As Hector, I think, says to the venerable Priam in one of Nævius's plays. Honourable indeed is that applause which is bestowed by those who have themselves been the constant objects of universal approbation. Accordingly, I esteem the encomiums you conferred upon me in the senate, together with your congratulatory letter, as a distinction of the highest and most illustrious kind. Nothing could be more agreeable to my wishes, as nothing could be more glorious for my reputation, than your having thus freely given to friendship whatever you could strictly give to truth. Were Rome entirely composed of Catos, or could it produce many (as it is surprising it can furnish even one) of that venerable character, my desires would be amply satisfied: and I should prefer your single approbation to all the laurels and all the triumphal cars in the universe. In my own judgment, indeed, and according to the refined estimate of true philosophy, the compliments you paid me in the senate, and which have been transmitted to me by my friends, are undoubtedly the most significant distinction I can possibly receive. I acquainted you, in my former letter, with the particular motives which induced me to be desirous (for I will not call it ambitious) of a triumph. And if the reasons I have assigned will not, in your opinion, justify a warm pursuit of that honour, they must prove, at least, that I ought not to refuse it, if the senate should make me the offer. And I hope that assembly, in consideration of my services in this province, will not think me undeserving of a reward so usually conferred. If I should not be disappointed in this hope, my only request is (what indeed you kindly promise), that, as you have paid me the honour you thought most to my glory, you would rejoice in my obtaining those which are most to my inclination. And this disposition you have already very sincerely shewn, not only by your letter, but by having signed the decree that has passed in my favour. For decrees of this kind, I know, are usually subscribed by those who are most in the interests of the person to whose honour they are voted. I will only add, that I hope to see you very soon; and may I find the republic in a happier situation than what my fears presage! Farewell."

but denied me what I did.—Yet this same man voted a supplication of twenty days to Bibulus: pardon me if I cannot bear this usage.”

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

Cicero, in writing afterward to Atticus on the same subject, says, “Consider what you would advise me with regard to a triumph, to which my friends invite me: for my part, if Bibulus, who, while there was a Parthian in Syria, never set a foot out of the gates of Antioch, any more than he did upon a certain occasion out of his own house,^c had not solicited a triumph, I should have been quiet; but now it is a shame to sit still.” Again, “As to a triumph, I had no thoughts of it before Bibulus’s most impudent letters, by which he obtained an honourable supplication. If he had really done all that he has written, I should rejoice at it, and wish well to his suit; but for him, who never stirred beyond the walls while there was an enemy on this side the Euphrates,^d to have such an honour decreed; and for me, whose army inspired all their hopes and spirits into his, not to obtain the same, will be a disgrace to us; I say to us, joining you to myself: wherefore I am determined to push at all, and hope to obtain all.”

402d con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 58.
Ad Att.
6. 8.

Vid. vol. 4.
p. 558.
Ad Att.
7. 2.

The remaining part of Cicero’s government was employed in the civil affairs of the province, where his whole care was to ease the several cities and districts of that excessive load of debts, in which the avarice and rapaciousness of former governors had involved them. He

Middl.
p. 33.
Ad Att.
5. 21.

^c N. B. This is that Bibulus, of whose lot, when the contempt he met with abroad made him shut himself up in his own house, Cicero once said, or pretends to have said, even in the presence of Pompey, that he preferred it, unhappy as it might appear, to all the splendid triumphs of the most victorious general! Vide supra, p. 115.

^d After the contemptible account which Cicero gives of Bibulus’s conduct in Syria, it must appear strange to see him honoured with a supplication, and aspiring even to a triumph: but this was not for any thing that he himself had done (for he had suffered a defeat), but for what, before the arrival of Bibulus, his lieutenant Cassius had performed against the Parthians; the success of the lieutenants being ascribed always to the auspices of the general, who reaped the reward and glory of it: and as the Parthians were the most dangerous enemies of the republic, and the more particularly dreaded at this time for their late victory over Crassus, so any advantage gained against them was sure to be well received at Rome, and repaid with all the honours that could reasonably be demanded.

Middl.
p. 15.

Vid. supr.
p. 194.
Vid. supr.
p. 178.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

Ad Att.
5. 15.

Ib. 6. 2.

laid it down for the fixed rule of his administration, not to suffer any money to be expended either upon himself or his officers: and when one of his lieutenants, L. Tullius, in passing through the country, exacted only the forage and firing which were due by law, and that but once a day, and not, as all others had done before, from every town and village through which they passed, he was much out of humour, and could not help complaining of it, as a stain upon his government, since none of his people besides had taken even a single farthing. All the wealthier cities of the province used to pay to all their proconsuls large contributions, for being exempted from furnishing winter-quarters to the army: Cyprus alone had paid yearly, on this single account, 200 talents, or about 40,000*l.*: but Cicero remitted this whole tax to them, which alone made a vast revenue; and applied all the customary perquisites of his office to the relief of the distressed province: yet for all his services and generosity, which amazed the poor people, he would accept no honours but what were merely verbal, prohibiting all expensive monuments, as statues, temples, brazen horses, &c. which, by the flattery of Asia, used to be erected of course to all governors though never so corrupt and oppressive. While he was upon his visitation of the Asiatic districts, there happened to be a kind of famine in the country; yet, wherever he came, he not only provided for his family at his own expense, but prevailed with the merchants and dealers who had any quantity of corn in their storehouses, to supply the people with it on easy terms; living himself all the while splendidly and hospitably, and keeping an open table, not only for all the Roman officers, but the gentry of the province. In the following letter to Atticus, he gives him a summary view of his manner of governing.

“ I see (says he) that you are much pleased with my moderation and abstinence; but you would be much more so, if you were with me; especially at Laodicea,

where I did wonders at the sessions, which I have just held, for the affairs of the diocesses, from the 13th of February to the 1st of May. Many cities were wholly freed from all their debts: many greatly eased; and all, by being allowed to govern themselves by their own laws, have recovered new life. There are two ways, by which I have put them in a capacity of freeing, or of easing themselves at least from their debts; the one is by suffering no expense at all to be made on the account of my government. When I say none at all, I speak not hyperbolically: there is not so much as a farthing: it is incredible to think what relief they have found from this single article. The other is this; their own Greek magistrates had strangely abused and plundered them. I examined every one of them who had borne any office for ten years past: they all plainly confessed; and without the ignominy of a public conviction, made restitution of the money, which they had pillaged: so that the people, who had paid nothing to our farmers for the present lustrum, have now paid the arrears of the last, even without murmuring. This has placed me in high favour with the publicans; a grateful set of men, you will say: I have really found them such.—The rest of my jurisdiction shall be managed with the same address, and create the same admiration of my clemency and easiness.^e There is no difficulty of access to me, as there is

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

^e Surely a corrupt and vicious taste for glory was never more visible in any man than it is in Cicero, when he affects to despise* his provincial government of Cilicia; where he had done more good, and deserved more praise, than in any one scene of his life; having, agreeably to his determined purpose, when he entered upon that employment, so conducted himself, as to leave the innocence and integrity of his administration for a pattern of government to all succeeding proconsuls. But, though he had there (as our late laureat observes) “thrown into actual practice those various virtues, of which, as a private man, he had hitherto only recommended the precepts; yet so quiet, so confined an eminence, such simplicity of virtue, alas! had no charms for Cicero. The thing itself was quite disagreeable to his temper. And truly

Cib.

p. 178.

Vid. supr.
p. 171.

* When just setting out from his province for Italy, he writes thus to Coelius: “Rome, my friend, Rome alone, is the object that merits your attention: and may you ever live within the splendour of that illustrious scene! All foreign employments (and it was my sentiment from my first entrance into the world) are below the ambition of those who have talents to distinguish themselves on that more conspicuous theatre. And would to God, as I was ever well convinced of this truth, I had always acted accordingly!”

Ep. Fam.
2. 12.

Melm. 6. 4.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 36.

Ad Att.
6. 1.

Vid. infra,
p. 214.

Vid. vol. 4.
p. 559.

to all other provincial governors ; no introduction by my chamberlain : I am always up before day, and walking in my hall, with my doors open, as I used to do when a candidate at Rome : this is great and gracious here ; though not at all troublesome to me, from my old habit and discipline, &c.——”^f

But Cicero's method of governing gave no small umbrage, it seems, to his predecessor Appius, who considered it as a reproach upon himself, and sent several querulous letters to Cicero, because he had reversed some of his constitutions : “ And no wonder (says Cicero) that he is displeased with my manner ; for what can be more unlike than his administration and mine ? Under him the province was drained by expenses and exactions ; under me, not a penny levied for public or private use : what shall I say of his prefects, attendants, lieutenants ? of their plunders, rapines, injuries ? Whereas now,

a temper more delicately difficult to please we seldom meet with ; yet was not this distaste more extraordinary than the reasons for it.—‘ The whole affair is too inconsiderable for a man of my strength and capacity, who am able to sustain, as I used to do, the weightier business of the republic.’ [‘ Istum negotium non est dignum viribus nostris, qui majora onera, in republica, sustinere et possem et soleam.’]”

This weightier business of the republic, if we consider the whole political conduct of Cicero, we must observe to be mere party business ; nothing more than employing his utmost eloquence to defend the senate in its usurpations upon the rights of the people, and to defend every super-egregious villain who professed himself his admirer, or to be of the aristocratical faction ; because, so long as the senate governed with sovereign authority, so long Cicero, by the means of that same eloquence, had a considerable share in the government.

For, as to what the laureat imagines, that Cicero's great object was “ to mend the morals of Rome, an enterprise not within the reach of human policy, benevolence, or wisdom, to effect,” it does not appear that Cicero had any such chimerical project. Ill qualified must he have been for a reformer of manners, who made it his business to screen from punishment the most notorious violators of the laws, even corrupt judges, that sold decrees. Vid. vol. 4. p. 542, and 549. He employed his eloquence to defend Antonius, of whose robberies he shared the profit ; he defended Vatinius and Gabinius, men whom he himself had branded for knaves ; and, as we have seen, was ready to defend Catiline, if Catiline would have requested that favour. Vid. vol. 4. p. 436. Even in the suppression of Catiline's conspiracy, which he for ever boasts of as the most glorious of all exploits, his manner of doing it was absolutely illegal and inexcusable, and of so pernicious a tendency, that he seems richly to have deserved the banishment to which he was condemned on that account. Vide vol. 4. p. 508, the note ; and 523.

What pity it is that a man who knew so well what was right, and could occasionally conform his conduct so strictly to it, should appear, even by his own account of himself, to have had no better motive for so doing than mere vain-glory, and the desire of applause ; and should be all the while a detestable hypocrite, a villain in his heart, and so shameless, as to make no scruple to own to his intimate friend, that he practised falsehood and hypocrisy without scruple, and as a necessary means to the living comfortably in the world. We shall meet with this confession very soon, in one of his letters.

there is not a single family governed with such order, discipline, and modesty, as my province. This some of Appius's friends interpret ridiculously, as if I was taking pains to exalt my own character, in order to depress his ; and doing all this, not for the sake of my own credit, but of his disgrace."

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

Cicero's letters to Appius make one book of his familiar epistles, the greatest part of which are of the expository kind, on the subject of their mutual jealousies and complaints. In this slippery state of their friendship, an accident happened at Rome, which had like to have put an end to it. His daughter Tullia, after parting from her second husband Crassipes, as it is probably thought, by divorce, he being alive at this time, and under Cicero's displeasure, was married, in her father's absence, to a third, P. Cornelius Dolabella : several parties had been offered to her, and, among these, Tib. Claudius Nero, who afterward married Livia, whom Augustus took away from him : Nero made his proposals to Cicero in Cilicia, who referred him to the women, to whom he had left the management of that affair ; but, before these overtures reached them, they had made up the match with Dolabella, being mightily taken with his complaisant and obsequious address. He was a nobleman of patrician descent, and of great parts and politeness ; but of a violent, daring, ambitious temper, and, by a life of pleasure and expense, greatly distressed in his fortunes ; which made Cicero very uneasy when he came afterward to know it. Dolabella, at the time of his marriage, for which he made way also by the divorce of his first wife, gave a proof of his enterprising genius, by impeaching Appius Claudius of practices against the state in his government of Cilicia, and of bribery and corruption in his suit for the consulship. This put a great difficulty upon Cicero, and made it natural to suspect that he privately favoured the impeachment, where the accuser was his son-in-law : but, in

Middl.
p. 40.

Ad Att.
7.1.

Ib. 6. 6.

Ep. Fam.
8. 6.

Ib. 3. 12.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

clearing himself of it to Appius, though he dissembled in disclaiming any knowledge of that match, yet he was very sincere in professing himself an utter stranger to the impeachment, and was in truth, for his own sake, greatly disturbed at it. But as from the circumstance of his succeeding to Appius in his government, he was of all men the most capable of serving or hurting him at the trial, so Pompey, who took great pains to screen Appius, was extremely desirous to engage Cicero on their side, and had thoughts of sending one of his sons to him for that purpose: but Cicero saved them that trouble, by declaring early and openly for Appius, and promising every thing from the province that could be of any service to him: so that Appius, instead of declining a trial, contrived to bring it on as soon as he could; and with that view, having dropped his pretensions to a triumph, entered the city, and offered himself to his judges, before his accuser was prepared for him: he was acquitted, without any difficulty, of both the indictments.

The following letters not only lay before us the base hypocritical conduct of Cicero, with regard to Appius and Dolabella, but contain several important particulars of what at this time was doing at Rome in relation to Pompey and Cæsar, and the approaching breach between them.

MARCUS CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam.
8. 6.
Melm. 5. 5.

“You have been informed, I doubt not, that Dolabella has exhibited articles of impeachment against Appius: and this prosecution seems to be more agreeable to the world in general than I imagined. Appius however has acted with great prudence upon the occasion: for, as soon as his adversary had lodged his information, he withdrew his petition for a triumph, and immediately entered the city. By this means he silenced the reports to his disadvantage; as he appeared more willing to take his trial than his prosecutor expected. Appius relies

greatly, in this conjuncture, upon your assistance : and I am persuaded, you are not disinclined to serve him. You have it now in your power to do so, as far as you shall think proper : though, I must add, you would be more at liberty to limit your good offices towards him, if you and he had never been ill together. But as the case now stands, were you to measure out your services by the right he has to demand them, it might be suspected that you were not sincere in your reconciliation : whereas you can hazard no censure by obliging him, as you will shew that you are not to be discouraged from acting a generous part, even where friendship might incline you to the contrary. This reminds me of acquainting you, that Dolabella's wife obtained a divorce just upon the commencement of this prosecution. I remember the commission^s you left with me, when you set out for the province : as I dare say, you have not forgotten what I afterward wrote to you concerning that affair. I have not time to enlarge upon it at present : only let me advise you, how much soever you may relish the scheme, to wait the event of this trial, before you discover your sentiments. If, indeed, your inclinations should be known, it will raise a very invidious clamour against you : and should you give Dolabella the least intimation of them, they will certainly become more public than will be convenient either for your interest or your honour. He would undoubtedly be unable to conceal a circumstance so advantageous to his present views, and which would give so much credit to the prosecution in which he is engaged : and, I am persuaded, he would scarce refrain from making it the subject of his conversation, notwithstanding he was sure the discovery would prove to his prejudice.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

“Pompey, I am told, interests himself extremely in

^s It seems very evident from this passage, that there was some prospect of a divorce between Dolabella and his wife before Cicero left Rome ; and that Cicero had commissioned Cœlius, in case this event should happen, to take some measures for procuring a match between Dolabella and his daughter Tullia. Melm. vol. 1. p. 438.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

behalf of Appius: insomuch, that it is generally imagined he has a design of sending one of his sons to solicit you in his favour. Meanwhile we are in the humour here of acquitting all criminals: nothing, in truth, so base and so villanous can be perpetrated, that is not sure of escaping punishment. You will perceive how wondrously active our consuls are in their office, when I tell you that they have not yet been able to procure a single decree of the senate, except one for appointing the Latio festivals. Even our friend Curio has not hitherto acted with any spirit in his tribunate: as indeed it is impossible to describe the general indolence that has seized us. If it were not for my contest with the vintners, and the surveyors of the public aqueducts, all Rome would appear in a profound lethargy. In short, I know not to what degree the Parthians may have animated you: but as for us, in this part of the world, we are fast asleep. But how much soever we may want to be awakened, I hope it will not be by the Parthians. It is reported, nevertheless, though I know not on what foundation, that they have gained some slight advantage over the troops of Bibulus near Mount Amanus.

Vid. supr.
p. 194.

“Since I wrote the above, I must recall what I said concerning Curio: the cold fit is at length expelled by the warmth of those censures to which the levity of his conduct has exposed him. For, not being able to carry his point with respect to the intercalation [for which he had applied himself to the pontifical college, in order to lengthen out the period of his tribunitian ministry], he has deserted the interest of the senate, and harangued the people in favour of Cæsar. He threatens likewise to propose a Viarian law, somewhat of the same tendency with the Agrarian, which was formerly attempted by Rullus: as also another, empowering the ædiles to distribute corn among the people.

“If you should determine (as I think you ought) to employ your good offices in behalf of Appius, I beg you

would take that opportunity of recommending me to his favour. Let me prevail with you likewise not to declare yourself with respect to Dolabella; as your leaving that point at large will be of singular importance, not only to the affair I hint at, but also in regard to the opinion the world will entertain of your justice and honour.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

“Will it not be a high reflection upon you, if I should not be furnished with some Grecian panthers? Farewell.”

TO MARCUS CÆLIUS.

“Would you imagine I should ever be at a loss for words? I do not mean of that chosen and elegant kind which are the privilege of your celebrated orators, but those of ordinary and common use. Yet, believe me, I am utterly incapable of expressing the solicitude I feel concerning the resolutions that may be taken in the senate in regard to the provinces. I am extremely impatient indeed to return to my friends at Rome: among which number you are principally in my thoughts. I will confess, likewise, that I am quite satiated with my government. For, in the first place, I have more reason to apprehend that some reverse of fortune may deprive me of the glory I have here acquired, than to expect I should be able to raise it higher; and, in the next place, I cannot but look upon the whole business of this scene as much inferior to my strength; which is both able and accustomed to support a far more important weight. I will acknowledge too, that I am uneasy in the expectation of a very terrible war [with the Parthians], which is like to be kindled in this part of the world; and which I may probably escape, if I should obtain my dismissal at the stated time.

Ep. Fam.
2. 11.
Melm.
5. 12.

“I do not forget the panthers you desired; and have given my orders to the persons usually employed in hunting them: but these animals are exceedingly scarce with us. They take it so unkind, you must know, that they should be the only creatures in my province for

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

whom any snares are laid, that they have withdrawn themselves from my government, and are gone into Caria.—Be well assured the honour of your ædileship is much my care: and this day particularly reminds me of it, as it is the festival of the Megalensian games” [which were under the conduct of the curule ædiles, of whom Cœlius was now one. The festival began on the 4th of April, and continued six days].

“I hope you will send me a minute detail of our public affairs: as I have an entire dependance on the accounts which are transmitted to me by your hand. Farewell.”

TO MARCUS CŒLIUS, CURULE ÆDILE.

Ep. Fam.
2. 13.
Melm.
5. 15.
* Vid. supr.
p. 208.

“Your very agreeable letters visit me but seldom: perhaps by some accident or other they lose their way. How full was the last* which came to my hands of the most prudent and obliging advice! I had determined indeed to act in the manner you recommend: but it gives an additional strength to one’s resolutions, to find them agreeable to the sentiments of so faithful and so judicious a friend. I have often assured you of my extreme affection for Appius: and I had reason to believe, after our mutual reconcilment, that he entertained the same favourable disposition towards me: for he distinguished me, in his consulate, with great marks of honour and amity.—I appeal to you, that I was not wanting, on my part, in a suitable return: and, indeed, he stood so much the higher in my esteem, as I was sensible of the affection he had conceived for you. Add to this, that I am, as you well know, wholly devoted to Pompey, and tenderly attached also to Brutus. Can I then want a reason of uniting myself with Appius, thus supported, as he is, by the most powerful friends and alliances, and flourishing in every other advantage that can be derived from affluent possessions, in conjunction with great abilities?—Believe me, I have never said or done the least thing, throughout the whole course of

my government, with a view of prejudicing his reputation. And now, that my friend Dolabella has so rashly attacked him, I am exerting all my good offices to dissipate the rising storm with which he is threatened. You mentioned something of a lethargic inactivity that had seized the republic. I rejoiced, no doubt, to hear that you were in a state of such profound tranquillity, as well as that our spirited friend* was so much infected with this general indolence, as not to be in a humour of disturbing it. But the last paragraph of your letter, which was written, I observed, with your own hand, changed the scene, and somewhat indeed discomposed me. Is Curio really then become a convert to Cæsar? But, extraordinary as this event may appear to others, believe me, it is agreeable to what I always suspected. Good gods! how do I long to laugh with you at the ridiculous farce which is acting in your part of the world!

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

* Curio.

“I have finished my juridical circuit; and not only settled the finances of the several cities upon a more advantageous basis, but secured to the farmers of the revenues the arrears due to their former agreements, without the least complaint from any of the parties concerned. In short, I have given entire satisfaction to all orders and degrees of men in this province. I propose, therefore, to set out for Cilicia on the 7th of May. From whence, after having just looked upon the troops in their summer cantonment, and settled some affairs relating to the army, I intend, agreeably to the decree of the senate for that purpose, to set forward to Rome. I am extremely impatient, indeed, to return to my friends; but particularly to you, whom I much wish to see in the administration of your ædileship.—Farewell.”

TO APPIUS PULCHER.

“When I first received an account of the ill-judged prosecution which had been commenced against you, it gave me great concern; as nothing could possibly have

Ep. Fam.
3. 10.
Melm. 6. 1.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

Vid. *supr.*
p. 206.

happened that I less expected. But, as soon as I had recovered from my surprise, I was well satisfied that you will easily disappoint the malice of your enemies; as I have the highest confidence in your own judicious conduct for that purpose; as well as a very great one in that of your friends. I see many reasons, indeed, to believe, that the envy of your adversaries will only brighten that character they meant to sully. Though I cannot but regret, that they should have thus snatched from you an honour you so justly merit, and of which you had so well-grounded an assurance; the honour I mean of a triumph. However, you will shew your judgment if you should consider this pompous distinction in the light it has ever appeared to my own view: and, at the same time, enjoy a triumph of the completest kind in the confusion and disappointment of your enemies: as I am well convinced, that the vigorous and prudent exertion of your power and influence will give them full reason to repent of their violent proceedings. As for myself, be well assured (and I call every god to witness the sincerity of what I promise) that I will exert my utmost interest in support, I will not say of your person, which I hope is in no danger, but of your dignities and honour. To this end I shall employ my best good offices for you in this province, where you once presided; and employ them with all the warmth of an intercessor, with all the assiduity of a relation, with all the influence of a man, who, I trust, is dear to those cities, and with all the authority of one who is invested with the supreme command. In a word, I hope you will both ask and expect of me every service in my power: and, believe me, I shall give you greater proofs of my affection than you are disposed, perhaps, to imagine. Notwithstanding, therefore, the letter I received from you by the hands of Quintus Servilius was extremely short, yet I could not but think it much too long: for it was doing an injury to the sentiments of my heart, to suppose you had any

occasion to solicit my assistance. I am sorry you should have an opportunity of experiencing, by an incident so little agreeable to you, the rank you bear in my affection, the esteem which I entertain for Pompey, whom I justly value above all men, and the measure of my unfeigned regard for Brutus: circumstances, I should hope, of which our daily intercourse had rendered you sufficiently sensible. However, since it has so happened, I should think I acted a most unworthy, not to say a criminal part, if I were to omit any article wherein my services can avail you.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

“Pontinius remembers the singular instances of friendship he has received from you, and of which I myself was a witness,^h with all the gratitude and affection to which you have so undoubted a right. The urgency of his affairs had obliged him, though with great reluctance, to leave me. Nevertheless, having been informed, just as he was going to embark at Ephesus, that his presence in this province might be of advantage to your cause, he immediately returned back to Laodicea. I am persuaded you will meet with numberless such instances of zeal upon this occasion; can I doubt then that this troublesome affair will prove, in the conclusion, greatly to your credit?

“If you should be able to bring on an election of censors, and should exercise that office in the manner you certainly ought, and for which you are so perfectlyⁱ well qualified, you can never want that authority in the republic which will afford at once a protection both to yourself and your friends. Let me entreat, therefore, your most strenuous endeavours to prevent my administration from being prolonged: that, after having filled up the measure of my affectionate services to you here,

^h Pontinius met with so strong an opposition to his claim of a triumph for quelling the Allobroges, and particularly from Cato, that it was four years before his petition was granted. Appius was then consul, and favoured him. Vid. *supra*, p. 137.

ⁱ N. B. Cicero, while he wrote this, thought no man less qualified for the office than Appius: whose projects of reformation are a subject of ridicule to him and his correspondent Coelius. Ep. Fam. 8. 14.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

Vid. supr.
p. 208.

I may have the satisfaction also of presenting them to you at Rome.

“ I read with pleasure, though by no means with surprise, the account you gave me of that general zeal which all orders and degrees of men have shewn in your cause : a circumstance of which I had likewise been informed by my other friends. It affords me great satisfaction to find, that a man, with whom I have the honour and pleasure to be so intimately united, is thus distinguished with that universal approbation he so justly deserves. But I rejoice in this upon another consideration likewise ; and as it is a proof that there still remains a general disposition in Rome to support the cause of illustrious merit :^k a disposition, which I have myself also experienced, upon every occasion, as the honourable recompence of my pains and vigils in the public service. But I am astonished that Dolabella, a young man whom I formerly rescued with the utmost difficulty from the consequences of two capital impeachments, should so ungratefully forget the patron to whom he owes all that he enjoys, as to be the author of this ill-considered prosecution of my friend. And what aggravates the folly of his conduct is, that he should thus adventure to attack a man, who is distinguished with the highest honours, and supported by the most powerful friendships ; at the same time that he himself (to speak of him in the softest terms) is greatly deficient in both these respects. I had received an account from our friend Cœlius, before your letter reached my hand, of the idle and ridiculous report he has propagated, and on which you so largely expatiate. There is so little ground, however, for what he asserts, that be assured I would much sooner break off all former friendship with a man who had thus declared himself your enemy, than be prevailed upon to engage with him in any new connexions.^l

^k The illustrious merit of Appius we have seen above. Vid. supra, p. 206.

^l “ Nothing could be more distant from Cicero’s heart than what he here pretends.

“ You have not the least reason to doubt of my zeal to serve you ; of which I have given many conspicuous

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

For there is the strongest evidence to believe that it was his fixed intention, at this very time, to enter into an alliance with Dolabella ; and, in fact, Tullia was married to him soon after the date of this letter. Cicero affirms, I must acknowledge, in an epistle to Atticus, that this transaction was entirely without his knowledge : but he seems to have dealt as insincerely upon this occasion with his bosom friend, as he too frequently did with all the world beside. Accordingly he assures Atticus, he so little expected the news of his daughter's match, that he was actually in treaty for the disposal of her to another person. But, if the latter part of this assertion were true, it aggravates his dissimulation ; for the former most evidently was false. For, not to mention the great probability there is that he left a commission with Cœlius, when he set out for the province, relating to the marriage in question, it appears that he had received more than one letter from him upon this subject, before he wrote the last-mentioned to Atticus ; and consequently that he could not have been so much a stranger to the affair as he chose to represent himself. For Cicero's answer to the letter of Cœlius, concerning this treaty with Dolabella, is extant, and it cannot be dated later than the beginning of May in the present year : because he mentions the 7th of that month as a future day, on which he proposed to return from another part of his province into Cilicia. But the letter to Atticus must have been written in the latter end of the same year, because he takes notice in it of the death of Hortensius. Now he was not informed of that event till he came to Rhodes, in his voyage from Cilicia ; as he himself tells us in the introduction of his oratorical treatise, inscribed to Brutus. If Cicero then was capable of thus disguising the truth concerning Dolabella, to the nearest and most valuable of his friends ; it is no wonder he should not scruple to act a still more counterfeit part in all that he says of him to Appius.

402d con-
sulship.

Ad Att.
11. 6.

Vid. supr.
p. 209.

“ And this dissimulation he very freely acknowledges to Cœlius, who indeed was in the whole secret of the affair ; as it was by his intervention that it seems to have been principally conducted. Accordingly Cicero, taking notice to Cœlius of the letter now before us, which he tells him was written in consequence of the information he had received from him, expresses himself in the following remarkable words : ‘ What would you have said, had you seen the letter I wrote to Appius after my receiving your's upon that subject ? ’ ‘ Quid si meam (sc. epistolam), legas quam ego tum ex tuis literis misi ad Appium ? sed quid agas ? sic vivitur : ’ which, in plain English, amounts to this, That, if a man will live in the world, he must submit to the lowest and most contemptible hypocrisy.* And it must be owned that Cicero, in the present instance, as well as in most others, acted up to the full extent of his maxim.” Ad Att. 6. 6. Ep. Fam. 8. 6. De Clar. Orator. 1. Ep. Fam. 2. 15.

Vid. infra,
p. 219.

The letter to Cœlius, in which we find this convenient maxim, contains the following passage :

Ep. Fam.
2. 15.

——“ It is with great pleasure I find that Dolabella enjoys the happiness of your esteem and friendship. I was at no loss to guess the circumstance to which you alluded when you mentioned your hopes, that the prudence of my daughter Tullia would temper his conduct.” M. Bayle observes, that Cœlius's letter to Cicero, concerning Dolabella (whom Cœlius knew to be a rake and a spendthrift), is exactly in the style of compliment that would now be used in the like case. “ On excuseroit le passé sur la jeunesse ; et si l'on n'osoit pas assurer que toutes les imperfections de cet âge fussent corrigées, on diroit que le mariage avec une personne si accomplie, avec la fille d'un si excellent pere, acheveroit la guerison.” The letter runs thus :

Melm.
6. 15.

Article
Tullie.

“ MARCUS CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

“ I congratulate you on your alliance with so worthy a man as Dolabella : for such I sincerely think him. His former conduct, it is true, has not been altogether for his own advantage. But time has now worn out those little indiscretions of his youth : at least, if any of them should still remain, the authority and advantage of your advice and friendship, together with the good sense of Tullia, will soon, I am confident, reclaim him. He is by no means, indeed, obstinate : and it is not from any incapacity of discerning better, whenever he deviates from the right path. To say all in one word, I infinitely love him.”

Ep. Fam. 8.
Melm. 6. 1.

* How admirably well does this maxim accord with those words in the above letter—“ The probity of my heart, a disposition in me worthy of those sublime contemplations to which I have devoted myself from my earliest youth ! ”

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

testimonies in this province, as well as at Rome : your letter, nevertheless, intimates some sort of suspicion of the contrary.——

“ If ever you experienced the probity of my heart, or observed a disposition in me worthy of those sublime contemplations to which I have devoted myself from my earliest youth ; if ever you discovered, by my conduct in the most important transactions, that I was neither void of spirit nor destitute of abilities, you ought to have believed me incapable of acting a low and little part towards my friends, much more a base and a treacherous one——

“ But abstracted from these numerous and powerful motives, there is one, which, of itself, might be sufficient to evince the disposition in which I stand towards you. For, tell me, did ever any man entertain, or had ever any man reason to entertain, so high an esteem for another, as that which you know I am filled with for the illustrious father-in-law of your daughter ? If personal obligations, indeed, can give him a title to these sentiments ; do I not owe to Pompey the enjoyment of my country, my family, my dignities, and even my very self?^m——

——“ Upon the whole, as you are united not only by alliance, but by affection, to my illustrious friend ; what are the sentiments, do you imagine, that I ought to bear towards you ? The truth of it is, were I your professed enemy, as I am most sincerely the reverse, yef, after the letter which I lately received from Pompey, I should think myself obliged to sacrifice my resentment to his request, and be wholly governed by the inclinations of a man to whom I am thus greatly indebted.——I expect every day to hear that you are chosen censor, &c.—Farewell.”

Melm.

^m “ Cicero by no means thought himself so much obliged to Pompey as he here pretends : and all these extravagant professions were a mere artifice (and a thin one it must be owned) to make Pompey believe that he had forgotten the ill usage he had formerly received from him.” Vid. ad Att. 9. 13.

In a subsequent letter to Appius, he writes thus—
 “ Whilst I lay encamped on the banks of the Pyramus [a river in Cilicia], I received two letters from you, and both at the same time.—One of them was dated on the 5th of April; but the other, which seemed to have been written later, was without any date. I will answer the former, therefore, in the first place, wherein you give me an account of your having been acquitted of the impeachment exhibited against you for maleadministration in this province. I had before been apprised of many circumstances of this event by various letters and expresses, as well as by general report.—But notwithstanding your letter was in some measure anticipated, yet it heightened my satisfaction to receive the same good news from your own hand. My information was by this means not only more full than what I had learnt from common fame, but it brought you nearer to my imagination, and rendered you in some sort present to those sentiments of joy which arose upon this occasion in my heart. Accordingly I embraced you in my thoughts, and kissed the letter that gave me so much reason to rejoice upon my own account as well as upon yours. I say, upon my own account, because I look upon those honours, which are thus paid by the general voice of my country to virtue, industry, and genius, as paid to myself; being too much disposed, perhaps, to imagine that these are qualities to which my own character is no stranger. But, though I am by no means surprised that this trial should have ended so much to your credit, yet I cannot forbear being astonished at that mean and unworthy spirit which carried your enemies to engage in this prosecution” [hinting at Dolabella, whose friendship and alliance Cicero was at this time courting].—“ Farewell: and if you are (as I sincerely hope) in the possession of the censorial office, reflect often on the virtues of your illustrious ancestor.”*

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d consulship.

Ep. Fam.
3. 11.
Melm.
3. 11.

Vid. supr.
p. 206.

Vid. supr.
p. 216.

* App.
Claud.
Cæcus.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

Dio, p. 147.
Middl.
p. 42.
Ep. Fam.
8. 14.

Dio, p. 150.

In a little time after Appius's trial he was chosen censor, together with Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law, the last men who bore that office during the aristocracy, or rather the anarchy, of Rome. Clodius's law, mentioned above, which had greatly restrained the power of these magistrates, was repealed the last year by Scipio the consul (Pompey's father-in-law), and their ancient authority restored to them, which was now exercised with great rigour by Appius: who, though really a libertine, and remarkable for indulging himself in all the luxury of life, yet, by an affectation of severity, hoped to retrieve his character, and passed for an admirer of that ancient discipline, for which many of his ancestors had been celebrated. But this vain and unseasonable attempt of reformation served only to alienate people from Pompey's cause, with whom Appius was strictly allied: whilst his colleague Piso, who foresaw that effect, chose to sit still, and suffer him to disgrace the knights and senators at pleasure, which he did with great freedom, and, among others, turned Sallust the historian out of the senate, and was hardly restrained from putting the same affront upon Curio. This added strength to Cæsar; of whom both the senate and Pompey were at this time become extremely jealous: the senate, because of Cæsar's amazing victories, which made him idolized more than ever by the people: Pompey, because Cæsar, as in all other accomplishments, so even in military virtue, appeared now to be his superior beyond compare.

CHAP. IX.

The war of Cæsar in Gaul, commenced in the year 695, and continued to the year 703.

C. J. Cæs.
de Bell.
Gall. Com.
l. 1.

GAUL (without including the Roman province) was, at the time of Cæsar's going thither, divided into three principal parts, Aquitain, Celtic Gaul, and Belgic Gaul.

Aquitain, the smallest of the three, was bounded on the north by the river Garonne, on the south by the Pyrenees, on the west by the ocean, and on the east by the Roman province.*

The largest of the three named Celtic Gaul, because inhabited by a people who called themselves Celtæ, though by the Romans they were calledⁿ Galli [Gauls], had for its boundaries the ocean on the west, the Rhine on the east, the Garonne on the south, and the Seine and the Marne on the north.

* Contain-
ing almost
all Pro-
vence and
Languedoc.
Gallia
Celtica.

The two last-named rivers made the southern boundary of Belgic Gaul. On its other sides it was encompassed by the British channel and the Lower Rhine.

Gallia.
Belgica.

Each of these nations had its distinct language, customs, and laws. Of the three, the Belgæ (or Belgic nation) were the most warlike, because situated the most remote from the refinements and luxury of the Roman province, and because continually engaged in war with their neighbours, the Germans, on the other side the Rhine.

For the same reason the Helvetii were distinguished above the rest of the Celtæ for their bravery, being almost constantly, either as aggressors, or as acting on the defensive, at war with the Germans.

The people
of Switzer-
land.

In the consulship of M. Messala and M. Piso [Year of Rome 692.] Orgetorix, the most opulent and most illustrious of the Helvetian nobles, formed a singular project of ambition. Having first gained to his purpose the principal men of the state, he exhorted the people to remove altogether in a body out of their own country; representing to them, that, as they surpassed all the other Celtæ in bravery, they would find it easy to acquire the sovereignty over the whole country of Celtic Gaul. To this proposal the Helvetii listened the more readily, not only because they thought themselves con-

ⁿ Cæsar very rarely, if ever, gives the name of Gauls to the people of Aquitania or of Gallia Belgica. Crev.

* Mount
St. Claude.
† Inhabit-
ants of
Franche
Comté.
‡ Lake of
Geneva.

fined within limits too narrow for their number (their territory being only 140 miles in length, and eighty in breadth), but because, being bounded on one side by the Rhine, a broad and deep river; on another by Mount Jura,* a high ridge of hills that runs between them and the Sequani; † and on the side of the Roman province by the lake ‡ Lemman and the river Rhone, they could not easily make hostile incursions on their neighbours, which restraint was a great grievance, a ground of much discontent to a numerous people that took delight in war.

The people
of Autun.

Moved by these considerations, and by the authority and persuasions of Orgetorix, they presently resolved to set about the providing of all necessaries for the projected migration. They imagined two years would be sufficient for these preparations, and they obliged themselves by a law to begin their march on the third. The whole management of this design was committed to Orgetorix, who undertook an embassy to two of the neighbouring states, the Sequani and Ædui, in order to establish peace and amity with them. As his aim was to make himself king of his own nation, he took this opportunity to persuade Casticus, whose father had for many years reigned over the Sequani, and been styled friend by the senate and people of Rome, to possess himself of the same regal authority which his father had held. He likewise persuaded Dumnorix the Æduan (brother of Divitiacus, at that time the leading man in the state, and greatly beloved of the people) to aspire to royalty, and he gave him his daughter in marriage.

These three entered into strict engagements to assist and support one another in their respective schemes; and they entertained the flattering hope, that, having once brought those to effect, they should afterward, with their united forces, easily get possession of all Celtic Gaul.

It happened, that the ambitious design of Orgetorix,

to raise himself to empire at home, became known to his countrymen : upon which discovery his person was seized, and a capital process commenced against him. Had he been found guilty, the law condemned him to be burnt alive : but, on the day appointed for his trial, his relations, servants, clients, and debtors, assembling in a body to the number of 10,000, rescued him out of the hands of justice. The people, provoked at this contempt of the laws, resolved to support the authority of them ; and the magistrates had collected a considerable force for that purpose, when Orgetorix died suddenly : it was given out he perished by his own hand.

The Helvetii, notwithstanding the death of the projector, continued to pursue the project of migration with the same diligence as before : when they had furnished themselves with provisions for three months, and completed their other preparations, they burnt all their towns, twelve in number ; their boroughs and villages, amounting to 400 ; and what corn they could not carry off ; that, having thus banished all thoughts of returning to their own country, they might proceed in their enterprise with the more determined courage. Before their departure, they strengthened themselves by allies and companions (who, after their example, and at their persuasion, burnt and destroyed their respective dwellings), the Rauraci, Tulingi, Latobrigi, and a swarm of Boii from Norica.^o

There were only two ways by which they could march out of their own country : one through the territories of the Sequani, between Mount Jura and the Rhone,

^o The first were the people of Basil, who then made part of the Helvetic body. The second and third were neighbours of the Helvetii. This is all we know of them with certainty. The Boii were originally inhabitants of the Bourbonnois, colonies of whom had settled in Germany and in Italy. Norica was Bavaria, and part of Austria. Crev.

After the total defeat of this multitude, a roll, written in Greek characters, was found in their camp, and brought to Cæsar. It contained a list of all who had set out upon this expedition, not only of those who were able to bear arms, but of the children, women, and old men. By this list it appeared, that the number of the Helvetii was 263,000 ; of the Tulingi 36,000 ; of the Latobrigi 14,000 ; of the Rauraci 23,000 ; of the Boii 32,000 ; in all 368,000.

* Inhabitants of Savoye and Dauphiné.

narrow and difficult, insomuch that in some places a single file of waggons could hardly pass. The impending mountain was besides very high and steep, so that a handful of men would be sufficient to stop them. The other lay through the Roman province, far easier and readier, because the Rhone, which flows between the confines of the Helvetii and the Allobroges,* a people lately subjected to the Romans, but seemingly not yet well affected to their government, was in some places fordable: and Geneva, a frontier town of the Allobroges, had a bridge which belonged to the Helvetii, whose country bordered upon theirs. The Helvetii, therefore, doubted not of obtaining a passage, either by persuasion or by force, through the territories of the Allobroges. Their general rendezvous was to be on the banks of the Rhone; and the day they fixed for it was the 28th of March, in the consulship of Piso and Gabinius.

[YEAR OF ROME 695.]

Cæsar, having notice of these proceedings, and that it was the design of the Helvetii to attempt a passage through the Roman province, hastened his departure^p

^p We see by this account, which is from Cæsar himself, that the reason of his sudden and expeditious journey, from his quarters near Rome into Transalpine Gaul, was the intelligence he received of the motions and purposes of the Helvetii; who had fixed upon the 28th of March for their rendezvous on the banks of the Rhone, which they were to pass by the bridge at Geneva: and that he arrived at Geneva time enough to prevent their passage, by breaking down the bridge, receive an embassy from the Helvetii, and, by deferring his answer to the 13th of April, gain time sufficient to assemble forces out of the province, and draw up lines sixteen feet high, and nineteen miles in length, before the said 13th of April: we cannot, therefore, well suppose, that he left the neighbourhood of Rome much later than the middle of March.

Crevier,
tom. 12.
p. 202.

Nevertheless M. Crevier, who all along seems (like Dr. Middleton) to be strongly biassed by prepossession and prejudice against Cæsar, finds a different reason from what Cæsar himself gives, for his going suddenly and in haste to his province; and gives that journey a different date. He writes thus:—"Cæsar, having driven from the commonwealth the two men he most feared [Cicero and Cato], had no longer any reason to stay in the neighbourhood of the city, but had reason to remove from it: for the partisans of the aristocracy, beginning to recover from the consternation they had been thrown into by the consulship of Cæsar, and the violence exercised towards Cicero, thought of bestirring themselves to do something against the oppressor of the public liberty. Two of the prætors, L. Domitius and C. Memmius, would have the acts of Cæsar's consulship submitted to the examination of the senate, in order to their being annulled. His quæstor was prosecuted, and he himself attacked by the tribune Antistius; but he implored the aid of the other tribunes, that

from Rome; and, posting by great journeys into Farther Gaul, came to Geneva. He began with breaking down the bridge over the Rhone; and, as there was at that time but one Roman legion in Transalpine Gaul, he ordered great levies to be made throughout the whole

he might have the benefit of the law which sheltered from all prosecutions those who were absent in the service of the state: and he made haste to get away."

Cæsar is here represented as running away from the neighbourhood of Rome, like a criminal who feared to be arrested and brought to punishment;—not a word of the Helvetii:—and this running away, which (as was just now observed) could not well be later than about the middle of March, was, according to M. Crevier, Crevier, some time in April: for he tells us that Cicero went from Rome by night in the beginning of April, and that Cæsar did not leave the neighbourhood of Rome till he had driven Cicero from thence. tom. 12. p. 181, 182.

Now what authority has M. Crevier for contradicting Cæsar's account of the reason which induced him to go away on a sudden, and in haste, to his province, and of the time when he went? Suetonius is the only author cited, an historian remarkable for delighting in detraction, and for having no regard to the order of events, nor even to probability, in many things which he relates. But it happens in the present instance, that, though Suetonius says something not true, he does not say that for which he is cited. He does not say that Cæsar stayed in the neighbourhood of Rome till he had driven Cicero out of it;* that is, till the month of April; he does not * Plutarch, postpone to that time the motion made in the senate by the two prætors; but speaks in Cæs. of it as made in the beginning of January: nor does he represent Cæsar as having tells us, any apprehension of danger from that motion; but, on the contrary, as consenting to that such a have the senate take cognizance of the acts of his consulship [*cognitionem senatui report detulit*]. And, according to Suetonius, the prosecution, begun against Cæsar's there was. quæstor, and the attack, made by the tribune Antistius upon Cæsar himself, were not before his sudden departure from the neighbourhood of Rome, but after it.—

"Functus consulatu, C. Memmio Lucioque Domitio prætoribus de superioris anni actis referentibus, cognitionem senatui detulit; nec illo suscipiente, triduoque per irritas altercationes absumpto, in provinciam abiit: et statim quæstor ejus in præjudicium aliquot criminibus arreptus est. Mox et ipse a L. Antistio, tribuno plebis, postulatus, appellato demum collegio, obtinuit, cum reip. causa abesset, reus ne fieret. Ad securitatem ergo posteritatis, in magno negotio habuit, obligare semper annuos magistratus, et è petitoribus non alios adjuvare, aut ad honorem pati pervenire, quam qui sibi recepissent, propugnatos absentiam suam: cujus pacti non dubitavit a quibusdam jusjurandum atque etiam syngrapham exigere." [The last part of this tale appeared, I presume, too ridiculous to Dr. Middleton and M. Crevier, to be adopted by them, notwithstanding their great dislike to Cæsar.] Sueton. J. Cæs. 23.

Doctor Middleton conforms his relation to Suetonius, as to the time when the motion was made in the senate by the two prætors: but does not conform it either to Suetonius, or to Cæsar, as to the time when Cæsar went to his province: for the doctor places this journey after Cicero's departure into banishment, that is, in the month of April: whereas Suetonius places it in January, and Cæsar himself, manifestly, not later than about the middle of March.

The doctor's words are these: "Cæsar continued at Rome till he saw Cicero driven out of it [*i. e.* according to the doctor, till about the end of March]: but had no sooner laid down his consulship [on the last day of December preceding], than he began to be attacked and affronted himself by two of the new prætors, L. Domitius and C. Memmius, who called in question the validity of his acts, and made several efforts in the senate to get them annulled by public authority. But the senate had no stomach to meddle with an affair so delicate; so that the whole ended in some fruitless debates and altercations [which had lasted only three days]: and Cæsar, to prevent all attempts of that kind in his absence, took care always, by force of bribes, to secure the leading magistrates in his interests; and so went off to his province of Gaul."—I do not see how these last words, "and so went off," &c. can be reconciled with Cæsar's continuing at Rome till he saw Cicero driven out of it. The doctor seems not consistent with himself. Middl. p. 337. See Middl. p. 350. Sueton. J. Cæs. 23.

province. The Helvetii, being informed of his arrival, deputed several noblemen of the first rank to wait upon him in the name of the state, and represent, "That they meant not to offer the least injury to the Roman province; that necessity alone had determined them to the design of passing through it, because they had no other way by which to direct their march; that they therefore entreated they might have his permission for that purpose." But Cæsar did not think proper to grant their request: however, that he might gain time, till the troops he had ordered to be raised could assemble, he told the ambassadors he would consider of their demand; and that, if they returned by the 13th of April, they should have his final answer. Meanwhile, with the legions he then had, and the soldiers that came in to him from all parts of the province, he raised a rampart sixteen feet high, and nineteen miles in length, with a ditch from the lake Lemanus, into which the Rhone discharges itself, to Mount Jura, which divides the territories of the Sequani from those of the Helvetii. This work finished, he strengthened it with redoubts from space to space, and manned them with troops. When the ambassadors, on the appointed day, returned for an answer, he told them, that he could not, consistently with the usages of the people of Rome on the like occasions, grant any foreign troops a passage through the province: and he let them see, that, should they attempt it by force, he was prepared to oppose them.

The Helvetii, driven from this hope, endeavoured, some by the means of boats fastened together, and of floats which they had prepared in great abundance, others by the fords of the Rhone, where was the least depth of water, to force a passage over the river; sometimes by day, oftener in the night: but, being constantly repulsed by the strength of the works thrown up, and by flights of darts, they at last abandoned the attempt. One way still remained, which was through

the territories of the Sequani, but so narrow, that, without the consent of the natives, they could not pass. Not able to prevail by their own persuasions, they sent ambassadors to Dumnorix the Æduan, that, through his intercession, they might obtain this favour of the Sequani. Dumnorix, by his popularity and generosity, had great influence with the Sequani, and was also well affected to the Helvetii, because he had married an Helvetian, the daughter of Orgetorix. Besides, he was framing to himself schemes of ambition, and wanted to have as many states as possible bound to him by offices of kindness. He readily therefore undertook the negotiation, and he obtained for the Helvetii the liberty of passing through the territories of the Sequani, the two nations mutually giving hostages to secure their not molesting or injuring each other during the march.

Cæsar had intelligence of their design ; which was to pass through the countries of the Sequani and Ædui into the territories of the Santones,* which border upon those of the Tolosati,† a state that made part of the Roman province. He foresaw many inconveniences likely to arise to the Romans, should they have for their neighbours, in an open and plentiful country, a people ill-affected to them, and of a martial disposition. Leaving, therefore, the care of the new works he had raised to T. Labienus, his lieutenant, he himself hastened by great journeys into Italy. There he raised two legions, and drew three more, that were cantoned round Aquileia, out of their quarters ; and with these five legions took the nearest way over the Alps into Farther Gaul. The mountaineers opposed his passage, but without effect : he descended into the country of the Vocontii,‡ traversed the territories of the Allobroges, crossed the Rhone, entered upon the lands of the Segusii,§ and all this with such expedition, that he overtook the Helvetii at the passage of the Arar.||

* Sain-
tonge.

† People of
Toulouse.

‡ Le Diois.

§ Le Lyon-
nois.

|| The Sa-
one.

They had marched their forces through the narrow

The people
of Zurich.

pass of Mount Jura, and the territories of the Sequani : and were at this time actually employed in passing the Arar. Cæsar, informed by his scouts, that three parts of their forces were got over the river, and that the fourth, which was the canton of the Tigurini, still remained on this side, left his camp about midnight, with three legions, and came up with the troops of the enemy that had not yet passed. As he found them unprepared for fighting, and encumbered with their baggage, he attacked them immediately, and put a great number of them to the sword : the rest fled, and sheltered themselves in the nearest woods.

Vid. vol. 4.
p. 103.

The forces of this very canton, about fifty years before, had vanquished and killed the consul L. Cassius, and obliged his army to pass under the yoke. “ Thus (says Cæsar), whether by chance or the direction of the immortal gods, that part of the Helvetic state, which brought so signal a calamity upon the Roman people, was the first to feel the weight of their resentment.” In this case, Cæsar revenged not only the public, but likewise his own domestic injuries ; because in the same battle where Cassius fell, was slain also his lieutenant, L. Piso, the grandfather of L. Piso, Cæsar’s father-in-law.

After this victory, Cæsar, throwing a bridge over the river, led his army, without delay, in pursuit of the enemy. The Helvetii, dismayed at his sudden approach, as he had spent only one day in crossing the river, which they had not, without the utmost difficulty, accomplished in twenty, sent an embassy to him, at the head of which was Divico, who had been general of the Helvetii in the war against Cassius. He addressed Cæsar in words to this effect :

“ If you are disposed to conclude a peace, we are willing to go and settle in what country you shall think fit to assign us. But, if you persist in the resolution of making war, you will do well to call to mind the disgrace

which befel the Romans heretofore, and the experienced bravery of the Helvetic nation."

Cæsar answered: "I have the less doubt concerning what will be the issue of a war, as I do bear in mind that disaster to which you refer, and which I well know to have happened to the Romans undeservedly. Had they been conscious of any injury by them committed, had they done any thing which could give them cause to fear, they would have kept themselves upon their guard; a conduct which admitted of no difficulty.—But, were I inclined to forget old injuries, can you expect I should forget likewise your late insult in attempting, against my will, to force a passage through the Roman province, and your ravaging^q the territories of the Ædui, Ambarri, and Allobroges? Your boasting so insolently of the victory over Cassius, is an additional provocation of my resentment. However, if you will make satisfaction to the Ædui and their allies, for the devastations committed in their countries, as also to the Allobroges, and will give hostages for the performance of your promises, I am ready to conclude a peace with you." Divico replied: "The Helvetii are accustomed to receive hostages, not to give them; and no people are better apprized of this than the Romans." He said, and retired.

The next day the Helvetii decamped: Cæsar did the same; and, to observe their motions, sent forward all his horse, which, to the number of 4,000, he had drawn together from the province, and the countries of the Ædui and their allies. The cavalry pressing too close upon the rear of the enemy, the latter seized a moment, when they had the advantage of the ground, turned suddenly upon their pursuers, and put them to the rout, with some slaughter of the most advanced. Elated by this success, as having, with no more than 500 horse, repulsed so great a multitude, they began to assume a

^q Of this injury the sufferers had sent complaints to Cæsar.

bolder appearance, and frequently to face the Romans. Cæsar kept back his men from fighting, thinking it sufficient for the present to straiten the enemy's forages. In this manner the armies marched for fifteen days together: between the Roman van and the rear of the Helvetii the distance did not exceed five or six miles.

In the mean time Cæsar daily pressed the Ædui for the corn which they had promised in the name of the public: for, by reason of the coldness of the climate, he was so far from finding the corn ripe in the fields, that there was not even sufficient forage for the horses. Neither could he receive those supplies which were coming to him by the Arar; because the Helvetii had turned off from that river, and he was determined not to quit the pursuit of them. The Ædui, to conceal from him the motive of their conduct, sometimes pretended that the corn was bought up, and ready to be sent; sometimes that it was actually on the way: but, when he saw no end of these delays, and that the day approached for delivering corn to the troops, he called together the Æduan chiefs, of whom he had a great number in his army, and among the rest Divitiacus, and their supreme magistrate^r Liscus. Cæsar reproached them severely for not having taken care to supply him in so pressing a conjuncture, and while the enemy was so near: adding, that, as he had engaged in that war chiefly at their request, he had the greater reason to complain of their neglect.

Hereupon Liscus thought proper to declare what he had hitherto concealed, "That there were some among them, who, though but private men, had yet more authority with the people than the magistrates themselves: that those men had, by artful and seditious speeches, alarmed the multitude, and persuaded them to keep back their corn; insinuating, that, if their own

^r This supreme magistrate, styled *vergobret* in the language of the country, was created annually, and had a power of life and death.

state could not obtain the sovereignty of Gaul, it would be better for them to obey the Helvetii, Gauls like themselves, than the Romans; there not being the least reason to question but the Romans, after having subdued the Helvetii, would deprive the Ædui too, with all the rest of the Gauls, of their liberty: that the very same men gave intelligence to the enemy of whatever the Romans designed or transacted in their camp; his authority not being sufficient to restrain them: that he was not ignorant of the danger to which he exposed himself by the discovery he now made, compelled to it by necessity; his silence being no longer consistent with the safety of the state."

Cæsar perceived that Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, was pointed at by this speech: but not thinking it advisable that these matters should be debated in the presence of so many witnesses, he speedily dismissed the council, retaining only Liscus; whom he then questioned on what he had just said; and was answered with great courage and freedom. He put the same questions to others; who all confirmed the truth of what Liscus had told him, that Dumnorix was a man of an enterprising spirit, fond of revolutions, and in great favour with the people because of his liberality: that he had for many years farmed the customs, and other public revenues of the Ædui, at a very low price; no one daring to bid against him: that by this means he had considerably increased his estate, and was enabled to extend his bounty to all about him: that he constantly kept a great number of horsemen in pay, who attended him wherever he went: that his influence was not confined merely to his own country, but extended likewise to the neighbouring states: that the better to support his interest, he had married his mother to a man of principal rank and authority among the Bituriges,* matched his sister, and the rest of his kindred, into other the most powerful states; and had himself taken a wife from among the

* People of
Bourges.

Helvetii: that he favoured and wished well to the Helvetii on the score of that alliance, and personally hated Cæsar, and hated the Romans, because by their arrival his power had been diminished, and his brother Divitiacus restored to his former credit and authority: that, should the Romans be overthrown, he was in great hopes of obtaining the sovereignty by means of the Helvetii. On the contrary, should they prevail, he must not only give up these hopes, but even all expectation of retaining the influence he had already acquired.

Cæsar learned also, that, in the late engagement, Dumnorix, who commanded the Æduan cavalry, was the first who fled, and by his flight struck a terror into the rest of the troops; that it was he who had procured for the Helvetii a passage through the territories of the Sequani; and had effected an exchange of hostages between the two nations: and that he had done these things not only without permission from his own state, but even without their knowledge. All this, together with his being accused by the chief magistrate of the Ædui, seemed to Cæsar a sufficient ground for taking cognizance of the matter himself, or ordering the state to proceed against him. One thing, however, restrained him awhile from coming to any resolution, his regard for Divitiacus, the delinquent's brother, a man of singular probity, a faithful ally of the Roman people, and a friend of Cæsar's. That he might not wound a man for whom he had so great a value, Cæsar sent for him, and, having removed the usual interpreters, spoke to him by C. Valerius Procillus, a prince of the Roman province, his intimate friend. He reminded Divitiacus of what, in his own presence, had been said of his brother Dumnorix in the council of the Gauls, adding the later informations which he had received against him in private; and Cæsar earnestly requested of Divitiacus to consent, that either he himself or the state might take the matter into consideration. Divitiacus, embracing

Cæsar, begged of him, with many tears, not to come to any severe resolution against his brother. “What you have heard is all true, and I myself have more reason than any man to be dissatisfied with him. At a time when my authority was great, both at home and in the other provinces of Gaul, and my brother, because of his youth, but little considered, I employed my interest to bring him into credit: and though Dumnorix has made use of the power he acquired by my means to diminish my favour with the people, yet I still find myself swayed by my affection for him, and by my regard for the public esteem: for, should my brother meet with any rigorous treatment from you, while I myself possess so large a share of your favour, all men will believe it done with my consent, and the minds of the Gauls be for ever alienated from me.”

Cæsar, observing his concern, took him by the hand, bid him say no more, comforted him, and assured him that, for his sake, he would overlook not only the injuries done to himself, but to the republic. He then sent for Dumnorix, and, in his brother's presence, declared the subjects of complaint he had against him, and admonished him to avoid for the future giving any ground for suspicion; adding, that he would pardon what was past for the sake of his brother: Cæsar appointed, however, some persons to have an eye over his behaviour, and to observe what company he frequented.

The same day having learned by his scouts, that the enemy had posted themselves under a hill, eight miles from his camp, he sent out a party to view the ground, and examine the ascent of the hill. These reporting it to be extremely easy, he detached, about midnight, his lieutenant Labienus (to whom he imparted the design he had formed), with two legions, and with the same men for guides, who, the day before, had examined the ground, to take possession of the summit of the hill. At three o'clock in the morning, having first sent for-

ward his cavalry, he himself followed with the foot. He had directed Considius, an officer of reputation, who had served in the army of Sylla, and afterward in that of Marcus Crassus, to go with the scouts to reconnoitre.

At day-break, when Labienus had executed his commission, and Cæsar was within a mile and a half of the enemy's camp, they knowing nothing yet either of his or Labienus's approach, Considius came galloping back, and assured Cæsar, that the summit of the hill was possessed by the enemy, and that he had seen the Gallic ensigns there.

Cæsar retired to a rising ground, and drew up his men in order of battle. Labienus, whose instructions were not to engage the enemy till he saw the rest of the army approaching, that the attack might be made on all sides at the same time, having gained the top of the hill, waited the arrival of the Roman main body, without stirring from his post. The day was far spent before Cæsar learned from his scouts that Considius, blinded by his fear, had made a false report, and that the enemy had decamped. The rest of that day Cæsar followed the enemy, and pitched his camp within three miles of them.

* Autun.

The next day, as the time drew near for delivering out corn to the army, and as he was not above eighteen miles from Bibracte,* the capital of the Ædui, where he hoped to find sufficient supplies for the subsistence of his troops, he quitted the pursuit of the Helvetii, and directed his march thither. The enemy, informed of this motion by some deserters, and either ascribing it to fear, because Labienus, though possessed of the higher ground, had not attacked them the day before; or flattering themselves with the hopes of intercepting Cæsar's provisions, all on a sudden changed their resolution, and, instead of continuing their march, began to pursue and harass the rear-guard of the Romans. Cæsar retired to a hill, and sent his cavalry to sustain the

charge, while he drew up his forces in battalia. His four veteran legions he ranged in three lines towards the middle of the ascent ; and above them he posted his two legions newly raised in Cisalpine Gaul, and all the auxiliaries ; in such wise, that the whole hill was covered with his troops : the baggage was committed to the care of those on the upper ground. The Helvetii repulsed the Roman cavalry, formed themselves into a phalanx, and advanced in close order to attack the Roman van.

Cæsar, having sent away first his own horse, and then the horses of all his officers, that, by making the danger equal, no hope might remain but in victory, encouraged his men, and began the charge. The Romans, who fought from the higher ground, pouring their darts upon the enemy, easily broke their phalanx, and then fell upon them sword in hand. The battle was bloody, and continued for a long time doubtful ; but the enemy being at length obliged to give way, one part withdrew towards a hill, and the rest sheltered themselves behind their carriages, which they had drawn together into one place before they began the battle. During this whole action, though it lasted from one o'clock in the afternoon till evening, no man saw the back of an enemy. The fight was renewed with great obstinacy at the carriages, and continued till the night was far spent. After a long dispute, the Romans got possession of the baggage and camp of the enemy. A son and daughter of Orgetorix were found among the prisoners. Only 120, 000 of the Helvetii survived this defeat ; who, retreating all that night, and continuing their march without intermission, arrived on the fourth day in the territories of the Lingones.* The Romans, detained by the care of looking after their wounded, and of burying their dead, continued upon the spot three days : but Cæsar sent messengers and letters to signify to the Lingones, that, if they would avoid drawing upon themselves the same calamities which the Helvetian fugitives

* The people of Langres.

were under, they must not furnish them with corn or other necessaries: and, after three days' repose, he set forward to pursue the enemy.

The Helvetii, compelled by an extreme want of all things, sent ambassadors to him to treat about a surrendry. These meeting him on the way, and throwing themselves at his feet, in suppliant terms, and with many tears, begged for peace. Cæsar gave them no express answer at that time; he only ordered that the Helvetii should wait for him in the place where they then were; which they accordingly did. Upon his arrival, he demanded hostages, their arms, and the slaves who had deserted to their camp. Upon their complying with these terms, they were admitted to a surrendry. The Helvetii, Tulingi, and Latobrigi, he ordered to return to their own countries, and rebuild the towns and villages they had burnt: and because, having lost all the corn, they were utterly destitute of subsistence, he gave it in charge to the Allobroges to supply them. Cæsar's design, in sending the Helvetii home, was, that their lands might not be left unoccupied, and the Germans, dwelling on the other side the Rhine, be thereby tempted to pass over and take possession of them; by which they would become neighbours to the Allobroges, and the Roman province in Gaul. The Boii, at the request of the Ædui themselves, who esteemed them highly on account of their courage, were permitted to settle in the Æduan territories, where lands were assigned them, and they were, by degrees, admitted to all the rights and privileges of natives.

The war with the Helvetii being ended, ambassadors from all parts of Gaul, men of principal consideration in their several states, waited upon Cæsar, to congratulate his success, which, they said, had been highly advantageous to Gaul in general, the Helvetii having left their own country with a view to make all the other states tributary to them; and these ambassadors request-

ed, on the part of their constituents, "that they might have his permission to hold, on a day prefixed, a general assembly of all the provinces of Gaul; there being some things, which they wanted to propose to him, which concerned the whole nation in common." Their request was granted; they fixed a day for the assembly, and they bound themselves by an oath, not to disclose what should be transacted there, but to such persons as should be named for that purpose by general consent.

Upon the rising of the council, the same chiefs of the state, who had come before to Cæsar, came again to him, and begged to be admitted to confer with him in private, concerning matters that regarded their own and the common safety. Cæsar complying, they all threw themselves at his feet, and with tears represented to him, that it was of no less importance to them to have their present deliberations kept secret, than to succeed in the petition they were going to make; because, should any discovery happen, they were in danger of being exposed to the extremest cruelties. Divitiacus, the Æduan, in the name of the rest, spoke thus:

"Two factions divide all Gaul: at the head of one are the Ædui: of the other the Arverni. After a contention of many years between these for the superiority, the Arverni, in concert with the Sequani, came at last to a resolution of calling in the Germans: of these, 15,000 only came over the Rhine at first; but finding Gaul an agreeable and plentiful country, others soon followed, insomuch that at present there are no less than 120,000 of them here. The Ædui and their dependants have frequently tried their strength against them in battle, but, by successive defeats, have lost all their nobles, senate, and cavalry. Broken by these calamities, they, who formerly held the chief sway in Gaul, both by their own bravery and the favour and friendship of the Roman people, are now reduced to the necessity of sending some of the principal men of their

state to the Sequani, to remain with them as hostages; and of obliging themselves by an oath, neither to demand their hostages back, nor to implore the assistance of the Roman people, nor to refuse a perpetual submission to the dominion and authority of the Sequani. I alone of all the *Ædui* refused to take the oath or give my children for hostages; and on that account I fled my country, and went to Rome to implore the assistance of the senate, as being the only man in the state who had not laid himself under the restraints of hostages and an oath. After all, it has fared worse with the victorious Sequani than with the vanquished *Ædui*; because *Ariovistus* has seated himself in their territory, seized a third part of their lands, the most fertile in Gaul, and has lately ordered them to yield up another third to the *Harudes*, who, to the number of 24,000, came over the Rhine a few months ago, wanting habitations and a settlement. In a few years all the native Gauls will be driven from their territories, and the Germans be transplanted hither from the other side of the Rhine; our climate far excelling that of their country, and our different ways of living not admitting a comparison.—*Ariovistus* is a man of a savage, passionate, and tyrannical disposition, whose government is no longer to be borne; and unless we find some resource in you and the people of Rome, the Gauls must, like the *Helvetians*, abandon their country, and seek some other settlement remote from the Germans, wherever fortune shall point it out. Were these complaints and representations to come to the knowledge of *Ariovistus*, I doubt not but he would exercise the greatest cruelties upon all the hostages in his hands: but it will be easy for you, by your own authority, the dread of the army you command, the fame of your late victory, and the terror of the Roman name, to hinder any more Germans from coming over the Rhine, and to defend Gaul from the insults of *Ariovistus*.”

When Divitiacus had made an end of speaking, all who were present began, with many tears, to implore Cæsar's aid. He observed, that the Sequani alone did nothing of all this; but pensive, and with downcast looks, kept their eyes fixed on the ground. Wondering what might be the cause, he questioned them upon it. Still they made him no answer, but continued silent, as before, with the same air of dejection. When he had interrogated them several times, without being able to obtain one word in return, Divitiacus, the Æduan, resumed the discourse, and observed, "that the condition of the Sequani was by much more deplorable and wretched than that of the rest of the Gauls; as they alone durst not, even in secret, complain of their wrongs, or apply any where for redress, and no less dreaded the cruelty of Ariovistus when absent, than if actually present before their eyes: that the other states had it still in their power to escape by flight; but the Sequani, who had received him into their territories, and put him in possession of all their towns, were exposed to suffer every kind of torment."

Cæsar encouraged the Gauls, and promised to have regard to their complaints; he told them he was in great hopes that, out of regard to him and to the authority of the Roman people, Ariovistus would put an end to his oppressions. Having returned this answer, he dismissed the assembly.

Many urgent reasons occurred upon this occasion to Cæsar, why he should consider seriously of the grievances which the Gauls had complained of, and undertake their redress. He saw the Ædui, friends and allies of the people of Rome, held in subjection and servitude by the Germans, and compelled to give hostages to Ariovistus and the Sequani; which, in the present flourishing state of the Roman affairs, seemed highly dishonourable both to himself and the commonwealth. He saw it likewise of dangerous consequence to suffer the Germans to ac-

custom themselves to come over the Rhine in great multitudes, and settle in Gaul : for this fierce and savage people, having once possessed themselves of the whole country, were but too likely, after the example of the Cimbri and Teutoni, to break into the Roman province, and thence advance even into Italy.

These considerations induced Cæsar to send ambassadors to Ariovistus with the proposal of an interview, and to desire that he would appoint a place for it, in order to their conferring upon certain public affairs of the highest importance to them both. Ariovistus answered, “ That, if he had wanted any thing of Cæsar, he would have gone to him in person ; and that Cæsar, if he had any business with him, must come to him : that he could neither venture, without an army, into those provinces of Gaul where Cæsar commanded, nor bring an army into the field without great trouble and expense. That he wondered extremely what business either Cæsar or the people of Rome could have in that part of Gaul which he had conquered.”

On the report of this answer, Cæsar sent another embassy, with commission to speak thus to the king : “ Since you have so little sense of the great obligations you lie under to the Roman people, and to Cæsar, in whose consulship you were styled king and friend by the senate, as to refuse a conference with him, and decline treating of affairs that regard the common interest, he sends you the particulars of what he requires of you : first, not to bring any more Germans over the Rhine into Gaul. In the next place, to restore the hostages you have received from the Ædui, and permit the Sequani likewise to restore the hostages given to them. Lastly, to forbear all injuries towards the Ædui, and neither make war upon them nor upon their allies. If you comply with these conditions, it will establish a perpetual amity between you and the Roman people ; but, if you do not comply, Cæsar will think himself bound

to have regard to the just complaints of the *Ædui*, and the other allies of Rome in this country; the senate having decreed in the consulship of M. Messala and M. Piso, [Y. R. 692.] that whoever should have in charge the province of Gaul, should, so far as was consistent with the interest of the republic, protect and defend them."

To this Ariovistus sent the following reply: "That, by the laws of war, the conqueror had a right to impose what terms he pleased upon the conquered: that the people of Rome did not govern the vanquished by the prescriptions of other nations, but according to their own pleasure: that he did not intermeddle with their conquests, nor interrupt them in the free enjoyment of their rights; nor ought they to concern themselves with what regarded him: that the *Ædui*, having tried the fortune of war, had been overcome and rendered tributary to him, and that Cæsar would be highly unjust if he attempted to deprive him of his revenues, or to diminish them. That he was resolved not to part with the hostages which the *Ædui* had put into his hands; but would, nevertheless, engage, not to make war either upon them, or upon their allies, provided they observed the treaty he had made with them, and readily paid the tribute agreed upon: if otherwise, they would find the title of friends and allies of the people of Rome of little advantage to them: that as to Cæsar's menace of not neglecting the complaints of the *Ædui*, he would have him to know, that none had ever entered into a war with Ariovistus but to their own destruction."

At the same time that Cæsar received this reply, ambassadors arrived from the *Ædui* and *Treviri*: from the *Ædui*, to complain that the *Harudes*, who had lately come [from Germany] into Gaul, were plundering their territories, so that even by their submissions and hostages they could not obtain peace of Ariovistus; from the *Treviri*, to inform him that 100 cantons of the *Suevi*, headed by two brothers, were arrived upon

the banks of the Rhine, with design to come over that river. Cæsar, deeply affected with this intelligence, determined to begin the war without delay : and fearing lest this new band of Suevi should strengthen the forces of Ariovistus, he advanced expeditiously towards the king, and the third day was informed, that he approached with all his forces to seize Vesontio,* the capital of the Sequani. Cæsar judged it by all means necessary to prevent him in this design, as the town was well fortified by nature, and stored with all sorts of ammunition. Marching, therefore, day and night, without intermission, he possessed himself of the place, and put a garrison into it.

While he continued here a few days, to settle the affair of his convoys and supplies, a sudden terror seized his whole army. It was occasioned by the curiosity of his men, and the reports of the Gauls, who talked much of the prodigious stature of the Germans, their invincible courage, and wonderful skill in arms. The terror first began among certain young officers of the Roman army, who had voluntarily and gaily followed Cæsar into Gaul, and were but little acquainted with military affairs. Some of these, under various pretences, desired leave to return home ; and others, though, out of shame they seemed willing to continue in the camp, were not able to put on a cheerful countenance, or to refrain from lamenting, with their companions, the dangers to which they fancied themselves exposed. Wills were made all over the camp, and the consternation began to seize even the veteran soldiers, the centurions, and the officers of the cavalry : only, to avoid the reproach of cowardice, they said, “it was not the enemy they feared, but the narrow passes and forests that lay between them and Ariovistus, and the difficulty they should find in getting provisions.” Some even intimated to Cæsar, that when he gave orders for marching, he would not be obeyed.

Cæsar hereupon called a council of war, and, having summoned thither all the centurions of the army, spoke to them to the following effect: “Ariovistus, during my consulship, earnestly sought the alliance of the Roman people; why then should any one imagine he will so rashly and hastily depart from his engagements? On the contrary, so soon as he comes to know my demands, and the reasonable conditions I am about to propose to him, he will, I am firmly persuaded, be very far from rejecting either my friendship or that of the Roman people. But if, urged on by madness and rage, he should resolve upon war, what, after all, have you to be afraid of? Why should you distrust either your own courage or my conduct? You are to deal with enemies of whom, in the memory of our fathers, trial has been already made. By our victory over the Teutoni and Cimbri, the army itself acquired no less glory than Caius Marius, the general who commanded it. They are the very same Germans with whom the Helvetii, though not a match for our army, have so often fought, and whom they have so often vanquished. The defeat which the Gauls suffered was rather by the conduct and craft of the Germans, than by their superior bravery. But though the king, by a stratagem, might baffle a rude and undisciplined soldiery, he cannot hope to prevail by such means against a Roman army. As to those who shelter their cowardice under the pretence of narrow passes, and the difficulty of procuring provisions, it argues, I think, no small presumption to betray such a distrust of their general’s conduct, or to prescribe to him what he ought to do. These things fall properly under my care: the Sequani, Luci,* and Lingones, are to furnish me with provisions: the corn is now ripe in the fields: as to the ways, you yourselves will soon be judges of them.

* People of
Lorraine
about Toul.

“I am not in the least disturbed by what is whispered about, that the army will not obey me; for no ge-

neral was ever so slighted by his soldiers, when neither ill success, nor rapacious covetousness, nor other crimes, had drawn that misfortune upon him : in all these respects I imagine myself secure, as the whole course of my life bears witness to my integrity ; and my good fortune has shewn itself in the war against the Helvetii. I am therefore resolved to execute, without delay, what I had intended to put off a little longer. I shall give orders for decamping this very night, three hours before day, that I may know as soon as possible, whether honour and a sense of duty, or an ignominious cowardice, have the ascendant in my army : nay, should all the rest of the troops abandon me, I will nevertheless march with the tenth legion alone, of whose fidelity and courage I have not the least doubt, and who shall serve me for my prætorian guard.” [Cæsar had always favoured and chiefly confided in this legion, remarkable for its intrepid bravery.]

This discourse made a wonderful change in the minds of all, and produced an uncommon alacrity, and eagerness for the war. The tenth legion, in particular, returned him thanks, by their tribunes, for the favourable opinion he had expressed of them ; and assured him of their readiness to follow him. Nor were the other legions less industrious, by their tribunes and principal centurions, to reconcile themselves to their general, protesting that they had never entertained either doubt or fear, nor had ever imagined that it belonged to them, but to him alone, to direct in matters of war. Cæsar, having accepted of their submission, and being informed by Divitiacus (in whom of all the Gauls he most confided) that, by taking a circuit of about forty miles, he might avoid the narrow passes, and lead his army through an open country, he set forward three hours after midnight, as he had said ; and, after a march of seven days, understood by his scouts, that he was within 24,000 paces of Ariovistus's camp.

The king, informed of Cæsar's arrival, sent ambassadors to acquaint him, that, as they were come nearer to each other, he was willing to have an interview with him, which he believed might now be without danger. Cæsar did not decline the proposal, imagining that the German, now offering of his own accord what he had before refused when requested, might perhaps be disposed to hearken to reason. The fifth day after was appointed for the interview; and, in the interval, frequent deputations passed and repassed from one side to the other, to regulate the circumstances and conditions of it. Ariovistus, under pretence that he feared an ambush, demanded that Cæsar should bring no infantry with him: both he and the king were to be attended by their cavalry only. To this Cæsar consented; yet, not caring to trust his safety to the Gauls, he dismounted all the Gallic cavalry, and gave their horses to the men of the tenth legion, that, in case of danger, he might have a guard on which he could rely.

In the midst of a large plain, there was a rising ground equally distant from both camps: at this place, by appointment, the conference was to be held. Cæsar stationed the legionary soldiers, whom he had converted into troopers, 200 paces from the mount. Ariovistus did the same with the German cavalry. The two commanders advanced to meet one another, each accompanied by ten friends, or principal officers; for so Ariovistus had desired it might be. The conference was on horseback. Cæsar began by reminding the king of his obligations to the republic. "You have been styled friend and ally by the senate, and very considerable presents have been sent you: these honours, conferred by the Romans on very few, and only for signal services to the state, have been bestowed on you, not on account of any just claim you had to them, but merely by my favour and the bounty of the senate." He mentioned likewise the ancient alliance which had sub-

sisted between the Romans and Ædui, in whose favour the senate had made many honourable decrees. He added : “ The Ædui always held the first rank and authority in Gaul, even before their alliance with Rome ; and it is the invariable maxim of the Roman people, not only to defend their friends and allies in the possession of their just rights, but likewise to study the increase of their honour, interest, and dignity : therefore, it can never be supposed that they will submit to see their friends stripped of those privileges, which had belonged to them before the commencement of that friendship.” And he concluded with repeating the same demands which he had before made by his ambassadors ; That the king should not make war upon the Ædui or their allies ; that he should restore to them their hostages ; and that, if he could not oblige the Germans to repass the Rhine, at least he should suffer no more of them to come into Gaul.

Ariovistus answered : “ I crossed the Rhine, not of my own motion, but by invitation and entreaty from the Gauls. The great hopes and expectations they gave me were my only inducement to quit my country : the settlements I have in Gaul were assigned to me by the Gauls themselves ; the hostages were voluntarily sent ; and the tribute I receive is in consequence of the rights of war : I did not make war upon the Gauls, they made war upon me : their several states brought their united forces against me ; but I found means to vanquish and disperse them : one battle sufficed : if they are again resolved to try the fortune of war, I am prepared to receive them ; but, if they choose peace, it will be unjust in them to refuse a tribute which they have hitherto voluntarily paid. The friendship of the Roman people ought not to be a detriment to me, but an honour and a security ; I courted it in no other view : but if, on account of my alliance with them, I must submit to lose my tributes, and my rights over the people I have sub-

dued, I am no less willing to give up that alliance than I was ambitious to obtain it. I have indeed brought over a multitude of Germans into Gaul, yet not with any design of disturbing the country, as appears by my not coming but at the request of the natives. My arrival in Gaul was prior to that of the Romans, whose armies have never till now passed the boundaries of their own provinces. What can they mean by coming into a country that belongs to me? why do they concern themselves with a part of Gaul that is no less my property than the province itself is theirs? As to the pretence of alliance between the Romans and Ædui, I am not so much a barbarian, or so wholly a stranger to the affairs of the world, as not to know that the Ædui neither assisted the Romans in their late war against the Allobroges, nor received any assistance from them in their many conflicts with me and the Sequani. I have reason to be jealous of your pretended regard for the Ædui, and have but too much reason to suspect, that the continuance of the Roman army in Gaul can be with no other design than that of oppressing me. If you do not therefore withdraw your troops out of these parts, I shall no longer look upon you as a friend, but as an enemy. And I am well assured, that, should I happen to kill you in battle, I should do a pleasure to many of the nobles and great men at Rome, who have explained themselves to me by couriers, and whose favour and friendship I might procure by your death: but if you will retire, and leave me in the undisturbed possession of Gaul, I will not only amply reward you, but will engage, at my own cost and hazard, to put a happy conclusion to any war you shall think fit to undertake."

In answer to this discourse, Cæsar offered many reasons why he could not depart from his first demands: "That neither his own honour, nor that of the Roman people, would suffer him to abandon allies, who had deserved so well of the republic. That it no way appeared

* La Rou-
ergue.

to him that Ariovistus had a juster claim to Gaul than the Romans : that the Arverni and Ruteni* had been subdued by Q. Fabius Maximus, who yet, contented with their submission, had neither reduced their country into a province, nor subjected it to a tribute : that, if antiquity of title was to decide the question, the Romans had an undoubted right to the sovereignty of Gaul : or, if the decree of the senate was to take place, Gaul must remain free, and subject only to its own laws."

Whilst these things passed at the interview, Cæsar was informed that Ariovistus's cavalry were drawing nearer the eminence, and had even cast some darts at his horsemen. Hereupon he immediately broke off the conference, retreated to his own men, and strictly charged them to forbear all acts of hostility. He did not fear the success of an engagement between his chosen legion and the German cavalry ; but he was desirous to maintain a conduct perfectly clear, and not to give the enemy the least ground to assert, that they had been treacherously drawn into an ambush by a pretended conference. When it was known in the camp that Ariovistus, at the interview, had haughtily ordered the Romans to depart out of Gaul ; that his cavalry had insulted Cæsar's guard ; and that this had put an end to the conference ; it spread throughout the whole army an ardent desire of coming to a battle.

Two days after, Ariovistus sent ambassadors to Cæsar, to propose a renewal of the negotiation ; and that he would either appoint a day for their meeting again, or depute some one to bring the treaty to a conclusion. Cæsar saw no reason for granting a second interview, especially when he considered that the Germans, as experience had taught him, could not be restrained from falling upon his men. Neither was he inclined to send any of his principal officers ; it seemed too great a venture to expose them to the perfidy of these barbarians.

He therefore cast his eyes upon C. Valerius Procillus,^s a young man of eminent virtue and gentle manners, and whose knowledge of the Gallic language, which Ariovistus, by long residence in the country, had learnt to speak readily, fitted him in a particular manner for this embassy: and as the Germans could have no motive to insult him, Cæsar thought him safe from that danger. With him was joined, in the same commission, M. Mettius, a person who had a connexion with Ariovistus by the ties of hospitality. Their instructions were to hear the king's proposals, and bring a report of them to Cæsar. But no sooner were they arrived in Ariovistus's camp, than, in the presence of the whole army, calling out to know their business, and whether they were come as spies, he commanded them to be put in irons, without suffering them to make any reply.

The same day he came forward with all his forces, and lodged himself under a hill, six miles from the Roman camp. The day after, he went two miles beyond it, to cut off their communication with the Ædui and Sequani, from whom they received all their provisions. Cæsar, for five days successively, drew up his men in order of battle before the camp, that, if Ariovistus had a mind, he might not be without an opportunity of coming to an engagement. The Germans kept all that time within their lines; only between the cavalry of the two armies there were daily skirmishes. The German manner of fighting was this: they had about 6,000 horse, who chose a like number out of the foot, each his man, and all remarkable for strength and agility. These continually accompanied them in battle, and served as a rear-guard, to which, when hard pressed, they might retire: if the action became dangerous, these advanced to their relief: if any horseman was wounded, and fell from his horse, these gathered round to defend him: if

^s He was the son of C. Valerius Caburus, who, being made free of the city by C. Valerius Flaccus, had, according to custom, taken the name of his patron.

speed was required, either for a hasty pursuit or sudden retreat, so nimble and active were they by continual exercise, that, laying hold of the manes of the horses, they could keep pace with them in running.

Cæsar, finding that Ariovistus declined a battle, turned his thoughts chiefly to provide for the freedom of his convoys. With this view he marked out a place for a camp, 600 paces beyond that of the enemy; and thither he marched with his whole army, drawn up in three lines. The first and second line had orders to continue under arms, while the third was to employ themselves in fortifying this new camp. Ariovistus detached 16,000 light-armed foot, and all his horse, to hinder the work, but without effect: the intrenchments were finished, and Cæsar, leaving two legions there, with part of the auxiliaries, led back the remaining four to his other camp. The next day, drawing out all his troops from both camps, he again offered the enemy battle, which Ariovistus still declined: Cæsar retired about noon. Ariovistus then detached part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. A sharp conflict ensued, which lasted till sunset; when Ariovistus sounded a retreat. Cæsar inquiring of the prisoners, why Ariovistus declined an engagement, learnt, that it was the custom among the Germans for the women to decide by lots and divination, when it would be proper to hazard a battle: and that these had declared, that the army could not be victorious if they fought before the new moon.

Cæsar hereupon resolved to force the enemy, without delay, to a battle: at the head of all his forces, in three lines, he advanced quite up to the head of their camp. The Germans now appeared before their intrenchment: they were distributed by nations, and disposed at equal distances one from another, and the whole army encompassed with a line of carriages, to take away all hope of safety by flight. The women, mounted upon these carriages, weeping and tearing their hair, conjured the

soldiers, as they moved forwards, not to suffer them to become slaves to the Romans. Cæsar began the battle in person at the head of his right wing, having observed the enemy to be weakest on that side. Their left wing was soon routed and put to flight, but their right had the advantage, and were like to overpower the Roman left wing by numbers. Young Crassus, who commanded the cavalry, observing this, made the third line advance to support them. The battle was renewed, and the enemy every where put to the rout: nor did they cease their flight till they had reached the banks of the Rhine, about fifty miles distant from the place of combat. There only a few escaped; some by swimming, others by boats. Of the latter was Ariovistus, who, embarking in a small vessel which he found by the edge of the river, got safe to the other side. All the rest were cut to pieces by the Roman cavalry. Ariovistus had two wives; one a Sueve, whom he had brought with him from Germany; the other a Norican, king Vocion's sister, whom he had married in Gaul. Both perished in this flight. Of his two daughters, one was killed, and the other taken prisoner. Procillus, whom, bound with a triple chain, his keepers had dragged after them in their flight, fell in with Cæsar in person as he was pursuing the German cavalry. Cæsar's joy for his victory was exceedingly heightened by his good fortune in recovering, out of the hands of the enemy, his intimate and familiar friend, universally esteemed for his probity. Procillus told him, that lots had been thrice drawn in his own presence, to decide whether he should be burnt alive upon the spot, or the execution be deferred to another time; and that the lot, three times favourable, had preserved his life. Mettius was likewise recovered and brought to Cæsar.

This battle being reported beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who were advanced as far as the banks of that river, thought it advisable to return to their own coun-

try; but retreating in disorder and confusion, were attacked by the Ubii, a people bordering upon the Rhine, who put many of them to the sword.

Cæsar, having thus, in one campaign, given a happy conclusion to two very considerable wars, went into winter-quarters somewhat sooner than the season of the year required. He distributed his army among the Sequani, and leaving Labienus to command in his absence, set out for Cisalpine Gaul, to preside in the assembly of the states.

J. C.
Comm. 1. 2.

* The people of the Netherlands.

In the winter, whilst Cæsar was in that country, he was alarmed by frequent reports, confirmed by letters from Labienus, that all the Belgæ* had joined in a league against the Roman republic, and ratified it by an exchange of hostages.

The causes of this confederacy were: first, their fear, lest the Romans, having subdued all the rest of Gaul, should afterward turn their arms against them: in the next place, the persuasions and importunity of some among the Celtæ; many of whom, as they had greatly disliked the neighbourhood of the Germans in Gaul, so were they no less displeased to see a Roman army take up its winter-quarters, and grow habitual, in the country: others from a levity and inconstancy of temper, fond of every project that tended to a revolution. Lastly, some were influenced by ambitious views; it being usual in Gaul for those who were the most powerful in their several states, and had men and money at command, to exercise over their fellow-subjects a kind of sovereignty, which they foresaw would be greatly checked by the authority and credit of the Romans in Gaul.

[YEAR OF ROME 696.†]

Cæsar, upon receiving these messages and reports, levied two new legions in Cisalpine Gaul, and early in the spring sent Q. Pedius, his lieutenant, to conduct

* Cn. Corn. Lentulus Spinther, and Q. Metellus Nepos, consuls.

them over the Alps; and he himself, as soon as there began to be forage in the fields, went to the army. He commissioned the Senones* and other Gauls, who bordered on Belgic Gaul, to inform themselves of the motions and designs of the confederates, and send him from time to time an exact account. They all agreed in reporting that the Belgæ were levying troops, and drawing their forces to a general rendezvous. Whereupon Cæsar, thinking he ought no longer to delay marching against them, decamped, and in fifteen days arrived on the confines of the Belgæ.

* The people of Sens.

As his approach was sudden, and much earlier than had been expected, the Rhemi,† who of all the Belgæ lay the nearest to Celtic Gaul, dispatched the two principal men of their state to represent to Cæsar, “That they put themselves and fortunes under the power and protection of the Romans, as having neither approved of the designs of the rest of the Belgæ, nor had any share in their confederacy against the people of Rome: that, on the contrary, they were ready to give hostages, execute his commands, receive him into their towns, and furnish him with corn and other provisions for his army: that, indeed, the rest of the Belgæ were all in arms, and that the Germans, on this side the Rhine, had associated with them: nay, that so universal was the infatuation, that the Rhemi had not been able to dissuade from entering into the confederacy the Suessones, a people united to them by the nearest ties of blood and friendship, both being subject to the same laws, living under the same form of government, and acknowledging one common magistrate.”

† The people of Rheims.

Cæsar learnt from the Rhemi, that the Belgæ were for the most part Germans originally, who, enticed by the fertility of the country, had crossed the Rhine, driven out the ancient inhabitants of that part of Gaul, and settled themselves there.—That, as to their numbers, the Bellovaci,‡ the most considerable of the several states,

‡ The people of Beauvais.

* The people of Soissons.

were able to muster 100,000 fighting men, and out of that number had promised to select 60,000 for the war: that next to them in dignity were the Suessones,* over whom, of late years, Divitiacus, the most powerful prince of Gaul, had been king; but that their present sovereign was Galba, whose singular prudence and justice had procured him, by the consent of all the confederates, the supreme command of the war: that these had within their territories twelve fortified towns, and had promised to bring into the field 50,000 men: that the like number had been stipulated by the Nervii,^t esteemed the most fierce and warlike of all the Belgic nations; and that the lesser states were to furnish troops proportionably.

Cæsar, exhorting the Rhemi to continue firm in their alliance, and promising amply to reward their fidelity, ordered the whole body of their senate to repair to his camp, and the sons of the principal nobility to be brought him as hostages; all which was accordingly performed by the day appointed. He then addressed himself to Divitiacus, the Æduan, representing, in the warmest manner, of what consequence it was to the common cause to divide the forces of the enemy, that the Romans might not be under the necessity of encountering so great a multitude at once. This division, he told him, might easily be effected, if the Ædui would march their forces into the country of the Bellovaci, and begin to plunder it and lay it waste. With these instructions he dismissed him.

Being soon after informed by his scouts and by the Rhemi, that the united forces of the Belgæ were march-

^t The Nervii possessed the country between the Scheld and the Sambre. Their chief cities are thought to have been Cambray, Valenciennes, and Tournay. The Atrebates (people of Artois) were to furnish 15,000: the Ambiani (people of Amiens) 10,000: the Morini (people of Terouane and Boulogne) 25,000: the Menapii (people of Ghent, Antwerp, and the sea-coast of Brabant) 9,000: the Caletes (people of Caux) 10,000: the Velocasses and Veromandui (people of Vexin and St. Quentin) the like number: the Aduatici (people of Namur) 29,000; and the Condrusi, Eburones, Cæræsi, and Pæmani, all comprehended under the common name of Germans, 40,000.

ing towards him in a body, and that they were even advanced within a few miles, he, with all the expedition he could, passed his army over the Axona,* which divides * The Aisne. the Rhemi from the rest of the Belgæ, and encamped on the farther side of it; putting himself in such a situation as to secure all behind him, cover one side of his camp with a river, and render the communication with the Rhemi, and those other states whence he expected to be supplied with provisions, safe and easy.

The Belgæ, having been disappointed in an attempt upon Bibrax,† a town belonging to the Rhemi, and likewise in an attempt to pass the Axona; and finding that provisions began to be scarce, and that the Romans could not be drawn to fight at a disadvantage, called a council of war. It was there judged most expedient to separate, and return every man to his own country, with a resolution, however, to assemble from all parts in defence of that state whose territories should be first invaded by the Romans: for they concluded it much safer to carry on the war at home, where they might have provisions, and every thing at command, than venture a battle within the confines of a foreign state. These reasons were at the same time backed by a still more powerful consideration: for the Bellovaci, upon advice that their territories would quickly be invaded by Divitiacus and the Ædui, could not be restrained from marching directly homewards.

In pursuance of the resolution above mentioned, the Belgæ broke up their camp about the second watch of the night. All was noise and tumult: not regarding either order in their march, or the command of their officers, each man pressed to be in the foremost rank, that he might get the sooner home: insomuch that their retreat had all the appearance of a precipitate flight. Cæsar, who had immediate notice of this from his scouts, apprehending some stratagem, because he knew not yet the reason of their departure, would not stir out of his

† Bievre,
between
Pont à Vere
and Laon.

trenches in the night ; but early in the morning, upon more certain intelligence of their retreat, detached his lieutenants, Pedius and Cotta, with all the cavalry, after them. Labienus had orders to follow with three legions. The enemy suffered a great slaughter in their flight, the Romans little or no loss. The latter, about sunset, gave over the pursuit, and returned to the camp, in obedience to the orders they had received.

The next day, before the enemy had time to rally, or recover out of their consternation, Cæsar led his army into the territories of the Suessones, which joined to those of the Rhemi, and, after a long march, reached
* Noyon. Noviodunum.* He was in hopes of carrying the town by assault, as being destitute of a sufficient garrison : but, as the ditch was broad, and the wall very high, the defendants, though few in number, withstood all his efforts. Wherefore, having fortified his camp, he began to provide engines, and get every thing in readiness for a siege. Meantime such of the Suessones as had escaped the late slaughter, threw themselves, during the night, into the town. But Cæsar advancing his preparations with great expedition, and approaching, under cover of his mantlets, to the very walls, where he cast up a mount, and planted his battering towers, the Gauls, astonished at the greatness of the works, as having never seen nor heard of any such before, and at the dispatch wherewith they were carried on, sent deputies to treat about a surrendry ; and the Rhemi interceded for them.

Cæsar, having received the principal men of the Suessones as hostages (amongst whom were two sons of Galba the king), and obliged them to deliver up all their arms, admitted them to a surrendry, and led his army against the Bellovaci. These, retiring with their effects
† Beauvais. into Bratuspantium,† their capital city, and understanding that Cæsar was advanced within five miles of it, sent a deputation of their old men, who came forth in venerable procession to meet him, signifying by outstretched

hands, and the most submissive terms, that they put themselves under his power and protection, and did not pretend to appear in arms against the people of Rome: and when he approached nearer the city, and encamped within view of the walls, the women and children from the ramparts, with extended arms, according to the custom of their country, besought the Romans for peace. Hereupon Divitiacus, who, after the retreat of the Belgæ, had dismissed the Ædui, and returned to Cæsar's camp, interposed in behalf of the Bellovaci, pleading: "That they had always lived in strict friendship with the Ædui, and, by the artful insinuations of their chiefs, had been seduced to forsake their ancient allies, and take up arms against the Romans, whom they had represented as holding the Ædui under an ignominious tyranny and oppression: that the authors of that advice, seeing its pernicious effects, were retired into Britain." Cæsar, out of regard to Divitiacus and the Ædui, promised pardon and protection to the Bellovaci; but as these were possessed of very extensive territories, and surpassed in power, and number of forces, all the other Belgic states, he demanded 600 hostages.

These being accordingly delivered, together with all their arms, Cæsar left their city and advanced into the country of the Ambiani,* who, upon his approach, immediately submitted. Adjoining to these were the Nervii:† of whose manners and genius Cæsar inquiring learnt; "That they suffered no resort of merchants into their city, nor the importation of wine, or of any thing tending to luxury, which they thought enfeebled the mind, and extinguished its martial fire: that they were men of a warlike spirit, and were continually reproaching the rest of the Belgæ for ignominiously submitting to the Roman yoke; and had openly declared their resolution of neither sending ambassadors to Cæsar, nor accepting any terms of peace."

* People of Amiens.

† People of Cambresis.

Cæsar, after a march of three days through their ter-

ritories, understood from some prisoners, “That he was now advanced within ten miles of the Sambre, on the other side of which the enemy had posted themselves, and there waited the coming of the Romans: that they had been joined by the Atrebates* and Veromandui,† neighbouring nations, whom they had persuaded to take part in the fortune of the war: that they expected also to be reinforced by the Aduatici, who were already on their march: and that all their women, and such as, on account of age, were unfit to bear arms, had been conveyed to a place of safety, inaccessible by reason of the marshes that surrounded it.” The two armies posted themselves on two hills, opposite to each other, the Sambre running between, which was not, in that part, above three feet in depth.

* People of Artois.

† People of Vermandois, a part of Picardy.

The battle which ensued was bravely and resolutely fought on both sides, and with great variety of fortune: each army possessed itself of the enemy's camp: the Roman cavalry were once broken and put to flight: the twelfth and the seventh legions reduced to the utmost distress: nor was there any body of reserve from which they could expect succour. In this extremity, Cæsar, snatching a buckler from one of the soldiers, and pressing to the front of the battle, called upon the centurions by name, and encouraged the rest. His arrival inspired the legionaries with new hope: and, every one being ambitious of distinguishing himself in the presence of his general, they redoubled their efforts, and checked the progress of the enemy. In the meantime, two new-raised legions, that had been placed in the rear of the Roman army, and been appointed to follow and guard the baggage, hearing of the battle, advanced with all possible speed: and Labienus, who had made himself master of the enemy's camp, observing from the hill on which that stood how matters went with Cæsar, detached the tenth legion to his assistance.

The arrival of this detachment produced so great a

change in favour of the Romans, that many of the soldiers, who before lay oppressed with wounds, now resuming courage, renewed the fight : nay, the very servants of the camp, unarmed as they were, observing the consternation of the enemy, rushed among their armed battalions. The cavalry, too, striving by extraordinary efforts, to wipe off the ignominy of their late flight, charged the enemy in all places where the void spaces between the legions suffered them to advance. Meantime the Nervii, now very hard pressed, exerted themselves with such determined courage, that, their front ranks being cut off, those who stood behind mounted the bodies of the slain, and thence continued the fight : and when these too, by their fall, had raised a mount of carcasses, those who remained, ascending the pile, poured their javelins upon the Romans as from a rampart, and even returned the darts thrown at them by their enemies. Fame therefore (says Cæsar) did not deceive in proclaiming so loudly the bravery of this people.

In a battle, maintained with such obstinacy, the loss of the vanquished must necessarily be prodigious : the very name and nation of the Nervii were in a manner quite extinguished : the old men, who, with the women and children (as above related) had been conveyed into a place surrounded with bogs and morasses, upon the report of this terrible overthrow, resolved, with the consent of all that survived the late destruction, to send a deputation to Cæsar, and surrender themselves. These deputies, in reciting the calamities of their country, represented, that of 600 senators there remained only three ; and that from 60,000 fighting men their soldiers were reduced to 500. Cæsar readily took them under his protection, allowing them free and full possession of their towns and territories, and strictly commanding all the neighbouring nations to abstain from doing them any injury.

The Aduatici,^u of whom mention has been made above, being upon their march with all their forces to join the Nervii, and hearing of their total defeat, immediately returned home; and then abandoning all their other towns and castles, conveyed themselves and their riches into a place which nature had strongly fortified: for it was on every side surrounded with high rocks and precipices, having only one avenue of about 200 feet broad, that led to the town by a gentle rising. Here they raised a double wall of prodigious height, whereon, as a farther security, they laid great numbers of huge stones and strong-pointed beams.

On the first arrival of the Roman army before the town, the inhabitants made frequent sallies from it, and engaged the besiegers in slight skirmishes. But Cæsar having drawn a line of contravallation twelve feet high, fifteen miles in circumference, and every where well fortified with redoubts, they kept themselves within their walls. When the Romans had finished their approaches, and cast up a mount, and were preparing a tower of assault behind their works, the besieged from their battlements at first derided them, and, in contemptuous language, asked the meaning of that prodigious engine raised at such a distance! with what hands or strength, men of the size and make of the Romans (whose small stature the Gauls, who were for the most part very tall, despised) could hope to bring forward so unwieldy a machine against their walls? But when they saw it removed, and approaching near the town, astonished at the new and strange appearance, they sent ambassadors to Cæsar to sue for peace. These, being introduced, told him, “That they doubted not but the Romans

^u This people were descended from the Teutoni and Cimbri, who, in their march towards the Alps and Italy, left their heavy baggage on this side the Rhine, with a detachment of 6,000 men to guard it. These, after the final overthrow of their countrymen, being for many years in wars with the neighbouring states; sometimes acting on the offensive, sometimes on the defensive; at length, with the consent of all the bordering nations, obtained peace, and settled themselves in this place.

were assisted in their wars by the gods themselves; it seeming a more than human task to transport, with such facility, an engine of that amazing height, by which they were brought upon a level with their enemies, and enabled to engage them in close fight. That they therefore put themselves and their fortunes into his hands, requesting only, that, if his clemency, of which they had heard much, should determine him to spare them, he would not deprive them of their arms: that the neighbouring nations were almost all their enemies, against whom they could not defend themselves if their arms were taken away; and that they would choose to undergo any fortune from the hands of the Romans, rather than expose themselves to be cruelly slaughtered by those, over whom they had been wont to exercise dominion."

To this Cæsar answered, "That, to conform himself to his usual conduct on such occasions, and not for any merit of theirs, he was willing to grant them peace, provided they submitted before the battering ram touched the walls; but that no surrendry would be accepted, unless they delivered up their arms: that he would take the same care of them as he had before done of the Nervii, and lay his express commands upon the neighbouring nations to abstain from all injuries towards a people who had put themselves under the protection of the Romans." The ambassadors returning with this answer, their countrymen accepted, in appearance, the conditions offered them; and threw so vast a quantity of arms into the ditch before the town, that the heap almost reached to the top of the wall. Nevertheless, as was afterward known, they retained about a third part, and concealed them within the town. The gates being thrown open, there was peace for the remaining part of that day.

In the evening, Cæsar ordered the gates to be shut, and his soldiers to quit the town, that no injury might

be offered to the inhabitants during the night. The Aduatici, imagining that the Romans, after the surrender of the place, would either set no guard at all, or, at most, keep watch with little care, armed themselves partly with those weapons they had secretly retained, and partly with targets, made of bark or wicker, and covered over hastily with hides, and made a furious sally about midnight with all their forces, on that side where the Roman works seemed to be of easiest access. The alarm being immediately given by lighting fires, as Cæsar had directed, the soldiers ran from the neighbouring forts to the place of action. A very sharp conflict ensued: for, the enemy now driven to despair, and having no hope but in their valour, fought with all possible resolution; though the Romans had the advantage of the ground, and poured their javelins upon them both from the towers and the top of the rampart. About 4,000 were slain upon the spot; the rest retired into the town. Next day the gates were forced, no one offering to make the least resistance, and the army having taken possession of the place, the inhabitants, to the number of 53,000, were sold for slaves.

* The people of Vannes.

About the same time Publius Crassus, whom Cæsar had sent with a legion against the Veneti,* and six other neighbouring states,^x inhabiting the sea-coast, dispatched messengers to acquaint him, that all those states had submitted to the dominion of the Romans.

The campaign being ended, and all the provinces of Gaul subdued, such was the opinion conceived of this war among the barbarians round about, that even the nations beyond the Rhine sent ambassadors to Cæsar, offering to give hostages, and submit to his commands: but he, being then in haste to return to Italy and Illyricum, ordered them to attend him next spring. Having put his army into winter-quarters, in the territories

^x The Unelli, Osismii, Curiosolytæ, Sesuvii, Aulerci, and Rhedones. The exact situation of these is unknown.

of the Andes, Turones, and Carnutes, which states lay nearest to the provinces that had been the seat of the war, he himself set out for Italy.

The people
of Anjou,
Touraine,
and Char-
train.

The senate, informed by letter from Cæsar of his successes, decreed a thanksgiving of fifteen days, a number never granted before to any general.^y

Cæsar upon his departure for Italy, sent Sergius Galba, with the twelfth legion, against the Nantuates,^z Veragri, and Seduni, whose territories extended from the confines of the Allobroges, the lake Lemanus, and the river Rhone, to the top of the Alps. His design, in this expedition, was to open a free passage over those mountains for the Roman merchants, who had hitherto travelled them with great danger, and subject to many grievous exactions. Galba executed his commission, made himself master of several forts, received ambassadors from the nations all around, and, having settled the terms of peace with them, received hostages for their fidelity. Having quartered two cohorts among the Nantuates, he himself, with the rest of the troops, took up his winter-quarters in a town of the Veragri, called Octodurus. It was situated in the midst of a valley, upon a plain of no great extent, and bounded on all sides with very high mountains.

J. C.
Comm. 1. 3.

As the city was divided into two parts by a river, he left one to the Gauls, and assigned the other to his soldiers, commanding them to fortify it with a ditch and rampart. After many days spent here, he was suddenly informed, that the Gauls had abandoned, in the night, that part of the city which had been allotted to them; and that the impending mountains were covered with the Veragri and Seduni. Upon this intelligence, Galba, who had neither completed the fortifications of his

^y Pompey was the first general to whose honour so many as ten days had been decreed. Vid. vol. 4. p. 376.

^z The Nantuates are said to have been the ancient inhabitants of that part of Savoye now called Lechablais. The chief town of the Veragri was Aquanum, now St. Maurice. The capital of the Seduni was Sion in Switzerland.

camp, nor laid in a sufficient store of corn and other provisions, as little apprehending an insurrection of this kind among a people who had submitted and given hostages, speedily assembled a council of war: the danger was imminent and unexpected; there was no room to hope for succours, or for supplies of provision, the enemy being in possession of all the avenues to the camp. Some of the council, thinking the case desperate, declared for abandoning the baggage, and attempting by a sally to recover their old quarters; but the greater number were for reserving this expedient to the last extremity, and in the meantime defending the camp in the best manner they could. It was not long before the enemy came rushing down upon them from all parts, and began the assault with a shower of stones and darts. When the battle had lasted upwards of six hours without intermission, the Romans not only found their strength greatly exhausted, but even began to be in want of weapons wherewith to annoy the enemy. The Gauls, on the other hand, urged the combat with greater fury than ever; and, meeting with but a faint resistance, fell to demolishing the rampart, and filling up the ditch. All was giving way before them, when P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, and highest reputation for courage, who had received many wounds in the battle against the Nervii; as likewise Volusenus, a man equally distinguished for his conduct and his bravery, came to Galba, and represented to him that the only expedient now left was to make a sudden sally, and put all upon the issue of one bold attack. Accordingly Galba, calling the centurions together, directed them immediately to signify to the soldiers, that they should for some time keep only upon the defensive, and when they had a little recovered their strength, and furnished themselves with the weapons thrown at them by the enemy, upon a signal given, to sally out of the camp, and place all their hopes of safety in their valour. The orders

were punctually obeyed: the Romans, rushing furiously upon the enemy, gave them no time either to comprehend the meaning of so unexpected an attack, or to recover out of the confusion into which it threw them: and thus fortune changed sides. Of 30,000 fighting men, who had been engaged in the assault, more than 10,000 perished upon the spot: the rest fled in terror and confusion. Galba, seeing the enemy entirely dispersed, quitted the pursuit and retired within his intrenchments. The next day, unwilling to expose himself a second time to the inconstancy of fortune, and being in great want of corn and forage, set fire to the town, and began his march back into the province. As there was no enemy in the field to molest or oppose him in his retreat, he brought the legion safe into the country of the Nantuates, and thence into the territories of the Allobroges, where he put them into winter-quarters.

The insurrection being thus entirely quelled, Cæsar, who believed that tranquillity was now re-established in Gaul (the Belgæ being subdued, the Germans expelled, and the inhabitants of the Alps compelled to submit), made a journey, in the beginning of the winter, into Illyricum; when all on a sudden a new war broke out in Celtic Gaul. The occasion of it was this: the seventh legion, commanded by young Crassus, had been quartered among the Andes, a people bordering upon the ocean. As there was a great scarcity of corn in those parts, Crassus sent some officers of the cavalry to solicit a supply from the neighbouring states. Of these states the Veneti were by far the most powerful, not only on account of their abundant shipping, wherewith they drove a mighty traffic to Britain, but because most of the nations that trade on those seas were tributaries to them. They began to revolt by detaining the officers sent to them by Crassus, hoping, by this means, to recover the hostages put into his hands. The neighbouring states, moved by their example and authority (as the Gauls

are in general very sudden and forward in their resolves), detained, for the same reason, the officers sent to them, and, speedily dispatching embassies from one to another, entered into a strict confederacy for supporting the common cause; earnestly soliciting, at the same time, the inland provinces to rise in defence of that liberty they had received from their ancestors, and not tamely submit to the ignominious yoke of the Romans. All the states upon the sea-coast coming readily into this alliance, they jointly sent ambassadors to Crassus to acquaint him, that he must first restore to them their hostages, if he expected to have his officers restored to him.

Cæsar, receiving intelligence of these things from Crassus, and being then at a great distance from Gaul, sent orders for building a great number of galleys upon the Loire, and for drawing together, from the province, mariners, rowers, and pilots. These orders were executed with good dispatch: and he himself, as soon as the season of the year permitted, went to the army.

[YEAR OF ROME 697.^a]

The Veneti and their allies, not ignorant of the greatness of their crime, in detaining and loading with irons ambassadors, a name ever looked upon, among all nations, as sacred and inviolable, made preparations in proportion to the danger that threatened them. The natural situation of their country gave them confident hopes of being able to defend themselves: for the passes by land were every where cut asunder by many friths and arms of the sea; and the approach by sea was not less difficult, on account of the small number of harbours, the little knowledge the Romans, accustomed only to the navigation of the Mediterranean, had of the art of governing ships on the ocean, and their total ignorance of the coast. Neither did the Veneti believe it practicable for the Roman army to continue long in that

^a Cn. Corn. Lentulus Marcellinus and L. Marcius Philippus consuls.

country, by reason of the great scarcity of corn ; and they had a mighty confidence in the strength and number of their shipping.

Cæsar, to restrain those of the Gauls who had not yet declared themselves, and to hinder the confederates^b from uniting their forces into one army, divided his troops, and dispersed them into different parts of Gaul. He sent Labienus towards Treves with a body of cavalry. P. Crassus, at the head of twelve legionary cohorts, passed the Garonne, and entered into Aquitain, to prevent the enemies receiving any supplies from that quarter. Another of his lieutenants, Titurius Sabinus, with three legions, found employment for the people who inhabited the coasts of Bassebretagne, and of Normandy as far as Lisieux. To D. Brutus was given the command of the fleet, and Cæsar himself conducted the land forces.

Most of the enemy's towns were built upon promontories, and points of land, whose feet were washed by the sea at high water, and left dry at ebb : so that neither his land forces nor his ships could stay long before them.

Cæsar, duly considering this, perceived plainly, that he should never be able to reduce the Veneti but by a naval battle. He resolved, therefore, to wait for his fleet. His fleet arrived ; and the enemy did not delay to come out of their ports to fight. Full of confidence in their naval strength and skill, they, with 220 tall vessels, fell furiously upon the Romans. The construction of their ships, which were much higher than the Roman galleys, gave the Gauls a considerable advantage in throwing their darts ; and the Romans suffered much at first from this circumstance. But Cæsar had fortunately provided a great number of sharp crooked scythes, like those that were used in sieges. With these, fixed to

^b Cæsar tells us, that the Veneti brought into their alliance the Osismii, Lexovii, Nannetes, Ambiani, Morini, Diablintes, and Menapii ; and dispatched ambassadors into Britain, which lies over against their coast, to solicit assistance from thence,

the end of long poles, the Romans, laying hold of the tackle of the enemy's vessels, towed them away by force of rowing; then, cutting the cables, the mainyards fell down, whereby the enemy, who relied on their sails and rigging, were at once deprived of the use of them: and now, the dispute depending wholly on courage and manhood, the Roman soldiers, who fought under the eye of their general, and of a vast number of witnesses (for all the hills that looked upon the sea were covered with spectators), easily obtained the victory.

The Veneti, observing that the Romans had already boarded and made themselves masters of a great part of their fleet, began to think of providing for the safety of the rest by flight. Accordingly they tacked about to run before the wind: but all on a sudden there ensued so dead a calm, that not a vessel could stir out of its place; and then the Romans took them with great ease. After a conflict that had lasted from nine in the morning, a very few escaped under favour of the night.

This victory put an end to the war with the Veneti; for they had lost the whole body of their youth, as well as the most eminent men among them for rank or authority, and all their naval strength. Those who survived this defeat, having no resource left, surrendered themselves to Cæsar's mercy; who thought it necessary to proceed against them with severity, that he might impress upon the minds of the Gauls for the future a proper regard to the sacred character of ambassadors. He condemned, therefore, all their senators to death, and sold the people for slaves.

The arms of Cæsar prospered on every side. At the same time that he vanquished the Veneti, Titurius Sabinus obtained a great victory over the united forces of the Unelli, Eburovices, and Lexovii.* The two last-mentioned nations were so furiously bent upon the war, that they massacred their senate for opposing it. After this cruel execution, they joined their troops to those of

* Inhabitants of Coutance, Evreux, and Lisieux.

the Unelli, whose conductor Viridovix was recognized for generalissimo of the army of the three nations. Under his command they advanced against the Romans, and, approaching near their camp, defied them to battle. Sabinus pretended fear, kept close within his intrenchments, and, by means of a pretended deserter, deceived the enemy into a belief that he was the next night to steal privately out of his camp, in order to go to the succour of his general, much distressed by the Veneti. By this stratagem he drew the Gauls to attack him in his camp, which was upon an eminence. Mounting it with precipitation, they arrived quite out of breath. Sabinus instantly caused all his troops to sally out upon them by two gates at once. The assailants, not able to support the very first shock, took to flight; the Roman cavalry pursued them, and almost finished the destruction of that numerous army.

Much about the same time, P. Crassus arrived in Aquitain. Having made due provision of corn, raised some cavalry, assembled his auxiliary troops, and strengthened his army with a select body of volunteers from Toulouse, Carcasson, and Narbonne, states in that part of the Roman province that lies nearest to Aquitain, he advanced with all his forces to the territories of the Sotiates.* Crassus, with great slaughter, put them to the rout, and presently after invested their capital. They made a brave resistance for some time; but finding that the Romans would surmount all the difficulties that could be thrown in their way, they sent to Crassus, requesting that they might be admitted to a surrender.

* Inhabiting
the country
about Aire.

The defeat of the Sotiates, and the reduction of their city, roused the other states of Aquitain to unite themselves against the conqueror: and they procured assistance from the Spaniards, their neighbours. Crassus attacked them in their camp, and of 50,000 men, of which their strength consisted, scarce a fourth part

escaped being cut in pieces. The fruit of this victory was the submission of all Aquitain.

[This was the last service performed by P. Crassus in the war of Gaul; for, with Cæsar's permission, he went soon after to Rome, and the next year into Asia, taking with him 1,000 Gallic horse, to assist his father in his expedition against the Parthians.]

When Cæsar had finished the war against the Veneti, the season was far advanced: nevertheless, as the Morini and Menapii, who were situated in the northern part of Gaul, and who, though they had entered into the league which was just dissolved, had taken no step yet to shew their submission to the Romans, Cæsar, who thought nothing done while there yet remained any thing to do,^d marched against them in order to finish his conquest. At his approach they retired, with all their effects, into the woods and morasses, with which their country abounded, hoping to find there a safe shelter. But Cæsar resolved to lay low those immense forests; and with the trees which he cut down he made a kind of rampart to cover the flanks of his army against any sudden incursions of the barbarians. He had made a considerable progress in this work, when, the bad weather coming on, and the continual rains requiring that he should find some shelter for his army, necessity compelled him to leave his conquest incomplete. Having ravaged the country and burnt the villages, he retired, and distributed his troops into winter-quarters in the territories of the Aulerci-Eburovices, Lexovii, and the other newly-subdued states.^e

[YEAR OF ROME 698.]

J. C. Com.
l. 4.

The next year [when Pompey and Crassus were consuls] a great body of the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, Ger-

^c The Morini probably inhabited the sea-coast from the Somme to the Scheld: the Menapii both banks of some part of the lower Rhine.

^d "Nil actum credens, cum quid superesset agendum." Lucan. 2. 657.

^e For what passed at Rome this year, 697, in relation to Cæsar, see above, p. 79, 80, &c.

man nations, passed the Rhine, not far from its mouth. The hostilities of their neighbours the Suevi, who had for many years harassed them with continual wars, and hindered them from cultivating their lands, were the cause of their making this emigration.

The Suevi, by far the most warlike and considerable of all the Germans, were divided into 100 cantons, each of which used to send yearly into the field 1,000 armed men. The rest, who continued in their several districts, employed themselves in cultivating the lands. These husbandmen became the next year soldiers, and were succeeded in the care of the lands by the troops that had served the year before. Thus they lived in the continual exercise of agriculture and war alternately. In the distribution of the lands, no such thing was allowed among them as property or private possession, their residence in any place being confined to one year. They had little trade, having nothing to sell but spoils taken in war. They suffered no wine to be imported into their territories, as thinking that it both enervated the mind, and unfitted the body for exercise and labour.

Having tried the strength of their neighbours, the Ubii, in many wars, they found them too numerous and potent to be dispossessed of their territories; yet they prevailed so far as to impose a tribute upon them, and very much reduce their power.

But the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, before mentioned, after many years' resistance, were at length totally driven out of their possessions by the Suevi. Having wandered over many regions of Germany during the space of three years, they arrived at last upon the banks of the Rhine, where the Menapii had houses, lands, and villages, on both sides the river. These, alarmed at the approach of so prodigious a multitude (for they were not an army, but two nations, who marched in a body, men, women, and children, to the number of above 430,000), abandoned all their habitations on the right bank of

the Rhine, and, retiring to the left side, disposed their troops in a proper manner, to hinder the passage of their invaders. The Germans tried every expedient; and finding they could neither force a passage, because of their want of shipping, nor steal over privately, by reason of the strict watch kept by the Menapii, had recourse to stratagem. They gave out that they would, without delay, go back to their own country; and, to gain credit to this report, they, in fact, thitherward made a three days' march. The Menapii were deceived. Such of them as had dwelt on the farther bank of the Rhine returned to their habitations, secure and fearless of danger. Surprised by the German cavalry, who in one night recovered the whole ground of the three days' march, they were all put to the sword: and the Germans, having seized the shipping before the Menapii on this side had intelligence of their approach, passed the river, took possession of towns and villages, and supported themselves the rest of the winter with the provisions there found.

Cæsar, informed of these things, and dreading the levity of the Gauls, who were very changeable in their councils, and fond of novelties, made all the haste he could to join his army. Upon his arrival he found that things were fallen out exactly as he had apprehended: some of the states of Gaul had sent ambassadors to the Germans, inviting them to leave the banks of the Rhine, and assuring them that all their demands should be readily complied with. The Germans, allured by these hopes, had already penetrated into the territories of the Eburones and Condrusi,* both which nations were under the protection of the Treviri.† Cæsar assembled the chiefs of the Gauls, dissembled his knowledge of their secret designs, and by soft words endeavoured to confirm them in their alliance with the people of Rome: he then demanded of them a certain number of horse, and prepared to march against the Germans.

*The people
about
Liege and
Namur.
† People of
Treves.

When he came within a few days' march of their camp, ambassadors arrived from them, who addressed him in words to the following effect: "The Germans have no design of beginning a war with the people of Rome; they are come into these parts against their inclination, having been forcibly driven from their former dwellings. If the Romans are disposed to accept of their friendship, they will rest satisfied with the quiet possession of those lands they have already conquered, or with such as the Romans shall think proper to assign them; in bravery they yield to the Suevi alone, for whom the immortal gods themselves are not an equal match."

Cæsar made such reply as best suited his present views: but the conclusion of his speech was of the following purport: "That he could enter into no treaty of friendship with them, so long as they continued in Gaul: that men unable to defend their own territories were not likely to make conquests in other countries: that there were no uncultivated lands in Gaul, sufficient for so great a multitude, without invading the properties of others: but that, if they pleased, they might incorporate themselves with the Ubii, whose ambassadors were then in his camp to complain of the injuries done them by the Suevi, and request his aid against their encroachments: and this he promised to obtain for them from the Ubii." The ambassadors replied, "That they would report to their countrymen what he had said, and in three days return with an answer; requesting that in the meantime he would not advance with his army."

But this Cæsar refused, as knowing that, a few days before, they had sent a great body of cavalry over the Meuse, to forage and plunder in the territories of the Ambivariti.* He thence concluded, that they asked for delay, because they waited the return of that party. Cæsar therefore still advanced. When within twelve miles of the enemy, he was met by the ambassadors on

* Probably the people of Breda and Boisdac.

the day appointed : they were very earnest in their request that he would advance no farther ; but not being able to prevail, entreated him that he would restrain the cavalry of his advanced guard from doing any act of hostility : and in the meantime permit them to send ambassadors to the Ubii ; from whose senate and magistrates, if they could obtain, under the sanction of a solemn oath, the conditions proposed by Cæsar, they declared themselves ready to accept them : only they desired, that he would allow them the space of three days to bring matters to a final issue. Cæsar believed that they had no other view in what they said, than to gain time till their cavalry should arrive : he told them, nevertheless, that, for the sake of water, he would that day advance four miles, and no farther ; but desired that their chiefs would attend him the day after to acquaint him with their demands. In the meantime he sent orders to the officers of his cavalry not to attack the enemy ; and, in case they should be attacked themselves, only to maintain their ground till he should come up with the rest of the army.

But the Germans, though their cavalry did not exceed 800, by reason of the absence of those who had been sent to forage, yet, seeing the Roman horse advance without caution, fell suddenly upon them. These amounted to 5,000, but having no apprehension of an attack, because they knew that the German ambassadors had been with Cæsar a little before, and had obtained a day's truce, were easily thrown into disorder and put to flight. The Romans lost seventy-four men.^f And

Tom. 12.
p. 506.

^f “ This battle (says M. Crevier) is of very great importance, on account of the circumstance of its being fought at a time when there was a negotiation actually on foot between Cæsar and the Germans. By whom the hostility was begun, and consequently upon whom the reproach of perfidy ought to fall, is a problem, that labours under some difficulty. Cæsar threw the fault upon the barbarians : but several persons at Rome were persuaded, that it was he who had violated the faith of the negotiation : and when the senate were decreeing him honours for his exploits in this campaign, Cato gave it as his opinion, that Cæsar should be delivered up to the Germans ; to the end that he alone might suffer the punishment of his breach of faith, and the commonwealth not be answerable for it to gods or men.

“ It is difficult to decide upon a point so obscure, and concerning which the inte-

now Cæsar resolved neither to give audience to the ambassadors of the Germans, nor admit them to terms of peace, seeing they had treacherously solicited for a truce, and afterward broke it themselves. He likewise considered that it would be downright madness to delay coming to an action, till the German army should be augmented by their cavalry, then absent; and besides, he was perfectly well acquainted with the levity of the Gauls, among whom the successful attack made by the Germans had given them a considerable reputation. A very lucky accident fell out to bring about Cæsar's purpose: for the very next morning the Germans, persisting in their treachery and dissimulation, came in great numbers to his camp; all their nobility making part of the embassy. Their pretended design in coming was, to vindicate themselves in regard to what had happened the day before; but their real motive was to obtain, if possible, another insidious truce. Cæsar, overjoyed to have them thus in his power, caused them to be secured: and immediately drew his forces out of the camp. The

rest of Cæsar, on one hand, lessens the weight of his evidence; and hatred and partiality, on the other, may have carried Cato beyond due bounds. It is known that Cæsar was not scrupulous in morals" [for he was too much addicted to gallantry], "but his proceedings were frank and generous, at least outwardly so; and how little care soever he took to have truth and justice really on his side, he always affected to have the appearances of them. It must, nevertheless, be allowed, that appearances are not for him here. It is not probable, that 800 horsemen should think of attacking 5,000." Surely it is less probable, that 800 horse should beat 5,000, unless the latter were "surprised and unprepared (as Cæsar says they were) because trusting to the truce granted at the enemy's request." M. Crevier proceeds: "And what seems to prove the good faith of the Germans is, that, the day after the battle, they sent their deputies again to Cæsar, to make apologies, and to continue the negotiation." If they were perfidious in attacking the Roman cavalry, it is no wonder that Cæsar shewed no regard to their apology, but considered them as no less perfidious in their new deputation. But, with relation to the notable advice said to have been given by Cato to the senate, what evidence is there of the fact, that Cato did deliver that opinion? Is it sufficiently warranted? Who is the historian that records it? Plutarch, the only writer we have who mentions the matter, gives us Tanusius Geminus for his authority. And who was this Tanusius or Tamusius? (He is cited by Suetonius for several tales of the slanderous kind, that carry no face of probability.) Vossius, concerning him, writes thus: "*Ex Senecæ verbis liquet, fuisse annales Tamusî, quales illi Volusî, qui eodem vixit tempore. De eo sic Catullus:*

'Annales Volusî, cacata charta.'"

De Hist.
Lat. l. 1.
c. 12.

Add to this, the great unlikelihood that Cato, envious and malicious as he was, even almost to madness, whenever Cæsar's name was in question, should yet expose his weakness to so great a degree, as, in the consulship of Crassus and Pompey, to give an advice concerning Cæsar, which at any time must appear senseless and impracticable.

cavalry, whom he supposed terrified by the late disaster, were commanded to follow in the rear.

Having drawn up his army in three lines, and made a very expeditious march of eight miles, he appeared before the enemies' camp. Their consternation was not a little increased by the unexpectedness of his appearance, and the absence of their own officers; they had hardly time to take counsel, or to arm: their camp was presently forced: the women and children betook themselves to flight on all sides. Cæsar sent the cavalry in pursuit of them: the Germans, hearing a noise behind them, and seeing their wives and children put to the sword, threw down their arms, and fled out of the camp. Being arrived at the conflux of the Rhine and Meuse, and finding it impossible to continue their flight any farther, they threw themselves into the river; where, through fear, weariness, or the force of the current, they almost all perished. And thus the Romans, without the loss of a man, put an end to this formidable war. Cæsar offered those of the Germans whom he had detained in his camp liberty to depart: but they, dreading the resentment of the Gauls, whose lands they had ravaged, chose rather to continue with him, and they obtained his consent.

Cæsar had various reasons for resolving to lead his army over the Rhine: but what chiefly swayed him was, that, seeing the Germans were so easily induced to transport their forces into Gaul, he thought it might be of no small service to let them see that the Romans wanted neither resolution nor ability to transport an army into Germany. Add to this, that the cavalry of the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, who having passed the Meuse (as was above related) to forage and plunder, and escaped thereby the disaster of the late defeat, had, upon receiving the news of it, repassed the Rhine, and retired into the territories of the Sicambri;* and Cæsar, having demanded that these troops should be delivered

* From whom the Franks were descended.

up to him, had received for answer, "That the Rhine was the boundary of the Roman empire: that if he thought it unjustifiable in the Germans to pass over into Gaul without his leave, upon what pretence could he claim any power or authority on the German side of that river?"

But Cæsar had a third reason: for the Ubii, who alone, of all the nations beyond the Rhine, had sent ambassadors to him, entered into alliance with him, and given him hostages, earnestly entreated him to come to their assistance, they being very hard pressed by the Suevi. They said, that his shewing himself in Germany would be alone sufficient to secure repose to them for the future; and they offered him boats to transport his legions.

Cæsar thought that it was neither safe, nor for the dignity of the Roman name, to make use of boats for crossing the Rhine. To build a bridge would be difficult, on account of the breadth, depth, and rapidity of the river: nevertheless he undertook it; and the work was completed in ten days, reckoning from the time they began to bring the timber to the bank of the river. Cæsar led over his army; and leaving a strong guard on each side the stream, marched directly into the territories of the Sicambri; who, so soon as they heard that the bridge was begun, had, by advice of the Usi-petes and Tenchtheri, withdrawn, with their effects, into the neighbouring woods and deserts. Cæsar made but a short stay in their country, burnt their villages, cut down their corn, and marched into the territories of the Ubii. The Suevi, in pursuance of an order of their national council, acted as the Sicambri, only with this difference, that all such as were able to bear arms met, by command, at a place of general rendezvous, in the very heart of their country, there to wait the arrival of the Romans, and give them battle. But Cæsar, having accomplished all he intended, in carrying his arms over

Cæsar
builds a
bridge over
the Rhine.

the Rhine, which was to spread a universal terror among the Germans, take vengeance of the Sicambri, and set the Ubii at liberty, after a stay of only eighteen days in Germany, led back his army into Gaul, and broke down the bridge.

Cæsar prepares to pass into Britain.

Though but a small part of the summer now remained, Cæsar resolved to pass over into Britain, having certain intelligence that, in all his wars with the Gauls, they had constantly received assistance from thence. He foresaw that the season of the year would not permit him to finish the enterprise; yet he thought it would be of no small advantage, should he only take a view of the island, learn the temper and manners of the inhabitants, and acquaint himself with the coast, harbours, and landing-places, to all which the Gauls were perfect strangers. The merchants who traded thither, and of whom he inquired, could neither tell him what was the extent of the island, nor what was the strength of the nations that inhabited it, nor their skill in war, nor what harbours they had, fit to receive large ships. For which reason, before he embarked, he thought proper to send C. Volusenus with a galley, to get some knowledge of these things; commanding him to return with all expedition, when he had informed himself as fully as opportunity would allow. Cæsar himself marched with his whole army into the territories of the Morini; because thence was the nearest passage into Britain. Here he ordered a great many ships from the neighbouring ports to attend him, and the fleet which he had made use of the year before in his war with the Veneti.

Meanwhile the Britons, having notice of his design by the merchants that resorted to their island, ambassadors from many of their states came to him with an offer of hostages, and submission to the authority of the people of Rome. To these ambassadors he gave a favourable audience, and, exhorting them to continue in the same mind, sent them back into their own

country. With them he dispatched Comius, whom he had constituted king of the Atrebates, a man, in whose virtue, wisdom, and fidelity, he greatly confided, and whose authority in the island was very considerable. To him he gave it in charge to visit as many states as he could, and persuade them to enter into an alliance with the Romans; letting them know, at the same time, that Cæsar designed, as soon as possible, to come over in person into their island.

Volusenus, having taken a view of the country, so far as it was possible for a man who was resolved not to quit his ship, or trust himself in the hands of the barbarians, returned on the fifth day, and acquainted Cæsar with his discoveries.

While Cæsar continued in the country of the Morini, for the sake of getting ready his fleet, deputies arrived from almost all their cantons, to excuse their late war with the people of Rome, and to promise an entire submission for the future. This fell out very opportunely; because a war with these people would have obliged him to postpone his expedition into Britain. He therefore ordered them to send him a great number of hostages; and on their compliance, received them into his friendship. Having got together about eighty transports, he thought these would be sufficient for carrying over two legions. His galleys he distributed to his quæstor, lieutenants, and chief officers of the navy. Eighteen vessels, which he had appointed to transport his cavalry, were detained by contrary winds at a port about eight miles off. The rest of the army, under the command of Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta, were sent against the Menapii, and those cantons of the Morini which had not submitted. P. Sulpicius Rufus had the charge of the harbour where he embarked, with a strong garrison to maintain it.

Things being in this manner settled, and the wind springing up fair, Cæsar weighed anchor about mid-

Cliffs of
Dover.

night, ordering the cavalry to embark at the other port, and follow him. About nine in the morning he himself, with a part of the fleet, reached the coast of Britain, where he saw all the cliffs covered with the enemies' forces. From those cliffs it was easy for them to pour down their javelins upon the Romans. Not thinking this, therefore, a convenient landing-place, he cast anchor at three in the afternoon, purposing to wait the arrival of the rest of his fleet. Meanwhile, having called the lieutenants and military tribunes together, he informed them of what he had learnt from Volusenus; instructed them in the part they were to act; and particularly exhorted them to do every thing with readiness and upon a signal given, agreeably to the rules of military discipline: expedition and dispatch being more especially requisite in sea-affairs, because of all the most liable to sudden changes. Having dismissed them, and finding both the wind and weather favourable, he made the signal for weighing anchor, and, after sailing about eight miles farther, he arrived at a smooth open shore.

Deal.

But the barbarians, perceiving his design, had sent before them their cavalry, and their chariots, such as they commonly made use of in battle; and, following with the rest of their forces, endeavoured to oppose his landing. And indeed the difficulty of effecting it was great on many accounts; for the Roman ships drew so much water, that they could not come very near the shore; and it was a painful service for the soldiers, loaded with a weight of armour, and unacquainted with the place, to leap from the ships, and, wading breast-high through the waves, encounter an enemy; who, standing upon dry ground, or advancing only a little way into the water, had the free use of their arms; and, knowing perfectly the ground, could also boldly spur on their horses against the invaders. All these circumstances spread a terror among the Romans; wholly strangers to this way of fighting, they shewed

not their wonted alacrity, and cheerful readiness to advance against the enemy. Cæsar, observing this, ordered some of his galleys, which drew less water than his transports, to draw nearer the shore, and endeavour, by showers of darts from the engines* which they carried, to drive the enemy to some distance. This proved of considerable service to them: for the surprise occasioned by the make of the galleys, the motion of the oars, and the playing of the engines, made the barbarians halt, and presently after begin to give back. But the Roman soldiers still demurring to leap into the sea, chiefly because of the depth of the water in those parts, the standard-bearer of the tenth legion, having first invoked the gods for success, cried out aloud: "Follow me, fellow-soldiers, unless you will betray the Roman eagle into the hands of the enemy: for my part, I am resolved to discharge my duty to Cæsar and the commonwealth." Instantly he jumped into the sea, advanced with the eagle, and was followed by all that were in the ship: which being perceived by those in the other vessels, they also did the like, and boldly approached the enemy.

* Balistæ.

The Britons defended themselves with resolution: nor were the Romans able to get firm footing, till Cæsar ordered some small boats to be manned with recruits, and go to the assistance of the foremost ranks; by which means they were soon enabled to put the enemy to the rout. But as the cavalry were not yet arrived, Cæsar could not yet pursue the runaways, nor advance far into the island.

The vanquished, soon after their defeat, dispatched ambassadors to Cæsar to sue for peace, offering hostages and an entire submission to his commands. With these ambassadors came Comius, whom Cæsar (as above related) had sent before him into Britain. The natives had seized him as soon as he landed, and, though charged with a commission from Cæsar, thrown him

into irons. Upon the late defeat, they thought proper to release him and send him back; casting the blame upon the multitude. Cæsar, after some reproaches for having begun the war against him after they had sent ambassadors to him into Gaul to sue for peace, at length told them he would forgive their fault; and commanded them to send a certain number of hostages. Part were delivered immediately, and the rest, as living at some distance, they promised to send in a few days. In the meantime they disbanded their troops; and the several chiefs came to Cæsar's camp, to negotiate their own concerns and those of the states to which they belonged: a peace being thus concluded four days after Cæsar's arrival in Britain.

* P. 279.

The eighteen transports appointed to carry the cavalry, of whom we have spoken above,* put to sea with a gentle gale: but, when they had so near approached the coast as to be within view of the camp, so violent a storm all on a sudden arose, that, being unable to hold on their course, some were obliged to return to the port whence they set out, and others driven to the farther end of the island westward, not without great danger. There they cast anchor: but the waves rising very high, so as to fill the ships with water, they were again, in the night, obliged to stand out to sea and make for the continent of Gaul. That very night it happened to be full moon, when the tides upon the sea-coast always rise highest, a thing, in those days, wholly unknown to the Romans. Thus, at one and the same time, the galleys, which Cæsar had caused to be drawn up on the strand, and the transports that were at anchor in the road, were raised up, tossed about, and beat to pieces by the tempestuous waves. Nor was it possible to attempt any thing for their preservation. This disaster spread a general consternation through the camp: for there were no other ships to carry back the troops, nor any materials to repair those that had been disabled

by the tempest. And, as it had been all along Cæsar's design to winter in Gaul, he was wholly without corn to subsist the troops.

All this being known among the British chiefs, who, after the battle, had repaired (as was just now said) to Cæsar's camp, they began to hold conferences among themselves. They plainly saw that the Romans were destitute of cavalry, shipping, and corn; and judged from the smallness of their camp, that the number of their troops was but inconsiderable; in which notion they were the more confirmed, because Cæsar, having brought over the legions without baggage, had occasion to enclose but a small spot of ground. They thought, therefore, they had now a fair opportunity to rid themselves of the invaders, and effectually put a stop to all future attempts upon Britain. Having, therefore, entered into a confederacy, they gradually left the camp, and began to draw the islanders together. But Cæsar, though he was not yet apprized of their design, yet conjecturing their intention, from the disaster which had befallen his fleet, and the delays formed in relation to the hostages, made preparations accordingly. He sent reapers every day into the fields, and stored his camp with corn. The timber of the ships that had been most damaged, he ordered to be made use of in repairing the rest, sending to Gaul for what other materials he wanted. As the soldiers were indefatigable in this service, his fleet was soon in a condition to sail, being diminished only by twelve ships. During these transactions, a cloud of dust appeared suddenly on the side where the seventh legion was supposed to be foraging. As but one field remained unreaped, the enemy suspected that the Romans would go thither to forage; and had therefore hid themselves, during the night, in the woods, there waiting till the reapers had quitted their arms, and dispersed themselves for the work in hand: then sallying out on a sudden

they began to surround them with horses and chariots. Cæsar, conjecturing how matters went, marched away with the cohorts that were upon guard, and ordered those that were in the camp to follow him as soon as possible. He had gone but a little way, when he saw his men with great difficulty sustaining the fight, being driven into a small compass, and exposed on all sides to the darts of the assailants. Upon his approach the enemy made a stand, and the Romans recovered from their fear. However, Cæsar, not thinking it a proper time for a general engagement, stood awhile facing the enemy, and then led back his legions to the camp. The continual rains that followed for some days both kept the Romans within their intrenchments, and withheld the enemy from attacking them. Meantime the Britons dispatched messengers into all parts to make known to their countrymen how favourable an opportunity they had of enriching themselves with spoil, and of securing themselves for ever from all future invasions, by forcing the camp of the Romans, whose number was very small. By this means having drawn together a great body of horse and foot, they boldly advanced towards the Roman intrenchments. Cæsar drew up his legions in order of battle before the camp, and gave the Britons so warm a reception, that they presently turned their backs and fled. He pursued them, with great slaughter, till his men were out of breath; and then returned to his camp. The Britons, disheartened by the loss they had sustained, dispatched ambassadors the same day to sue for peace; which Cæsar readily granted, upon their promising to send him over into Gaul double the number of hostages he had required before. His want of horse, and the fear of exposing his fleet to another storm, if he stayed till the equinox, made him hasten his departure. The same night therefore, the wind proving favourable, he weighed anchor, and arrived safe in Gaul; whence

he immediately wrote to the senate, acquainting them with his exploits in Britain; for which a supplication, or general thanksgiving, was decreed for twenty days.^g

The Britons, it would seem, were not much awed by Cæsar's arms; for of all the states who had promised to send him hostages, two only performed their engagements. He resolved therefore to make a new descent the following spring with a more powerful fleet and army. With this view, before he returned to Italy, where he usually passed a part of the winter, he ordered his lieutenants to refit the old ships, and build as many new ones as they could.

When he had finished what he had to do in Cisalpine Gaul, he set out for Illyricum, upon advice that the Pirustæ, a people of that country, were making devastations in the province [that is, in those parts of Illyricum which recognized the Roman government]. When he arrived there, he ordered the several states to furnish their contingents, and appointed a place of general rendezvous. Cæsar was put to no other trouble than that of appearing in the country to compel the injurious barbarians to give hostages and make satisfaction for the damage they had done.

[YEAR OF ROME 699.^h]

The order which Cæsar had left with his lieutenants had been executed with such diligence during his absence, that, at his return into Gaul, he found 600 transport ships, and twenty-eight galleys, ready to be launched in a few days. He ordered the whole fleet to rendezvous at port Itius, the island being there not above thirty miles distant from the continent: but because the Treviri seemed disposed to rebellion, having neither appeared at the general diets of Gaul, nor submitted to the orders of the republic, and were reported to have even solicited assistance from Germany, he marched into their terri-

J. Cæs.
Comm. l. 5.

^g See above, p. 93, &c. for those transactions at Rome of the year 698, wherein Cæsar was interested.

^h L. Domitius Ahenobarbus and App. Claudius Pulcher consuls.

tories with four legions and 800 horse; being desirous totally to quiet Gaul before he engaged in his enterprise against Britain. Two of the principal men of the Treveri, Indutiomarus and Cingetorix, were at this time competitors for the supreme authority. The latter, so soon as he heard of the arrival of Cæsar, came to him and assured him, that he and all his party would continue firm to their duty. The other soon after submitted, finding himself deserted by some principal men of his own party. Cæsar exacted of him 200 hostages, among whom were to be his son, and all his nearest relations, specified by name. Indutiomarus complied: nevertheless Cæsar, assembling all the principal men of Treves, reconciled them one after another to Cingetorix, thinking it of importance to establish thoroughly the authority of a man, of whose inviolable attachment he had received convincing proofs.

This affair being settled, Cæsar hastened with his legions to port Itius,ⁱ where he found 4,000 Gallic horse,

ⁱ Calais or Boulogne.

Middl.
p. 494.

Ad Quint.
1. 16.
Ad Att.
4. 16.

Ep. Fam.
7. 7.

“Cæsar was now upon his second expedition into Britain, which raised much talk and expectation at Rome, and gave Cicero no small concern for the safety of his brother, who, as one of Cæsar’s lieutenants, was to bear a considerable part in it. But the accounts which he received from the place soon eased him of his apprehensions, by informing him, that there was nothing either to fear or to hope for from the attempt; no danger from the people, no spoils from the country. In a letter to Atticus: ‘We are in suspense (says he) about the British war: it is certain that the access of the island is strongly fortified; and it is known also already, that there is not a grain of silver in it, nor any thing else but slaves; of whom you will scarce expect any, I dare say, skilled in music or letters.’ In another to Trebatius: ‘I hear that there is not any gold or silver in the island: if so, you have nothing to do but to take one of their chariots and fly back to us.’

“From their railleries of this kind (says Dr. Middleton) one cannot help reflecting on the surprising fate and revolutions of kingdoms: how Rome, once the mistress of the world, the seat of arts, empire, and glory, now lies sunk in sloth, ignorance, and poverty; enslaved to the most cruel as well as to the most contemptible of tyrants, superstition and religious imposture: while this remote country, anciently the jest and contempt of the polite Romans, is become the happy seat of liberty, plenty, and letters, flourishing in all the arts and refinements of civil life; yet running, perhaps, the same course which Rome itself had run before it; from virtuous industry to wealth, from wealth to luxury, from luxury to an impatience of discipline and corruption of morals; till, by a total degeneracy and loss of virtue, being grown ripe for destruction, it falls a prey at last to some hardy oppressor, and, with the loss of liberty, losing every thing else that is valuable, sinks gradually again into its original barbarism.”

This reflection is undoubtedly very judicious as far as it regards the danger to which our country, with respect to its liberties, is exposed by the corruption of its morals: but who would not imagine that, in the opinion of the author, ancient Rome was free from superstition and religious imposture? Who would imagine that the author had written a book with this title: The religion of the present Romans derived from that of their heathen ancestors?

and all the prime nobility of the several states assembled. Cæsar's design was to leave behind him a few only of these nobles, on whose fidelity he could rely, and to take the rest into Britain as hostages, in order to prevent any commotions in Gaul during his absence.

Among those whom he resolved to carry away with him, was Dumnorix the Æduan; because he knew him to be a lover of novelties, ambitious, enterprising, and of great interest and authority among the Gauls. Dumnorix at first earnestly requested to be left behind; sometimes pretending that he was unused to the sea, and afraid of it; sometimes, that religious engagements required him to stay at home: but, finding his reasons had no weight with Cæsar, he began to cabal among the Gallic nobles, advising them not to leave the continent, and telling them that Cæsar's intention was undoubtedly to destroy them all; but that not daring to do it in their own country, he was carrying them into Britain, where he hoped to find a favourable opportunity of executing his cruel purpose.

Cæsar, though fully informed of these practices, yet, in consideration of the Ædui, a nation for which he had a singular regard, satisfied himself with endeavouring to traverse the designs of the malecontent; being determined, nevertheless, to continue inflexible, and to prefer the interests of the commonwealth to every other consideration. While detained at the port about five-and-twenty days, during which the north-west wind, very common on that coast, hindered him from sailing, he studied to keep Dumnorix in his duty by ways of gentleness and persuasion, not neglecting, however, to watch all his motions. At length, the wind springing up fair, he ordered both horse and foot to embark. As the execution of this order universally engaged the attention of the camp, Dumnorix seized the opportunity to draw off the Æduan cavalry; and he began his march homeward. Cæsar had early notice of it, instantly put

a stop to the embarkation, and, postponing every other business, sent out a strong party of horse to pursue the Æduan, and bring him back. Their orders were to kill him in case of disobedience or resistance. They overtook him; he refused to return, defended himself sword in hand, and implored the assistance of his followers, often crying out to them, that he was free, and the subject of a free state. The Romans, pursuant to the orders they had received, surrounded and slew him; upon which all the Æduan cavalry returned to Cæsar.

Cæsar's second invasion of Britain.

And now Cæsar, leaving Labienus, with three legions and 2,000 horse, to secure the port, provide corn, and have an eye upon the transactions of the continent, embarked on board his vessels the same number of horse, together with five legions; and weighing anchor about sunset, arrived with his whole fleet, the next day by noon, on the British coast, where he landed without opposition, in the same place which he had found so convenient the year before. The Britons had assembled in vast multitudes to oppose his landing, as he afterward understood by the prisoners: but, being terrified at the sight of so numerous a fleet, which, with the vessels that private persons had provided for their own use, amounted to 800 and upward, had quitted the shore, and retired to the hills. Cæsar left ten cohorts and 300 horse to secure the fleet; and with the rest marched in quest of the enemy, whom, agreeable to the intelligence he had received, he found posted on the farther side of a river,* about twelve miles from the place where he had landed. They made some efforts to hinder his passage, but were quickly driven from their post, and put to flight. However, the day being far spent, Cæsar, who was wholly unacquainted with the country, would not pursue them, but chose to employ the rest of the day in fortifying his camp.

* Supposed to be the Stour.

Early the next morning he sent out, in pursuit of the enemy, his troops, both horse and foot, divided into three

bodies : these were but just come within the sight of the British army, when they received orders from Cæsar to proceed no farther, but to return to the camp. Some horsemen, dispatched by Q. Atrius, had brought him word that, by a dreadful storm in the night before, his fleet was in a manner destroyed. This made him hasten back to the sea-side. Forty of his ships, he saw, were entirely lost, and the rest so damaged as to seem almost irreparable. Nevertheless, he set all the carpenters of both the fleet and the army to work, and sent over to Gaul for others, ordering, at the same time, Labienus to build as many ships as he could, by the labour of the legions that were with him. And, to prevent the like misfortune thereafter, he drew all his ships on shore, and enclosed them within the fortifications of his camp. This stupendous work was completed in ten days, the soldiers labouring the whole time without intermission. The ships being thus secured, and the camp strongly fortified, he left the same troops to guard it as before, and returned to the place where he had ceased the pursuit of the enemy.

Upon his arrival he found their numbers greatly increased. The chief command and administration of the war had, by common consent, been conferred upon Cassibelanus, king of the Trinobantes,* whose territories (says Cæsar) were divided from the maritime states by the river Thames at eighty miles' distance from the sea. This prince had hitherto been engaged in almost continual wars with his neighbours : but the terror, caused by the arrival of the Romans, making the Britons unite among themselves, they intrusted him with the whole conduct of the war.

* The people of Middlesex and Essex.

The Britons, in the beginning, gained some slight advantage over the Romans, surprised and astonished at their manner of employing their chariots in battle ; but in an attempt which they afterward made to cut off the

Roman foragers, they suffered so terrible a slaughter from the Roman cavalry whom Cæsar sent to the assistance of the foragers, that the auxiliary troops of Cassibelanus abandoned him, returning to their respective countries: nor did the Britons any more, with their united forces, engage the Romans.

Cæsar marched towards the Thames, in order to penetrate into the kingdom of Cassibelanus. The river was fordable but in one place, and not there without much difficulty; and the enemy were drawn up in great numbers on the other side: they had likewise fortified the bank with sharp stakes, and driven a great number of these into the bed of the river, so as to be covered by the water. Of this Cæsar had intelligence from prisoners and deserters: nevertheless he undertook to force his passage; and he succeeded. The legions advanced with so much expedition and alacrity, though up to their necks in water, that the enemy, unable to sustain the charge, betook themselves to flight.

Cassibelanus from that time determined to avoid a general action: disbanding his other forces, he kept with him only 4,000 chariots, with which he watched opportunities to cut off the Roman stragglers; or, when he had enticed the Romans, by a prospect of booty, to a disadvantageous ground, to start from his ambush, and fall upon them by surprise. These frequent alarms obliged Cæsar to order his cavalry to keep always so near the foot, as to be sure of having the support of these when necessity required.

And now several of the states round about sent ambassadors to make their submission to Cæsar. Of these the Trinobantes were the first. Their king Imanuentius had been put to death by Cassibelanus; and Mandubratius, the son of that unfortunate prince, was now in Cæsar's army, to whom he had fled, even into Gaul, for shelter and protection. The Trinobantes desired Cæsar

to send him back to govern them. They obtained their request; and in compliance with Cæsar's demands, sent him forty hostages, and supplied him with corn.

The protection granted to the Trinobantes securing them from the insults of the soldiers, several other petty states sent ambassadors to Cæsar, and submitted. From them he had intelligence, that he was not far from the capital^k of Cassibelanus, which was situated amidst woods and marshes, and whither great numbers of men and cattle were retired. Thither Cæsar marched his legions: and though the place appeared to be exceeding strong, both by art and nature, he nevertheless attacked it in two several quarters, and, after a short resistance, carried it; the Britons retiring to another part of the wood.

While these things passed on the north side of the Thames, four petty kings of Kent, by order from Cassibelanus, drew all their forces together, purposing to fall by surprise on the naval camp of the Romans: but these, sallying out against them as they approached, put them to the rout with great slaughter, took one of the four kings prisoner, and returned safe to the camp. Cassibelanus, discouraged by so many losses, the devastation of his territories, and, above all, the revolt of the provinces, sent ambassadors to Cæsar to sue for peace, by the mediation of Comius of Arras.

Cæsar, designing to pass the winter in Gaul, because of the frequent commotions in that country, and reflecting that but a small part of the summer remained, during which it would be easy for the Britons to protract the war, demanded hostages, and appointed the yearly tribute which Britain should pay to the Romans. At the same time he took Mandubratius and the Trinobantes under his protection, strictly charging Cassibelanus to give them no molestation. Having received the host-

^k A town among the Britons was nothing more than a thick wood, fortified with a ditch and a rampart, to serve as a place of retreat against the incursions of their enemies.

ages, he led his forces back to the sea-side, where he found his fleet repaired. The time of the equinox drew near: he seized therefore the opportunity of a favourable gentle breeze, weighed anchor about ten at night, and brought his whole fleet safe to the continent. He was the first of the Romans, says Tacitus, who transported an army into Britain: he terrified the natives, and became master of the coast; yet it would seem, that he only gave his countrymen a view of Britain, not the possession of it. Tac. Agric. n. 13.

* Amiens.

Having led up his fleet, and held a general assembly of the Gauls at Samarobriva,* his next affair was to put his legions into winter-quarters; and as the crop this year had been very thin, by reason of the great droughts, he was obliged to quarter his men in different provinces.

† People of Teroenne in Artois.
‡ People of Cambresis.

One legion he quartered on the Morini,† under the command of C. Fabius: another among the Nervii,‡ under Q. Cicero: a third with the Ædui,¹ under L. Roscius: and a fourth in the country of the Rhemi, on the borders of the Treviri, under Labienus. Three were

§ The present Picardy, a part of Belgic Gaul.

sent into Belgium,§ over whom he appointed three commanders, his quæstor, M. Crassus, L. Munatius Plancus, and C. Trebonius. The eighth and last, which Cæsar had newly raised on the other side of the Po, were sent, together with five cohorts, among the Eburones,* between the Rhine and the Meuse, where Ambiorix and Cativulcus reigned. At the head of this last body were two of Cæsar's lieutenants, Q. Titurius Sabinus and L. Aurunculeius Cotta. By this distribution of his legions, Cæsar thought he had found a remedy against the scarcity of corn; and yet they lay all within the compass of 100 miles, except the legion under L. Roscius, for which he was in no pain, as being quartered in a very quiet and friendly country. He resolved, however, not

|| People of Liege.

¹ In the text of Cæsar we read Essui [an unknown people], but Vossius thinks we should read Ædui, the Autunois.

to leave Gaul till he had received assurances that their quarters were established, fortified, and secured.

Among the Carnutes * lived Tasgetius, a man of distinguished birth, and whose ancestors had been possessed of the sovereignty of that state. Cæsar had restored him to the dignity of his forefathers, in consideration of the many services he had done him in all his wars. It was now the third year of his reign, when he was openly assassinated. The affair was laid before Cæsar, who, fearing lest the great number concerned in the plot might draw the state into a revolt, ordered L. Plancus, with a legion from Belgium, to march speedily into the country of the Carnutes, fix his winter-quarters in that province, seize all who had been concerned in the murder, and send them to him.

* People of Chartres.

Scarce fifteen days had elapsed since the arrival of the legions in their appointed quarters, when a general conspiracy of the Gauls broke out, discovering itself first in the revolt of the Eburones. Their two chiefs or kings, Ambiorix and Cativulcus, had been to meet, in a friendly manner, on their frontiers, Sabinus and Cotta; and had supplied them with corn: but now, instigated by Indutiomarus of Treves, they excited their people to take up arms; and, having fallen by surprise on some Roman soldiers who were cutting wood, and put them to the sword, came with a great body of troops to attack the camp where the legion was intrenched. Repulsed with loss, they had recourse to cunning and perfidy, demanding a conference, and pretending that they had something to say which concerned the common interest, and might put an end to the present differences.

Accordingly Arpinus, a Roman knight, a friend of Sabinus; and Junius of Spain, who had frequently before been sent to Ambiorix; were deputed to treat. Ambiorix addressed them in words to this effect: "I have in no sort forgot the many obligations I am under to Cæsar, who freed me from the tribute I was wont to

pay to the Aduatici, and restored to me my son and nephew, whom that people, after receiving them as hostages, had treated as slaves. The hostilities I have just now committed were not the effect of my own private animosity against the Romans, but were the act of the whole state; where the government is of such a nature, that the people have as much power over me as I have over the people. Even the state itself in a manner has been forced into this war: I can appeal to my own weakness for the truth of what I say, being not so very unskilled in affairs, as to imagine that the Eburones are a match for the Romans. It is a scheme concerted by all the states of Gaul, to assault in one day, this very day, all the quarters of the Roman army, so that no one may be able to succour another. It was not easy for us to resist the importunity of those of our own nation, especially when the proposal was to act in concert, for the recovery of liberty. But, having performed what the common voice of my country demanded, I think I may now listen to that of gratitude: I find myself compelled by my attachment to Cæsar, and by my friendship for Sabinus, to give you notice of the extreme danger to which your legion is exposed. A great body of Germans has actually passed the Rhine, and will be here in two days at farthest: Sabinus and Cotta, therefore, are to consider whether it will be advisable to retire with their troops, and, before the neighbouring states can be apprized of their design, go and join Labienus or Cicero, who are neither of them distant above fifty miles. As for myself, I promise, by all that is sacred, to secure your retreat through my territories; and I undertake this the more readily, as I shall thereby not only discharge my duty to my country, in delivering it from the inconvenience of wintering the Romans, but at the same time I shall manifest my gratitude to Cæsar." Having made this speech, he withdrew.

Arpinus and Junius reported what they had heard to

the lieutenants, who thought the information not to be neglected, though it came from an enemy : for it appeared to them altogether incredible, that the Eburones, a weak and inconsiderable people, should, unsupported, presume to rise up in arms against the Romans : they laid the matter therefore before a council of war. Cotta, with a great number of the military tribunes, and centurions of the first rank, were against undertaking any thing hastily, or quitting their winter-quarters, before they had received orders from Cæsar so to do. They alleged that their camp was well fortified, and might be defended against all the forces of the Germans : that it was well stored with provisions, so as to be in no danger of distress on that account : and, lastly, that nothing could be more dishonourable or injudicious, than, in affairs of the greatest moment, to take measures upon the information of an enemy.

Sabinus, on the other hand, exclaimed, that it would be too late to think of retiring, when the enemy, strengthened by the accession of the Germans, should come against them ; or when the Romans in the nearest quarters to them should have received some considerable blow : that Cæsar was unquestionably gone into Italy ; and that the enemy knew it, which gave the Carnutes the boldness to think of assassinating Tasgetius, and the Eburones of assaulting the Roman camp. “ Who could imagine Ambiorix, without a certainty of being supported, would have embarked in so dangerous an enterprise ? ” He added, “ My advice is in all respects safe ; because, if no such confederacy has been formed, we have nothing to apprehend in marching to the nearest legion ; if, on the contrary, all Gaul and Germany are united, expedition alone can save us from destruction : whereas, by following the advice of Cotta, though we may defend ourselves for awhile, we are sure in the end of perishing by famine.” The dispute grew warm, and continued long : Cotta and the prin-

cipal officers strongly opposing the march of the troops. At last Sabinus raising his voice, that he might be heard by the soldiers without: "Be it so, then (says he), since you seem so resolved: I am not the man who is afraid of death. But if any misfortune happen, those who hear me will know whom to blame. In two days, did not you oppose it, we might easily reach the quarters next us; and there, in conjunction with our fellow-soldiers, confront the common danger: whereas, by keeping the troops separate, and at a distance, you reduce them to the necessity of perishing by sword or famine."

The officers, surrounding their generals, conjured them not to put all to hazard by their dissension.—That, whatever resolution was taken, whether to go or stay, the danger was by no means great, provided they acted in concert; but their disagreement threatened the troops with inevitable destruction. The debates continued till midnight: when at length, Cotta, vanquished by importunity, yielded to Sabinus. Orders were given for marching by break of day. The remainder of the night was none of it passed in sleep, each man being taken up in choosing what things to carry with him; so that their want of rest rendered them incapable of a vigorous defence, in case of being attacked upon their march. At daybreak they left their camp, not like men acting by the advice of an enemy, but as if Ambiorix had been their particular friend; marching in a very extended column, and followed by a great train of baggage.

The enemy, judging, from the hurry and bustle in the camp, that the Romans intended to leave it, placed themselves in ambush in a wood, and there waited for them at about two miles' distance; and when the greater part of the army had entered a large valley, suddenly appeared, and attacked them both in front and rear.

Then Sabinus, like one conscious of having neglected

all the necessary precautions, and unable to hide his concern, ran up and down among the troops, beginning to dispose them in order of battle; but with an air so timid and disconcerted, that it appeared he had no hopes of success, as happens for the most part to those who leave all to the last moment of execution. But Cotta, who had foreseen that this might happen, and had therefore opposed the departure of the troops, omitted nothing in his power for the common safety, calling to and encouraging the men like an able general, and at the same time fighting with the bravery of a common soldier; and, because the great length of the column rendered it difficult for the lieutenants to remedy all disorders, and repair expeditiously enough to the places where their presence was necessary, orders were given to quit the defence of the baggage, and form into an orb. This disposition, though not improper in these circumstances, was nevertheless attended with very unhappy consequences; for, being considered as the effect of terror and despair, it discouraged the Romans, and augmented the confidence of the enemy. Besides, as unavoidably happens on such occasions, many of the soldiers, quitting their ensigns, hurried away to fetch from the baggage the things they most valued, and filled all parts with uproar and lamentation.

The Gauls conducted themselves with great prudence: their officers proclaimed through the ranks: "Let no man stir from his post; the baggage of the Romans and every thing they have shall be yours; but let your first care be to secure the victory." The Romans not being fewer in number or less brave than the enemy, cherished a hope, though they had neither a general nor fortune on their side, that yet by their bravery they should be able to surmount all difficulties; and whenever any of the cohorts sallied out, so as to come to close fighting with the enemy, a considerable slaughter of the Gauls ensued. This being observed

by Ambiorix, he ordered his men to cast their darts at a distance, avoid a close fight, retire before the Romans, when they advanced, and pursue them when returning to their standards. These orders were exactly followed, much to the advantage of the enemy. The Romans, however, still maintained their ground; and though the fight had continued from sunrise till two in the afternoon, they had done nothing, in all that time, unworthy of the Roman name. At length Balventius, who the year before had been made first centurion of a legion, a man of distinguished courage, and great authority among the troops, had both his thighs pierced through with a dart. Lucanius, an officer of the same rank, endeavouring to rescue his son, whom he saw surrounded by the enemy, was killed after a brave resistance: and Cotta, the lieutenant, encouraging the several cohorts and companies, received a blow on the mouth from a sling.

These disasters totally dispirited Sabinus; who, perceiving Ambiorix at a distance animating his troops, sent his interpreter, Cn. Pompey, to beg quarter for his soldiers and for himself. Ambiorix answered: "That, if Sabinus desired a conference, he was ready to grant it, and to pledge his faith, that no hurt should befall his person; and that, as to the Roman soldiers, he hoped to prevail with the multitude to spare them too." This answer Sabinus communicated to Cotta, proposing to him that they should go and confer with Ambiorix, from whom he hoped to obtain quarter both for themselves and their men. Cotta absolutely refused to go to an armed enemy, and persisted in that resolution. Sabinus, attended by such of the officers as were then about him, set forward; and when he drew near to Ambiorix, being commanded to lay down his arms, obeyed; ordering those that were with him to do the same: after which, being gradually surrounded, while Ambiorix purposely spun out a long discourse, he was

perfidiously murdered. Then the Gauls, according to their custom, raising a shout and crying out victory, charged the Roman troops with great fury, and put them into disorder. Cotta, fighting manfully, was slain, with the greatest part of the soldiers. The rest retreated to the camp they had quitted in the morning; of these, Petrosidius, the standard-bearer, finding himself sore pressed by the enemy, threw the eagle within the intrenchments, and was killed fighting bravely before them. Those that remained, with much difficulty, sustained the attack till night; but, having no hope of preservation, killed one another to the last man. A few, who had escaped out of the battle in the field, got by different ways to Labienus's camp, and brought him the news of this sad event.

Ambiorix, elated with his victory, marched immediately, at the head of his cavalry, into the country of the Aduatici, which bordered upon his territories. Having informed them of his success, and roused them to arms, he the next day arrived among the Nervii, and urged them not to lose the favourable opportunity of freeing themselves for ever from the yoke of slavery, and revenging the injuries they had received from the Romans. He added: "Two of their lieutenants have been slain, and a great part of their army cut to pieces: it will be an easy matter, by a sudden attack, to destroy the legion quartered in your country, under the command of Cicero; and I myself am ready to assist you in the enterprise." By this speech he drew in the Nervii. They dispatched messengers forthwith to the cantons dependent on their state, and, having assembled what forces they could, came unexpectedly upon Cicero's quarters, who had heard nothing yet of the fate of Sabinus. Here it unavoidably fell out, that, by the sudden arrival of the cavalry, the Roman soldiers who had been sent out to cut wood for firing, and for the fortification of the camp, were intercepted and put to the sword; after which the

Eburones, Aduatici, and Nervii, with their allies and tributaries, amounting to a formidable army, came and attacked the camp. The Romans instantly flew to arms, mounted the rampart, and sustained that day's assault, though with difficulty; for the enemy placed all their hopes in dispatch, and firmly believed, that, if they came off conquerors upon this occasion, they could not fail of victory every where else.

Cicero's first care was to write to Cæsar, promising the messengers great rewards if they carried the letters safe: but, as all the ways were beset with the enemies' troops, most of his couriers were intercepted. Of the materials which had been brought for fortifying the camp, 120 towers were built with incredible dispatch during the night, and the works about the rampart completed. Next day the enemy, much stronger than before, attacked the camp and filled up the ditch, but were again repulsed by the Romans. This continued for several days together. The night was wholly employed repairing the breaches made by day; insomuch that neither the sick nor the wounded were exempted from labour. Cicero himself, though much out of order, would take no repose even during the night, unless when the soldiers constrained him to it.

In the meantime some officers of the Nervii, who were well acquainted with Cicero, desired a conference with him: to this he having given consent, they addressed him in the same strain that Ambiorix had used to Sabinus: they said that all Gaul was in arms: that the Germans had passed the Rhine: that Cæsar and the rest of the Romans were besieged in their winter-quarters. They told him likewise of the fate of Sabinus, and, to gain credit, produced Ambiorix, adding: "It is in vain for you to expect relief from those who are in the utmost distress: we mean not, however, any injury to you or to the Romans; but only to prevent their wintering in this country, and bringing that practice into a cus-

tom : you are at liberty therefore to leave your quarters, and may retire, in safety and without molestation, whithersoever you please." To this Cicero made a short answer : " It is not usual with the people of Rome to accept conditions from an armed enemy : but, if you will lay down your arms, I promise to be your mediator ; and will permit you to send ambassadors to Cæsar, from whose justice you may reasonably expect redress."

The Nervii, not succeeding by this stratagem, surrounded the camp with a line, the rampart of which was eleven feet high, and the ditch fifteen deep. They had learned something of this in their former wars with Cæsar, and they got farther instructions from their prisoners : but being unprovided of the tools necessary in this kind of service, they were obliged to cut the turf with their swords, dig up the earth with their hands, and carry it in their cloaks. And hence it will be easy to form some judgment of their number : for in less than three hours they completed a line fifteen miles in circuit. The following days were employed in raising towers proportioned to the height of the Roman rampart ; and in preparing scythes and wooden galleries, in which they were again assisted by the prisoners.

On the seventh day of the attack, a very high wind arising, they began to throw red-hot balls of clay, and burning javelins, upon the barracks of the Romans, which, after the manner of the Gauls, were thatched with straw. These soon took fire ; and the flames were in a moment spread by the wind into all parts of the camp. The enemy falling on with a mighty shout, as if already secure of victory, advanced their towers and galleries, and prepared to scale the rampart. But such was the constancy of the Roman soldiers, that though the flames surrounded them on every side, and they were oppressed with showers of darts, and saw their huts, their baggage, and their whole fortunes in a blaze, yet not only did they continue firm in their posts, but

scarce a man offered so much as to look behind him ; so intent were they on fighting and repelling the enemy. This was by much the hardest day for the Roman troops ; but had nevertheless this fortunate issue, that the greatest number of the enemy were on that day wounded or slain : for, as they had crowded close up to the ramparts, those behind prevented the front ranks from retiring. The flames abating by degrees, and the enemy having brought forward one of their towers even to the foot of the rampart, the centurions^m of the third cohort drew off their men a little, beckoning to the Gauls, and challenging them to enter : but, as not a man of them would run the hazard, the Romans attacked them on all sides with stones, drove them from the tower, and set it on fire.

As the defence every day became more difficult, chiefly by the great multitude of killed and wounded, which considerably lessened the number of defendants, Cicero sent letter after letter to inform Cæsar of his danger. Many of these couriers, falling into the enemies' hands, were tortured to death within view of the Roman soldiers. There was at this time in the Roman camp a Nervian of distinction, by name Vertico, who

^m In this legion were two centurions of distinguished valour, T. Pulfio and L. Varenus, who stood fair for being raised to the first rank of their order. These were perpetually disputing with one another the pre-eminence in courage, and at every year's promotion contended with great eagerness for precedence. In the heat of the attack before the rampart, Pulfio said to Varenus : " What hinders you now, or what more glorious opportunity would you desire, of signalizing your bravery ? This, this is the day for determining the controversy between us."—Instantly he sallied out of the camp, and rushed amidst the thickest of the Gauls. Nor did Varenus decline the challenge ; but thinking his honour at stake, followed at some distance. Pulfio darted his javelin at a Gaul in the enemy's van, and transfixed him : he fell dead ; the multitude covered him with their shields, and all poured their darts upon Pulfio, giving him no time to retire. A javelin pierced his shield, and stuck fast in his belt. This accident gave the enemy time to surround him, before he could make use of his right hand to draw his sword. Varenus flew to his assistance, and endeavoured to rescue him. Immediately the whole multitude, quitting Pulfio, as fancying the dart had dispatched him, turned upon Varenus. He met them with his sword drawn, charged them hand to hand ; and having laid one dead at his feet, drove back the rest : but pursuing them with too much eagerness, stepped into a hole, and fell down. Pulfio hastened to his relief ; and both together, after having slain a multitude of the Gauls, and acquired infinite applause, retired unhurt within the intrenchments. Thus fortune gave such a turn to the dispute, that each owed his life to his rival ; nor was it possible to determine which of them had the better title to the prize of valour.

in the beginning of the siege had fled to Cicero, and given ample proofs of his fidelity. This man engaged one of his slaves by the hope of liberty and a promise of great rewards, to carry a letter to Cæsar. The slave passed through the camp of the Gauls unsuspected, as being himself of their nation, and arrived safe at Cæsar's quarters.

Cæsar, receiving the letter about five in the afternoon, immediately dispatched a messenger to Marcus Crassus, who was quartered among the Bellovaci twenty-five miles off, ordering him to draw out his legion at midnight, and march with all possible expedition to join him. Crassus came away with the courier. Cæsar sent likewise to C. Fabius, who wintered with the Morini, to lead his legion into the country of the Atrebates, which was in the way to Cicero: and he wrote to Labienus to meet him upon the frontiers of the Nervii, if it could be done with safety. He himself, in the meantime, assembled about 400 horse from the nearest garrisons, resolving not to wait for those parts of his army which lay at too great a distance.

At nine in the morning he had notice from his scouts of the arrival of Crassus. That day he marched twenty miles, leaving Crassus with a legion at Samarobriva,* * Amiens. where he had deposited the baggage, hostages, public papers, and all the provisions which had been laid up for the winter. Fabius, in consequence of his instructions, having made all the haste he could, met him with his legion. Labienus, who had been informed of the death of Sabinus, and the destruction of the troops under his command, and who saw all the forces of Treves advancing against him, fearing, lest, if he should quit his quarters, the enemy might construe it into a flight, and that it would be impossible for him to sustain their attack, especially as they were flushed with their late success against Sabinus, wrote to Cæsar, informing him of that disaster, and the danger that would attend the quit-

ting his camp; and that all the forces of the Treviri, both horse and foot, were encamped within three miles of him.

Cæsar approved his reasons, though he thereby found himself reduced from three to two legions: and well knowing that all depended upon expedition, he made forced marches, reached the territories of the Nervii, and there learned from some prisoners the state of the siege, and the danger the legion was in. Immediately he engaged a Gallic horseman, by the promise of great rewards, to carry a letter to Cicero: it was written in Greek characters, that if it fell into the enemy's hands, it might not be intelligible to them. The messenger had orders, in case he found it impracticable for him to get into the Roman camp, to tie the letter to a javelin, and throw it in. In this letter Cæsar sent word to Cicero, that he was already on the march to relieve him, and would be up very soon; exhorting him to defend himself in the meantime with his wonted bravery. The Gaul, fearing to be discovered and intercepted, threw the letter into the camp as he had been ordered: but the javelin, accidentally sticking in a tower, remained there two days unperceived: on the third a soldier saw it, took it down, and brought it to Cicero; who immediately read it in full assembly, and thereby diffused universal joy through the camp. Presently after, they perceived the smoke of the villages fired by Cæsar in his march, which put the arrival of succour beyond all doubt.

The Gauls, having notice of it also by their scouts, thought proper to quit the siege and march away to meet Cæsar. Their army consisted of about 60,000 men. Cicero, now at liberty, applied himself again to Vertico for the slave above spoken of, whom, having admonished him to use the utmost diligence and circumspection, he dispatched with a letter to Cæsar, informing him, that the enemy had raised the siege, and were

advancing against him with all their forces. Cæsar received the letter about midnight, communicated the contents to his army, and exhorted them to meet the enemy with courage. Next day he decamped early, and, after a march of four miles, discovered the Gauls on the other side of a large valley, with a rivulet in front. As the siege of Cicero's camp was now raised, Cæsar had no longer any reason to be in a hurry : he encamped, therefore, in the most convenient spot he could find, and completed his intrenchments. His army, consisting of no more than 7,000 men, without baggage, required but a very small camp ; nevertheless, to inspire the enemy with the greater contempt of him, he contracted it as much as possible ; and, in the meantime, sending out scouts on all sides, he endeavoured to find where he might cross the valley with safety.

The rest of the day passed in slight skirmishes near the brook ; but the main body of the army on both sides kept within their lines : the Gauls, in expectation of more forces, which were not yet come up ; Cæsar, that, by pretending fear, he might draw the enemy to his side of the valley. Early the next morning, the enemy's cavalry, approaching the camp of the Romans, charged their cavalry ; which, by Cæsar's orders, purposely gave ground and retired behind the works. At the same time he ordered the ramparts to be raised higher, and the gates to be barricaded ; and that the soldiers, in the execution of these orders, should run up and down tumultuously, and affect an appearance of timidity and concern. The enemy, invited by all these appearances, crossed the valley, and drew up in a very disadvantageous place. The Romans in the meanwhile retiring from the rampart, the Nervii approached still nearer, cast their darts on all sides within the trenches, and sent heralds round the camp to proclaim that, if any of the Gauls or Romans had a mind to come over to them, they should be at liberty so to do till nine o'clock,

after which no quarter would be granted. Nay, so far did they carry their contempt, that, thinking they could not break in by the gates (which, to deceive them, were stopped up with a single row of turf), some began to scale the rampart, and others to fill up the ditch. But then Cæsar, sallying forth by all the gates at once, and charging them briskly with his cavalry, put them to so precipitate a flight, that not a man offered to make the least resistance. Great numbers were slain, and the rest obliged to throw down their arms. The same day he joined Cicero with all his forces, when, beholding the towers, galleries, and other works of the Gauls, he could not help being struck with admiration. He then reviewed Cicero's legion, and found that not a tenth man had escaped unwounded, which gave him a just idea of the greatness of the danger to which they had been exposed, and of the vigorous defence they had made. He bestowed great commendation on the legion and its commander; and addressed himself to the centurions and military tribunes by name, of whose valour Cicero made honourable mention.

In the meantime, the report of Cæsar's victory flew with incredible speed, through the country of the Rhemi, to Labienus. For though he lay at the distance of fifty miles from Cicero's camp, where Cæsar did not arrive till past three in the afternoon, yet before midnight a shout was raised by the Rhemi at the gates of Labienus's camp, by which they notified Cæsar's victory, and their congratulations on that success. This news being carried to the Treviri, Indutiomarus, who had determined to attack the camp of Labienus the next day, made off in the night, and retired with all his forces into his own country. Cæsar sent back Fabius with his legion to his former quarters, resolving to take up his own for the winter near Samarobriva* with three legions, and to continue in person with them, Gaul being then universally in motion. For the defeat and death of Sa-

* Amiens.

binus spreading every where, the states of Gaul were almost every one of them meditating a revolt; with which view they sent messengers and deputies into all parts, to concert measures, and agree upon the properest place where to begin the war.

But Cæsar, having summoned the principal noblemen of every state to attend him, and having made them sensible that he was no stranger to their designs, prevailed, partly by menaces, and partly by exhortations, to keep the greatest part of Gaul in its duty. The Senones,* however, a potent state, and of great authority among the Gauls, formed a design of assassinating Cavarinus, whom Cæsar had given them for a king; whose brother Moritagus had held the sovereignty at the time of Cæsar's arrival in Gaul, and whose ancestors had long been in possession of that dignity. Cavarinus, having intelligence of the plot, thought proper to fly; whereupon pursuing him to the very frontiers, they drove him from his kingdom, and sent ambassadors to Cæsar to justify their conduct: but, upon his ordering their whole senate to repair to him, they refused to comply. And of such influence was this example among the barbarians, that some at last became hardy enough to declare open war; and so great a change did it produce in the inclinations of all, that, except the Ædui and Rhemi, who had always been particularly distinguished and favoured by Cæsar (the first, on account of their ancient and inviolable fidelity to the people of Rome; the last, for their late services in the Gallic war), scarce was there a single state in all Gaul that did not give cause of suspicion. Nor is it, in truth, to be much wondered at, that a people of high spirit, and famed above all other nations for their military virtues, could not with patience see themselves so fallen from their former height of glory, as to be forced to bend under the yoke of Roman domination.

Indutiomarus and the Treviri ceased not, during the

whole winter, to send ambassadors over the Rhine, soliciting the German states, offering them money, and assuring them that the greater part of the Roman army was already cut off: but no one of those states could be persuaded to come into their designs: because, having twice before tried their fortunes with the Romans, first in the war of Ariovistus, and then in the defeat of the Tenchtheri, they were resolved, they told them, to run no more hazards. Indutiomarus, disappointed of this hope, was not less active in drawing forces together, soliciting recruits from the neighbouring states, providing horses, and encouraging even outlaws and convicts, by the promise of great rewards, to engage in his service. And so great credit and authority had he by this means acquired in Gaul, that, from all parts, embassies and messages were sent to solicit his alliance and friendship.

Finding himself thus voluntarily courted: on one side by the Senones and Carnutes, whom a consciousness of guilt incited thereto; on another by the Nervii and Aduatici, who were actually preparing for a war with the Romans; so that, if he once took the field, forces would not be wanting; he called an assembly of the states in arms. This, according to the custom of the Gauls, implies an actual commencement of war; and, by a standing law, obliges all their youth to appear in arms at the assembly; in which they are so very strict, that whosoever has the misfortune to come last, is put to death, in sight of the multitude, with all manner of torments. In this assembly, Cingetorix, the son-in-law of Indutiomarus, and who (as related above) had declared for Cæsar, and still continued firm to him, was proclaimed a public enemy, and his estate confiscated.—After which Indutiomarus acquainted the council, that the Senones, Carnutes, and several other states of Gaul, had solicited his assistance; that he accordingly intended to join his forces with theirs, taking his route through the territories of the Rhemi, and giving up their lands

to be plundered ; but that, before he began his march, he was desirous of mastering the camp of Labienus : and to effect this he gave the necessary directions.

Labienus, whose camp, both by the nature of the ground and the fortifications he had added, was extremely strong, feared nothing ; but was wholly intent upon a project to give the enemy some considerable blow. Informed by Cingetorix and his adherents of the speech made by Indutiomarus in the general council of Gaul, he sent deputies to the neighbouring states, to solicit them for a recruit of horse, and appointed a day of rendezvous for the cavalry they should send : in the meantime, by an affectation of fear, the Roman was contriving to beget presumption and security in the mind of his enemy. The stratagem succeeded. The king, at the head of his cavalry, came every day quite up to the camp of the Romans, insulting them with opprobrious language, and challenging them to fight.—The Romans making no answer, the Gauls retired towards night, and, without observing any order, dispersed themselves. Labienus had, unknown to the enemy, received into his camp by night all the horse he had sent for. One evening, therefore, when the enemy had retreated in their careless manner, he ordered all his cavalry to make a sally on a sudden, strictly cautioning and charging his men, that, as soon as they had put the Gauls to flight (which happened according to his expectation), they should every one single out Indutiomarus, nor attempt to kill or wound any other, till they saw him slain : for Labienus was unwilling that any delay, occasioned by the slaughter of the rest, should give the general an opportunity to escape : and he promised great rewards to the man who should kill him. This measure succeeded : for, as they were intent upon the destruction of Indutiomarus alone, he was overtaken and slain in passing a river, and his head brought to the camp. The Roman cavalry, in their return, put all to the sword that came in their way.

Upon the news of this defeat, the forces of the Eburones and Nervii returned home; and Gaul was somewhat quieter the rest of the winter.

J. C.
Comm. l. 6.

Cæsar, for many reasons, expecting greater commotions in Gaul, ordered his lieutenants, M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T. Sextius, to levy recruits. And as Pompey, now proconsul, had, during his second consulship (688), enlisted, in Cisalpine Gaul, a considerable number of soldiers, to the amount of a legion, but had not put them into that form (the public affairs detaining him near the city), Cæsar requested of him to set those forces on foot, form them into a legion, and send it to him: for he thought it of the utmost importance, towards securing a proper respect from the Gauls for the time to come, to give them such an idea of the power of Italy, as might convince them, that it was not only able speedily to repair any losses sustained, but even to bring a greater force into the field. “Friendship and the good of the commonwealth (says Cæsar), equally determined Pompey to comply with this request:” and the lieutenants having with great diligence executed their commissions, three new legions, containing double the number of cohorts lost with Sabinus, were brought into Gaul before the end of winter.

After the death of Indutiomarus, slain as related above, the Treviri conferred the command on his relations. They persisted likewise in soliciting the Germans, and gained them by force of money; and they associated Ambiorix in the confederacy. Cæsar found that he was threatened with war on all sides; the Nervii, Aduatici, Menapii, with all the Germans on that side the Rhine, were actually in arms: the Senones refused to attend him, pursuant to his orders; and were tampering with the Carnutes, and other neighbouring states: and that the Treviri were soliciting the Germans by frequent embassies: he judged therefore that it would be necessary to open the campaign early. Accordingly,

without waiting till the winter was over, he drew together the four nearest legions, and fell unexpectedly into the territories of the Nervii, before they could either assemble in a body, or find means to save themselves by flight. Having carried off a great number of men and cattle, enriched the soldiers with booty, and laid waste the country, he compelled the inhabitants to give hostages, and then led back his legions into their winter-quarters.ⁿ

[YEAR OF ROME 700.^o]

Early in the spring, Cæsar summoned a general assembly of Gaul. No deputies from the Senones, or the Carnutes, or the Treviri, appearing, he looked upon this as the beginning of a revolt, adjourned the session, and transferred it to Lutetia;* whose inhabitants, though they had been united with the Senones for 100 years past, did not appear to be concerned with them in their present measures. The same day in which he declared the adjournment, he set out with his legions against the Senones, and made such haste, that Acco their chief, not having time to collect his forces, ordered the multitude to shelter themselves in their towns: but before this could be done the Romans appeared. Entreaties were now the only resource left to the Senones. Cæsar, at the request of his faithful allies the Ædui, whose clients they were, pardoned them; but demanded of them 100 hostages; and these he committed to the custody of the Ædui. The Carnutes likewise submitted, and obtained the same conditions by the mediation of the Rhemi, their patrons. Cæsar then went to Lutetia, put an end to the session of the states, and ordered the Gauls to furnish him with a body of cavalry.

Celtic Gaul being thus restored to a state of tranquillity, Cæsar turned his thoughts to the war with the

ⁿ For the events and transactions, at Rome, in this year, 699, see above, p. 135, &c.

^o N. B. Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messala, the consuls of the year 700, did not enter on their magistracy before the middle of July.

Treviri, and with Ambiorix king of the Eburones, purposing to revenge, by his death, the slaughter of the Roman cohorts.

He knew that Ambiorix was in friendship with the Menapii, a fierce nation, who, living in a country full of woods and morasses, had hitherto eluded the efforts of the Roman army, and had never made the least step towards a submission to Cæsar: he knew likewise, that, by means of the Treviri, he had entered into an alliance with the Germans. Cæsar thought it advisable, therefore, to deprive him of those two supports, before he attacked him in person. This resolution being taken, he sent the baggage of the whole army to Labienus in the country of the Treviri, ordered him a reinforcement of two legions, and marched himself against the Menapii with five legions, who carried nothing with them but their arms. The Menapii were soon constrained to submit and give hostages. Cæsar granted them peace on condition of their engaging not to admit Ambiorix, or any one from him, into their territories. These things settled, he left Comius of Arras there, with a body of horse, to keep them in awe, and set out himself against the Treviri.

In the meantime Labienus, by pretending fear and flight, had drawn the Treviri over a river, that was between him and them; and had then with great ease put them to the rout. The Germans, who were coming to their assistance, hearing of their defeat, returned home; and the relations of Indutiomarus, who had been the authors of the revolt, chose likewise to retire with them: and within a few days the whole state submitted. Cingetorix, who had always continued faithful to the Romans, was thereupon invested with the supreme authority.

Cæsar, after his arrival at Treves from the country of the Menapii, resolved, for two reasons, to pass the Rhine a second time; to punish the Germans for sending succours to the Treviri, and to deter them from givingo r

the common people are little better than slaves; attempting nothing

24 26 28 30 32

GERMANIA, DACIA,
MOESIA, ILLYRICUM,
PANNONIA, RHÆTIA,
ET NORICUM.

52

M

Olympic Stadia
200 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

promising a retreat to Ambiorix. In consequence of this resolution, he set about making a bridge, which was finished in a few days. Upon his arrival on the German side of the river, ambassadors came to him from the Ubii, to assure him that they had neither sent troops to the assistance of the Treviri, nor in any instance departed from their engagements; and they requested he would spare their territories, and not, out of a general hatred to the Germans, involve the innocent in the punishment of the guilty. Cæsar, upon inquiry, found that the Ubii were wholly innocent, and that the aids sent to the Treviri were from the Suevi. These, upon certain information of the arrival of the Roman army, had retired to the remotest part of the country with all their forces, and those of their allies; and there they waited the coming of the enemy at the entrance of an immense forest, called Bacenis,^p which served as a barrier between the Cherusci and the Suevi, to prevent their mutual incursions.^q

^p Cellarius takes it to be the forest of Hartz in Lower Saxony, in the principality of Wolfenbittel.

^q On this occasion, says Cæsar, it may not be improper to say somewhat of the manners of the Gauls and Germans, and the difference of customs between these two nations. A spirit of faction prevails throughout Gaul, and that not only in their several states, districts, and villages, but almost in every private family.——When Cæsar arrived in the country, the Ædui were at the head of one faction, and the Sequani of the other. The latter being the weaker, because the Ædui had several considerable states in their dependance, they united with Ariovistus and the Germans, whom, by great presents and promises, they drew over the Rhine to their assistance. This alliance made them so powerful, that, having worsted their enemies in several battles, and killed almost all their nobility, they forced the states dependant upon the Ædui to have recourse to them for protection; obliged the Ædui themselves to give the children of their principal nobility as hostages, swear publicly not to attempt any thing against the Sequani, and resign up to their possession a part of their territories; and by this means they rendered themselves in a manner sovereigns of all Gaul. Divitiacus, in this necessity, applied himself to the senate of Rome for relief, but without effect. Cæsar's arrival soon changed the face of affairs. The Æduan hostages were sent back, their former clients restored, and new ones procured them by Cæsar's interest; it appearing, that such as were under their protection, enjoyed a more equal and milder lot than others: by all which their fortune and authority being considerably enlarged, the Sequani were obliged to resign the sovereignty. The Rhemi now held the second place: and, as they were known to be in the same degree of favour with Cæsar, such of the Gauls as could not get over their old animosity to the Ædui, put themselves under the protection of the Rhemi. These were extremely attentive to the interests of their clients, and thereby both preserved their old authority, and that which they had newly acquired. Such, therefore, was the then situation of Gaul: the Ædui possessed indisputably the first rank, the Rhemi were next in consideration and dignity.

Over all Gaul, there are only two orders of men in any degree of honour and esteem: for the common people are little better than slaves; attempting nothing of

Cæsar, fearing the want of provisions, because Germany was but ill cultivated, resolved not to advance any

Le pays
Chartrain.

themselves, and having no share in the public deliberations. As they are generally oppressed with debt, heavy tributes, or the exactions of their superiors, they make themselves vassals to the great, who exercise the same jurisdiction over them as masters do over slaves. The two orders of men, with whom, as we have said, all authority and distinction are lodged, are the druids and the nobles. The druids preside in matters of religion, have the care of public and private sacrifices, and interpret the will of the gods. They have the direction and education of the youth, by whom they are held in great honour. In almost all controversies, whether public or private, the decision is left to them: and if any crime is committed, any murder perpetrated; if any dispute arises touching an inheritance, or the limits of adjoining estates; in all such cases they are the supreme judges. They decree rewards and punishments: and if any one refuses to submit to their sentence, whether magistrate or private man, they interdict him the sacrifices. This is the greatest punishment that can be inflicted among the Gauls: because such as are under this prohibition are considered as impious and wicked: all men shun them, and decline their conversation and fellowship, lest they should suffer from them by contagion. They can neither have recourse to the law for justice, nor are capable of any public office. The druids are all under one chief, who possesses the supreme authority in that body. Upon his death, if any one remarkably excels the rest, he succeeds: but if there are several candidates of equal merit, the affair is determined by a plurality of suffrages. Sometimes they have even recourse to arms before the dispute can be decided. Once a year they assemble at a consecrated place in the territories of the Carnutes, whose country is supposed to be in the middle of Gaul. Hither such as have any suits depending flock from all parts, and submit implicitly to the decrees of the druids. Their institution is supposed to have come originally from Britain; and even at this day, such as are desirous of being perfect in it travel thither for instruction. The druids never go to war, are exempted from taxes and military service, and enjoy all manner of immunities. These mighty encouragements induce many to put themselves, of their own accord, under the discipline of this order; and many are made to enter into it by their parents and relations. They are taught to repeat a great number of verses by heart, and often spend twenty years upon this institution; for it is deemed unlawful to commit their statutes to writing; though in other matters, whether public or private, they make use of Greek characters. They seem to me (adds Cæsar) to follow this method for two reasons: to hide their mysteries from the knowledge of the vulgar; and to exercise the memory of their scholars, which would be apt to be neglected, had they letters to trust to, as we find is often the case. It is one of their principal maxims, that the soul never dies, but after death passes from one body to another; which, they think, contributes greatly to exalt men's courage, by disarming death of its terrors. They teach likewise many things relating to the stars and their motions, the magnitude of the world and our earth, the nature of things, and the power and prerogatives of the immortal gods.

The other order of men are the nobles [Cæsar calls them *equites*, cavaliers; doubtless because they fought on horseback, as at this time the Polish nobility do, and as those among us formerly did, whom our ancestors called men of arms]; who, when any war breaks out (and before Cæsar's arrival the Gauls were almost every year engaged in war, either offensive or defensive), all take the field, at the head of their clients and dependants; and the greater number of these, the more honourable the leader; for the Gauls have no other measure of dignity and grandeur.

The whole nation is extremely addicted to superstition; whence, in threatening distempers, and the imminent dangers of war, they make no scruple to sacrifice men, or engage themselves by vow to such sacrifices; in which they make use of the ministry of the druids: for it is a prevalent opinion among them, that the life of one man cannot be ransomed but by the life of another; insomuch, that they have established even public sacrifices of this kind. Some prepare huge colossuses of osier twigs, into which they put men alive, and setting fire to them, those within expire amidst the flames. They prefer for victims such as have been convicted of theft, robbery, or other crimes; believing them the most acceptable to the gods: but, when criminals are wanting, the innocent are often made to suffer. Mercury is the chief deity with them: of him they have many images, account him the inventor of all arts, their guide and conductor in their journeys, and the patron of merchandise and gain.

farther : but, to keep the enemy still in some fear of his return, and to prevent their sending succours into Gaul,

Next to him are Apollo, and Mars, and Jupiter, and Minerva. Their notions in regard to them are pretty much the same with those of other nations. Apollo is their god of physio ; Minerva of works and manufactures ; Jove holds the empire of heaven ; and Mars presides in war. To this last, when they resolve upon a battle, they commonly devote the spoil. If they prove victorious, they offer up all the cattle taken, and set apart the rest of the plunder in a place appointed for that purpose. And it is common in many provinces to see these monuments of offerings piled up in consecrated places. Nay, it rarely happens, that any one shews so great a disregard of religion, as either to conceal the plunder, or pillage the public oblations ; and the severest punishments are inflicted upon such offenders.

The Gauls fancy themselves to be descended from the god Pluto ; which, it seems, is an established tradition among the druids. For this reason they compute their time by nights, not by days ; and in the observance of birthdays, new moons, and the beginning of the year, always commence the celebration from the preceding night. In one custom they differ from almost all other nations ; which is, that they never suffer their children to come openly into their presence, until they are of age to bear arms : the appearance of a son in public with his father, before he has reached the age of manhood, is accounted dishonourable.

Whatever fortune the woman brings, the husband is obliged to equal it out of his own estate. This whole sum, with its annual product, is left untouched, and goes always to the survivor. The men have power of life and death over their wives and children : and when any father of a family of illustrious rank dies, his relations assemble, and, upon the least ground of suspicion, put even his wives to the torture like slaves. If they are found guilty, iron and fire are employed to torment and destroy them. Their funerals are magnificent and sumptuous, according to their quality. Every thing that was dear to the deceased, even animals, are thrown into the pile : and formerly, such of their slaves and clients as they loved most sacrificed themselves at the funeral of their lord.

In their best-regulated states they have a law, that whoever hears any thing relating to the public, whether by rumour or otherwise, shall give immediate notice to the magistrate, without imparting it to any one else : for the nature of the people is such, that rash and unexperienced men, alarmed by false reports, are often hurried to the greatest extremities, and take upon them to determine in matters of the highest consequence. The magistrates stifle things improper to be known, and only communicate to the multitude what they think needful for the service of the commonwealth : nor do the laws permit to speak of state-affairs, except in public councils.

The Germans differ widely in their manners from the Gauls. For neither have they druids to preside in religious affairs, nor do they trouble themselves about sacrifices. They acknowledge no gods but those that are objects of sight, and by whom they are apparently benefited, the sun, the moon, and Vulcan [fire]. Of others they know nothing, not even by report. Their whole life is addicted to hunting and war ; and from their infancy they are inured to fatigue and hardships. They esteem those most who continue longest strangers to women, as imagining nothing contributes so much to stature, strength, and vigour of body : but to have any commerce of this kind before the age of twenty is accounted in the highest degree ignominious. Nor is it possible to conceal any irregularity this way, because they bathe promiscuously in rivers, and are clothed in skins, or short mantles of fur, which leave the greatest part of their bodies naked.

Agriculture is little regarded amongst them, as they live mostly on milk, cheese, and the flesh of animals. Nor has any man lands of his own, or distinguished by fixed boundaries. The magistrates, and those in authority, portion out yearly, to every canton and family, such a quantity of land, and in what part of the country, they think proper ; and the year following remove them to some other spot. Many reasons are assigned for this practice : lest, seduced by habit and continuance, they should learn to prefer tillage to war : lest a desire of enlarging their possessions should gain ground, and prompt the stronger to expel the weaker : lest they should become curious in their buildings, in order to guard against the extremes of heat and cold : lest avarice should get footing amongst them, whence spring factions and discords : finally, to preserve contentment and equanimity among the people, when they find their possessions nothing inferior to those of the most powerful.

after his repassing the river, broke down only about 200 feet of his bridge on the German side; and, to secure the rest, built at the extremity a tower of four stories, where he left a garrison of twelve cohorts, and strengthened the place with all manner of works. To C. Volcatius Tullus he gave the charge of the fort and garrison. He himself, as soon as the corn began to be ripe, marched against Ambiorix and the Eburones, taking his way through the Forest of Arden. Basilus, whom he sent before him with all the cavalry, pushed on with such expedition, and so well concealed his approach from the enemy, that he surprised great numbers of them in the field. Being informed by them of the place whither

It is accounted honourable for states to have the country all around them lie waste and depopulated. For they think it a proof of bravery to expel their near neighbours; and a part of prudence thus to provide against sudden incursions. When a state is engaged in war, either offensive or defensive, they make choice of magistrates to preside in it, whom they arm with power of life and death. In time of peace there are no public magistrates; but the chiefs of the several provinces and clans administer justice, and decide differences within their respective limits. Robbing has nothing infamous in it, when committed without the territories of the state to which they belong: they even pretend that it serves to exercise their youth, and prevent them from falling into sloth. When any of their princes offers himself publicly in council to be the leader of an expedition, such as approve of it rise up, declare themselves ready to follow him, and for this are applauded by the whole multitude. They who go back from their engagement are looked upon as traitors and deserters, and lose all esteem and credit for the time to come. The laws of hospitality are held inviolable among them. All that fly to them for refuge, on whatever account, are sure of protection and defence: their houses are open to receive them, and they plentifully supply their wants.

Formerly the Gauls exceeded the Germans in bravery, often made war upon them, and, as they abounded in people beyond what the country could maintain, sent several colonies over the Rhine. Accordingly, the more fertile parts of Germany, in the neighbourhood of the Hercynian Forest (which I find mentioned by Eratosthenes and other Greek writers under the name of *Orcinia*), fell to the share of the *Volcæ Tectosages*,* who settled in those parts, and have ever since kept possession. They are in the highest reputation for justice and bravery, and no less remarkable than the Germans for poverty, abstinence, and patience of fatigue, conforming themselves to the German customs both in habit and way of living. But the neighbourhood of the Roman province, and an acquaintance with commerce, have introduced luxury and plenty among the Gauls: whence becoming gradually an unequal match for the Germans, and being worsted in many battles, they no longer pretend to compare with them in martial prowess.

The Hercynian Forest, of which mention was just now made, is about nine days' journey in breadth: for as the Germans are ignorant of the art of measuring land, they have no other way of computing. It begins from the borders of the *Helvetii*, *Nemetes*, and *Rauraci*, and, following directly the course of the Danube, extends to the territories of the *Anartes* and *Daci*: thence turning from the river to the left, it runs through a multitude of different regions: and though there are many in the country who have advanced six days' journey into the Forest, yet no one pretends to have reached the extremity of it, or to have discovered how far it extends.

* A people of *Gallia Narbonensis*, of whom whole armies passed not only into Germany, but into Asia.

Ambiorix had retired with a few horse, thither he without delay directed his course.

Fortune, says Cæsar, has a considerable share in all human concerns, and particularly in those of war. For, as it was a very extraordinary chance, that Basilus should come upon Ambiorix before he had the least notice of his approach, so was it equally an effect of fortune, that the Gaul, after having lost his arms, horses, and chariots, should yet find means to escape. This was principally owing to the situation of his house, which was surrounded with a wood; it being customary among the Gauls, in order to avoid the heats, to build in the neighbourhood of woods and rivers. His attendants and friends, possessing themselves of a narrow pass, sustained the attack of the Roman cavalry for some time; during which, one of his servants having provided him with a horse, he got safely off.

Ambiorix, seeing the storm that was going to break on his country, and knowing that he could not possibly assemble an army strong enough to make head against Cæsar, dispatched messengers privately through the country, to signify to the Eburones, that every one should shift for himself as well as he could. They followed his advice, and, dispersing themselves, retired, some into woods, others to inaccessible morasses, others to places near the sea, which at high water became islands. Many, abandoning their country altogether, trusted themselves and their fortunes to the faith of foreigners. Cativulcus, who had shared the rule with Ambiorix, being very old and infirm, and therefore incapable of supporting the fatigues of either war or flight, poisoned himself, after venting bitter imprecations against his colleague for drawing him into so fatal an enterprise.

Cæsar's intention was utterly to extirpate the Eburones: the difficulty was how to find them. With this view he divided his forces, and deposited the bag-

Tongres,
in the
country of
Liege.

gage of the whole army in the fort of Aduatica,^r which was situated in the heart of their country, the late quarters of the unfortunate Sabinus and Cotta. As its works were still entire, the labour of the soldiers would be the less. The fourteenth legion, one of the three lately levied in Italy, he left to guard the fort, under the command of Q. Cicero. Dividing the rest of his army, he sent Labienus with three legions towards the sea-coast, and the provinces that bordered upon the Menapii: Trebonius, with the like number of legions, he commissioned to lay waste the country adjoining to the Aduatici; and resolved to march himself with the other three towards the Scheld, and to the extremities of the Forest of Arden, whither he was informed that Ambiorix had retired with a few horse. Cæsar, at his departure, promised to return at the end of seven days, the legion which he had left in garrison being provided with corn only for that time; and he exhorted Labienus and Trebonius, if they found it consistent with the public advantage, to return with their legions at the same time; that consulting together, and taking their measures from the conduct of the enemy, they might resolve whither next to carry the war.

The Eburones, as was before observed, had no formed body of troops, no garrison, no fortified town to defend by arms, but were a dispersed multitude. Wherever a cave, or a thicket, or a morass, offered them shelter, thither they retired. This made it difficult for Cæsar and his army to take their revenge on this perfidious race; whom he could not attack with his united forces, nor, without great danger to his men, suffer them, in small parties, to seek out the enemy in their hiding-places. He sent messengers therefore to the neighbouring states, inviting them all, by the hopes of plunder, to join in the extirpation of the Eburones. Accord-

^r The Aduatici were a distinct people from the Eburones; and their capital, according to many geographers, was Namur. Crevier.

ingly, great numbers flocked suddenly thither from all parts. The Eburones were attacked on all sides, and the havoc continued till the seventh day, which Cæsar had appointed for returning to his camp. It then evidently appeared, says Cæsar, what influence fortune has in war. The report being spread among the Germans beyond the Rhine, that the territories of the Eburones were given up to be plundered, and that all without distinction were invited to share in the spoil, the Sicambri, who had afforded a retreat to the Usipetes and Tencheri (spoken of above), assembled immediately a body of 2,000 horse, passed the river in barks, about thirty miles below Cæsar's bridge and fort, and advanced directly towards the territories of the devoted nation. Many of the scattered people fell into their hands, and abundance of cattle; and the invaders, allured by this success, pushed on still farther. Inquiring of the prisoners concerning Cæsar, they understood that he had left the country with his whole army, and was a great way off. "What makes you lose your time (says one of the prisoners) in the pursuit of acquisitions trifling and insignificant, when fortune offers you so rich a booty? In three hours you may reach Aduatica, where the Romans have deposited all their wealth. The garrison is hardly sufficient to line the rampart, much less to make sallies." The Sicambri, full of hope, marched directly towards Aduatica, under the guidance of the captive who had given them the information. Vid. supr.
p. 276.

Cicero, who hitherto had kept his soldiers strictly within the camp, according to Cæsar's orders, nor had suffered so much as a servant to straggle beyond the lines, seeing the seventh day arrive, began to despair of Cæsar's return; who, he heard, was marched farther into the country. Wearied out therefore with the continual murmurings of the soldiers, who complained that he kept them up like men besieged; and not suspecting that any accident could befall him within the

small extent of three miles, especially from an enemy in a manner totally dispersed, he sent out five cohorts to forage in a field, separated from the camp by only a single hill. About 300 men, who had been sick, and were now pretty well recovered, joined the detachment: these were followed by almost all the servants of the camp, together with a vast number of carts and carriage horses. In that very instant the German cavalry arrived, and, without discontinuing their course, endeavoured to force an immediate entrance by the Decuman gate. As their march had been covered by a wood, they were not perceived till they were just upon the camp; insomuch that the suttlers, who kept their booths under the rampart, had not time to retire within the intrenchments. The cohort upon guard could scarce sustain the first onset, so surprised and struck were the soldiers by the sudden and unexpected attack. The whole camp was in an uproar, every one inquiring of another the cause of the confusion; nor could they determine which way to advance the standards, or where to post themselves. Some reported, that the camp was already taken; others, that the Germans, having destroyed Cæsar and his troops, were come victorious to assault it. The greater number, full of imaginary fears, called to mind the fate of Cotta and Sabinus, who perished on that very spot.

Among the sick in the garrison was P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, of whom honourable mention has been already made. This officer, though he had not tasted food for five days, rushed unarmed out of his tent. Seeing the enemy at hand, and the danger extreme, he snatched up the first arms that offered, and posted himself in the gate of the camp. The centurions of the cohort upon guard followed his example, and for awhile sustained the enemies' charge. Sextius expired under a multitude of wounds, and was with difficulty carried off by the soldiers. But the Romans now had

begun to resume their courage; so far at least as to mount the rampart, and make a show of defending themselves.

Meantime the foragers, returning, heard the noise at the camp. They sent some horsemen before to learn the cause of it, who were quickly apprized of the danger. The new levies, unexperienced in matters of war, fixed their eyes upon the officers, waiting their orders. Not a man was found so hardy and resolute as not to be disturbed and disconcerted by the unexpected accident. The Germans, when they perceived the Roman ensigns at a distance, gave over the attack of the camp, imagining at first that it was Cæsar with the legions; but discovering in a short time how few they were whom they had to deal with, fell upon them on all sides.

The servants of the camp fled to the nearest rising ground; whence being presently driven, they threw themselves amongst the ranks of the cohorts, and thereby increased their terror. Some retired to a hill, there to defend themselves in the best manner they could: but the veteran soldiers of the detachment, mutually encouraging one another, and being led on by their commander, C. Trebonius, a Roman knight, broke through the midst of the enemy, and all to a man arrived safe at the camp. The servants and cavalry followed them, and assisting their retreat, were likewise by their bravery preserved. But the troops which had retired to the hill, being unexperienced in military affairs, did not persist in the resolution they had taken of defending themselves there, but in a short time, quitting the advantage of their situation, endeavoured to gain the camp: but they failed in the attempt: a few only escaped; the rest were surrounded and cut to pieces by the barbarians.

The Germans, despairing now to force the camp, repassed the Rhine with the booty which they had deposited in the woods: but, even when they were gone,

the terror the Romans were under continued to be so great, that Volusenus, arriving in the camp the same night with the cavalry, could not persuade them that Cæsar and the army were safe: they persisted in believing that the infantry was wholly destroyed, and that the cavalry alone had escaped, it seeming to them altogether incredible, that the Germans would have dared to attack the camp, had no misfortune befallen the Roman army. Cæsar's arrival quickly put an end to their fears.

Being informed of what had happened, he only complained of the sending out the cohorts to forage: observing, that in war nothing ought to be left to fortune, whose power had shewed itself evidently in the sudden arrival of the enemy, and much more in their coming up unperceived to the very gates of the camp. But nothing in this whole affair appeared to him more wonderful than that the Germans, having crossed the Rhine with the purpose of plundering the territories of Ambiorix, should do him a most acceptable service, by falling upon the Roman camp.

Cæsar marched a second time to harass and distress the enemy, and having drawn a great number of troops together from the neighbouring states, sent them into all parts upon this service. Such devastation was made, that it seemed likely, if the enemy escaped the sword for the present, they would afterward perish by famine. Nothing was left unattempted to take Ambiorix prisoner, the parties that were sent out in search of him believing they should thereby gain the highest favour with Cæsar, whose good fortune waited only this to render it complete. But all their endeavours were fruitless: Ambiorix found means to hide himself in the woods and morasses; whence removing privately in the night, he escaped into other countries accompanied only by four horsemen, in whom alone he durst confide.

Cæsar in this expedition had lost only two cohorts;

and, having laid waste the whole country, led back his army into the territories of the Rhemi. There he summoned a general assembly of Gaul, to examine into the affair of the Senones and the Carnutes: and having passed sentence against Acco, the author of the revolt, ordered him to be executed on the spot. Some, fearing a like fate, fled; whom having banished by a decree of the assembly, he quartered two legions in Treves, two among the Lingones, and the remaining six in the country of the Senones: and, having provided the army with corn, he went, pursuant to his design, into Italy, to hold the assemblies of Cisalpine Gaul.

While Cæsar was on the Italian side of the Alps, the Gauls on the other side plotted a general revolt: and made a more vigorous effort, than they had ever done before, to shake off the Roman yoke. The execution of Acco, chief of the Senones, had alarmed all the great men, each thinking himself exposed to the same treatment. And what more especially encouraged their making an attempt at this time to recover their freedom, were the intestine commotions and seditions at Rome, which the death of Clodius had occasioned, and which they thought would detain Cæsar a long time in Italy. Besides, as his ten legions were stationed in the remote extremity of Gaul, on the north and the east, if the country between him and them revolted, it would not be easy for him to rejoin them, when he should be at leisure to do it; nor would the legions, without their general, dare to leave their winter-quarters: and, lastly, they came to this conclusion, that it was better to die bravely in the field, than not regain their former martial glory, and the liberty derived to them from their ancestors.

J. Cæs.
Comm. l. 7.

Such were the debates and resolutions in the private councils of the Gauls, held in woods and remote places for the sake of secrecy. The Carnutes, declaring themselves ready to submit to any danger for the common

safety, offered to be the first to take up arms against the Romans; and because the exchanging of hostages might occasion a too early discovery of their design, they proposed, that the other states should bind themselves by a solemn oath, sworn before the military ensigns collected together (which is the most sacred obligation among the Gauls), not to abandon them during the course of the war. This offer of the Carnutes was received with universal applause, and the oath taken by all present: after which, the time for action being fixed, the assembly separated.

When the appointed day came, the Carnutes, headed by two men of desperate resolution, flew on a sudden to Genabum, massacred the Roman citizens who had settled there on account of trade, and seized their effects.—Among the slain was C. Fufius Cotta, a Roman knight of eminence, to whom Cæsar had committed the care of supplying the army with provisions. The fame of this massacre soon spread into all the provinces of Gaul: for, when any thing extraordinary and important happened, it was their custom to publish it from place to place by outcries, which, being successively repeated by men stationed on purpose, were carried with incredible expedition over the whole country. And thus it was on the present occasion; what had been done at Genabum about sunrising, was known before nine at night in the territories of the Arverni, a distance of 160 miles.

Instigated by this example, Vercingetorix, the son of Celtillus, of the nation of the Arverni, a young nobleman of great power and interest (whose father had presided over all Celtic Gaul, and for aiming at the sovereignty had been put to death by his countrymen), calling his clients and followers together, easily persuaded them to a revolt. His design being discovered, the people immediately flew to arms; and Gobanitio, his uncle, with the other principal men of the state, dread-

ing the consequences of so rash an enterprise, united all their authority against him, and expelled him the city of Gergovia.^s But Vercingetorix, not discouraged by this opposition, having engaged in his service a considerable number of outlaws and fugitives, soon made himself master of Gergovia, and drove out of the country all those who had so lately forced him to leave that city. He was, upon this, saluted king by his followers, and immediately dispatched ambassadors into all parts to exhort the confederate states to continue firm to their engagements. The Senones, Parisii, Pictones, Cadurci, Turones, Aulerci, Lemovices, Andes, and the nations bordering upon the ocean, readily came into the alliance, and with unanimous consent declared him generalissimo of the league. Invested with this authority, he demanded hostages of the several states; ordered them, at a prefixed time, to furnish him with a certain number of men and arms; and more particularly applied himself to the raising of a numerous cavalry. To an extreme diligence, he joined an extreme rigour of command: for greater faults, the criminals, after having been tortured, were burnt alive; and for lighter offences, they had their ears cut off, or one of their eyes put out, and were in that condition sent home to serve as an example to the rest. Thus, by the severity of his punishments, he obliged the irresolute to declare themselves in his favour.

Having assembled a considerable army, he sent Luterius of Quercy, a bold and enterprising man, with part of the forces, against the Rutheni;* and marched himself into the territories of the Bituriges. This people, upon his arrival, dispatched ambassadors to the Ædui, under whose protection they were, to demand succours against the enemy. The Ædui, by the advice of the lieutenants Cæsar had left with the army, ordered a

* The inhabitants of Rouergue.

^s City of Auvergne, the ruins of which are visible two leagues south-east of Clermont: the mountain is still called Gergoie.

body of horse and foot to the assistance of the Bituriges; but those troops advanced no farther than the banks of the Loire, which divides their country from that of the Bituriges, and after halting there a few days, returned home, pretending that they had received information, that in case they had passed the river, they would be treacherously attacked on one side by the Bituriges, whom they went to assist, and on the other by the Arverni. On their departure, the Bituriges immediately joined the forces of the revolted states.¹

[YEAR OF ROME 696.]

Cæsar, upon the first report of this insurrection, left Italy, and set out for Transalpine Gaul. On his arrival there he found it very difficult to resolve, in what manner to join the army; for should he order the legions to repair to the province, he foresaw they would be attacked on their march in his absence; and should he himself proceed to the quarters of the legions, he was not without apprehension of danger, even from those states that seemingly continued faithful to the Romans.

In the meantime Luterius of Quercy, who had been sent by Vercingetorix into the territories of the Rutheni, brought over that state to the alliance of the Arverni.

* People of the Agenois.

† Those of the Gevaudan.

Advancing from thence among the Nitobrigi* and Gabali,† he received hostages from both nations; and having got together a numerous body of troops, drew towards Narbonne, to attack the Romans on that side. Cæsar, informed of his design, thought it incumbent on him first to provide for the security of the province. He therefore flew to Narbonne, secured that town, placed garrisons in the towns of the Rutheni, subject to the Romans, also in those of the Volsci, Tolosati, and other states bordering upon the enemy. Luterius, not daring to march forwards among so many Roman gar-

¹ For the events and transactions at Rome in the year 700, see above, p. 140—157.

risons, thought proper to retire. Thus Cæsar was left at liberty to execute the project he had formed of penetrating into the country of the Arverni, through the territories of the Helvii, which were separated from each other by the high mountain Cebenna. With this view he joined a part of the provincial forces, and the recruits he had brought from Italy, whom he had before ordered to rendezvous on the frontiers of the Helvii, and, proceeding on his march, opened a way over the Cebenna, with infinite labour to the soldiers, the mountain being covered with snow to the depth of six feet. The Arverni, who looked upon the Cebenna as an impenetrable barrier, impassable in that season even to single men, were altogether unprepared on the arrival of the Romans; and Cæsar, to strike a general terror among them, ordered his cavalry to spread themselves on all sides over the country.

Fame and messengers from the state soon informed Vercingetorix of the calamity of his country. The Arverni gathered round him, and with looks full of dismay, conjured him to have regard to their fortunes, and not abandon them to the ravages of the enemy; especially as he now saw that the whole war was pointed against them. Vercingetorix, moved by their entreaties, broke up his camp, and marched towards Auvergne. This Cæsar had foreseen: and his scheme being to amuse the enemy on that side, while he stole off to his legions, he stayed only two days in the camp; and leaving young Brutus to command in his absence, with orders to disperse the cavalry as wide as he could, he set out on pretence of going for a reinforcement, promising to return, if possible, in three days. But posting by great journeys to Vienne, he there joined the new-levied cavalry, whom he had sent thither some time before. From thence travelling day and night, without taking any rest, through the country of the Ædui, to prevent by his expedition any designs they might form against

his person, he at length reached the confines of the Lingones, where two of his legions wintered; and sending immediately to the rest, he drew them all together, before the Arverni could be apprized of his arrival in those parts.

Vercingetorix, upon notice of this junction, led back his army into the territories of the Bituriges, and invested Gergovia, a town belonging to the Boii, where they had been settled by Cæsar after the defeat of the Helvetii, and made subject to the Æduan state. This motion of the enemy greatly perplexed the Roman general. If he continued encamped with his legions during the rest of the winter, and abandoned the subjects of the Ædui to the attempts of the enemy, he had reason to apprehend that the Gauls, seeing him afford no protection to his friends, would universally revolt. On the other hand, if he took the field too early, he risked the want of provisions and forage, by the great difficulty of procuring convoys. Resolving, however, not to submit to an affront that must for ever alienate the minds of his allies, he in the strongest terms enjoined the Ædui to be diligent in supplying him with the necessary provisions, dispatched messengers to the Boii, to inform them of his approach, and exhort them to continue firm to their duty: then leaving two legions with the baggage of the whole army at Agendicum,* he began his march to the relief of Gergovia.

* Sens.

† Beaune
in Gatinois.

He arrived the next day before Vellaunodunum,† a city of the Senones, which surrendered after a siege of two days. In two days more he reached Genabum, where the Roman citizens had been lately massacred by the Carnutes. Cæsar's sudden approach had not left the enemy time to prepare for a defence; they therefore attempted to make their escape in the night by a bridge over the Loire. To prevent the execution of such a design, Cæsar had ordered two legions to be in readiness under arms: and about midnight, being informed

by his scouts that the enemy were stealing off, he set fire to the gates of the town; the legions entered, pursued the fugitives over the bridge, and almost entirely destroyed them. The town was plundered and burnt.

Here Cæsar passed the Loire, and, marching into the territories of the Bituriges, sat down before Noviodunum.* The inhabitants sent deputies to treat of a sur- * Nouan.
rendry, but before the articles agreed upon could be put into execution, the cavalry of Vercingetorix appeared at a distance. This general of the Gauls, informed of Cæsar's approach, had raised the siege of Gergovia, and marched to meet the Romans. The besieged, on this prospect of relief, though they had already given hostages, and received into the town some centurions and soldiers of the Roman army, with great clamours flew to arms, shut the gates, and manned the walls. The centurions in the town judging, from the noise among the Gauls, that they had some new project in view, had cautiously posted themselves at one of the gates, and getting all their men together, retreated without loss to the camp. Cæsar soon dispersed the enemies' horse, which was not supported by the body of the army; and the people of Noviodunum, disappointed and terrified at the defeat of their friends, seized immediately on all those who had been instrumental in breaking the capitulation, sent them prisoners to Cæsar's camp, and delivered up the town. From thence Cæsar marched on to Avaricum, the strongest and most considerable city of the Bituriges.

Vercingetorix, alarmed at the loss of so many towns in so short a time, called a general council of his followers, and represented to them: "That it was necessary to resolve upon a very different plan of war, from that which they had hitherto pursued; and, instead of giving battle to the Romans, they should bend their whole aim to intercept their convoys and foragers: that this might be easily effected, as they themselves abounded in

cavalry, and in the present season of the year, there being no forage in the fields, the enemy must unavoidably disperse themselves into the distant villages for subsistence, and thereby give daily opportunities of destroying them : that, where life and liberty were at stake, poverty and private possession ought to be little regarded : that therefore the best resolution they could take was, at once to burn all their houses and villages, from the territories of the Boii to wherever the Romans might extend their quarters for the sake of forage : that they themselves had no reason to apprehend scarcity, as they would be plentifully supplied by those states, whose territories they were ready to defend at so great loss ; whereas, the enemy must either be reduced to the necessity of starving, or making distant and dangerous excursions from their camp : that it equally answered the purpose of the Gauls, to defeat the Roman army, or seize upon their baggage and convoys ; because, without these last, it would be impossible for them to carry on the war : that, in his opinion, they would do well to set fire even to the towns themselves, which were not strong enough to be perfectly secure against all danger ; as by this means they would neither become places of retreat to their own men, to screen them from military service ; nor contribute to the support of the Romans by the supplies and plunder they might furnish :” he added, “ that though these things were indeed grievous, yet they ought to reflect that it was still more grievous to see their wives and children dragged into captivity, and be themselves put to the sword, the unavoidable fate of the conquered.”

This proposal being approved by all, more than twenty cities of the Bituriges were burnt in one day ; the like was done in other states ; nothing but conflagrations were seen over the whole country ; and though the natives bore this desolation with extreme regret, they comforted themselves with the hopes, that it was the sure

way to a speedy victory, which would amply recompense their losses. The fate of Avaricum was solemnly debated in council, whether it should be burnt or defended; the Bituriges falling prostrate on the ground, earnestly begged that they might not be obliged to burn with their own hands one of the most beautiful cities of Gaul, the ornament and the security of their state; especially as the town itself, almost wholly surrounded by a river and morass, and affording but one very narrow approach, was, from the nature of its situation, capable of an easy defence. Vercingetorix at first opposed their request, but at length, moved by their prayers, and the generous compassion of the army, he yielded, and sent a strong garrison to defend the town.

This affair determined, he followed Cæsar by easy marches, and chose for his camp a place surrounded with woods and marshes, about fifteen miles distant from Avaricum. There he had hourly intelligence by his scouts, of all that passed before the town; and sent his orders from time to time to the garrison. He kept a constant watch upon the Roman convoys and foragers, whom, notwithstanding their vigilance, he frequently cut off when necessity obliged them to seek for provisions at too great a distance.

Cæsar, having encamped on that side where the river and morasses left a narrow access to the town, began to raise a mount, bring forward his battering engines, and prepare two towers of assault; without attempting to make lines of circumvallation, which the nature of the ground rendered impossible. He was continually soliciting the Æduans and Boii for corn, but received no great supplies from either; partly through the negligence of the Æduans, who were not zealous in the affair; partly through the inability of the Boii, who, possessing an inconsiderable territory, soon consumed all the corn their land produced. The army were for many days altogether without bread, and had nothing

to appease their hunger but the cattle brought from distant villages : yet not an expression was heard among the soldiers unworthy the majesty of the Roman name, or the glory they had acquired by former victories. And when Cæsar visited the different quarters of the legions in person, and offered to raise the siege, if they found the famine insupportable ; they with one voice requested him not to do it, adding, “ That, during the many years they had served under him, they never yet had met with any check, or formed any enterprise in which they had not succeeded ; that they could not but look upon it as inglorious to abandon a siege they had once begun ; and had rather undergo the greatest hardships, than not revenge the blood of the Roman citizens perfidiously massacred by the Gauls in Genabum.”

And now the towers began to approach the walls, when Cæsar was informed by some prisoners, that Vercingetorix, having consumed all the forage round him, had removed his camp nearer to Avaricum, and was gone himself at the head of the cavalry, and the light-armed troops accustomed to fight in their intervals, to form an ambuscade for the Romans, in a place where it was supposed they would come the next day to forage. Upon this intelligence, setting out about midnight in great silence, he arrived the next morning at the enemies' camp. But they, having had timely notice by their scouts, instantly conveyed their baggage and carriages into a thick wood, and drew up in order of battle on an open hill. Cæsar immediately ordered all his soldiers to prepare for an engagement.

The hill itself where the enemy stood, rising all the way with an easy ascent, was almost wholly surrounded by a morass difficult and dangerous to pass, though not above fifty feet over. Here the Gauls, confiding in the strength of their post, and having broke down all the bridges over the morass, appeared with an air of resolution. They had formed themselves into different bodies,

according to their several states ; and planting select detachments at all the avenues and fords, waited with determined courage, that, if the Romans should attempt to force their way through, they might fall upon them from the higher ground, while embarrassed in the morass. The Romans, full of indignation, that the enemy should dare to face them, loudly demanded to be led to battle. Cæsar checked their ardour, and endeavoured to make them sensible, that in attacking an army so strongly posted, the victory would be attended with the loss of many brave men ; adding, that he could not be too tender of the lives of those, whom he found ready to encounter every kind of danger for his glory. Having by this speech comforted the soldiers, he led them back the same day to Avaricum, and applied himself wholly to the carrying on of the siege.

Vercingetorix, upon his return to the camp, was accused by the army of treason. The removal of his quarters nearer to those of the enemy, his departure at the head of all the cavalry, his leaving so many troops without a commander-in-chief, and the opportune and speedy arrival of the Romans during his absence ; all these things, they said, could not easily happen without design, and gave great reason to believe, that he had rather owe the sovereignty of Gaul to Cæsar's favour, than to the free choice of his countrymen. To this charge he replied ; “ That the removal of his camp was occasioned by the want of forage, and made at their own express desire : that he had posted himself nearer to the Romans, on account of the advantage of the ground, which secured him against all attacks : that cavalry were by no means wanted in a morass, but might have been extremely serviceable in the place to which he had led them : that he purposely forbore naming a commander-in-chief at his departure, lest the impatience of the multitude should have forced him to give battle ; to which he perceived they were all strongly inclined,

through a certain weakness and effeminacy of mind, that rendered them incapable of bearing long fatigue : that whether accident or intelligence brought the Romans to their camp, they ought to thank, in the one case fortune, in the other the informer, for giving them an opportunity of discovering, from the higher ground, the inconsiderable number of the enemy, and despising their feeble efforts ; for, not daring to hazard an engagement, they had ignominiously retreated to their camp : that for his part, he scorned treacherously to hold an authority of Cæsar, which he hoped soon to merit by a victory, of which both he and the rest of the Gauls had now a certain prospect : that he was willing to resign the command, if they thought the honour done him by that distinction, exceeded the advantages procured by his conduct.” He added : “ To convince you of the truth of what I have said, hear the Roman soldiers themselves.” Instantly he produced some slaves, whom he had made prisoners a few days before, and whom by severity and hard usage he had brought to his purpose. These, according to the instructions they had received, declared, “ That they were legionary soldiers : that, urged by hunger, they had privately stolen out of the camp, to search for corn and cattle in the fields : that the whole army was reduced to so weak a condition, as no longer to be capable of supporting fatigue : that the general had therefore resolved, if the town held out three days longer, to draw off his men from the siege.” “ Such (said Ver-
cingetorix) are the services you receive from the man, whom you charge with treason. To him it is owing, that, without drawing a sword, you see a powerful and victorious army almost wholly destroyed by famine. He has, moreover, taken effectual care, that when necessity compels them to seek refuge in a shameful flight, no state shall receive them into its territories.”

The whole multitude set up a shout ; and, as their manner was, clashing their arms, to denote their appro-

bation of the speaker, proclaimed Vercingetorix a consummate general, whose fidelity ought not to be questioned, and whose conduct deserved the highest praise. They decreed that 10,000 men, chosen out of all the troops, should be sent to reinforce the garrison of Avaricum; it seeming too hazardous to rely upon the Bituriges alone for the defence of a place, whose preservation, they imagined, would necessarily give them the superiority in the war.

Though the Romans carried on the siege with incredible vigour, yet was their progress greatly obstructed by the address and contrivance of the Gauls. For they were a people of singular ingenuity, quick of apprehension, easily imitating whatever they saw practised by others. They turned aside, with ropes, the hooks made use of by the Romans, and after having seized them, drew them into the town with engines. They likewise endeavoured to undermine the mount; an art they were perfectly skilled in, as their country abounded with iron-mines. At the same time they raised towers on all parts of the wall, covered them with raw hides, and in frequent sallies by day and night, either set fire to the mount, or fell upon the workmen. In proportion as the Roman towers increased in height, by the continual addition to the mount, in the same proportion did they advance the towers upon their walls,^u raising one story above another. And counterworking the mines with the utmost diligence, they either filled them with great stones, or

^u The fortified towns, among the Gauls, had their walls mostly built in the following manner. Long massy beams of wood were placed upon the ground, at the distance of two feet one from another, and so as to constitute by their length the thickness of the wall. These being again crossed by others, which served to bind them together, had their intervals on the inside filled up with earth, and on the outside with large stones. The first rank thus completed and firmly joined, a second was laid over it, with the same distance between the beams; but these did not rest upon the beams of the order below, but were placed above their intervals, and filled up as before with earth and stones. In this manner the work was carried to a proper height, and the building was as useful as beautiful. For as the variety and regular intermixture of the materials pleased the eye, so the stone was proof against fire, and the beams against the battering-ram; for being fastened on the inside with continued planks, they could neither be disjoined nor thrown down.

poured melted pitch into them, or repulsed the miners with long stakes, burnt and sharpened at the end.

Such were the obstacles the Romans met with in this siege. But the soldiers, though much incommoded, during the whole time, with cold and perpetual rains, yet, by dint of labour, overcame all difficulties, and at the end of twenty-five days had raised a mount 330 feet broad, and eighty feet high. When it was brought almost close to the walls, Cæsar, according to custom, attended the works, and encouraged the soldiers to labour without intermission; a little before midnight it was observed to smoke, the enemy having undermined and fired it. At the same time they raised a mighty shout, and sallying from two of their gates, vigorously attacked the works. Some threw lighted torches and dry wood from the walls upon the mount, others pitch and all sorts of combustibles; so that it was not easy to know on which side it was proper first to send relief. But, as Cæsar kept always two legions upon guard in the trenches, besides great numbers employed in the works, who relieved one another by turns, his troops were soon in a condition, some to oppose those that sallied from the town, others to draw off the towers, and make openings in the mount; whilst the rest endeavoured to extinguish the flames.

The fight continued with great obstinacy during the remaining part of the night. The enemy still entertained hopes of victory, and persisted with the more firmness, as they saw the mantlets that covered the towers burnt down, the Romans being unable to rescue them for want of shelter. Fresh troops were continually advancing from the town to relieve the fatigued, the enemy believing that the safety of Gaul depended on that critical moment. “Here (says Cæsar) I cannot forbear mentioning a remarkable instance of intrepidity, to which I was myself a witness upon this occasion. A certain Gaul, posted before the gate of the city, threw

into the fire balls of pitch and tallow to feed it. This man being exposed to the discharge of a Roman battery, was struck through the side with a dart, and expired. Another, striding over his body, immediately took his place. He also was killed in the same manner. A third succeeded; to the third a fourth: nor was this dangerous post left vacant, till the fire of the mount was extinguished, the enemy repulsed on all sides, and an end put to the conflict."

The Gauls having in vain tried all methods of defence, consulted the next day about leaving the town, in consequence of the orders they had received from Vercingetorix. This they hoped easily to effect in the night; as that general's camp was not far off, and the morass between them and the Romans would serve to cover their retreat. Night came, and the besieged were preparing to put their scheme in execution; when suddenly the women running out into the streets, and throwing themselves at their husbands' feet, conjured them, with many tears, not to abandon to the fury of an enraged enemy them, and their common children, whom nature and weakness rendered incapable of flight. Finding their entreaties ineffectual (for, in extreme danger, fear often excludes compassion), they began to set up a loud cry, to inform the Romans of the intended escape. This alarmed the garrison, who, apprehending the passages would be seized by the enemy's cavalry, desisted from their attempt.

Next day Cæsar brought forward the tower, and gave the necessary directions concerning the works. A heavy rain chancing just then to fall, he thought it a favourable opportunity of effecting his purpose, especially as he observed that the walls were negligently guarded. Wherefore, ordering the soldiers to abate a little of their ardour in the works, and having instructed them in what manner to proceed, he exhorted the legions, who advanced under cover of the machines, to seize at last the

fruit of so many toils. Then promising rewards to those who should first scale the town, he gave the signal of attack. The Romans rushed suddenly upon the enemy from all parts, and in a moment possessed themselves of the walls. The Gauls, terrified at the vigour of the assault, and driven from their towers and battlements, drew themselves up in the form of a triangle in the market-place, expecting that the Romans would advance to attack them. But observing that they still kept upon the walls, and were endeavouring to get possession of their whole circuit, they began to fear lest they should be shut up on every side. Therefore, throwing down their arms, they ran tumultuously to the farthest part of the town, where many of them were slain by the legionaries, the narrowness of the gates obstructing their flight. Others were slaughtered by the cavalry without the walls. The Romans, regardless of plunder, but eager to revenge the massacre of Genabum, and exasperated by the obstinate defence of the place, spared neither old men, women, nor children; insomuch, that of all that multitude, amounting to about 40,000, scarce 800 who had quitted the town upon the first alarm escaped safe to Vercingetorix. He received them into his camp in the dead of the night: for, fearing lest their entrance by day, and in a body, should occasion a tumult among the troops, he had sent out his friends, and the principal noblemen of each province, to meet them by the way, and conduct them to the quarters of their several states.

Vercingetorix, having called a council, comforted the soldiers, and exhorted them not to be discouraged by their late misfortune. He said, “The Romans had not overcome by bravery, or in the field, but by their address and skill in sieges, an art the Gauls were little acquainted with; that they deceived themselves, who in war expected success to attend every enterprise; that he himself, as they all knew, had never advised the defence of Avaricum, and could not but impute the present

disaster to the imprudence of the Bituriges, and the too easy compliance of the rest : that he hoped, however, soon to compensate their loss by superior advantages, as he was using his utmost endeavours to bring over the other states, which had hitherto refused their concurrence, and to form one general confederacy of all Gaul, against whose united strength, not the whole world would be able to prevail : that he had even in a great measure effected his design, and in the meantime only required of them, for the sake of the common safety, immediately to fortify their camp, the better to secure themselves from the sudden attacks of the enemy." This speech was not displeasing to the Gauls, and the rather, that notwithstanding so great a blow, Vercingetorix neither retired from public view, nor seemed to have lost any thing of his wonted courage. They even entertained a higher opinion of his prudence and foresight ; as from the first he had advised the burning of Avaricum, and at last sent orders to abandon it. Thus ill success, which usually sinks the reputation of a commander, served only to augment his credit, and give him greater authority among the troops. At the same time, from the assurances he had given them, they were full of hopes that the other states would accede to the alliance. And now for the first time the Gauls set about fortifying their camp ; being so humbled by their late misfortunes, that, though naturally impatient of fatigue, they submitted to every task imposed upon them by their general.

Vercingetorix on his side was extremely active to bring over to the confederacy the other provinces of Gaul, endeavouring, by presents and promises, to gain the leading men in each state. For this purpose he made choice of fit agents, who, by their address, or peculiar tie of friendship, were most likely to influence those to whom they were sent. He provided arms and clothing for the troops that had escaped from Avaricum,

and to repair the loss sustained by the taking of that place, gave orders to the several states in alliance to furnish a certain number of men, and send them to the camp, by a day prefixed. At the same time he required of them, that all the archers, of which there were great numbers in Gaul, should be sought out and sent to the army. By these measures he soon filled up the places of those he lost at the siege of Avaricum. In the meantime Theutomatus, the son of Ollovico, and king of the Nitobrigi, whose father had been styled friend and ally by the senate of Rome, came and joined Vercingetorix with a great body of horse, which he had raised in his own territories, and in the province of Aquitain.

Cæsar finding great plenty of corn and other provisions at Avaricum, stayed there several days to refresh his troops, after their late sufferings from scarcity and fatigue. Spring was now approaching, and as the season invited him to take the field, he resolved to march against the enemy, either to draw them out of the woods and marshes, or besiege them in their fortresses. While he was preparing for this expedition, deputies arrived from the Ædui to beg he would interpose his authority to settle the differences in their state. "Every thing there (they told him) threatened an intestine war. That as it was their custom to be governed by a single magistrate, who possessed the supreme power for one year, two noblemen contended for that office: each affirming his election was according to law. The one was Convictolitanis, an illustrious and popular young man; the other Cotus, of an ancient family, great authority, and powerful relations, whose brother Videliacus had held the same magistracy the year before: that the whole state was in arms, the senate and people divided; nor had they hopes of escaping a civil war, but in his care and timely endeavours to put an end to the contest."

Although Cæsar was sensible it would greatly prejudice his affairs, to quit the pursuit of the war, and leave the enemy behind him; yet, reflecting on the mischiefs that arose from divisions, and desirous if possible to prevent so powerful a state, in strict amity with the people of Rome, and which he had always in a particular manner cherished and befriended, from having recourse to violence and arms, which might drive the party that least confided in his friendship to seek the assistance of Vercingetorix, he resolved to make it his first care to put a stop to the progress of those disorders. And because, by the constitutions of the Ædui, it was not lawful for the supreme magistrate to pass beyond the limits of the state, that he might not seem to infringe their privileges, he resolved to go thither in person, and summoned the senate and the two candidates to meet him at Decetia. The assembly was very numerous, and it appeared that Cotus had been declared chief magistrate by his own brother, in presence of only a few electors privately called together, without regard to time or place, and even contrary to the express laws of the state, which prohibited two of the same family to hold the supreme dignity, while he who first obtained it was alive, or so much as sit together in the senate. Cæsar therefore obliged Cotus to resign in favour of Convictolitanis, who, upon the expiration of the office of the preceding magistrates, had been elected in due form by the priests.

This sentence being passed, Cæsar exhorted the Ædui to lay aside their quarrels, and apply themselves solely to the business of the present war; to expect with confidence the full recompence of their services, as soon as the reduction of Gaul should be completed; and to send him immediately all their cavalry, and 10,000 foot, to form a chain of posts for the security of his convoys. He then divided his army into two parts. Four legions, under the conduct of Labienus, he sent

against the Senones and Parisii, and the other six he led in person along the banks of the Allier, towards the territories of the Arverni, with a design to invest Gergovia. Part of the cavalry followed Labienus : part remained with Cæsar. Vercingetorix having notice of these motions, broke down all the bridges upon the Allier, and marched along the other side of the river.

As both armies were continually in view, encamped almost over-against each other, and the enemies' scouts so stationed, that it was impossible for the Romans to make a bridge for carrying over their forces, Cæsar began to be uneasy, lest he should be stopped in his progress the greatest part of the summer, by the river, the Allier being seldom fordable till towards autumn. But he soon found means to compass his end. He encamped in a place covered by woods, over-against one of those bridges which Vercingetorix had caused to be broken down. The next day, remaining there concealed with two legions, he sent forward with all the baggage the other four, dividing them into six corps, that the number of the legions might appear complete, and ordered them to march as far as they could. When, by the time of the day, he judged they were arrived at the place of their encampment, speedily he rebuilt the bridge upon the old piles, the lower part of which the enemy had left standing; marched over the troops he had with him, and, having chose a proper place for his camp, recalled the rest of his forces. Vercingetorix being informed that the Romans had passed the river, marched on before them by long journeys, that he might not be forced to a battle against his will.

Cæsar, after five days' march, came before Gergovia, where he had a slight engagement with the enemy's cavalry. Having taken a view of the place, which he found situated on a very high hill, all whose approaches were extremely difficult, he not only despaired of reducing it by storm, but resolved not to invest it, till he had

secured a supply of provisions for his army. Vercingetorix was encamped near the town, where he had disposed the forces of the several states in different divisions, separated from one another by moderate intervals. As his army covered the whole summits of the hill, it made a very formidable appearance. Every morning, by daybreak, the chiefs of each state, who composed his council, assembled in his tent, to advise with him, and receive his orders: and he scarcely let a day pass without detaching some cavalry, intermixed with archers, to skirmish with the Romans, that he might make trial of the spirit and courage of his men. There was a rising ground, that joined to the foot of the hill on which the town stood, well fortified by nature, being very steep on all sides. This eminence, though of such importance to the Gauls, that if the Romans should get possession of it, they could in a great measure deprive them of water and forage, was yet but indifferently guarded. Cæsar therefore leaving his camp about midnight, dislodged the enemy before any assistance could arrive from the town, seized the hill, and having placed two legions to defend it, drew a double ditch twelve feet deep from the greater to the lesser camp, that the soldiers might pass and repass without danger.

While these things were transacted at Gergovia, Convictolitanis the Æduan, to whom, as we have before related, Cæsar had adjudged the supreme magistracy, being bribed by the Arverni, endeavoured to engage in the confederacy some young noblemen, the chief of whom were Litavicus and his brothers, of the most distinguished family in the country. With these he shared the money he had received, and exhorted them to consider, “That they were free, and born to command: that the Ædui alone obstructed the victory of the league, that their authority restrained the other states from joining in the common cause, and that their concurrence in it would not leave the Romans a possibility

of supporting themselves in Gaul. That he himself indeed was under some obligation to Cæsar, at least so far as an equitable decision deserved that name, but he still owed more to his country ; adding, that the Ædui had no greater reason to have recourse to the Roman general, in what regarded their laws and customs, than the Romans had in the like case to apply themselves to the Ædui." The representations of the magistrate, and the rewards he bestowed, soon prevailed with the young noblemen. They offered to become the chief conductors of the enterprise ; and nothing remained but to consult on the proper means for accomplishing their design ; for they well knew, that the state would not be easily induced to engage in the war. It was agreed, that Litavicus should have the command of the 10,000 foot appointed to join Cæsar, and that his brother should be sent before. They also concerted in what manner the rest of the project should be executed.

Litavicus having taken the command of the army, and led them within thirty miles of Gergovia, suddenly called the troops together, and addressing them with tears : " Whither, soldiers (said he), are we going? All our cavalry, all our nobility, are slain. Eporedorix and Virdumarus, men of the first quality in the state, accused by the Romans of treason, are put to death without a trial. But learn these things of those who have escaped the slaughter ; for, as to me, overwhelmed with grief for the loss of my brothers and kinsmen, I am unable to utter our calamities." He then produced some, whom he had before instructed for that purpose, who repeated to the multitude, " That the greatest part of the Æduan cavalry had been put to the sword, under pretence of their holding intelligence with the Arverni ; and that they themselves had escaped with great difficulty by mixing with the Roman soldiers." Hereupon the whole army called aloud to Litavicus, entreating him to provide for their safety ; " As if (said he) there was

room for counsel, or any choice left, but that of marching directly to Gergovia, and joining the Arverni. Can we doubt, after so black an instance of Roman perfidy, but that they are already on their way to destroy us? Let us, therefore, if any spirit or courage remains in us, revenge the death of our countrymen, so unworthily slain, and put these inhuman spoilers to the sword." He then pointed to some Roman citizens, who had taken the opportunity of their march to bring a large supply of corn and provisions to the camp. Instantly the convoy was plundered, the Romans put to death with cruel torments, and messengers dispatched through all the territories of the *Ædui*, to spread the same forgery of the massacre of the cavalry and princes, and excite them to take the like vengeance on the common enemy.

Eporedorix, the *Æduan*, a young nobleman of distinguished birth, and great interest in the state; as likewise Viridomarus, of the same age and equal authority, though not so well descended (whom Cæsar, on the recommendation of Divitiacus, had raised from a low condition to the highest dignities), were both at this time in the Roman camp. Between these two was a competition for greatness; and in the late dispute about the magistracy, the one had declared warmly for Convictitanis, the other for Cotus. Eporedorix, having notice of Litavicus's design, came at midnight to Cæsar's tent, discovered the whole plot, and entreated him not to suffer the state, through the mischievous counsels of a few young men, to fall off from the alliance of the Romans, which he foresaw must happen, if they should join the enemy with so many thousand men, whose safety would neither be neglected by their relations, nor disregarded by the state.

This intelligence gave Cæsar extreme concern, because he had always had a particular regard for the *Ædui*. He therefore immediately drew out four legions, together with all the cavalry; nor had he time

to contract his camp, because the affair seemed wholly to depend upon expedition. He left C. Fabius, his lieutenant, to command in his absence with two legions. Litavicus's brothers, whom he ordered to be seized, had some time before escaped to the enemy. Having exhorted the soldiers to bear the fatigue cheerfully in so pressing a conjuncture, they marched with great alacrity, and about five-and-twenty miles from Gergovia came within sight of the *Ædui*. Cæsar immediately detached the cavalry to retard and stop their march; but with strict charge to abstain from slaughter. He ordered Eporedorix and Virdumarus, whom the *Ædui* had lamented as dead, to ride up and down among the squadrons, and call to their countrymen. They were soon known, and Litavicus's forgery being detected, the *Ædui* stretched out their hands, offered to submit, and, throwing down their arms, begged their lives might be spared. Litavicus, with his clients (who by the custom of the Gauls cannot without infamy abandon their patrons, even in the greatest extremity of fortune), fled to Gergovia.

Cæsar, having dispatched messengers to the *Ædui* to inform them, that from a regard for their state he had spared those, whom by the right of war he might have put to the sword, after allowing the army three hours' rest, marched back to Gergovia. About half way he was met by a party of horse, sent by Fabius, to acquaint him with the danger that threatened his camp. They told him, "That the enemy had attacked it with all their forces, relieving the fatigued with supplies of fresh men, while the Romans were kept to continual labour; for the vast extent of ground they had to defend obliged them to be perpetually upon the rampart. That the multitude of arrows and darts discharged by the Gauls had wounded many of the soldiers, notwithstanding the protection received from the engines, which yet had been of good service in repelling the assailants: that

Fabius, upon the retreat of the enemy, had closed up all the gates of the camp except two, carried a breastwork quite round the rampart, and made preparation for sustaining the assault the next day." Cæsar, upon this news, hastened his march with all diligence, and, seconded by the ardour of the troops, arrived in the camp before sunrising.

While these things passed at Gergovia, the Ædui, upon receipt of the first dispatches from Litavicus, stayed not for the confirmation of the report; but prompted, some by avarice, others by revenge, and many hurried on by a levity and rashness, natural to that people, who are always ready to give credit to every flying rumour, ran immediately to arms, plundered the Roman citizens, killed some of them, and sold others for slaves. Convictolitanis incited to the utmost this fury of the multitude, that, by engaging them in desperate acts of violence, he might render a return to right measures the more difficult. At his instigation, they obliged M. Aristius, a military tribune, who was upon his way to join the army, to quit Cabillonum, promising not to molest him in his journey: they engaged also several Roman merchants, who resided there on account of traffic, to quit their habitations; then attacking them treacherously on the road, they stripped them of their baggage, and invested day and night those who made resistance. But as soon as they had intelligence that all their troops were in Cæsar's power, they ran to Aristius; assured him that nothing had been done by public authority; ordered informations to be brought against those who had been concerned in pillaging the Romans; confiscated the estates of Litavicus and his brothers, and sent ambassadors to Cæsar, to excuse what had happened. This they did with a view to recover their troops; but unwilling to part with the plunder, in which great numbers had shared, conscious of guilt, and dreading the punishment they deserved, they began privately

to concert measures of war, and by their ambassadors solicited other states to join them. Though Cæsar was not ignorant of those practices, he spoke with the greatest mildness to the Æduan deputies, assuring them that he would not consider the imprudence and levity of the multitude as a crime of the whole nation, nor upon that account lessen his regard for the state. Apprehending, however, a universal revolt of Gaul, and that he might be surrounded by all the forces of the states at once, he began to think of retiring from Gergovia, and drawing his whole army again into a body; yet in such a manner, that the retreat, occasioned by the fear of a general insurrection, should not carry with it the appearance of a flight.

While he was intent on these thoughts, fortune seemed to present him with an opportunity of acting against the enemy with success. For coming into the lesser camp, to take a view of the works, he observed a hill quite destitute of troops, that for some days before was scarce to be seen for the multitude that covered it. Wondering what might be the cause, he inquired of the deserters, who flocked daily in great numbers to his camp. They all agreed with Cæsar's scouts, that the back of the hill was almost an even ground, but narrow and woody in that part where a passage led to the other side of the town: that the enemy were extremely afraid of losing this post, because the Romans, who had already possessed themselves of one hill, if they should seize the other, would in a manner quite surround them, become masters of all the outlets, and entirely cut off their forage: that Vercingetorix had therefore drawn all his forces on that side, in order to fortify the passage.

Cæsar, upon this intelligence, dispatched some squadrons of cavalry towards that place about midnight, ordering them to ride up and down with as much noise as possible. At day-break he drew a great number of mules and carriage-horses out of the camp, without

the usual harness, and furnishing the grooms and waggons with helmets, to make them appear like cavalry, commanded them to march round the hill. With these he joined some squadrons of horse, who, for the greater show, were to range a little more freely. The whole detachment had orders to move towards the same place, taking a very large circuit. All these dispositions were seen from the town, which commanded a full view of the Roman camp, though the distance was too great to distinguish objects with certainty. At the same time Cæsar, the more effectually to deceive the enemy, detached a legion towards the eminence; and when it was advanced a little way, stationed it at the foot of the hill, affecting to conceal it in the woods. This increasing the suspicion of the Gauls, they immediately led all their forces to defend that post. Cæsar seeing their intrenchments abandoned, made his soldiers cover the military ensigns and standards, and file off in small parties from the greater to the lesser camp, that they might not be perceived from the town. He then opened his designs to his lieutenants, whom he had appointed to command the several legions, directing them above all things to moderate the ardour of the soldiers, that the hope of plunder, or desire of fighting, might not carry them too far. He represented to them the danger they were exposed to by the disadvantage of the ground, for which there was no remedy but dispatch; and that he intended only to make a sudden attack, not to fight a battle. These precautions taken, he gave the signal to engage, and at the same time dispatched the *Ædui* by another ascent, to charge the enemy on the right.

The wall of the town was about 1,200 paces distant from the foot of the hill, without reckoning the breaks and hollows. The compass the troops were obliged to take, to moderate the steepness of the ascent, added still to this space upon the march. About half way up the hill, the Gauls had run a wall of large stones, six feet

high, the better to defend themselves against the attacks of the Romans. Between this and the plain, the enemy had no troops; but the upper part of the hill, to the very walls of the town, was crowded with the camps of their several states.

The signal being given, the Romans immediately mounted the hill, scaled the nearest wall, and possessed themselves of three of the enemies' camps. Such too was the expedition wherewith they carried them, that coming suddenly upon Theutomatus, king of the Nitobrigi, as he was reposing himself in his tent about noon, he very narrowly escaped being taken: he was obliged to fly half naked, and had his horse wounded under him.

Cæsar, having accomplished all he had in view, ordered a retreat to be sounded; and the tenth legion, which fought near his person, obeyed; the other legions did not hear the signal, being separated from him by the valley; but the lieutenant and military tribunes, according to the instructions given by Cæsar in the beginning, commanded them to halt. Nevertheless, elated with the hopes of a speedy victory, and the remembrance of their former successes, they thought nothing impracticable to their valour; nor did they desist from the pursuit, till they had reached the walls and gates of the town. Upon this a great cry arising from all parts, those that were farthest from the place of assault, terrified by the noise and tumult, and imagining the enemy already within the gates, quitted the town with precipitation. The women, throwing their money and clothes from the walls, with naked breasts and extended arms, conjured the Romans to spare their lives, and not, as at Avaricum, sacrifice all to their resentment without distinction of age or sex. Some being let down from the wall, delivered themselves up to the soldiers. L. Fabius, a centurion of the eighth legion, told his troop, that he had not yet forgot the plunder of Avaricum, and was resolved no man should enter the place before

him. Accordingly, having with the assistance of three of his company got upon the town-wall, he helped them one after another to do the like.

In the meantime the Gauls, who, as we have before related, were gone to defend the post on the other side of the town, excited by the cries of the combatants, and the repeated accounts that the enemy had entered the place, sending all the cavalry before to stop the progress of the Romans, advanced in great crowds to the attack, and as they arrived drew up under the walls. They soon became formidable by their multitude, and the women, who a little before had implored the compassion of the Romans, now began to encourage their own troops, shewing their dishevelled hair, and producing their children, according to the custom of the Gauls. The contest was by no means equal either in respect of numbers, or of the ground; and the Romans, already fatigued with their march, and the length of the combat, were little able to sustain the attack of fresh and vigorous troops.

Cæsar, perceiving the disadvantages his troops laboured under, began to fear the event: sending therefore to Sextius his lieutenant, whom he had left to guard the lesser camp, he ordered him to draw out the cohorts with all expedition, and post them at the foot of the hill upon the enemies' right: that if the legions engaged should give way, the cohorts might deter the Gauls from pursuing them. He himself advancing a little with the tenth legion, waited the issue of the combat.

While the conflict was maintained with the utmost vigour on both sides; the enemy trusting to their post and numbers, the Romans to their courage; suddenly the Ædui, whom Cæsar had detached by another ascent on the right to make a diversion, appeared on the open flank of his men. As they were armed after the manner of the Gauls, this sight greatly terrified them, and

though the *Ædui* extended their right hands in token of peace, yet still the Romans imagined it a stratagem to deceive them. At the same time *L. Fabius* the centurion, and those who had mounted the wall with him, being surrounded and slain, were thrown down by the enemy from the battlements. *M. Petreius*, a centurion of the same legion, who had endeavoured to force the gates, finding himself overpowered, and despairing of safety, because he was already covered with wounds, turned to the soldiers that followed him, and said: “Since I find I am unable to save both myself and you, I will do my utmost to preserve your lives, which, through too eager a desire of glory, I have brought into this danger; seize the opportunity and retire.” Then rushing on, killed two of the enemy, drove the rest from the gate, and seeing his men approach to his assistance, he cried: “In vain do you endeavour to preserve my life: my blood and strength forsake me. Go therefore, while you may, and rejoin your legion.” Continuing still to fight, he expired soon after, generously sacrificing his own life to the safety of his followers.

The Romans, thus pressed on all sides, were at length driven from the place. But the tenth legion, which had been posted on a more advantageous ground to cover their retreat, checked the impetuous pursuit of the Gauls, and was sustained by the cohorts of the thirteenth legion, who had quitted the lesser camp under *Sextius*, and possessed themselves of an eminence. The legions having reached the plain, immediately halted, and faced about towards the enemy; who, advancing no farther than the foot of the hill, returned back to their intrenchments. The Romans lost forty-six centurions, and about 700 men.

Cæsar having assembled the army the next day, severely blamed the temerity and avarice of the soldiers, “That they had taken upon themselves to judge how far they were to proceed, and what they were to per-

form ; regarding neither the signal to retreat, nor the orders of their officers. He represented to them the danger of fighting on disadvantageous ground, and reminded them of his own conduct at the siege of Avaricum, when, having surprised the enemy without a general, and without cavalry, he had chosen rather to give up a certain victory, than, by attacking them in a difficult post, hazard a considerable loss : that as much as he admired their courage, which neither the intrenchments of the camps, nor the height of the hill, nor the walls of the town, could check ; so much did he blame their licentiousness and arrogance, who thought they knew more than their general, and could see better than him the way to conquest : that he looked upon obedience and moderation as virtues no less essential to a good soldier, than valour and magnanimity." In the end he exhorted them, "not to be discouraged by their late misfortune, nor ascribe that to the bravery of the enemy, which was entirely owing to the disadvantage of the ground, on which they fought." He still persisted in his design of retiring from Gergovia, but first drew out his legions on the plain, and offered battle to the enemy ; which Vercingetorix declined, not thinking it advisable to quit the advantage of his situation : and Cæsar returned to his camp, after a small but successful skirmish between the cavalry. The following day he again drew out his army, and thinking he had done enough to confirm the courage of his own men, and abate the pride of the Gauls, he decamped, and marched towards the territories of the Ædui. The enemy made no attempt to pursue him. He arrived the third day on the banks of the Allier, and having repaired the bridge, passed over with his whole army.

Here Eporedorix and Viridomarus informed him, that Litavicus was gone with all the cavalry to solicit the Ædui to revolt ; and that it imported greatly, that they should be there before him, to confirm the state in their

attachment to the Romans. Though Cæsar was by many proofs fully convinced of the perfidy of the Ædui, and foresaw that the departure of these men would hasten the revolt, yet, not to give ground of offence, or betray any fear, he did not think it advisable to detain them. After enumerating the many services he had done the Ædui; “That having found them low and depressed, shut up within their towns, deprived of their lands, without troops, tributaries to their enemies, and ignominiously obliged to give hostages, he had not only restored them to their former condition, but had raised them to a degree of power and authority beyond what they had ever possessed;” he dismissed them.

Noviodunum was a town belonging to the Ædui, conveniently situated on the banks of the Loire. Here Cæsar had lodged all the hostages of Gaul, his provisions, the public money, and great part of his own and his army’s baggage: here also he kept the horses brought from Italy and Spain for the service of the war. When Eporedorix and Viridomarus arrived at this place, and were informed how the Æduan state was disposed: “That Litavicus had been received into Bibracte; that Convictolitanis, the chief magistrate, and almost all the senate, had repaired thither to meet him; that ambassadors had been publicly sent to Vercingetorix, to conclude a treaty of alliance;” they thought the present favourable opportunity was by no means to be neglected. Having therefore put to the sword the garrison of Noviodunum, with all the Romans found in the place, they divided the money and horses, ordered the hostages to be conducted to Bibracte, and set fire to the town. Then drawing together the troops cantoned in the neighbourhood, they placed guards along the banks of the Loire, and began to scour the country with their cavalry, in order to cut off Cæsar’s convoys, and oblige him, through want of provisions, to return into the Roman province. This they thought the more easy to

effect, as the Loire was then considerably swelled by the melting of the snow, and did not appear to be any where fordable.

Cæsar, sensible that a retreat into the Roman province over the Cebenna would be both inglorious and difficult, and that it was necessary to rejoin Labienus with the legions under his command, and come to an action with the enemy before they could draw all their forces together, resolved to cross the Loire, though he should be under a necessity of building a bridge over it. Therefore, marching day and night with the utmost diligence, he arrived unexpectedly on the banks of the river. His cavalry very opportunely having found a ford, which however was so deep that the water reached to the shoulders of his men, he placed his horse higher up in order to break the stream, and carried over his army without loss; the enemy being so terrified at his boldness, that they did not dare to make any opposition. Finding an abundance of corn and cattle in the fields, he plentifully supplied his army, and directed his march towards the country of the Senones.

While Cæsar was thus employed, Labienus on his side, leaving at Agendicum, to guard his baggage, the new levies lately arrived from Italy, marched with four legions to Lutetia, a town of the Parisii, situated in an island of the Seine. Upon notice of his approach, the enemy drew together a great army from the neighbouring states; which was commanded by Camulogenus, an Aulercian, who, though very much advanced in age, was raised to that honour for his singular knowledge in the art of war. This general pitched his camp near the town behind a large morass, whose waters ran into the Seine, and obstructed all the passages on that side. Labienus attempted, by the means of hurdles covered with mould, to make a passage through it; but not succeeding, he silently made off in the night, and retired as far as Melodunum, a city of the Senones, situated also in

an island of the Seine. There having seized about fifty boats, and filled them with soldiers, with a view of storming the town ; the inhabitants, terrified at this new manner of attack, and being too few to defend the place, because the greater part of them had joined Camulogenus, yielded without making any resistance. Labienus immediately repaired the bridge, which had been cut down on his approach, crossed the Seine, and following the course of the river, marched back to Lutetia. The Gauls, informed of his motions, set fire to the town, broke down the bridges, and encamped on the other side of the river over-against the Romans.

It was now every where known, that Cæsar had left Gergovia, and that the Ædui, with many other states of Gaul, had joined in the revolt. It was likewise reported that Cæsar had been obliged to return into the Roman province. At the same time the Bellovaci, who bordered upon the territories of the Parisii, were raising troops with all diligence. In this situation of affairs, Labienus, menaced on one side by this warlike people, and pressed on the other by the army of Camulogenus, saw it was no proper time to think of making conquests, but rather in what manner to secure his retreat to Agendicum, where he had left all his baggage, with the rest of his troops, and from which place he was now separated by a large river. This he effected in the following manner.

He had brought from Melodunum the fifty boats found there, the command of which he gave to as many Roman knights, and ordered them to fall down the river silently four miles below Lutetia, and there wait his arrival. Five cohorts, the least fit for action, were appointed to guard the camp ; the other five of the same legion were directed to march up the river with all the baggage, making as much stir and noise as possible ; while a few barks that attended them increased this noise with their oars. Soon after their departure, he

marched with three legions to the boats that waited for him, and passed them over. Camulogenus, informed at day break of these motions, imagined that the legions were ordered to pass the river in three different places, and dividing his army into three corps, one he left to guard the passage over-against the Roman camp; another had orders to march up the river as far as the Romans should proceed that way; and the rest, being the greatest part of his troops, he led himself against Labienus. On his approach, the Roman general drew up his army, and gave the signal for battle. At the first charge, the seventh legion, which formed the right wing, routed the left of the Gauls. But their right wing, where Camulogenus commanded in person, and which was engaged with the twelfth legion, maintained its ground with the utmost bravery; the conflict was long and doubtful, till the seventh legion, leaving the pursuit of the left, faced about and attacked the Gauls in the rear. Thus surrounded, they still obstinately maintained the fight, and were with their general cut to pieces. Labienus, having gained a complete victory, retired to Agendicum, and from thence marched with all his forces and joined Cæsar.

The revolt of the Ædui gave great strength to the confederacy. Interest, money, authority, were all employed to procure the concurrence of the states, that still continued quiet. The hostages found at Noviodunum were made a means to compel some of them. But it was with great reluctancy that the Ædui submitted to the command of Vercingetorix, an Arvernian; they loudly demanded to have the chief conduct of the war, which not being consented to by Vercingetorix and his friends, the affair was referred to the decision of a general assembly of the revolted states, summoned to meet at Bibracte for that purpose, where the public voice declared Vercingetorix general-in-chief.

Confirmed in his command, he demanded of the

states to furnish him with 15,000 horse. He told them, "He was sufficiently provided with infantry, as he had no intention to refer the decision of the war to fortune, or hazard a pitched battle; but would endeavour to intercept the convoys of the enemy by the means of his superior cavalry; which he judged the easiest and safest way to ruin them: that the confederates must resolve to destroy their corn and houses, and patiently submit to a present loss, which would be rewarded by perpetual liberty." He ordered the *Ædui* and *Segusii* to raise 10,000 foot, to whom having joined 800 horse, he gave the command of them to *Eporedorix's* brother, with directions to attack the *Allobroges*. On the other hand, he commissioned the *Gabali*, and some cantons of *Auvergne*, to make an irruption into the territories of the *Helvii*, and sent the *Rutheni*, and *Cadurci*, into those of the *Volsci-Arecomici*. He neglected not, however, both by public ambassadors and private agents, to solicit the concurrence of the *Allobroges*; endeavouring to gain the leading men by presents, and allure the state by an offer of the sovereignty of the Roman province.

L. Cæsar, who commanded in those parts, had levied twenty-two cohorts in the province, and with them prepared to make head on all sides. The *Helvii* venturing to come to an engagement with the enemy, were defeated, and forced to shelter themselves in their walled towns. But the *Allobroges*, placing detachments at proper distances along the banks of the *Rhone*, guarded all the avenues of their country with great diligence.

Cæsar, seeing that the enemy was much superior in cavalry, and that his communication with Italy and the province was cut off, had recourse to his German allies beyond the *Rhine*, of whom he obtained a supply of cavalry, with some light-armed infantry accustomed to fight amongst them. On their arrival, finding that they were but indifferently mounted, he gave them the horses of

the tribunes and other officers of his own army, and marched through the frontiers of the Lingones into the country of the Sequani, in order to be at hand to succour the Roman province.

The forces of the enemy from Auvergne, and the cavalry of all the confederate states, were now met at the general rendezvous, and formed a very numerous army. Vercingetorix, elated with the prosperity of his affairs, and suffering himself to be led into a contempt of Cæsar, who he thought had no other view, but of retiring into the Roman province, rashly deviated from that prudent plan of war, which he had hitherto so steadily pursued. He followed the Romans, and posted himself at about four miles distance from their army in three camps. Having assembled the officers of the cavalry, he endeavoured to persuade them that the time of victory was come. He told them, “That the Romans were at last obliged to leave Gaul, and retreat into the province: that this retreat secured liberty for the present, but did not ascertain future tranquillity; as the Romans would, doubtless, soon return with greater forces, and persist in the design of enslaving them: that it was therefore highly expedient to attack them now, while they marched encumbered with their baggage: that in this attack their cavalry would never dare to stir from the main body of the army; and if the infantry faced about, in order to assist them, they would thereby be unable to continue their march: if, as was more likely, they abandoned the baggage to provide for their own safety, they would be deprived of every conveniency, and return home covered with ignominy and reproach: that to strike a greater terror into the enemy, he would, during the action, keep all his infantry under arms before the camp.” These words were followed by the acclamations of all the cavalry, who proposed taking an oath never to return home, nor see again their parents, wives, or children, if they did not twice pierce through the Roman army.

This proposal being approved, and the oath administered to all, Vercingetorix the next day attacked the Romans on their march; he had divided his cavalry into three bodies, two of which moved towards the flanks of the enemy's army, while the third began to charge and harass them in front. Cæsar formed also his horse into three divisions, and ordered them to advance against the Gauls, while the infantry halted, and covered the baggage, which was received into the centre. Wherever the Roman cavalry gave way, or appeared hard pressed, thither Cæsar sent detachments from the legions, which both checked the progress of the Gauls, and confirmed the courage of his own men. At last the Germans on the right, having driven the enemy from an eminence, pursued them with great slaughter to the river, where Vercingetorix was posted with the infantry. The rest of the Gallic cavalry perceiving the defeat of their countrymen, and apprehensive of being surrounded, betook themselves likewise to flight. Three Æduan noblemen of distinguished rank were brought prisoners to Cæsar: Côtus, general of the cavalry, who the year before had been competitor with Convictolitanis for the supreme magistracy; Cavarillus, who, after Litavicus's revolt, was appointed to command the infantry; and Eporedorix, who had been generalissimo of the Æduan forces in the war against the Sequani before Cæsar's arrival in Gaul.

Vercingetorix seeing his cavalry routed, drew off the infantry, and immediately retreated towards Alesia, a town belonging to the Mandubii. Cæsar pursued him till night, cut 3,000 of his rear to pieces, and arrived the next day before Alesia. After examining the situation of the town, he resolved to take advantage of the consternation of the enemy, and lay siege to it.

Alesia was situated on the top of a very high hill, at the bottom of which ran two rivers that washed it on two sides. Before the town was a plain extending about

three miles in length, but on every other side the place was surrounded, at a moderate distance, by a ridge of hills, whose summits were nearly of an equal height. Under the walls, on the side facing the east, lay encamped all the forces of the Gauls, which were defended by a ditch, and a rampart six feet high. The line of circumvallation made by the Romans took in a circuit of eleven miles. Their camp was conveniently situated, and strengthened with three-and-twenty redoubts, in which centinels were placed by day, and a strong guard by night.

Whilst the Romans were employed in these works, Vercingetorix ventured another engagement with the cavalry, in the plain between the hills. The battle was sharply maintained on both sides, but the Romans beginning to give ground, Cæsar detached the Germans to their assistance, and drew up the legions in order of battle before the camp, that he might be ready to oppose any sudden irruption of the enemy's infantry. The sight of the legions encouraged his men; the Gauls were put to the rout, and crowding upon one another in their flight, obstructed their entrance at the gates of their camp, and gave the Germans, who pursued them to their intrenchments, an opportunity of destroying great numbers, and carrying off a multitude of prisoners.

Vercingetorix now resolved to dismiss his cavalry, before Cæsar had completed his lines. At their departure he enjoined them, "To repair to their respective states, and assemble all the men capable of bearing arms. He set forth the many services he had done them, and conjured them not to neglect his safety, or abandon to the cruelty of the enemy one who had deserved so well of the common liberty. He told them, that, if they were dilatory in the execution of his orders, 80,000 chosen men must perish with him: that he had scarce corn for thirty days, and that with the utmost economy it could not be made to last much longer." After giving these

instructions, he sent them away silently about nine at night, on the side where the Roman line was not yet finished. He then distributed among his soldiers all the cattle in the place, but ordered the corn to be brought in to him, resolving to deliver it out sparingly and by measure. He entered the town with all his forces, and having prepared for an obstinate defence, waited for the expected succours.

Cæsar, informed of these dispositions by the prisoners and deserters, constructed his fortifications in the following manner. He first drew a perpendicular ditch twenty feet wide. All the other works he made 400 feet farther from the town than that ditch. This he did to secure his workmen from the darts of the enemy by day, and his works from sudden and nocturnal sallies. Observing, therefore, the distance abovementioned, he made two other ditches, each fifteen feet broad, and as many deep, and filled the innermost, which lay in a low and level ground, with water from the river. Behind these he raised a rampart twelve feet high, strengthened with a parapet and battlements: and to prevent the enemy from getting over, a fraise ran along the foot of the parapet, made of long stakes, and branches cut into points, like the horns of a stag. On the whole work were placed turrets, eighty feet distant one from another.

But as the soldiers were employed to fetch provisions, bring materials, and work at the fortifications, which considerably lessened the number of troops left to defend them, and as the enemy sometimes sallied out to attack the lines, Cæsar judged it necessary to make the following addition to his works, that they might not require so many men to guard them. Between the first and second ditches that were nearest the town, he run a trench five feet deep, and fixed in it small trees and strong branches, the tops of which he had caused to be sharpened. He then filled the trench with earth, so

that nothing appeared above ground but the sharp points of the branches, which must necessarily run into those who attempted to pass them : and as there were five rows of them, interwoven in a manner with each other, they could not be avoided. In the front of these he caused pits to be dug three feet deep, and something narrower at bottom than at top. In these pits he fixed strong stakes, about the thickness of a man's thigh, burnt and sharpened at the top, which rose only four inches above the level of the ground, into which they were planted three feet deeper than the pits, to keep them firm. The pits were covered with bushes to deceive the enemy. There were eight rows of them at the distance of three feet from each other, and disposed in the form of a quincunx. The whole space between the pits and the advanced ditch was sowed with crows' feet, or caltrops, of an extraordinary size.

These works completed, he drew another line fourteen miles in compass, constructed in the same manner as the former, and carried through the most even places he could find, to serve as a barrier against the enemy without ; that if the Gauls should attack the camp, they might not be able to surround it with their troops, or charge with equal vigour in all parts. To prevent the danger his men might be exposed to, when in quest of provisions and forage, he laid in a sufficient store of both for thirty days.

Whilst these things passed before Alesia, a general council being held by the chiefs of the Gauls, it was not thought advisable to assemble all that were able to bear arms, as Vercingetorix had desired, but to order each nation to furnish a contingent ; lest so great a multitude should occasion a scarcity of provisions, and render the observance of military discipline impracticable. The *Ædui*, with their vassals the *Segusii*, *Ambivareti*, *Aulerci*, *Brannovices*, and *Branuarii*, were rated at 35,000 men. A like number was demanded of the *Arverni*, in con-

junction with their dependants the Cadurci, Gabali, and Velauni. The Senones, Sequani, Bituriges, Xantones, Rutheni, and Carnutes, were ordered each to furnish 12,000, and Bellovaci, 10,000; the Lemovices, the same number; the Pictones, Turoni, Parisii, Helvii, Suessiones, each 8,000; the Ambiani, Mediomatrici, Petricorii, Nervii, Morini, Nitobrigi, Aulerci, Cenomani, each 5,000; the Atrebates, 4,000; the Bellocasii, Lexovii, and Aulerci Eburovices, each 3,000; the Rauraci and Boii, 30,000; the maritime and Armorican states, of which number were the Curioselites, Rhedones, Caletes, Osismii, Lemovices, Veneti, and Unelli, each 6,000. The Bellovaci alone refused to furnish the troops required, declaring that it was their design to wage an independent war with the Romans, without being subject to the command of any foreign general or state: however, at the request of Comius, they sent a body of 2,000 men.

Comius, as has been before related, had been singularly faithful and serviceable to Cæsar in his Britannic expedition: in consideration of which, his countrymen had been exempted from tribute, restored to the full enjoyment of their laws and privileges, and had their territories enlarged by the addition of the country of the Morini. But such was the present zeal of the Gauls to vindicate their liberty, and recover their ancient military glory, that neither friendship nor benefits received had any influence on them, but all with one consent devoted themselves and their fortunes to the support of this war. They raised an army of 240,000 foot, and 80,000 horse, and the country of the Ædui was the place of general rendezvous. Four commanders-in-chief were appointed, Comius, the Atrebatian, Viridumarus and Eporedorix, Æduans, and Virgasillaunus of Auvergne, cousin-german to Vercingetorix. To these were added a select number of men, chosen from among the several states, to serve as counsellors to the generals

in the conduct of the war. The whole army advanced towards Alesia with great alacrity, confident that the Romans would not so much as sustain the sight of so vast a multitude, especially as they would be attacked by another numerous army from the town.

The troops shut up in Alesia, having consumed all their provisions, finding the day appointed for the arrival of succours expired, and knowing nothing of what was transacted among the *Ædui*, summoned a council of war to debate on what was requisite to be done in the present extremity. Various were the opinions proposed: some advised a surrendry; others were for sallying forth, while yet their strength would permit, in order to break through the enemy, or die bravely in the field. Amongst the rest, Critognatus, a man of the first rank and authority in Auvergne, addressed the assembly in a speech, which, says Cæsar, deserves to be mentioned for its singular and detestable inhumanity. He said, "I shall take little notice of the opinion of those, who, under the name of a surrendry, advise you to an ignominious servitude. Such should neither be esteemed Gauls, nor suffered to come into this assembly. Let me rather apply myself to them who approve of a general sally. In this proposal you seem to think there is something worthy of our ancient bravery. It is not courage that inspires such thoughts, but weakness and an effeminacy of mind, which render us unable to bear want for a few days. It is easier to find men who will voluntarily rush on death than such as can patiently endure pain. I should not however be against this proposal, which has something generous in it, if only our own lives were at stake. But on our present determination depends the fate of all Gaul, which we have stirred up to our assistance. How would it dishearten our relations and friends to see 80,000 of their countrymen slaughtered in one place, and be obliged to fight in the midst of their dead bodies! Deprive not then of your assistance those,

who, to save you, have exposed themselves to the greatest dangers; nor, through folly and rashness, or imbecility of mind, destroy at once the expectations of Gaul, and condemn her to perpetual servitude. If the expected succours are not arrived exactly at the appointed time, ought you therefore to suspect the fidelity and constancy of your countrymen? Can you think that it is for amusement only that the Romans labour on those lines towards the country? Though you hear not from your friends, because all communication is interrupted, yet you may learn their approach from your enemies, who, through fear of them, work day and night on those fortifications. What then do I propose? What, but to do as our ancestors did in the war with the Teutones and Cimbri; a war much less important than the present? Compelled to shut themselves up in their towns, and reduced to a distress equal to what we now suffer, rather than surrender to their enemies, they fed upon the bodies of those whom age had rendered useless in war. Had we no such precedent to follow, yet still I should esteem it glorious, in the noble cause of liberty, to give one to posterity. The Cimbri, after spreading desolation over the country, at length withdrew their forces, and repaired to other regions; leaving us in the full enjoyment of our lands, laws, and liberties. But the Romans, envying a people so renowned and powerful in war, aim at nothing less than to take possession of our cities and territories, and reduce us to perpetual servitude. This has ever been the object of their wars. If you are unacquainted with what passes in distant countries, cast your eyes upon the adjoining Gaul, which, reduced into the form of a province, deprived of its laws and privileges, and subjected to the arbitrary sway of Rome, groans under the yoke of endless slavery." When all had delivered their opinions, it was resolved, that such as were unfit for war should be obliged to quit the town, and every expedient be tried,

rather than agree to the proposal of Critognatus: but if relief were long deferred, and necessity urged, they determined to submit to his advice, rather than consent to a surrendry. The Mandubii, natives of the town, were ordered to leave it with their wives and children. When they came to the Roman lines, they with tears petitioned to be received as slaves, and to be saved from perishing by famine: but Cæsar, having planted guards along the rampart, refused to admit them into his camp.

At length Comius and the other generals of the Gauls appeared with their army before Alesia, and encamped on a hill not above 500 paces from the Roman lines. The next day they drew out their cavalry, and covered the whole plain under the hill: the infantry were stationed at some distance on the heights. Great was the joy of the besieged at this sight; they immediately came forth with all their forces, posted themselves before the town, and having filled up the nearest ditch with earth and fascines, prepared for a vigorous attack.

Cæsar having disposed his troops along both his lines, ordered the cavalry to march out and charge the enemy. The Gauls had interspersed among their horse some archers and light-armed troops, to sustain them, and check the impetuosity of the Roman cavalry. Many of these being wounded at the first onset, were obliged to quit the battle. The Gauls seeing they had the advantage, and that the Romans were hard pressed by numbers, set up a general shout, both within and without the place, to give new life to their troops. As the action passed in view of both armies, the desire of applause and fear of ignominy, spurred on both parties to exert their utmost bravery. After a conflict that lasted from noon till near sunset, victory still continuing doubtful, the Germans in close order charged furiously the Gauls upon one side, and routed them. Their flight leaving the archers exposed, they were all sur-

rounded and cut to pieces. The success was equal in other parts of the field, where the Romans, pursuing the runaways to their camp, gave them no time to rally. The troops on the side of the town, despairing of victory, retired disconsolate within the walls.

After the interval of a day, which was spent in providing a great number of fascines, scaling-ladders, and iron hooks, the Gauls issued out of their camp about midnight, and approaching the Roman lines, set up a shout, to give notice to the besieged of their arrival, threw their fascines into the ditch, and endeavoured by a discharge of stones, darts, and arrows, to drive the Romans from the rampart. At the same time Vercingetorix gave the signal, and led forth his men to the attack. While the Gauls kept at a distance from the Roman lines, they did great execution by the multitude of their darts; but in proportion as they advanced, they either entangled themselves among the caltrops, or tumbling into the pits, were wounded by the pointed stakes, or were pierced by the darts discharged from the towers and rampart. Finding, when day appeared, that they had not forced any post in the lines, and fearing to be taken in flank by some troops that were sallying from the redoubts on the eminence, they retreated to their camp. The besieged, on their side, after much time spent in making preparations for the assault, and filling up the advanced ditch, seeing their countrymen were retired, before they could so much as approach the works, returned into the town without effecting any thing.

The Gauls, thus twice repulsed with great loss, thought it proper to change the plan of their attack. North of the town was a hill of too great compass to be taken into the Roman lines, and Cæsar had been obliged to place a camp on the ascent, in a disadvantageous situation, as it was commanded by the summit. C. Antistius Reginus and C. Caninius Rebilus guarded

this quarter with two legions. The Gallic generals, informed by their scouts of the situation of this camp, resolved to form the attack on that side. Having concerted their plan, they selected 55,000 of their best men, and assigned the command of them to Vergasillaunus of Auvergne, with directions to begin the assault at noon. This general, marching out in the evening, arrived before daybreak at the back of the hill on which the Roman camp above mentioned was situated. There lying concealed, he ordered his troops to take refreshment. About noon he approached the quarters of the two legions. At the same time the Gallic cavalry advanced into the plain, and the rest of the army drew out before their camp. Vercingetorix, observing these motions, led forth his troops from Alesia, carrying with him fascines, covered galleries, long poles, hooks, and other instruments prepared to force the lines. The fight began on all sides at once, and was maintained by the Gauls with great ardour. The Romans, having such extensive works to guard, scarcely sufficed for the defence of them all. What greatly contributed to disturb them was the cries of the combatants behind, which informed them that their safety depended on the valour of others.

The chief stress of the battle lay at the higher fortifications, where Vergasillaunus charged with his forces. The eminence which commanded the declivity of the hill gave his men great advantage. Some threw darts, others advanced under cover of their shields formed into a tortoise, fresh troops continually succeeded in the room of the fatigued. The earth they threw up against the lines, not only enabled them to mount the rampart, but filled the pits and ditches, and frustrated the design of the works made in the ground. The Romans, thus continually pressed, had neither strength nor weapons left to make resistance.

Cæsar, who had chosen a post from whence he

could see all that passed, observing the danger his men were in on that side, sent Labienus with six cohorts to their assistance ; ordering him, if he was not able to defend the works, to draw off the troops, and sally out upon the enemy : yet this only in case of extremity. He went in person to the rest of his men, and exhorted them to bear up courageously under the present fatigue, representing that the fruit of all their former victories depended upon the issue of that critical moment.

The Gauls, under the command of Vercingetorix, despairing to force the intrenchments in the plain, on account of the great strength of the works, attacked them in the higher and uneven ground, whither they brought all the instruments for the assault. They soon drove the Romans from the towers by a discharge of darts, filled up the ditches and pits with earth and fascines, and began to pull down the rampart and breast-work with their hooks.

Cæsar first sent young Brutus with six cohorts, to the aid of his men ; after him, C. Fabius, with seven more ; and, as the contest grew warmer, led in person fresh troops to their assistance. Having restored the battle, and forced the enemy to retire, he hastened to the side where Labienus was engaged. He drew four cohorts from the nearest fort, ordered part of the cavalry to follow him, and commanded the rest to take a circuit round the outward works, and fall upon the enemy's rear. Labienus finding that neither the rampart nor ditch was sufficient to stop the progress of the Gauls, drew together about thirty-nine cohorts from the nearest forts, and sent to inform Cæsar of his design to sally out upon the enemy. Cæsar immediately quickened his march that he might be present at the action.

His arrival being known from the colour of his garments, by which he used to distinguish himself in a day of battle, and the troops and cohorts he had ordered to follow him appearing, the fight was renewed. The

Gauls raised on all sides a mighty shout, which, being returned from the rampart, was carried quite round the lines. The Romans having cast their darts, fell furiously upon the enemy sword in hand. At the same time the cavalry appeared unexpectedly in their rear; fresh cohorts flocked continually to the assistance of those already engaged; the Gauls, unable to sustain the violent shock, took to flight, and being met by the Roman cavalry, a dreadful slaughter ensued. Sedulius, chief and general of the Lemovices, was slain upon the field of battle; Vergasillaunus of Auvergne was made prisoner in the pursuit; seventy-four colours were taken; and, of so numerous an army, very few regained their camp. The rout and slaughter being observed from the town, the besieged, on their side despairing of success, drew off their troops from the attack. The rest of the Gauls instantly abandoned their camp; and had not the Romans been exhausted by the continual fatigue of the day, the whole Gallic army might have been destroyed. However, about midnight, Cæsar detached the cavalry to pursue them, who, falling in with their rear, slew and took great numbers. The rest fled to their several cities.

The next day, Vercingetorix, assembling a council, represented to the besieged, "That he had undertaken that war, not from a motive of private interest, but to recover the common liberty of Gaul; and that, since there was a necessity of yielding to fortune, he was willing to become a victim for their safety, whether they should think proper to appease the anger of the conqueror by his death, or to deliver him up alive."

Deputies were immediately sent to Cæsar to receive his commands. He ordered them to surrender their arms, and deliver up all their chiefs. Having seated himself at the head of his lines, their leaders were brought before him, and Vercingetorix was delivered up, together with their arms. Cæsar reserving the

Ædui and the Arverni, as a means to recover those two nations, divided among his soldiers the rest of the prisoners.

These affairs dispatched, he marched into the territories of the Ædui, and received the submission of their state. There he was addressed by the ambassadors of the Arverni, who promised an entire obedience to his commands. Having exacted a great number of hostages, and restored to those two states 20,000 captives, he sent his legions into different parts of Gaul to keep the country in subjection. T. Labienus with two legions and the cavalry, was quartered among the Sequani, jointly with M. Sempronius Rutilus. C. Fabius and L. Minutius Basilus were ordered with two legions into the country of the Rhemi, to defend it against the attempts of the Bellovaci, their neighbours. C. Antistius Rheginus had his station assigned him among the Ambivareti; T. Sextius among the Bituriges; and C. Caninius Rebilus among the Rutheni; each with one legion. Q. Tullius Cicero and P. Sulpicius were placed at Cabillo and Matisco upon the Arar in the country of the Ædui, and were charged with the care of the provisions. He himself took up his winter-quarters at Bibracte.

Thus ended this memorable campaign, in which Cæsar gave those proofs of military skill and valour, which have been the object of the admiration of the greatest generals, in all ages. Having sent an account of his victory to the Roman senate, they decreed a thanksgiving of twenty days.

The unsuccessful event of this campaign had convinced the Gauls, that they were not able to resist the Romans by any army they could bring together into one place; but they persuaded themselves, that if many states revolted at once, and set on foot many separate wars, the Romans would have neither time nor troops sufficient to oppose them all. And though some of those states

must be sufferers, yet that misfortune, they thought, should be borne with, since their particular loss would purchase the liberty of the rest. Many states therefore agreed to this plan, and began to make preparations for renewing the war. To disappoint their views, Cæsar judged it necessary to use the utmost expedition. Leaving M. Antony, the quæstor, to command in his winter-quarters, he set out on the last of December from Bibracte with his cavalry, and went to the camp of the thirteenth legion, which he had placed among the Bituriges, not far from the territories of the Ædui. To these he joined the eleventh legion, whose quarters lay nearest; and, leaving two cohorts to guard the baggage, marched with the rest of the army into the most fertile parts of the country of the Bituriges. By this sudden and unexpected arrival he found them unprepared, and dispersed up and down in the fields. He forbade setting fire to the houses, the usual sign of an invasion, that he might neither alarm the enemy, nor expose himself to the want of corn and forage, if it should be necessary to advance far into the country. Many thousands of the Bituriges were made prisoners, surprised by the Roman cavalry before they could retreat into their towns. Such as escaped fled in great terror to the neighbouring states. But Cæsar pursued them with great expedition, and those states, anxious for their own safety, submitted, gave hostages, and were received into his protection. The Bituriges, seeing that his clemency left the way still open to his friendship, followed their example, and were pardoned. Cæsar, to recompense the fatigue and labour of his soldiers, gave 200 sesterces to every private man, and 2,000 to every centurion; and, having sent back the legions, to their winter-quarters, returned again to Bibracte, after an absence of forty days. He had not been there above eighteen days, when ambassadors arrived from the Bituriges to implore his assistance

Year of
Rome 702.*

* For what passed at Rome this year, see above, p. 172, &c.

against the Carnutes, who were laying waste their country. Cæsar set out to their relief with the sixth and fourteenth legions, which had not been engaged in the last expedition. The Carnutes, hearing of his approach, abandoned their towns and villages, consisting then mostly of little cottages, ran up in haste to defend them from the cold, and fled different ways. Cæsar, thinking it sufficient, in that severe season of the year, to have dispersed the forces that began to assemble, and prevented their rekindling the war, encamped at Genabum during the remaining part of the winter.

A new and more difficult war gave him a more serious employment in the beginning of the spring. The Rhemi, by frequent embassies, informed him that the Bellovaci, the most distinguished for bravery of all the Belgic or Gallic nations, with some of the neighbouring states, under the conduct of Correus, general of the Bellovaci, and Comius the Atrebatian, were raising an army, and drawing their forces to a general rendezvous, with design to invade the territories of the Suessiones, a people subject to the jurisdiction of the Rhemi. Honour and interest required of him to undertake the defence of allies, who had deserved so well of the commonwealth. He marched therefore immediately, with four legions, into the country of the Bellovaci, which he found abandoned by its inhabitants. The few prisoners his cavalry made had been left as spies. These informed him, “That all those capable of bearing arms had assembled in one place, and been joined by the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Vellocasii, and Atrebates; that they had chosen for their camp a rising ground, surrounded with a difficult morass, and disposed of their baggage in woods that lay behind them; that many of their chiefs were in the army, but the principal authority rested in Correus, because he was known to bear an implacable hatred to the Roman name; that, a few days before, Comius had left the camp to solicit aid of the Germans, who were their

nearest neighbours, and abounded in troops; that it had been resolved among the Bellovaci, with consent of all the chiefs, and at the earnest desire of the people, to offer battle to Cæsar, if, as was reported, he came at the head of only three legions, lest they should be afterward obliged to fight upon more unequal terms, when he had got his whole army together; but, if he brought greater forces with him, to continue within their camp, intercept his convoys, and cut off his forage, which in that season of the year was extremely scarce."

In consequence of this information, Cæsar resolved to try every method to draw the enemy into a contempt of his numbers, and thereby induce them to hazard a battle. He had with him the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions, all veterans of approved valour; and though the eleventh, which he had also drawn out of its winter-quarters, was not of equal standing, nor had attained the same reputation of bravery, they were yet chosen men, of great hopes, and had served under him in eight campaigns. Calling therefore the army together, he laid before them the advices he had received, and exhorted the soldiers to behave themselves with their usual courage. He arrived before the enemy's camp much sooner than they expected, and, as he approached, disposed the legions in the following order:—The seventh, eighth, and ninth legions marched in front, the baggage followed, and the eleventh legion formed the rear. Thus there appeared in view no more than three legions, the number the Gauls had determined to encounter. But, when they saw the Romans advancing against them with a steady pace, they did not think it proper to follow the resolution which had been reported to Cæsar; and either fearing the event of a battle, or surprised at his sudden approach, or desirous to penetrate farther into his intentions, they would not descend from the higher ground, but drew up in arms before their camp. Cæsar, though earnest to come to an engagement, yet, considering the

multitude of the enemy, and the advantage of their situation, contented himself for the present to encamp directly over-against them, being separated from them by a deep but narrow valley. He threw up before his camp a rampart twelve feet high, strengthened by a proportionable breastwork, and secured it by two ditches, each fifteen feet wide, with perpendicular sides. Upon the rampart he raised, at small distances, turrets of three stories, and joined them to each other by galleries, which had little parapets of osier before them. Thus the works were defended by a double range of soldiers; one of which fighting from the galleries, and secured by their height, would with more boldness and advantage launch their darts against the enemy; the other, though nearer danger, and placed upon the rampart, were yet screened by the galleries from the impending darts. All the entrances of the camp were secured by strong gates, over which he placed turrets of a greater height than the rest.

Cæsar had a twofold design in these fortifications; one, by the greatness of the works to make the enemy believe he was afraid of them, and thereby increase their presumption; the other, to enable him to defend his camp with a few troops, when it should be necessary to go far in quest of corn and forage. There happened frequent skirmishes between the two camps, carried on for the most part with missive weapons at a distance, by reason of a morass that separated the combatants. Sometimes the auxiliary Gauls and Germans in the Roman army crossed the morass and pursued the enemy; sometimes the Bellovaci, having the advantage, passed in their turn and drove back the Roman auxiliaries. And as the Romans daily sent out parties to forage, who were obliged to disperse themselves over the country, their men were sometimes surprised and cut to pieces by the detachments of the enemy. In one of these encounters, the Rhemi, auxiliaries in Cæsar's army, lost a great part of their cavalry. The Bellovaci, having observed the

daily stations of the horse destined to guard the Roman foragers, placed a chosen body of foot in ambush in a wood, and sent some squadrons of cavalry to draw the enemy into the snare. The cavalry of the Rhemi, upon guard that day, suddenly discovering the Gallic horse, and despising their small numbers, attacked and pursued them with such eagerness, that, being surprised and almost surrounded by the foot, they fled with precipitation, lost many of their men, and, among the rest, their commander Vertiscus, the chief man of their state. This general, though so far advanced in years that he could hardly sit on horseback, yet, according to the custom of the Gauls, would neither decline the command on account of his age, nor suffer his people to fight without him.

Cæsar, finding that the enemy kept within their camp, and considering that he could neither force their intrenchments without great loss, nor with so small an army enclose them within lines, wrote to C. Trebonius to join him with three legions. Upon their arrival, the generals of the Bellovaci, fearing a siege like that of Alesia, ordered all those who were weak, and less fit for service, to be sent away by night, and with them the baggage of the army. But, before this confused and numerous train could be put in order, daylight appeared; and the Gauls, to hinder the Romans from disturbing the march, drew up in arms before their camp. Cæsar did not think it proper to attack them in so advantageous a post, nor was he willing to let them retire without loss. To be in readiness for the pursuit, he passed the morass with his legions, and seized an eminence which commanded the enemy's camp, and was separated from it only by a small valley. The Gauls, confiding in the strength of their post, did not decline fighting, if they were attacked, and both armies remained in order of battle the whole day. At night the Bellovaci, seeing the Romans prepared for the pursuit,

made use of the following stratagem to secure their own retreat. Having collected and placed at the head of their line all the fascines in the camp, they set fire to them at once, and, being concealed by the smoke, marched off with the utmost diligence to another advantageous post ten miles distant. Cæsar, though he suspected that this was a contrivance to cover their flight, yet fearing also an ambuscade, and that they might possibly continue in the same post, to draw his men into a place of disadvantage, followed but slowly with his army, and suffered the enemy to escape.

The Bellovaci from their new camp carried on the same defensive war, and in frequent ambuscades attacked and cut to pieces the Roman foragers. Cæsar, having suffered many losses of this kind, was at last informed by a prisoner, that Correus, general of the Bellovaci, had chosen 6,000 of his best infantry, and 1,000 horse, to form an ambuscade in a place abounding in corn and grass, and where it was therefore presumed the Romans would come to forage. Upon this intelligence he sent the cavalry, who formed the ordinary guard of the foragers, before, intermixed them with platoons of light-armed foot, and he himself followed with some legions to support them. The Gauls had disposed their forces in ambush round the plain where the Romans were to forage, which extended a mile every way, and was environed with thick woods or a deep river. The Roman cavalry entered the plain, troop by troop, with great resolution, knowing that the legions were behind to sustain them. Correus immediately appeared, but with a few men, and fell upon the nearest squadrons. The Romans, prepared for the attack, did not flock together in crowds, which frequently happens among the cavalry on occasions of sudden surprise, and often throws them into confusion; but, preserving the proper distances, received the enemy in good order; nor did they suffer themselves to be taken in flank. The rest of the Gallic ca-

valry then broke from the woods, and advanced to the aid of those who fought under Correus. The contest was maintained with great heat and equal advantage, till the infantry of the Gauls, advancing slowly in order of battle, obliged the Romans to give way; but their light-armed infantry, marching up speedily, and posting themselves in the intervals of the squadrons, restored and continued the fight. Soon after, both sides had notice that Cæsar was approaching with his forces in order of battle. The Roman cavalry then redoubled their efforts, lest the legions should share with them the honour of the victory. The enemy, on the other hand, lost courage, and fled different ways: but, being obstructed by the same difficulties of the ground, in which they hoped to have entangled the Romans, the greatest part of them were put to the sword. Correus, whose resolution no misfortune could abate, would neither quit the field nor accept of quarter; but, fighting to the last with invincible courage, and wounding several of his enemies, forced them at length to transfix him with their javelins.

The Bellovaci, and the other states in their alliance, finding that their general was slain, their cavalry and the flower of their infantry destroyed, and, dreading the approach of the Roman army, speedily assembled a council, in which it was resolved, by common consent, to send ambassadors and hostages to Cæsar. Comius alone refused to join in the treaty, from a distrust of the Romans, who had attempted the year before, by the order of Labienus, to assassinate him treacherously at an interview with Volusenus Quadratus, where he was grievously wounded by a Roman centurion.

Cæsar granted peace to the Bellovaci and their allies, and, having thus subdued the most warlike nations of Gaul, he divided his troops into several bodies, under the command of his lieutenants, and sent them into different parts, to keep the whole country in subjection. He himself marched into the territories of the Eburones,

with a view to get Ambiorix into his power. But the Gaul flying before him, Cæsar destroyed the country with fire and sword, killing or taking prisoners great numbers of the inhabitants, that he might render Ambiorix odious to his people as the cause of so great a calamity, and preclude his being again received into the state. He then dispatched Labienus, with two legions against the Treviri, who, bordering upon Germany, and being exercised in continual wars with that nation, differed but little from them in barbarity and fierceness; nor ever submitted to his commands, unless enforced by the presence of an army. Leaving M. Antony, with fifteen cohorts, in the country of the Bellovaci, to prevent any new insurrection among the Belgæ, he marched into the country of the Carnutes. They had been lately reduced by his lieutenant Fabius, who had defeated Dumnacus, the general of the Gauls in those parts, destroyed or dispersed his army, and expelled him out of that and the neighbouring countries. Cæsar pardoned the Carnutes, on their delivering up Gutervaulus, the prime mover and incendiary of the war. This man had hid himself, even from his countrymen; but, being diligently sought after by the people, desirous to appease Cæsar's resentment, they soon found him, and brought him to the camp, where he was beaten with rods and beheaded.

Caninius, one of Cæsar's lieutenants, had defeated the Cadurci in battle, under their generals Drapes and Luterius, and was besieging Uxellodunum, a strong fortress in that country. Thither Cæsar repaired, and found the circumvallation completed. Many reasons determined him to continue the siege. He could not raise it without dishonour; the obstinacy of the garrison, which consisted of only 2,000 men, deserved exemplary punishment; and, if the place were not reduced, the Gauls might imagine that not strength but constancy had been wanting to enable them to resist the Roman arms; a

persuasion which might perhaps induce other states, who had the advantage of strong towns, to endeavour again to assert their liberty ; especially as it was generally known, that only one year of his government remained, during which, if they could but hold out, they had no farther danger to apprehend. Cæsar, understanding from the deserters that the besieged were well stored with provisions, determined, if possible, to deprive them of water.

Uxellodunum stood upon a steep rock, which was almost surrounded by a river, where the townsmen used to water. There was no possible way to turn the course of this river, because it flowed so near the foot of the rock, and in so low a channel, that ditches could not be sunk deep enough to receive it. But the descent to it from the town was so difficult and steep, and lay so open, that the people, in coming to it, could be easily annoyed by the Romans. Cæsar, taking advantage of this circumstance, posted archers and slingers, with some engines, over-against all the places of access. This forced the townsmen to water at a fountain which issued close under the walls, on the side where the town was not surrounded by the river. To deprive them of this resource, Cæsar undertook to raise a terrace over-against the fountain, which could not be performed without incredible fatigue, almost continual fighting, and much danger to the soldiers ; for they were exposed to the assaults of the enemy, who fought in safety, at a distance, and from the higher ground. A terrace notwithstanding was raised, sixty feet high, and a tower of ten stories placed upon it ; not indeed equal to the height of the walls, for which no works were sufficient, but to command the fountain. From this tower the Romans continually played their engines upon all the accesses to the spring, which made it extremely dangerous to water there ; insomuch that not only cattle and beasts of burden, but great numbers of people, perished by thirst.

The besieged were not dismayed by this distress. They filled many barrels with tallow, pitch, and dry wood, and, having set them on fire, rolled them down upon their works; and at the same time charged the Romans with great fury. The machines soon were on fire; but Cæsar, to give his men time to extinguish it, and to draw off the enemy, ordered some troops to ascend the hill on all sides, and raise a great shout, as if preparing to scale the walls. This alarming the inhabitants, they recalled their men to the defence of the town; and the Romans, being relieved from the attack, soon put a stop to the flames. The place continued to hold out with great obstinacy, till Cæsar contrived to drain the fountain by mines. When the besieged saw it suddenly become dry, they imagined it an event brought about not by human wisdom, but by the will of the gods; and therefore, despairing of success, they immediately surrendered themselves.

Cæsar, satisfied that his clemency was known to all, and no way fearing that his severity on this occasion would be imputed to cruelty; as he perceived there would be no end of the war, if other states of Gaul should in like manner revolt; resolved, by a signal example of punishment, to deter them from such projects. He ordered the hands of all those whom he found in arms to be cut off; granting them their lives, that their punishment might be the more conspicuous. Drapes, who had been made prisoner by Caninius, either out of indignation for his captivity, or dreading a severer fate, put an end to his life by abstaining from food. Luterius, who had escaped out of the battle when Drapes was taken prisoner, falling into the hands of Eparnactus of Auvergne, a faithful friend to the Romans, was by him delivered bound to Cæsar.

About this time Labienus sent intelligence that he had engaged the cavalry of the Treviri with success, killed a great number on the field of battle, with many

Germans who had joined them, and made prisoners the greatest part of their chiefs; amongst the rest Surus the Æduan, a man of distinguished birth and valour, and the only one of that nation who had till then continued in arms. Thus the whole country being pacified, Cæsar marched with two legions into Aquitain, which P. Crassus had in a great measure reduced to his obedience. On his arrival, the states sent ambassadors to him, and delivered hostages. At Narbonne he ordered his army into winter-quarters, under the command of his lieutenants. M. Antony, C. Trebonius, P. Vatinius, and Q. Tullius, were quartered in Belgium with four legions; two were sent into the country of the Ædui; two into that of the Turones, bordering upon the Carnutes, to hold the maritime states in awe; and the remaining two were stationed amongst the Lemovices, not far from Auvergne. He held at Narbonne the usual assemblies of the province, decided the differences subsisting among the states, recompensed those who had distinguished themselves by their fidelity and services, and, after dispatching all those affairs, repaired to the legions in Belgium, and took up his winter-quarters at Nemetocenna.*

* Arras.

Here he found all quiet; even Comius, that bitter enemy to the Romans, had been received into friendship. This Atrebatian general, who had headed the armies of the Bellovaci, retired to his German allies, when matters were compounded with Cæsar, but always kept a watchful eye upon the motions of his countrymen, that, in case of a war, he might be ready to offer them his counsel and assistance. Finding that the state now submitted quietly to the Romans, he employed the troops that remained with him to support himself and his followers by plunder, and frequently carried off the convoys that were going to the Roman winter-quarters. M. Antony sent against him C. Volusenus Quadratus, an officer of distinguished valour; the man who, by the

order of Labienus, had lately attempted to kill him at an interview, and who still preserved a particular hatred to him. These two mortal enemies soon met in battle: Volusenus, after a successful engagement, urged by an eager desire of making Comius prisoner, rashly pursued him with only a few attendants. The Gaul, by a precipitate flight, drew the Roman a considerable way from the main body of his army, then, turning to his own men, he called upon them to revenge the wound he had so treacherously received. They instantly faced about, charged their pursuers, and repulsed them. Comius, clapping spurs to his horse, ran furiously against Volusenus, and drove his spear through his thigh. The Romans, seeing their commander dangerously wounded, fought with redoubled fury, and put the enemy to flight a second time with considerable slaughter. Comius escaped by the swiftness of his horse; but, as he had lost the greatest part of his men, he sent a deputation to Antony, offering to retire wherever he should order him, to submit to any terms that should be imposed on him, and to give hostages for his good behaviour; requesting only, that so much regard might be had to his fears, as that he should not be obliged to appear in the presence of any Roman. Antony, before the arrival of Cæsar, consented, took hostages, and granted him peace.

This campaign effectually completed the reduction of Gaul, and put an end to the Gallic war, in the course of which it is said that Cæsar either took by force 800 towns, or made them yield to the terror of his arms; that he subdued 300 different nations; that he defeated in battle 3,000,000 men, of which more than 1,000,000 were killed in the field, and another 1,000,000 made prisoners.^y

^y Plut. in Cæs. Plin. Hist. Nat. 7. 25.

[YEAR OF ROME 703.^z]

The ninth and last year of his government was quite pacific. In his winter-quarters at Nemetocenna in Belgium, and in the following year, he made it his business to ingratiate himself with the Gauls, and deprive them of all pretence for a revolt. He treated the several states with respect, imposed no new burdens upon them, and was extremely liberal to their chiefs. By these means he prevailed with them, wearied and exhausted by long and unsuccessful wars, to embrace the ease and quiet, attendant on their present submission. Thus he had leisure, in this last year, to fix his attention on Rome, where a contest for and against him was carried on with great vehemence; a contest which ended in that memorable civil war, that changed the form of the Roman government into monarchic despotism.

^z For the transactions at Rome in this year, 703, see p. 195, &c.

BOOK X.

FROM THE END OF THE YEAR 703, WHEN THE CIVIL WAR BROKE OUT BETWEEN POMPEY AND CÆSAR, TO THE SECOND TRIUMVIRATE, OR THE LEAGUE WHICH WAS FORMED BETWEEN LEPIDUS, ANTONY, AND OCTAVIUS, IN THE YEAR 710.

CHAP. I.

A brief relation of the rise and progress of the contest between Pompey and Cæsar.

FROM the year 693, the triumvirate reigned in Rome: the whole management of the public affairs was in the hands of the three most powerful men of the state, Crassus, Pompey, and Cæsar. The latter, during his consulship in 694, had cemented and established the power of the confederacy; and Pompey directed it in his absence for his own, and the purposes of his associates. He was, therefore, in a manner, the sovereign of the republic, while Cæsar was employed in the conquest of Gaul. In the year 696, he was invested, on the proposal of Cicero, whose motion was approved of by the senate, with an absolute power for five years over all the public stores and corn-rents of the empire;^a by which means all those who were concerned in the naval, the commercial, and landed interest, became his tributaries and dependants. Another law, proposed at the same time by the tribune Messius,^b gave him the additional power of raising what fleets and armies he thought fit; with a greater command through all the provinces than their proper governors had in each. These extra-

Vid. supr.
vol. 4.
p. 569.

Vid. supr.
p. 48. 69.

^a This law was moved and carried by the consul Lentulus Spinther, one of the heads of the aristocratical party, with a view to his own designs, and to divert Pompey from the thoughts of being employed in re-establishing Ptolemy on the throne of Egypt; an office which the consul was solicitous should be assigned to himself.

^b Cicero, though he thought the law of Messius insufferable, yet held his peace, because the pontifices had yet decreed nothing concerning his house:—"Nos taceamus; et eo magis, quod de domo nostra nihil adhuc pontifices responderunt." Melm. vol. 1. p. 56. Thus were the liberties of Rome sacrificed to the private purposes of her pretended patriots.

ordinary concessions to Pompey created a jealousy in Crassus, who, perceiving himself quite eclipsed by his old enemy and rival, now his partner in power, encouraged Publius Clodius to put some public affronts upon him, which Pompey openly resented, and complained of. A reconciliation, however, was speedily effected by Cæsar; and, in 697, the triple league was renewed at Lucca; where the governor of the two Gauls, after three successful campaigns, spent the winter-season in the greatest splendour, attended by almost all the magistrates and great men of the republic. It was agreed upon by the triumviri that Pompey and Crassus should sue for the consulate of the following year, take to themselves what provinces they liked best, and continue Cæsar in his government of Gaul for five years more. How all this was effected has been formerly related. Cras-^{Vid. supr. b. 9. c. 3. and 4.} sus, before the expiration of his consulship, set out for his government of Syria, and the Parthian war; but Pompey remained in Italy, though invested with the command of an army and the government of Spain; and there continued to influence all the public transactions. His commission for the providing of corn, which expired not till the year 701, furnished him with a pretence for not going to his province. He is universally accused of having given way to all the disorders of the city, and of having inflamed public discord, with a view of forcing the senate to create him dictator; in which scheme he succeeded so far as to get himself elected sole consul by the unanimous vote of the senate, and the consent even of Cato.—But, while he was in-^{P. 139.} vested with the whole public authority in the year 701, in order to settle the state, he employed it to a very different purpose.* Before his law took place for disquali-

* Cicero often extols Pompey's third consulship, so far as to call it divine; yet he influenced the judges to condemn Milo, whom Cato loudly acquitted, while Sautius was absolved, who headed Milo's gladiators in forcing the inn where Clodius was killed: "Milonem reum non magis invidia facti, quam Pompeii damnavit voluntas: quem quidem M. Cato palam lata absolvit sententia." Vell. Pat. 2. 47. He employed his authority to save Scipio, though notoriously guilty, while he let

fyng all future consuls and prætors from holding any province till five years after the expiration of their magistracy, he was careful to provide an exception for himself, and got the government of Spain continued to him for five years longer. His chief intention, after he had secured his own interest and power, was to quell the passions, and stop the ambitious pursuits, of his fellow-grandees. He was under a necessity, however, of providing something extraordinary for his partner Cæsar; and he consented to a law dispensing with his absence in suing for the consulship. Cœlius, tribune of the people, who promoted this law, had been engaged to it by Cicero, at the joint request of Pompey and Cæsar;^d and it was carried with the concurrence of all the other tribunes, though not without difficulty and obstruction from the senate. This last measure in favour of Cæsar was entered into by Pompey against his inclination, and he soon had reason to repent of it. Julia's death had

Hypsæus be condemned by an *ex post facto* law, who had been his quæstor, and ever obsequious to his will. He abandoned Scaurus, who had served under him, and to whom he left the government of Syria after the Mithridatic war, because, says Asconius, he took offence at Scaurus's marrying Mutia, his divorced wife:—"in eo iudicio neque Pompeius propensum adiutorium præbuit; videbatur enim apud animum ejus non minus offensionis contraxisse, quod iudicium ejus in Mutiam, crimine impuditiæ ab eo dimissam, levius fecisse existimaretur, cum eam ipse probasset, quam gratiæ acquisisse necessitudinis jure, quod ex eadem uterque liberos haberet." In Arg. Or. pro Scauro. He, with his father-in-law Scipio, restored also the censorship; but who were elected to this office? Two of the most notoriously profligate citizens of Rome, Appius and Piso. How infamous must have been the character of Scipio himself, whom Pompey took for his father-in-law and colleague in the consulship, if the following story from Valerius Maximus be true:—"Æque flagitiosum illud convivium, quod Gemellus tribunitius viator, ingenui sanguinis, sed officii intra servilem habitum deformis, Metello Scipioni consuli, ac tribunis plebis magno cum rubore civitatis comparavit. Lupanari enim domi suæ instituto, Muciam et Fulviam, tum a patre, tum a viro utramque inclytam, et nobilem puerum Saturninum in eo prostituit." Lib. 9. c. 1. Cæsar, in the beginning of the third book of the Civil War, affirms that many of the decisions given at this time were so little conformable to law, that sentence was often pronounced by a party of judges different from those who attended the pleadings. Tacitus, it may likewise be added, is far from giving us a favourable idea of Pompey's third consulship:—"Cn. Pompeius tertium consul, corrigendis moribus delectus, et gravior remediis quam delicta erant, suarumque legum auctor idem ac subversor." Ann. 3. c. 28.

Ad Att.
7. 1.

Philip. 2.
c. 10.

^d "Well then: shall I declare against Cæsar? Where then is the faith I plighted him? For I was the means of the dispensation being granted him; and, when Cæsar solicited for my vote at Ravenna, at his request, I brought over Cœlius to his party. But what do I say of Cæsar? I was solicited to the same purpose by our darling Pompey in that immortal third consulate of his." Yet Cicero, in his second Philippic, affirms, that he endeavoured to dissuade Pompey from suffering this law to pass. There are many such contradictions in Cicero's writings.

broken all his ties with her father, and that of Crassus had given a new turn to their several pretensions : his commission over the corn-rents of the empire was expired, and the laws loudly ordered him away to Spain, where he had no mind to go. He had been greatly caressed of late by the senate, who had trusted him with the whole power of the state ; but the popular party was, with very good reason, better inclined to Cæsar. In these circumstances he thought it advisable to change his scheme of politics :^e and, by Cicero's account to Cælius in the very beginning of the year 702, Pompey was quite alienated from his father-in-law,^f and associate in power, without having received the least provocation either real or pretended, and had resolved to act in concert with his enemies. Hitherto, Pompey and Cæsar had joined their interests against the chief of the nobility, and obtained from the people what the senate would not grant ; but now, that the whole power of the empire was thrown as a kind of prize between two, it was natural that they should divide, and head, respectively, the two permanent and distinct parties in the republic, the aristocracy and the people.

Eight years successively had Cæsar conducted the Roman arms in Gaul with such amazing success as entitled him to a triumph for the actions of every campaign ;^g no wonder, therefore, that his enemies among

^e “ Septimo ferme anno, Cæsar morabatur in Galliis, cum medium jam ex invidia Pompeii male cohærentis inter Cn. Pompeium et C. Cæsarem concordiae pignus, Julia, uxor Magni, decessit ; atque omnia inter destinatos tanto discrimini duces dirimente fortuna, filius quoque parvus Pompeii, Julia natus, intra breve spatium obiit. Tum in gladios cædesque civium furente ambitu, cujus neque finis reperiabatur, nec modus, tertius consulatus soli Cn. Pompeio, etiam adversantium antea dignitati ejus judicio, delatus est. Cujus ille honoris gloria, veluti reconciliatis sibi optimatibus, maxime a C. Cæsare alienatus est.” Vell. Pat. l. 2. 47.

^f “ I passed several days with Pompey, conversing with him on nothing else but the republic :—Take this from me, that Pompey is an excellent citizen, prepared both with courage and counsel for all events which can be foreseen : wherefore give yourself up to the man ; believe me, he will embrace you ; for he now holds the same opinion with us of good and bad citizens.” Ep. Fam. 11. 8. Melm. 3. 28. “ I left Pompey an excellent citizen, and in readiness against all events which we may dread.” Ad Att. 4. 8.

^g “ Novemque æstatibus vix ulla non justissimus triumphus emeritus.” Vell. Pat. l. 2. c. 47. “ Dicam enim ex animo, patres conscripti, quod sentio, et quod vobis audientibus sæpe jam dixi. Si mihi nunquam amicus C. Cæsar fuisset, sed semper

the nobles should feel an apprehension of his growing power with the people, who, before the recent proofs he had given of his superior military abilities, and of his amiable qualities, had, in many instances, distinguished him by singular marks of their esteem, affection, and confidence. Pompey, too, was undoubtedly jealous of his glory as a captain, which, it must be confessed, exceeded his own; and he easily foresaw that, if Cæsar was permitted to sue for the consulship, and to enter upon it at the expiration of his military command, he would become master of the republic; and, after his magistracy, procure, by a law of the people, the most considerable province, with a powerful army; while he himself, in the meantime, would be obliged to withdraw to his government of Spain. Thus Pompey and the aristocracy, though agreeing in little else, were induced to unite their strength against the conqueror of Gaul.

A coalition was therefore formed, and a resolution taken, to revoke Cæsar's command before the time was out, and to oblige him to come as a private man to sue for the consulship; in which case he had been exposed to the mercy of his enemies, and Cato had threatened publicly to bring him to a trial. But this resolution was very difficult to be put into practice, as it would necessarily occasion, as a previous step, the repeal of two laws, the one made by the senate itself, the other by the people, with the unanimous concurrence of the tribunes, and with the approbation of Pompey.

The consuls for the year 702 were Servius Sulpitius and M. Claudius Marcellus, who had been elected by the joint interest of Pompey and Cæsar. Cato had stood candidate with them; but, having displeased the people

iratus: si aspernaretur amicitiam meam, seseque mihi implacabilem inexpiabilemque præberet, tamen ei, cum tantas res gessisset gereretque quotidie, non amicus esse non possem. Cujus ego imperio non Alpium vallum contra adscensum transgressionemque Gallorum, non Rheni fossam, gurgitibus illis redundantem, Germanorum immanissimis gentibus objicio et oppono. Perfecit ille, ut, si montes resedissent, amnes exaruisent non naturæ præsidio, sed victoria sua, rebusque gestis Italiam munitam haberemus." Cic. in Pis.

by an ill-timed severity, he was rejected.—Plutarch informs us, that he had obtained a decree from the senate, ordering the candidates to make interest by themselves, and not by their friends; so that the people were deprived not only of their usual bribes, but of the satisfaction of being courted: and he refused also, says the same author, to condescend to that submissive manner of soliciting which is common on such occasions, and behaved with great state, choosing rather to preserve the dignity of his character, than to acquire the dignity of consul. On the very day he had lost his election, as if quite unconcerned for what had happened, he was seen in the Campus Martius playing at tennis; a behaviour which Plutarch greatly extols, but which might have been nothing else but an affectation of singularity, or a consequence of that haughty rage, which made him declare, that he would no more stand candidate for any magistracy.

Marcellus,^h entirely devoted to Pompey, was no sooner entered into office, than he began the attack upon Cæsar, by declaring his intention to abrogate immediately his command, and to appoint him a successor, alleging that the war in Gaul was now brought to a conclusion. But he was stopped for some months in this pursuit, probably by Pompey's falling ill soon after his promotion to the consulship, and by the opposition of his colleague Sulpitius,ⁱ who, being of a more moderate temper, and

Suet. in
Cæs. c. 28.
Dio, l. 40.
p. 148.

^h Dr. Middleton, vol. 2. p. 196, has given the following character of him: "He was the head of a family, which, for a succession of many ages, had made the first figure in Rome; and was himself adorned with all the virtues that could qualify him to sustain that dignity which he derived from his noble ancestors. He had formed himself in a particular manner for the bar, where he soon acquired great fame; and, of all the orators of his time, seems to have approached the nearest to Cicero himself in the character of a complete speaker. His manner of speaking was elegant, strong, and copious; with a sweetness of voice, and propriety of action, that added a grace and lustre to every thing that he said. He was a constant admirer and imitator of Cicero; and of the same principles in peace, and on the same side in war." His fierceness, however, it may be remarked, against Cæsar, so ill-timed, gives us no great idea of his prudence or his honour: it was this probably which procured the consulship successively to two of his relations.

ⁱ "Sulpitius was of a noble and patrician family, of the same age, the same studies, and the same principles with Cicero, with whom he kept up a perpetual friendship. They went through their exercises together when young, both at Rome and at Rhodes,

Suet. in
Cæs. 28.

addicted to neither faction, overruled his motions. The enemies of Cæsar contented themselves therefore with making vows for the success of the Bellovaci, with whom he was engaged in war; and for the destruction of the Roman general. Marcellus had also made some attempt to deprive Novum Comum, a colony, which Cæsar, when consul, had settled at the foot of the Alps, of the freedom of the city, granted to it by a law preferred by Vatinius. He was likewise frustrated in this design, yet resolved to have no regard to the privilege of the colony; and, having caught a Comensian magistrate, who was acting the citizen at Rome, he ordered him to be seized, and publicly whipped; an indignity from which all citizens were exempted by law; bidding the man go, and shew these marks of his citizenship to Cæsar.^k

The elections of magistrates for the ensuing year en-

in the celebrated school of Molo: whence he became an eminent pleader of causes, and passed through all the great offices of the state, with a singular reputation of wisdom, learning, and integrity; a constant admirer of the modesty of the ancients; and a reprover of the insolence of his own times. When he could not arrive at the first degree of fame, as an orator, he resolved to excel in what was next to it, the character of a lawyer; choosing rather to be the first, in the second art, than the second only in the first: leaving therefore to Cicero the field of eloquence, he contented himself with such a share of it as was sufficient to sustain and adorn the profession of the law. In this he succeeded to his wish; and was far superior to all who had ever professed it in Rome; being the first who reduced it to a proper science, or rational system; and added light and method to that which all others before him had taught darkly and confusedly. Nor was his knowledge confined to the external forms, or the effects of the municipal laws; but enlarged by a comprehensive view of universal equity, which he made the interpreter of its sanctions, and the rule of all his decisions; yet he was always better pleased to put an amicable end to a controversy, than to direct a process at law. In his political behaviour he was always a friend to peace and liberty; moderating the violence of opposite parties, and discouraging every step towards civil dissension; and, in the wars which ensued, he was so busy in contriving projects of an accommodation, that he gained the name of the peacemaker. Through a natural timidity of temper, confirmed by a profession and course of life averse from arms, though he preferred Pompey's cause as the best, he did not care to fight for it: but, taking Cæsar's to be the strongest, suffered his son to follow that camp, while he himself continued quiet and neuter: for this he was honoured by Cæsar, yet could never be induced to approve his government. From the time of Cæsar's death he continued still to advise and promote all measures which seemed likely to establish the public concord; and died at last, as he lived, in the very act and office of peacemaking." Middl. p. 361.

^k "All the other colonies on that side of the Po had before obtained from Pompey's father the rights of Latium [*Jus Latii*], that is, the freedom of the city of Rome to those which had borne an annual magistracy in them. Hence Cicero blames this act of Marcellus as violent and unjust. 'Marcellus (says he) behaved shamefully in the case of the Comensian; for, if the man had never been a magistrate, he was yet of a colony beyond the Po; so that Pompey will not be less shocked at it than Cæsar himself.'" Middl. p. 44. Those who had not been magistrates might give their votes in the assemblies of Rome, if ordered by the presiding magistrate to vote in such a tribe: but only the magistrates could pretend to any office.

gaged the attention of the city in the months of July and August; and Pompey's faction generally prevailed. C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Paulus¹ were chosen consuls. The first, who was cousin-german to M. Marcellus, carried his suit in competition with Calidius, an eminent orator and friend to Cæsar, and was zealously attached to Pompey. The second set out also in his administration with principles agreeable to those of his colleague.

Marcus Cœlius, Cicero's friend and correspondent, obtained the ædileship this year. He had been tribune of the people in Pompey's third consulship, and had distinguished himself in that office by his zeal for Milo, and was reputed of the aristocratical faction.^m

Curio likewise obtained the tribunate, which he sought with no other design, as many imagined, than for the opportunity of mortifying Cæsar, against whom he had hitherto acted with great fierceness. Heⁿ was a

¹ Cicero wrote congratulatory letters to them both from Cilicia, and another to M. Marcellus, which, as it informs us how the consul's thoughts were taken up before the elections, we shall insert it here:

TO MARCUS MARCELLUS, CONSUL.

"I very warmly congratulate you on your relation Caius Marcellus being elected to succeed you: as I sincerely rejoice in your having received this happy fruit of your pious affection to your family, of your patriot zeal to your country, and of your illustrious deportment in the consular office. I can easily imagine the sentiments which your address on this occasion has created in Rome; and as to myself, whom you have sent to these far-distant parts of the globe, believe me, I speak of it with the highest and most unfeigned applause. I can with strict truth assure you, that I have ever had a particular attachment to you from your earliest youth: as I am sensible you have always shewn by your generous offices in promoting my dignities, that you deemed me worthy of the most distinguished honours. But this late instance of your judicious management in procuring the consulship for Marcellus, together with the proof it affords of the favour in which you stand with the republic, has raised you still higher in my esteem. It is with great complacency, therefore, I hear it observed by men of the first distinction for sense and merit, that, in all our words and actions, our tastes and studies, our principles and pursuits, we bear a strong resemblance to each other. The only circumstance that can render your glorious consulate still more agreeable to me, will be your procuring a successor to be nominated to this province as soon as possible. But if this cannot be obtained, let me entreat you, at least, not to suffer my continuance here to be prolonged beyond the time limited by your decree, and the law which passed for that purpose. In a word, I hope upon all occasions to experience in my absence the benefit of your friendship and protection. Farewell." Ep. Fam. 15. 9. Melm. 3. 35.

^m See some account of him, p. 163.

ⁿ "The circumstance of Curio's standing candidate for the tribuneship (says Ep. Fam. Cœlius, in a letter to Cicero, in 702) greatly alarms those who are unacquainted with the real good qualities of Curio's heart. I hope, and indeed believe, he will act agreeably to his professions, and join with the senate in supporting the friends of

8. 4.
Melm.
3. 32.

young nobleman of great parts, spirit, and eloquence: but addicted beyond all measure or modesty to the prevailing luxury and gallantries of a most dissolute age. In his youth he had been the leader of the young nobility, and a warm assertor of the authority of the senate against the power of the triumvirate. Upon his first taste of public honours, his ambition and thirst of popularity had engaged him in such expense and prodigality, that, to supply the magnificence of his shows and plays, he had contracted an immense debt.

Ep. Fam.
8. 4.
Melm. 3.
32. [dated
Aug. 1,
702.]

The consul Marcellus, who, when taken up in these elections, had seemed to have dropped the design of abrogating Cæsar's proconsular power,^o upon which he was so intent in the beginning of his magistracy, resumed the affair after the consuls were chosen. "At a meeting of the senate (says Cœlius to Cicero) held on the 22d of July, in the temple of Apollo,^p upon a debate relating to the payment of the forces commanded by Pompey, mention was made of that legion, which, as appeared by his accounts, had been lent to Cæsar; and he was asked of what number of men it consisted, and for what purpose it was borrowed? In short, Pompey was pushed so strongly upon this article, that he found himself under a necessity of promising to recall this legion out of Gaul; but he added at the same time, that the clamours of his enemies should not force him to take this step too precipitately. It was afterward moved, that the question might be put concerning the election of a

the republic. I am sure, at least, he is full of these designs at present; in which Cæsar's conduct has been the principal occasion of engaging him. For Cæsar, though he spares no pains or expense to gain over even the lowest of the people to his interest, has thought fit to treat Curio with singular contempt. The latter has behaved with so much temper upon this occasion, that he, who never acted with artifice in all his life, is suspected to have dissembled his resentment, in order the more effectually to defeat the schemes of those who oppose his election; I mean the Lælii and the Antonii, together with the rest of that wonderful party."

^o "Marcellus (says Cœlius to Cicero) has dropped the design upon which he was lately so intent: but not so much from indolence, I believe, as prudence." Ep. Fam. 8. 2. Melm. 3. 29.

^p The temple of Apollo was situated without the town, and the senate was assembled there, that Pompey, who was actually governor of Spain, and commanded a considerable army, might be present: and all the matter of this deliberation had been probably concerted with him.

successor to Cæsar. Accordingly the senate came to a resolution that Pompey (who was just going to the army at Ariminum,^a and did immediately after set out for that purpose) should be ordered to return to Rome with all expedition; that the affair relating to a general election of new governors for all the provinces might be debated in his presence. This point (adds Coelius) I imagine will be brought before the senate on the 13th of this month; when, if no infamous obstacles should be thrown in the way by the tribunes, the house will certainly come to some resolution; for Pompey, in the course of the debate, let fall an intimation, that he thought every man owed obedience to the authority of that assembly."

Thus the senate threw themselves precipitately into

^a This army was probably part of the four legions which were decreed to Pompey for the support of his government of Spain. He feigned at this time a resolution of going to that province, which was opposed by Cæsar's enemies and Cicero himself. The last writes thus to Atticus on the 6th of July: "It appeared to me likewise as if Pompey (according to what you wrote me Varro had said) would most certainly go to Spain. This resolution by no means met with my approbation. I easily made Theophanes* sensible that he could do nothing better than to remain where he was. That Grecian therefore will do all he can to detain him, and indeed I know that Pompey has a great deference for his opinion." From this it appears that Cicero and all the aristocrats thought, that on Pompey's presence rested the safety of what they called the republic. Ad Att. 5. 11.

In another letter to his friend Atticus, he writes: "As to the affairs of Rome, we have ugly accounts of Curio and Paulus; not that I see any danger while we have Pompey: let him only keep his health, and we are safe." [Non quo ullum periculum videam stante Pompeio, vel etiam sedente; valeat modo.] "But I am concerned for my friends Curio and Paulus." Ad Att. 6. 3. Yet the same Cicero has the confidence, in a subsequent letter, written to Aulus Cæcina, in 707, to affirm solemnly, that he always advised Pompey to go to his government, and boasts, at the same time, of his having never been deceived in the foresight of future events. "Now, if the principles (says he) of the Etruscan science, in which you were instructed by your illustrious and excellent father, did not deceive you with respect to me; neither will my presages be less infallible with regard to you. They are derived, indeed, not only from the maxims and records of the most distinguished sages, whose writings, you well know, I have studied with great application; but from a long experience in public affairs, and from having passed through various scenes both of prosperity and adversity. I have the stronger reason to confide in this method of divination, as it has never once deceived me, during all these dark and distracted times: insomuch that, were I to mention my predictions, I am afraid you would suspect that I framed them after the events I pretend to have foretold.—I always gave it as my opinion, that Pompey should go to his government of Spain: with which, if he had happily complied, we should never have been involved in this fatal civil war."—Ep. Fam. 6. 6. Melm. 9. 34. This is most evidently false; and we shall see him out in his politics in almost every circumstance: yet Cornelius Nepos, and all Cicero's commentators, have taken his word for it, and are astonished at his prophetic discernment!

* A learned Greek of Mitylene, who was Pompey's constant companion, and wrote his life.

the arms of Pompey. The affair was not debated on the 13th of August, because Marcellus, though he had exerted himself in the pursuit of his design, was not able to assemble a complete number of senators. Many absented themselves, being in Cæsar's interest; others were backward because they saw that these motions tended to a rupture, and that nothing could be legally determined; the tribunes of Cæsar's party being always ready to interpose their negative. At last, an assembly was held on the 30th of September; and Pompey, who, in a preceding meeting, had opened himself so far as to declare, that Cæsar ought not to be admitted as a candidate for the consulship, whilst he retained his command in Gaul, now let fall an expression which was much observed, and gave, says Coelius to Cicero, confident hopes of his good intentions; that he could not, without great injustice, determine any thing in relation to the provinces under Cæsar's command before the 1st of March; but that, after that time, he should have no sort of scruple. It was resolved accordingly by the senate, that the consuls elect, L. Paulus and C. Marcellus, should move them on the 1st of March to settle the consular provinces; and if any magistrate should interpose to hinder the effect of their decrees, that he should be deemed an enemy to the republic; and, if any one actually interposed, that this vote and resolution should be entered into the journals as an order of the senate, to be considered some other time by the house, and laid before the people. In this same assembly, Pompey being asked what if a negative should be put on the 1st of March, upon the decree for recalling Cæsar? he declared, that he looked upon it just as the same thing, whether Cæsar openly refused to obey the orders of the senate, or secretly procured some magistrate to obstruct them. "What (said another) if he should insist on being consul, and holding his province also?" "What (replied Pompey) if my

son should take a stick and beat me?"—From expressions of this kind, it was generally conceived that a rupture would undoubtedly ensue between Pompey and Cæsar: and indeed the votes of the senate, and the measures taken at the same time by Pompey, were no less than a declaration of war against Cæsar, who lost no time to prepare himself against this attack of his enemies. As soon as he had vanquished the Bellovaci, he applied himself to quiet the affairs of his province, that he might be able to give all his attention to the city, and have his army in readiness to support him. At the same time he left no stone unturned to procure friends among the magistrates of the ensuing year. He first attempted to gain C. Marcellus; but finding him too rigid, he addressed himself to L. Paulus, to whom he is said to have given 1,500 talents, or about 300,000*l.* which he employed in building a noble palace adjoining to the Forum. He gave a much greater sum to the tribune Curio, who, by his prodigalities, had not only wasted his immense fortune, but had contracted a debt of 600,000 sesterces, or about half a million.^r The consul and tribune agreed therefore, secretly, to suffer nothing prejudicial to Cæsar's interest to pass during their magistracy; but both continued to appear in the party of Pompey.^s

In the last months of this year, the city was greatly alarmed by the news sent them by Cassius of an invasion of the Parthians. As the senate had no opinion

Ep. Fam.

8. 10.

Melm.

4. 14.

^r "Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum,
Gallorum captus spoliis, et Cæsaris auro."

Lucan. lib. 4. 819. Burman. p. 299.

Caught by the spoils of Gaul, and Cæsar's gold,
Curio turn'd traitor, and his country sold.

^s The *vendit hic auro patriam* of Virgil is also applied to the case of Curio. Servius.

"As for Paulus (says Cælius, in a letter to Cicero, dated the 18th of November), he declares most vehemently against suffering Cæsar to continue in Gaul, and our friend Furnius is the only tribune whom I suspect of obstructing his measures for that purpose.—Curio (says he, in the same letter) I foresee will undertake two things; he will in the first place attempt to weaken the authority of Cæsar; and in the next endeavour to throw some little advantages on the side of Pompey." Ep. Fam. 8. 10. Melm. 4. 14.

of the military skill of Bibulus and Cicero, who governed in Syria and Cilicia, the two frontier-provinces, some were of opinion that the command should be given to Pompey; and he himself seemed to relish the proposition.^t This project would serve his ends in Asia, and would furnish a pretext for staying in Italy, and taking from Cæsar two of his legions. Others were for assigning this expedition to Cæsar and his army; and many named the consuls as the most proper persons to be employed. And these magistrates, in the apprehension that they would either be nominated to a commission, which they did not relish, or suffer the disgrace of its being delegated to others, forbore to convene the senate; though they thereby incurred the censure of neglecting the public interest. But whether indolence or pusillanimity was the real motive of their declining the conduct of the war, it was concealed under the specious appearance of modesty; and thus the year was spun out without doing any effectual business. The senate, however, with a view to weaken Cæsar, taking advantage of the general apprehension of an irruption of the Parthians into Syria, ordered that Pompey and Cæsar should each of them furnish a legion to be sent into that province. But Pompey, instead of giving one of his, called for that which he had formerly lent to Cæsar; and Appius was dispatched to take the command of it, and to bring it into Italy. Cæsar, though he easily saw through the policy of his enemies, obeyed without demur the decree of the senate, and not only delivered to Appius Pompey's legion, but also the fifteenth, cantoned at that time in Hither Gaul, which was immediately replaced by the thirteenth. Plutarch says, that he gave to each soldier of the two legions 250 drachms, about 8*l.* sterling; a circumstance which Cæsar himself has not mentioned. These troops were

^t "I shall be able (says Cicero to Atticus), with the reinforcement of Deiotarus, to keep the Parthians in play till Pompey arrives: his letter informs me that he will be appointed to that command." Ad Att. 6. 1.

no sooner arrived in Italy, but they had quarters assigned them in Campania, near Capua, instead of being sent into Syria.

L. ÆMILIUS PAULUS,

C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS,

} Consuls.

The beginning of the year 703 was very quiet, but the calm soon ended in a mighty tempest. Curio, who had already sold himself to Cæsar, and who had hitherto acted insidiously with the friends of Pompey, and even signed the decrees of the senate against Cæsar, was now looking out for a pretext to quarrel with his party : with this view he applied to the pontifical college for an intercalation, in order to lengthen out the period of his tribunitian ministry ; and the priests rejecting his demand, their refusal furnished him with the pretence he wanted, and gave a colour, such as it was, to the desertion he had long meditated. He instantly declared against the senate, and harangued the people in favour of Cæsar, threatening, at the same time, to propose not only an Agrarian and a Viarian law,^u but a law also which would empower the ædiles to distribute corn among the people. These motions, however, soon gave way to one that was more important and interesting. C. Marcellus

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

^u " Consules autem habemus summa diligentia : adhuc senatusconsultum, nisi de feriis Latinis, nullum facere potuerunt. Curioni nostro tribunatus congelat. Sed dici non potest, quomodo hinc omnia jaceant : nisi ego cum tabernariis et aquariis pugnarem, veternus civitatem occupasset . . . Quod tibi supra scripsi, Curionem valde frigere ; jam calet. Nam ferventissimè concerpitur. Levissimè enim, quia de intercalando non obtinuerat, transfugit ad populum, et pro Cæsare loqui cœpit ; legemque Viariam, non dissimilem Agrariæ Rulli, et Alimentariam, quas jubet ædiles metiri, jactavit. Hoc nondum fecerat, cum priorem partem epistolæ scripsi."—Cœlius Ciceroni. (Weiske. p. 182.) He threatens likewise to propose a Viarian law, somewhat of the same tendency with the Agrarian one which was formerly attempted by Rullus. This place must be corrupted ; for the Viarian and Agrarian laws were different. The former regarded the keeping of the high roads in repair, and regulated the equipages of travellers, imposing a tax on them ; and the latter is thus explained by Cœlius, in a letter written in the end of the year 702 : " I forgot to mention that Curio designs to make an attempt to procure a division of the lands in Campania : it is pretended that Cæsar does not concern himself in this matter ; certain however it is, that Pompey is very desirous of having the distribution settled before Cæsar's return, that he may be precluded from applying them to his own purposes." Ep. Fam. 8. 10. Melm. 4. 14. Cæsar's Agrarian law had not probably been executed in its whole extent, and Curio meant to carry the remaining part into execution. Cœlius compares the Agrarian law of Curio to that of Rullus, to shew his disapprobation of it.

Ep. Fam.

8. 16.

Melm. 5. 5.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

Appian.
Bel. Civ.
1. 2.

Ibid.

Ep. Fam.
8. 12.
Melm. 6. 6.

proposed, on the 1st of March, the affair of the consular provinces, as it had been ordered by the vote of the senate of the 30th of September. Paulus, the other consul, was silent ; but Curio, after giving his approbation to the proposition, demanded that Pompey should likewise be ordered to renounce the government of Spain, and the command of the legions allotted to him ; declaring, that the republic could never be free, till both he and Cæsar were reduced to the condition of private citizens ; and that, if the one was continued in command, the other ought not to be stripped of his authority ; which, in that case, was necessary to preserve the balance, and to prevent the republic from being at the disposal of one man. The senate, not being willing to make a decree so contrary to the interest of Pompey, rejected the tribune's proposal ; who, in return, put his negative on every other resolution.

When the news of the debate reached Pompey, who was then in Campania, he wrote, with a false modesty which deceived nobody, “ that, whatever honours had been heaped upon him, they had been freely granted him by the good-will of his fellow-citizens, without his ever soliciting any : that, lately, he had been forced into a third consulship, and to take the government of Spain for another five years ; and that they should always find him ready to resign, at their will, an employment which he had received with reluctance.” These protestations he even renewed on his return to Rome ; but Curio, who was not to be put off with fair words, insisted upon his carrying his promises into execution, assuring him of a like submission from Cæsar.

There were fresh debates upon this subject ; and Cœlius has given the following accounts of them to Cicero : “ As to political affairs ; the efforts of all parties are at present directed to a single point : and the general contest still is, in relation to the provinces. Pompey seems to unite in earnest with the senate, that

the 13th of November may be limited for Cæsar's resigning his government. Curio, on the contrary, is determined to oppose this to the utmost; and, accordingly, has relinquished all his other schemes, in order to apply his whole strength to the affair in question. As to our party, you well know their irresolution; and consequently will readily believe me when I tell you they have not the spirit to push their opposition to the last extremity. The whole mystery of the scene in short is this: Pompey, that he may not seem to oppose Cæsar, or to aim at any thing but what the latter shall think perfectly equitable, represents Curio as acting in this affair merely upon his own authority, and with no other view than to create disturbances. It is certain, at the same time, that Pompey is much averse to Cæsar's being elected consul before he shall have delivered up his government, together with the command of his army: and indeed he seems to be extremely apprehensive of the consequences, if it should prove otherwise. In the meantime he is severely attacked by Curio: who is perpetually reproaching him with deviating from the principles on which he acted in his second consulship. Take my word for it, notwithstanding all the difficulties they may throw in Curio's way, Cæsar will never want a friend to rise up in his cause: and if the whole turns, as they seem to fear, upon his procuring some tribune to interpose his negative to their decrees, I will venture to pronounce that he may remain in Gaul as long as he shall think proper."

"Do you know, my dear Cicero, what a victory Curio has lately obtained in relation to the provinces? The senate, in pursuance of a former order, having assembled to consider of the obstruction which some of the tribunes had given to their decree; M. Marcellus moved that the application might be made to those magistrates to withdraw their protest; but it was carried in the negative by a considerable majority. Pompey is at present

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d consulship.

Ep. Fam.
8. 13.
Melm.
6. 8.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

Ad Att.
7. 7.

Ep. Fam.
8. 14.
Melm.
6. 15.

in such delicate circumstances, that he will scarce find any measures, I believe, perfectly to his satisfaction. The senate, however, seem to intend, by the resolution I just now mentioned, that Cæsar shall be admitted as a candidate for the consulship, notwithstanding he should refuse to resign his government." Cicero speaks of this resolution in a letter to Atticus, and produces it as a proof that the intentions of the senate were not true to the interest of the commonwealth: "For, had the motion (says he) of Marcellus been vigorously supported, Curio's opposition would have been vain, and Cæsar must necessarily have resigned his command." But this measure had been certainly unconstitutional: and Pompey, who had often shewn himself ungrateful to his friends, and cruel to his enemies, had no merit with the greater part of the senate, comparatively with Cæsar, who never courted them, but relied entirely upon the people, while his antagonist, as induced by his interest, had applied to the one and to the other.

"As to political affairs; I have often mentioned to you, that I imagined the public tranquillity could not possibly be preserved beyond the present year: and the nearer we approach to those contentions, which must inevitably arise, the more evident this danger appears. For Pompey is determined most strenuously to oppose Cæsar's being consul, unless he resigns his command: and Cæsar, on the contrary, is persuaded that he cannot be safe upon those terms. He has offered, however, to throw up his commission, provided Pompey will do the same. And thus their very suspicious alliance will probably end at last in an open war With respect to our present divisions, I foresee that the senate, together with the whole order of judges, will declare in favour of Pompey: and that all those of desperate fortunes, or who are obnoxious to the laws, will list themselves under the banners of Cæsar. As to their armies, I am persuaded there will be a great inequality

But to answer your question in a few words, concerning my sentiments of public affairs; if one or other of our chiefs should not be employed against the Parthians, I am persuaded great dissensions will soon ensue: dissensions, my friend, which nothing can terminate but the sword, and which each of them seem well inclined and prepared to draw.”^x

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

The consular elections were carried by Pompey and his party. Sergius Galba, a lieutenant of Cæsar, who stood candidate, was rejected; and L. Lentulus Crus and C. Marcellus, his fiercest enemies, were chosen.

Cæsar, after the campaign of the year 702, had made it his business in the winter-season to pacify his province, and to take away all occasion of future insurrections. He treated the cities honourably; rewarding generously the noblemen and leading men, and did not burden the country with new impositions. In the spring, he hastened into Italy, under the pretence of assisting his quæstor Antony in his suit for the augurate; but in

^x These accounts are the most authentic we have: what Suetonius, or Plutarch, or Appian, adds to them, cannot be depended upon, being full of blunders and absurdities. The relations, nevertheless, of these authors are copied by almost every writer of Roman history. Appian talks of a debate in the senate, in which the consul, C. Marcellus, having put the question separately, first, whether they were of opinion that Pompey should lay down his command, the majority answered in the negative: then putting the question, whether a successor should be named to Cæsar? all agreed to it: but that Curio, reuniting what the consul had separated, put to the vote another question, whether they should not both be ordered to dismiss their armies? twenty-one rejected it, and 370 answered in the affirmative; all, says he, affectionate to the public good: whereupon the consul dismissed the assembly, crying, “Well, then, take Cæsar for your master.” He adds, that soon after, a false rumour coming that Cæsar had passed the Alps, and was marching directly to Rome, the city was alarmed, and the consuls proposed to the senate to send for the legions at Capua, to employ them against him as an enemy to the state; but that, upon Curio’s declaring the report to be false, the consul, in great wrath, said: “Since, in consulting with the senate, I am hindered to provide for the safety of the commonwealth, I will provide alone, according to the power I am intrusted with.” Then, rushing out of the city with his colleague [who was L. Æmilius Paulus, Cæsar’s fast friend], and presenting a sword to Pompey, “We order you (said he), my colleague and I, to march against Cæsar, and fight for your country; and to that end, we give you the command of the army at Capua, and all the forces in Italy, with power to raise troops at your discretion.” Pompey declared he would obey them, because it was their command; adding, however, these words, “if no better expedient can be found.” Plutarch has much the same tale, but has added, most ridiculously, that the senate followed the consul, and that the whole city put on mourning. Dio has adopted only a part of the story, and tells us that the subject of the debate was, whether Curio should be turned out of the senate; Appian, the censor, having declared that, in his judgment, he ought to be degraded. He observes, that only C. Marcellus and the two consuls elect went to Pompey. Lib. 40. p. 151

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

reality to take a nearer view of the transactions in the city, and to encourage his party there. The news therefore which he received of Antony's^y success, before he reached Italy, did not stop him. It was then time to thank the municipal towns for the assistance they had given his friend upon his recommendation, and to recommend unto them his own case touching the consulate, which he purposed to apply for the next year. He was received with extraordinary respect and affection: all the people came forth to meet him; sacrifices were offered over the whole country; and the gates where he was to pass, the market-places, and the temples, were adorned as in a day of triumph. After making his tour through the municipal towns, and agreeing with his friends at Rome, he left T. Labienus to command in Italy, and went himself into Gaul to review his army, and put it in readiness to act on the first call.

In the end of the year 703, he returned to Italy: and, when he came thither, he found that the two legions which he had dismissed, and which by the decree of the senate should have been employed against the Parthians, had been delivered to Pompey by C. Marcellus, the consul, and were kept in the neighbourhood of the city, and that every measure had been taken to abrogate his command, and reduce him to the state of a private citizen. Here he was joined by Curio, who, after some fruitless attempts to prohibit Pompey's levies, seeing the

^y We have an account of this election in a letter from Cœlius to Cicero: "If you had taken the king of Parthia himself prisoner, and sacked his metropolis, it could not make you amends for your absence.—You have lost indeed a subject of inexhaustible mirth, by not being spectator of the very ridiculous figure which the luckless [L.] Domitius displayed, when he lately found himself disappointed in his election. The assembly of the people was exceedingly numerous upon this occasion; but the force of party bore down all before it, and even carried away many of the friends of Domitius from his interest. This circumstance he imputes to my management; and as he considers the preference which has been given to his competitor Antony as a real injury done to himself, he honours me with the same marks of his displeasure with which he distinguishes the most intimate of his friends. He is at present indeed a very diverting compound of wrath and indignation; which he impotently discharges, in the first place against myself for promoting the election of M. Antony; and in the next against the people, for expressing too much satisfaction in his repulse." Ep. Fam. 8. 14. Melm. 6. 15.

opposite party greatly incensed against him, had left the city before the expiration of his office.

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

Mark Antony^z succeeded him in the tribunate on the

^z Dr. Middleton has collected, from Cicero's writings, the history of M. Antony's 402d consulship. life to the commencement of the civil wars; and the reader will allow me to transcribe this article from that intelligent historian.

"M. Antony, who now began to make a figure in the affairs of Rome, was of an ancient and noble extraction; the grandson of that celebrated statesman and orator who lost his life in the massacres of Marius and Cinna: his father had been honoured with one of the most important commissions of the republic; but, after an inglorious discharge of it, died with the character of a corrupt, oppressive, and rapacious commander. The son, trained in the discipline of such a parent, whom he lost when he was very young, launched out at once into all the excess of riot and debauchery, and wasted his whole patrimony before he had put on the manly gown; shewing himself to be the genuine son of that father, who was born, as Sallust says, to squander money, without ever employing a thought on business, till a present necessity urged him. His comely person, lively wit, insinuating address, made young Curio infinitely fond of him; so that, in spite of the commands of a severe father, who had often turned Antony out of doors and forbidden him his house, he could not be prevailed with to forsake his company; but supplied him with money for his frolics and amours, till he had involved himself on his account in a debt of 50,000*l*. This greatly afflicted old Curio; and Cicero was called in to heal the distress of the family; whom the son entreated, with tears in his eyes, to intercede for Antony, as well as for himself, and not suffer them to be parted; but Cicero, having prevailed with the father to make the son easy, by discharging his debts, advised him to insist upon it as a condition, and to enforce it by his paternal power, that he should have no farther commerce with Antony. This laid the foundation of an early aversion in Antony to Cicero, increased still by the perpetual course of Antony's life, which fortune happened to throw among Cicero's inveterate enemies: for, by the second marriage of his mother [Julia, a relation of Cæsar's], he became son-in-law to that Lentulus who was put to death for conspiring with Catiline, by whom he was initiated into all the cabals of a traitorous faction, and infected with principles pernicious to the liberty of Rome. To revenge the death of this father [in-law] he attached himself to Clodius; and during his tribunate, was one of the ministers of all his violences; yet was detected at the same time in some criminal intrigue in his family, injurious to the honour of his patron. From this education in the city, he went abroad to learn the art of war under Gabinus, the most profligate of all generals," [Plutarch tells us, that Antony not being able to endure the madness of Clodius, and apprehensive of the power of his enemies, withdrew himself, and retired into Greece, where he inured his body to warlike exercises, and applied his mind to the study of eloquence; and that it was with difficulty that he was prevailed upon by Gabinus to serve under him,] "who gave him the command of his horse in Syria; where he signalized his courage in the restoration of king Ptolemy, and acquired the first taste of martial glory, in an expedition undertaken against the laws and religion of his country." [An expedition which Cicero encouraged his great and noble friend Lentulus Spinther to undertake.] "From Egypt, instead of coming home, where his debts would not suffer him to be easy, he went to Cæsar into Gaul, the sure refuge of all the needy, the desperate, and the audacious:" [This is not a fair manner of representing Antony's behaviour. Was not Cæsar's camp the school of military skill, and the field of glory? Had not Cæsar, among his lieutenants, P. Crassus, so much extolled by Cicero, Quintus Cicero, M. Brutus, and many other officers of great merit: and where could Antony spend his youth better?] "and, after some stay in that province, being furnished with money and credit by Cæsar, he returned to sue for the quæstorship.—Cæsar recommended him in a pressing manner to Cicero, entreating him to accept Antony's submission, and pardon him what was past, and to assist him in his present suit: with which Cicero readily complied, and obliged Antony so highly by it, that he declared war presently against Clodius, whom he attacked with great fierceness in the Forum, and would certainly have killed, if he had not found means to hide himself under some stairs. Antony openly gave out, that he owed all this to Cicero's generosity, to whom he could never make amends for former injuries, but by the destruction of his enemy Clodius. Being

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d con-
sulship.

Ad Att.
7. 8.

In Pomp.

10th of November, and in all his zeal for Cæsar. He was no sooner in possession of his office, than he proposed that the two legions taken from Cæsar should be sent into Syria; that all new levies should be stopped, and that all those who had already given in their names, and taken the oath, should be released from their obligation, and even be forbid to serve. On the 21st, he made a speech to the people, which was a perpetual invective on Pompey's conduct from his first appearance in public, with great complaints against the violent and arbitrary condemnation of citizens, and the terror of his arms; and it was probably on this occasion that he read Cæsar's letter to the people, mentioned by Plutarch, in which he expressed a desire that both Pompey and he, quitting their governments, and dismissing their armies, should submit to their judgment. According to Suetonius, Plutarch, and Appian, Cæsar made other equitable overtures, proposing to part immediately with eight of his legions and Transalpine Gaul, provided he might keep two legions with the Cisalpine province, or but one legion with Illyricum and Cisalpine Gaul, till he was made consul. Plutarch and Appian add, that Pompey was satisfied with these conditions, but that they were rejected by the consuls; a circumstance extremely improbable: for Pompey, it is certain, was as averse to peace, as the most determined of Cæsar's enemies. In an interview that Cicero had with him, on the 10th of December, Pompey told him, that there was no hope of an accommodation, and that war was inevitable; and, finding Cicero wholly bent on peace, he contrived to have a second conference with him at Lavernium, on the 27th, before he reached the city, in

chosen quæstor, he went back immediately to Cæsar, without expecting his lot, or a decree of the senate to appoint him his province; where, though he had all imaginable opportunities of acquiring money, yet, by squandering, as fast as he got it, he came a second time empty and beggarly to Rome, to put in for the tribunate; in which office, after the example of his friend Curio, having sold himself to Cæsar, he was, as Cicero says, as much the cause of the ensuing war, as Helen was of that of Troy." Phil. 2. 21, 22. Midd. p. 64.

hopes to allay his fears, and to turn him from the vain project of an accommodation, which might contribute to cool the zeal of his friends in the senate. He declared, that there could be no pacification, but such as was treacherous and dangerous; and that, if Cæsar should resign the command of his army, and take the consulship, he would throw the republic^a into confusion. At this time he was even actually disposing of all the governments; and he tried to engage Cicero to go to Sicily, though neither the resolution of the senate nor the orders of the people had given him any command in that quarter. He farther assured Cicero, that, when Cæsar heard of the earnest and mighty preparations that were making against him, he would throw up his pretensions to the consulship, and stick by his army and government: "But supposing (added he), that Cæsar should act like a madman, and fly to extremities, I should despise every thing he could do, and should place an entire confidence in my own and the republic's forces."^b "In short (says Cicero), though I was frequently checked by reflecting on the doubtful events of war, yet I was made the more easy, when I heard a general, of such courage and such experience and authority, discoursing, like a statesman, upon the dangers that might attend an insincere accommodation."^c

Year of
R O M E
703.
B. C. 49.

402d consulship.

Ad Att.
7. 8.

^a He means the aristocratic faction.

^b This extravagant confidence betrays great weakness in Pompey, and the historians bring several reasons to account for it. He looked upon himself, it is said, as the idol of the people of Italy: for, having fallen dangerously ill, in the beginning of this same year, in Campania, the whole country made sacrifices to the gods for his recovery, and the example was followed by the rest of Italy; and, when he appeared in public, such multitudes came forth to see him, that no place could contain them. Plutarch, it may likewise be observed, has informed us, that Appius, and those who brought him the two legions from Gaul, very much vilified Cæsar's actions there, and gave out scandalous reports in derogation of his honour, telling Pompey that he was unacquainted with his own strength and reputation, if he made use of any other forces against Cæsar than his own; for such was the soldiers' hatred to Cæsar and their love to Pompey, that they would all come over to him upon his first appearance. Whatever were the causes which raised in him so favourable an opinion of his power and security, certain it is that he proceeded so far as to laugh at those who seemed to dread the war; and somebody telling him, that, if Cæsar determined to march to Rome, there was nothing to oppose him, Pompey answered, "In whatever part of Italy I stamp with my foot, there will rise up legions."

^c Cicero, in a letter to Atticus on the subject of his interview with Pompey on the 10th of December, writes thus: "Pompey said, that he had long perceived

CHAP. II.

Cæsar is ordered by a decree of the senate to disband his army, and, in case of refusal, is declared a public enemy. The consuls and other magistrates are vested with extraordinary powers. Cæsar passes the Rubicon with one legion, and in two months' time makes himself master of all Italy.

C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS, } Consuls.
L. LENTULUS CRUS,

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cæsar de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

ON the 1st of January,^d Curio came to Rome, and produced letters from Cæsar to the senate, in which, after enumerating his many services to the republic, and answering the accusations of his enemies, he declared, “that he was willing to lay down his command, if Pompey should also consent to that measure; and that, as there could be no safety for him upon any other terms, he would immediately, if his demand was not complied with, march into Italy, and revenge the injuries done to himself and the commonwealth.” It was with great difficulty that the tribunes procured these

Cæsar to be alienated from him, but had received a very late instance of it: for that Hirtius came from Cæsar a few days before, and did not come to see him; and, when Balbus promised to bring Scipio an account of his business the next morning before day, Hirtius was gone back to Cæsar in the night: this he takes for a clear proof of Cæsar’s resolution to break with him.” Ad Att. 7. 4. Had not Pompey given Cæsar sufficient provocation? If Cæsar had acted with the perfidious insincerity of Pompey, it had been an eternal blemish upon his character.

^d The months of the Roman calendar, at this time, did not perfectly correspond with those of our Julian year; but the difference was not so great as our learned Bishop Usher has made it. Annals, p. 639. According to him the 1st of January of this Roman year answered to the 22d of October of the Julian year, 50 before Christ; so that the autumnal months were carried back into summer, and the winter months into autumn. It is impossible to reconcile this way of reckoning with the unanimous testimony of the ancient historians. And the primate pretends that they were deceived by Cæsar’s reformation of the calendar. But it is also irreconcilable with the facts related by them; and it is astonishing that Abbé Mongault, Dr. Middleton, and M. Crevier, who have examined so narrowly into every thing relating to these times, did not perceive this mistake. Cicero, in a letter to Tiro, whom he had left sick beyond seas, dated the 29th of January, charges him not to sail during winter: “Cave festines aut committas, ut aut æger aut hieme naviges;” and he adds, that he imagines the hard winter has prevented his letters from reaching him: “Neque enim meas puto ad te litteras tanta hieme preferre.” Ep. Fam. 16. 11. Could Cicero, then in the southern parts of Italy, call the beginning of November hard winter? No, he speaks of letters written in the end of December. In a letter dated the 7th of April, ad Att. 10. 2. he says, the swallow is come, “garrula [hirundo] en adest,” or, the spring is come. The 1st of April, therefore, could not answer to any part of the month of January; it was certainly March. The ingenious M. de le Nauze, member of the Royal Academy of Literature in Paris, has proved the first day of this Roman year to be the 16th of December of the Julian year, which is fifty-five days later than our learned primate.

letters to be read ; but nothing could prevail with the consuls to permit their contents to come under the deliberation of the house : and they proposed to debate on the state of the commonwealth. Lentulus declared that he would not be wanting to the senate and the common cause, if they would deliver their opinions with freedom and courage ; but that, if they continued to regard Cæsar, and affected to court his friendship, he would disclaim entirely their authority. Scipio, father-in-law to Pompey, spoke to the same purpose : he said that Pompey was firmly bent not to abandon the republic, if he found the senators ready to support him : but that if they cooled or were remiss in their resolves, it would be in vain for them to expect his aid, if they should afterward find it necessary to apply for it. The speech of Scipio was considered as proceeding from Pompey, who was at that time in the suburbs. Others proposed milder councils. M. Marcellus objected to any deliberation on this matter till troops were raised over all Italy, and an army got ready, under whose protection the senate might proceed with freedom and safety in their debates. It was moved by Calidius, that Pompey should be sent to his government of Spain, in order to take away all occasion of discord ; because Cæsar, it was said, had reason to fear that the two legions, taken from him, were retained by Pompey in the neighbourhood of Rome, to be employed against him. M. Cœlius spoke to the same purpose. But they were all severely reprimanded by the consul Lentulus, who expressly refused to put Calidius's motion to the vote : and M. Marcellus, awed by the consul's rebuke, retracted what he had said. Thus the clamours of Lentulus, the dread of an army at the gates of Rome, and the menaces of Pompey's friends, intimidating the greatest part of the senate, it was carried, though with great difficulty, that Cæsar should be ordered to disband his army before a certain day then fixed ; and that, in case of disobedience, he

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. 1. 1.

should be declared an enemy to the republic. This is Cæsar's account, and it appears to be a true one, from the conduct of the senate in the last year, and from Cicero's letters.^e The boasted advantage of Pompey's having the support of the senate must be considered of consequence, as nothing more than a fair appearance; and was in reality a new infringement of the liberty of his country; since it was procured by the most illegal and tyrannical means.

M. Antony and Q. Cassius, tribunes of the people, put their negative on the decree of the senate; but their prerogative was disputed, and a debate ensued, in the course of which many severe speeches were made against them. He who spoke with the greatest warmth and passion was most applauded by the Pompeian faction. The assembly broke up without coming to any determination; and Pompey, in the evening, sent for all those who were of his party, and commended the forward, and reproved and animated the more moderate. Multitudes of veterans, who had formerly served under him, flocked to Rome from all parts, allured by the expectation of rewards and dignities: and a great number of officers belonging to the legions lately returned by Cæsar had likewise orders to attend him. The city was filled with troops.

Ibid.

The contest between the consuls and the tribunes was renewed the following days, and continued till the

^e He writes to Atticus in the end of December: "I am daily more apprehensive of the public commotions, for even our patriots are not so unanimous as they ought to be: how many knights, how many senators have I seen, who have bitterly inveighed against the whole of Pompey's conduct, and especially the unseasonable journey he has undertaken?" Ad Att. 1. 7. 5. [This journey was probably to give directions for the raising of troops.] Ibid. 6. "I am in great concern about the public, nor have I hitherto found a man, who did not think it better to yield to Cæsar all he demands, than enter upon a civil war." Cicero himself was of the same opinion, as he declares in the same letter: "You will ask me then, what are my real sentiments? Why, truly, they are not the same with my words. My sentiments are, that any concession is preferable to a civil war: but I will talk, and that too from no servile motive, in the same strain that Pompey does. For indeed it would be of the worst consequence to the public, and particularly unbecoming in me, should I differ from Pompey at this important juncture." Unbecoming to speak his real sentiments, and to advise what he thought was for the public good! This, it must be confessed, is a very strange morality.

seventh, during which time Piso, the censor, father-in-law to Cæsar, and L. Roscius, the prætor, who had served under Cæsar in Gaul, offered to go to him and acquaint him with the state of affairs, demanding only six days for that purpose. Others proposed to send deputies to him : but all these proposals were rejected by the consuls, and by Scipio, Cato, and the other chiefs of the aristocratical faction. The tribunes were threatened, or, according to Appian,^f were ordered to leave the house : and the senate had recourse to that decree, which was never used but in the greatest extremity, that the consuls, prætors, tribunes of the people, and the proconsuls that were near Rome, should take care that the commonwealth received no detriment.^g Antony and Cassius left the city that same night, disguised like slaves, in a hired carriage, and stopped not till they got to Rimini. Curio and M. Cœlius soon followed them.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

The following days the senate assembled without the city, where Pompey confirmed every thing he had before intimated by the mouth of Scipio : he applauded the resolution and courage of the senators, and acquainted them, that he had ten legions already in arms, and was besides well informed that Cæsar's troops were by no means satisfied with their general, and had even refused to support and follow him. It was then proposed that troops should be raised all over Italy ; that Pompey

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

^f Appian says, " that Marcellus and Lentulus ordered Antony and Cassius to leave the senate, lest no regard should be had to their dignity : that Antony, leaping from his seat in great rage, invoked the faith of the gods and men, and lamented that an authority, which had been hitherto held sacred, was no longer a security ; and that those who proposed salutary advice were driven out of the senate, as if they had been guilty of murder or some other crime : that, after pronouncing these words, he instantly departed in a fury, foretelling, in a prophetic strain, the wars, proscriptions, banishments, and confiscations, with which the city was threatened, and making horrid imprecations against those who were the cause of all these miseries." On the contrary, Cicero, in a letter to Tiro, dated the 12th of January, writes thus : " Curio, in conjunction with Q. Cassius and M. Antony, without the least violence being offered to them, have withdrawn themselves to Cæsar. They took this step immediately after the senate had given in charge to the consuls, the prætors, and the tribunes of the people, together with those of us who are invested with proconsular power, to take care of the interest of the republic." Ep. Fam. 16. 11. Melm. 7. 1.

^g Id. Jan. or the 7th of January : the 28th of October, according to Bishop Usher, but rather the 12th of December.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Ep. Fam.
16. 12.

Melm. 7. 5.

should be supplied with money out of the public treasury; that Faustus Sylla should be sent pro-prætor to Mauritania; and that King Juba should have the title of king and ally to the people of Rome. Marcellus, the consul, opposed the last of these motions, and Philippus, tribune of the people, would not agree to the pro-prætorship of Sylla. The other motions were approved of. The affair of the provinces, two of which were consular, and the rest prætorian, came next to be canvassed. Syria was allotted to Scipio, and Transalpine Gaul to L. Domitius. To the prætorian provinces governors were assigned without the privity or approbation of the people, and they instantly departed for their several commands. Thus war was in effect declared against Cæsar; and measures were taken to arm the whole empire in order to crush him. The Pompeians flattered themselves that, before Cæsar could draw his forces together from the several quarters of Gaul where they were quartered, Pompey would have a considerable army on foot, with which he might possess himself of the principal parts of Italy, obstruct his access to Rome, and hold him continually employed, till the army from Spain, consisting of five legions under the command of Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, came up upon his rear, to complete his overthrow. They did not doubt but he would be deserted by great numbers of his officers and soldiers, and that the two Gauls would rise against him; every part of those provinces, excepting only the colonies beyond the Po, being thought utterly averse to him.

Ep. Fam.
16. 11.

Melm. 7. 1.

Cicero arrived at Rome on the 4th of January, with all the pomp of his proconsular and imperatorial dignity: and, in this disordered state of the city, he solicited a decree for his triumph, to which, as he informs us, in a letter to Tiro, “the senate, in a very full house, immediately consented: but that the consul Lentulus, in order to appropriate to himself a greater share in con-

ferring this honour, told them, that he would propose it himself in proper form as soon as he should have dispatched the affairs that were necessary in the present conjuncture." In the same letter, which is dated the 12th of January, he adds, "I am unhappily fallen into the very midst of public dissension, or rather, indeed, I find myself surrounded with the flames of a civil war. It was my earnest desire to have composed these dangerous ferments: and I probably might, if the passions of some in both parties, who are equally eager for war, had not rendered my endeavours ineffectual.—We are raising forces with all possible diligence, under the authority and with the assistance of Pompey: who now begins, somewhat too late, I fear, to be apprehensive of Cæsar's power.—I act with great moderation: and this conduct renders my influence with both parties so much the stronger. The several districts of Italy are assigned to our respective protections: and Capua is the department I have taken for mine." And in a letter dated the 29th of January, he observes, "It has been the perpetual purpose of all my speeches, my votes, and my actions, ever since I returned to Rome, to preserve the public tranquillity, but an invincible rage for war had unaccountably seized not only the enemies, but even those who are esteemed the friends of the commonwealth; and it was in vain I remonstrated that nothing was more to be dreaded than a civil war.—Upon my return to Rome, it was too late to enforce my pacific sentiments: I was wholly unsupported in my opinion, and not only found myself among a set of men, who were madly inflamed with a thirst of war, but was considered likewise as one, who, by a long absence, was quite unacquainted with the true state of the commonwealth."^h

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Ep. Fam.
16. 12.
Melm.
7. 5.

Ep. Fam.
4. 1.
Melm.
7. 12.

Cæsar was at Ravenna when he received the first in-

^h It is remarkable that Cicero, in his letter to Tiro, talks of his influence with both parties, and that here he complains of his being totally disregarded.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

telligence of the proceedings against him. He assembled his troops, and acquainted them with the grateful requital which his long and glorious services had met with from the senate. In his speech, he insisted on nothing so much as the violation of the tribunitian power in the persons of Antony and Cassius. He complained of the innovation introduced into the commonwealth, which checked, by the terror of arms, the authority of the tribunes: he said, “that Sylla, who had made it his business to humble, and almost annihilate that magistracy, had yet left it the liberty of opposition; but that Pompey, who valued himself for having restored it to all its prerogatives, deprived it now of that privilege which it had always enjoyed.” His officers and soldiers having testified their readiness to defend him and the tribunes, he sent dispatches to his lieutenants in Gaul to quit their winter-quarters and come to him with all expedition; and he himself entered immediately upon action, and marched to Ariminum. There he found Antony and Cassius, whom he produced in the servile disguise they had been forced to put on for their security: and the sight of them greatly exasperated the soldiers, who made fresh protestations to their general, that they would follow him wherever he should think proper to lead them.ⁱ

ⁱ Suetonius (in Vit. Cæs. c. 31.) mentions several particulars which I have not thought worthy of being inserted into the text of this history. He says, “that, as soon as Cæsar was informed that the interposition of the tribunes had been overruled, and that they themselves had been forced to save themselves by flight, he privately dispatched away some battalions; and, to prevent any suspicion of his design, he attended at a public show, and examined the model of a school for gladiators, which he intended to build: and sat down to table with his friends as usual: that after sunset, having caused mules from a neighbouring mill to be put to his chaise, he set out with all possible secrecy and a small retinue; but, his lights going out, he lost his way, and wandered a long time in the dark, till, meeting at break of day with a guide, he got on foot through some narrow paths into the road again, and came up with his troops on the banks of the Rubicon, which was the boundary of his province: and that there he remained silent and pensive for some time, musing on the greatness of his attempt; then, turning to those about him, ‘We may still retreat (said he), but if we pass this little bridge, we must put all to the decision of the sword.’” Cæsar mentions nothing of all this. The great secrecy so much insisted on could serve no purpose; nor is it consistent with Cæsar’s speech to his soldiers at Ravenna. His hesitation on the banks of the Rubicon is quite ridiculous: his determination had been taken long before, and indeed was not free: but let us proceed with this curious narrative.

Cæsar, sensible of what importance celerity was in his present situation, to prevent the efforts of his enemies, and to raise the courage of his friends, did not lose a moment, but sent M. Antony with five cohorts to seize Aretium, and other officers to secure Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona, while he himself remained at Ariminum to levy troops. And, being informed that the prætor Thermus had entered Iguvium with five cohorts, and was endeavouring to fortify the town, whose inhabitants he knew to be well inclined to his interest, he detached instantly Curio to oppose him with three cohorts, drawn from the towns he had already got possession of. Thermus left the place on Curio's approach, and was deserted by his soldiers in his retreat. Attius Varus also, who commanded in Auximum, was obliged to abandon it, on account of the disaffection of the townsmen to his cause, and, being attacked in his retreat, was likewise deserted by his troops, part of which went to their homes, and the rest joined themselves to Cæsar.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Arezzo.
Pesaro.
Fano.

Eugubio.

Osino.

The first report of this march towards Rome struck the magistrates with such a panic, that they precipitately came to the shameful resolution of forsaking the city. Pompey had treated with contempt the menaces of his rival, but it plainly appeared that he was utterly unprepared to oppose him. Instead of marching towards Cæsar, and taking the command of the troops cantoned in Picenum and the neighbouring provinces, he withdrew

“ Whilst Cæsar was demurring upon the matter, a man of an extraordinary size and shape appeared of a sudden, sitting by the river, and playing on a rural flute. The novelty of the sight drew together a great many of the soldiers, and among the rest a trumpeter, from whom the extraordinary man snatching the trumpet, leaped into the water, and sounding a charge, went over to the other side; upon which Cæsar, without farther consideration, crossed the river, crying out aloud, ‘ Let us go where the gods so remarkably call us, and where the fury of our enemies drives us : the lot is cast.’ ”

The same historian adds, “ and accordingly, passing the river with his army, and having received the tribunes of the people, he, with tears in his eyes, and his clothes torn away from his breast, implored the protection of the soldiers.” Could Cæsar be ignorant of the attachment of his soldiers to him? Had they not followed him with an entire confidence for nine years? Had he not endeared himself to them by the unwearied care he had taken of their subsistence, and by his magnificent presents? Did not both the soldiers and officers ground the hopes of their fortunes upon his generosity and protection?

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Ascoli.

Middl.
p. 69.

De Bell.
Civ. Com.
l. 1.

to the two legions near Capua, whither he was soon followed by the consuls and the chief senators of his faction. Cæsar affirms that their consternation was so great, that, when the consul Lentulus came to the treasury to deliver out the money to Pompey, in consequence of the decree of the senate, he scarce waited the opening of the inner door, but hastily left the place, upon a false rumour that Cæsar was approaching, and that some of his cavalry were already in view. However, Pompey sent orders to the commanders in the north of Italy, to stop Cæsar's progress as much as possible; and Lentulus Spinther threw himself into Asculum, a town of Picenum, with ten cohorts, while at the same time L. Domitius took possession of Corfinium, a strong town in the country of the Peliani, at the foot of the Apennine, on the Adriatic side, where he proposed to make a stand till Pompey could come up.

At Capua, the consuls took courage, and began to renew their levies in the surrounding colonies. This town had always been the common seminary or place for educating gladiators for the great men of Rome; and there Cæsar had a famous school of them at this time, which he had long maintained under the best masters, for the occasions of his public shows in the city. And, as they were very numerous and well furnished with arms, there was reason to apprehend that they would break out, and make some attempt in favour of their master, which, in the present state of affairs, might be of dangerous consequence. Pompey, therefore, we are told, thought it necessary to take them out of their school, and to distribute them among the principal inhabitants of the place, assigning two to each master of a family, by which he secured them from doing any mischief. But Cæsar's account is very different; he tells us, "That Lentulus summoned the gladiators into the Forum, gave them their liberty, furnished them with horses, and commanded them to follow him: but, being admo-

nished by his friends that this step was unanimously condemned, he dispersed them into the neighbouring towns of Campania, to keep garrison there." It is probable that Lentulus had rashly employed, or thought of employing, the gladiators, in the manner here mentioned, but that Pompey, sensible of the impropriety of arming slaves against their master, had disposed of them as we have just now related.^k

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

While preparations were thus making on the side of Pompey, and while Cæsar was pushing on the war with incredible vigour, messages were sent by the two generals to each other concerning an accommodation. Before Cæsar left Ariminum, young L. Cæsar, whose father was one of his lieutenants, came to him, and told him, that he was empowered to inform him, "That Pompey was desirous of clearing himself to Cæsar, lest he might interpret those actions as designed to affront him, which had no other aim but the good of the commonwealth; the advantage of which it was Pompey's constant maxim to prefer to any private interest; and that Cæsar, in the opinion of Pompey, should sacrifice his passion and resentment to the same noble motive, and not prejudice his country by pushing too far his resentment against his private enemies." The prætor Roscius, who had a commission of the like nature from Pompey, joined likewise in the negotiation. Cæsar made answer, "That the interest of the commonwealth had always been dearer to him than life; and that, though he could not help being alarmed at the malice of his enemies, who had frustrated the good intentions of the Roman people in his favour, by cutting off six months from his command, and obliging him to return to Rome to sue for the con-

^k It appears from a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that, in relation to these gladiators, there were two different reports at different times: "I was misinformed (says he) as to what I wrote to you, upon the strength of Torquatus's intelligence, with regard to Cæsar's gladiators at Capua: for Pompey has quartered them very judiciously among the inhabitants, two to each family. There were 5,000, and they threatened to break out. This was a measure greatly for the service of the public." Ad Att. 7. 14. I cannot think there could be 5,000 gladiators in one school; perhaps there may be an error in the number.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

sulship, he had yet, for the sake of his country, patiently submitted to this assault upon his honour. That his proposal of disbanding the armies, on both sides, which he had made in his letter to the senate, had been rejected; and that new levies were making all over Italy. That the two legions, which had been taken from him under the pretence of the Parthian war, were still retained in the service of his enemies; and that the whole state was in arms. That all this aimed evidently at his destruction: but that, nevertheless, he was ready to agree to any proposal, and expose himself to any danger, for the sake of his country. Let Pompey [he continued] go to his government: let all the armies be disbanded: let every one throughout Italy lay down his arms: let every thing that participates of terror and force be removed: let the elections of magistrates be made with perfect freedom: and let the republic be administered by the authority of the senate and people. And, the better to settle all these articles, and in order to corroborate them with an oath, let Pompey himself draw nearer, or suffer Cæsar to approach him; as all differences may most easily be determined by a conference.”¹

Ep. Fam.

16. 12.

Melm. 7. 5.

¹ Cicero, in a letter to Tiro, dated the 29th of January, gives a quite different account of Cæsar’s proposals, which is followed by Dr. Middleton: “Cæsar is reported to have offered us [*feruntur conditiones*] the following conditions: in the first place, that Pompey shall retire to his government of Spain; in the next, that the army we have raised shall be disbanded, and our garrisons evacuated. Upon these terms he promised to deliver up the Farther Gaul into the hands of L. Domitius, and the Nearer into those of Considius Nonianus; the persons to whom these provinces have been respectively allotted. He farther engages to resign his right of suing for the consulship in his absence, and is willing to return to Rome in order to appear as a candidate in the regular form. We have accepted these propositions, provided he withdraws his forces from the several towns he has taken, that the senate may assemble at Rome in order to pass a decree for that purpose. If he should think proper to comply with this proposal, there are hopes of peace; not indeed of a very honourable one, as the terms are imposed upon us: yet any thing is preferable to our present circumstances. But, if he should refuse to stand to his overtures, we are prepared for an engagement: but an engagement which Cæsar, after having incurred the general odium of retracting his own conditions, will scarce be able to sustain.” It is not at all probable that Cæsar made the proposals here mentioned: because he would thereby have given himself up to his enemies. Cicero, therefore, was either ill informed, or L. Cæsar added to what Cæsar had proposed: and this, according to Dion Cassius, was really the case. The following extracts from Cicero’s letters to Atticus, concerning this whole negotiation, cannot, I think, be disagreeable to the reader, who may compare them with Cæsar’s relation, to which I have given the preference:

“I saw L. Cæsar at Minturnæ on the 23d of January, in the morning. This rope of sand, for I cannot call him a man, was charged with propositions so absurd,

L. Cæsar and Roscius, having received this answer, departed for Capua, near which place they found Pom-

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

that I imagine Cæsar designed them as a ridicule upon all negotiations, especially as he gave so important a commission to so inconsiderable a creature. I cannot account for his conduct any other way, unless (which may possibly be the case) this envoy has caught up some random expressions of Cæsar, and converted them into a commission for himself." Ad Att. 7. 13. Guthrie's transl. It is plain, that L. Cæsar did not explain his commission to Cicero on the 23d, as Cicero explained it six days after to Tiro, or Cicero would not have treated it with such contempt.

403d con-
sulship.

"On the 23d, L. Cæsar delivered Cæsar's proposals to Pompey, while he was at Theanum with the consuls. The terms were approved of, on condition that he should withdraw his troops from all the places, not within his own government, that he had seized. If he would do that, it was agreed that we should return to Rome, and that the senate should ratify the treaty. At present I am in hopes we shall have peace; because Cæsar thinks he has gone too far, and Pompey that his army is too weak." Ad Att. 7. 14. [dated the 25th.]

"Upon my arrival at Capua yesterday, being the 25th of January, I had a meeting with the consuls and many others of the senate. All of them wished that Cæsar would draw off his troops and stand to the terms he had proposed. Favonius was the only man who expressed his dislike of his imposing terms upon us; but he was very little regarded in the meeting, for Cato himself would now rather comply than fight. He declares, however, that he intends to be present in the senate, where, I am afraid, he will do great hurt.—We have here great variety of opinions as to public matters. It is generally imagined that Cæsar will not stand to his proposals, which he is thought to have made to divert us from making the necessary preparations to oppose him in the field. For my own part, I am of opinion, that he will stand to them so far as to withdraw his troops from the towns not in his government. For he will have gained his ends, if he should be made consul, and the conclusion of this scene will be less guilty than its commencement. But still we must be under his buffet; for we are scandalously unprovided both as to troops and money; having left to his mercy not only the private property, but the public treasury of Rome." Ad Att. 7. 15. [dated the 26th.]

"We are now in great suspense concerning two points. The one is, how Cæsar will proceed upon the answer which L. Cæsar was charged with to lay before him: the other is, how Pompey will act, who writes to me, that, in a few days, he will be at the head of an effective army, and gives me hopes that, when he arrives at Pice-num, we shall be in a condition to return to Rome. He has with him Labienus, who takes it for granted that Cæsar's army is but weak, and his desertion has put our friend Pompey into high spirits." Ibid. Ep. 16. [dated the 29th.]

"Now you doubtless know the answer which Pompey sent to Cæsar by L. Cæsar, and the letter he sent him by the same hand; for they were written and delivered with a view of making them public. I have blamed Pompey in my own mind, as he himself has a very perspicuous style, for employing our friend Settius in drawing up a writing of so great importance, especially as it is to be made public: nor, to say the truth, did I ever see any thing more truly in the Settian style. But from Pompey's letter it is plain that Cæsar has been denied nothing; that he has obtained all, and more than he demanded: and, as he has obtained his demands, impudent as they are, he would be the worst of madmen, should he break off the accommodation. For what right had he, or you, or any man, to say, I will do so and so, if Pompey will go to Spain, and if he will withdraw his troops from Italy? Yet even this has been complied with, though I own the compliance does not now come with so good a grace, after the government has been attacked and hostilities commenced, as it would have done before, when he demanded the dispensation with his absence while he stood for the consulate. After all, I am apprehensive, that even these terms will not satisfy him. It was no good symptom that he continued his operations during the dependance of the treaty which he committed to L. Cæsar, and before he had any answer. At present he is said to proceed more violently than ever." Ibid. Ep. 17. [dated February 2.]

"We hear that the city is wonderfully pleased with Pompey's answer, and that it was approved of in an assembly of the people. I always thought it would; and that Cæsar would lose his interest, should he reject it. But, should he accept it—alas!

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

pey and the consuls, and laid Cæsar's proposals before them. After deliberating upon the affair, they sent a reply in writing by the same messengers, which informed Cæsar that he must quit Ariminum, return to Gaul, and disband his army; which conditions being performed, Pompey would go into Spain: and that, in the meantime, till he gave security for the performance of what he had promised, neither Pompey nor the consuls would discontinue their levies.

It was by no means, in the opinion of Cæsar, a fair proposal, that he should be obliged to quit Ariminum and return to Gaul: whilst Pompey held provinces and legions that had not been legally allotted to him; and that he should dismiss his army, whilst Pompey was levying troops, and only promised to go to his government without fixing a day: an evasion by which, was he to be found in Italy even at the expiration of Cæsar's consulship, he could not be charged with a breach of faith. His forbearing to appoint a time for a conference, and his declining to approach nearer, gave little reason to hope for a peace.^m

say you, which is the lesser evil? This is a question I cannot answer, unless I knew in what forwardness our preparations are." Ibid. Ep. 18. [dated February 3.]

"I am really so far from having any thing to write, that I have withdrawn a letter which I was to have sent you, because it was so full of hopes for the best, founded upon my informations of the dispositions of the assembly of the people of Rome, and upon my own suggestions that Cæsar would never reject the terms that were granted him, especially as they were proposed by himself. Meanwhile, on the morning of the 4th of February, I received letters from you, from Philotimus and Furnius, with one to the latter from Curio, ridiculing the whole of L. Cæsar's negotiation. We are indeed reduced to a desperate pass.—I am setting out for Capua, where I can be better informed of Pompey's situation." Ibid. Ep. 19. [dated February 4.]

"This juncture requires fewness of words. I despair of peace: we are unprovided for war. You cannot imagine two more despicable creatures than our consuls. After coming, as I was ordered, to Capua, through a deluge of rain upon the 4th instant, in hopes of hearing and understanding our preparations, I have missed them here, and when they come they will come unprovided and unprepared. As to Pompey, he is said to be at Luceria to put himself at the head of some cohorts of Attius's legions, who are thought to be wavering." Ibid. Ep. 20. [dated February 5.]

^m "It seems very evident (says the ingenious author of the Life of Cicero), that Cæsar had no real thoughts of peace, by his paying no regard to Pompey's answer, and the trifling reasons which he gave for slighting it. The sending a message so important by a person so insignificant as young L. Cæsar, looked (says Cicero) as if he had done it by way of contempt, or with a view to disclaim it, especially when, after offering conditions which were likely to be accepted, he would not sit still to wait an answer, but continued his march with the same diligence, and in the same hostile manner as before." He is therefore of opinion, "that Cæsar had a double view in offering these conditions; for by Pompey's rejecting them, as there was reason to

T. Labienus, Cæsar's principal lieutenant in the Gallic war, who had not only eminently distinguished himself by his military exploits, but had raised an immense fortune, deserted his general about this time, and came over to Pompey. This added a new life to his cause, and raised an expectation that many more would follow the example. He was much caressed and carried about every where by Pompey, who promised himself great

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 70.

expect, from his known aversion to any treaty, he hoped to load him with the odium of the war; or, by his embracing them, to slacken his preparations and retard his design of leaving Italy, whilst he himself, in the meantime, by following him with a celerity that amazed every body, might chance to come up with him, and give a decisive blow to the war; from which he had nothing to apprehend, but its being drawn into length. 'I now plainly see (says Cicero), though later indeed than I could have wished, on account of the assurances given me by Balbus, that he aims at nothing else, nor has ever aimed at any thing from the beginning but Pompey's life.' Midd. p. 72, 73. But this is the conclusion of a man whose mind was confounded by continual disappointments (for indeed he was no prophet, as he is commonly supposed to have been), and disturbed by a thousand vain fears. Cicero apprehended also that Cæsar would prove a Phalaris, sack Rome, and commit all manner of cruelties. Such passionate expressions are no authorities. Velleius Paterculus (l. 2. c. 50.) has, from the consideration of Cæsar's conduct, inferred just the contrary: "At Cæsar Domitio legionibusque Corfinii, quæ una cum eo fuerant, potitus, duce aliisque, qui voluerant abire ad Pompeium, sine dilatione dimissis, persecutus Brundisium, ita ut appareret, malle, integris rebus et conditionibus, finire bellum, quam opprimere fugientes." (Krause, p. 268.)—As to the arguments brought in proof of Cæsar's insincerity, they are very weak. 1. Cæsar's reasons for paying no regard to Pompey's answer are no ways trifling. If he had submitted to go back to his province, whilst Pompey remained in Italy to influence the public deliberations, his cause was discredited, and he was evidently undone. He would have been obliged to submit to every thing imposed upon him by Pompey and his adherents, backed by the forces he would soon have had at hand. 2. Cæsar's message was given not only to L. Cæsar, but also to the prætor Roscius; and L. Cæsar was employed for no other reason, than because he had brought a message from Pompey. 3. It would have been folly in Cæsar, while his enemies were making preparations against him with the utmost diligence, to have suspended his military operations in a conjuncture, when all depended upon expedition. And I oppose to the authority of Dr. Middleton that of Matius, of whom Cicero gives this character: (Ad Att. 9. 11.) "Indeed I think him a discreet wise man, and he has been always reckoned an adviser of peaceable measures."—"As we had a great deal of conversation (says Cicero), I shewed him Cæsar's letter to me, and I begged to know what he meant by his expressions of his wanting to be directed by my advice, interest, authority, and assistance, in all things. His answer was, that he made no doubt Cæsar applied to me for my assistance and interest in bringing about an accommodation.—He was very positive that Cæsar's sentiments were pacific, and promised to recommend the thing to him himself." Velleius Paterculus, who, in general, is not unfavourable to Pompey and his cause, entirely condemns the Pompeians in this negotiation. After saying, "Alterius ducis causa melior videbatur; alterius erat firmior. Hic omnia speciosa, illic valentia. Pompeium senatûs auctoritas, Cæsarem militum armavit fiducia:—vir antiquus et gravis Pompeii partes laudaret magis, prudens sequeretur Cæsaris: et illa gloriosa, hæc terribiliora duceret;" he adds, "Nihil relictum a Cæsare, quod servandæ pacis causa tentari posset: nihil receptum a Pompeianis; cum alter consul justo esset ferocior; Lentulus vero salva rep. salvus esse non posset; M. autem Cato moriendum ante, quam ullam conditionem civis accipiendam reip. contenderet: ut deinde, spretis omnibus, quæ Cæsar postulaverat, tantummodo contentus cum una legione titulum retinere provinciæ, privatus in urbem veniret, et se in petitione consulatus suffragiis pop. Rom. committeret, decrevere." L. 2. c. 49. (Krause, pp. 265—267.)

See ch. 3.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

service from his fame and experience, and especially from his credit in Cæsar's army, and his knowledge of his councils : but his account of things, like that of all deserters, was accommodated rather to please than to serve his new friends ; representing the weakness of Cæsar's troops, their aversion to his present designs, the disaffection of the two Gauls, and disposition to revolt ; the contrary of all which was found to be true in the event : and as he came to them alone, without bringing with him any of those troops with which he had acquired his reputation, so his desertion had no other effect than to ruin his own fortunes without doing any service to Pompey.ⁿ Cæsar behaved on this occasion with great magnanimity : he took very little notice of his lieutenant's desertion, though the example might have been of dangerous consequence in the beginning of a war of this nature ; and sent after him all his equipage, and every thing he had left behind.

There were now little hopes of an accommodation

ⁿ Cicero thinks aloud in his letters to his friend Atticus, and it is entertaining to consider his various views of the same objects, and the shiftings of his mind. Ep. 7. 12. ad Att. dated January 22. "It is next to certain that Labienus has left Cæsar. In that case, if he had gone to Rome, while the magistrates and the senate were there, he would have been of great use to our party. It would have intimated that the best of Cæsar's friends had condemned him as a traitor to his country. The fact is indeed so, but, at the present juncture, it is of less use, because our party cannot avail itself of it ; and I believe that Labienus himself repents of what he has done. Yet, after all, there is a possibility that his leaving Cæsar is false ; we, however, depend upon it as a certainty."

Ep. 13. "I look upon Labienus to be a hero. We have not for these many years had so noble an instance of Roman spirit. Had it no other effect, it has that of galling Cæsar, but I am in hopes of seeing it productive of more solid consequences."

Ibid. "Labienus, whom I think a truly great man, came on the 22d instant to Theanum, where he had a conference with Pompey and the consuls. What the import and result of it was, I will write to you when I am better informed.—Labienus seems to have given us spirits." Yes, Pompey, encouraged by him, talked big, that he would soon be at the head of an effective army ; that he would march into Picenum, and put things into such a posture that the senate might safely return to Rome.

Ad Att. 8. 2. February 17. "There is no dignity in Labienus." And thus the hero, the high-spirited Roman, sinks into a base deserter :

———"Fortis in armis

Cæsareis Labienus erat ; nunc transfuga vilis." Lucan. 5. 345.

About the same time Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law, left the city : this step engages all Cicero's affection to him, and raises his prophetic spirit : "I am in love with Piso, and I can foresee the dislike he has signified of his son-in-law's conduct will make a great impression on the public."

between the two ambitious chiefs: matters were too far engaged, and their enmity too openly declared. Their reciprocal proposals, which were drawn up in writing and immediately published, were no more than manifestoes to justify their conduct. Pompey, whose chief reliance was on his troops in Spain, and the forces of the east, which were absolutely in his interest, resolved to hazard nothing in Italy, and, while he remained there, his sole aim was to gain time. Cæsar, on the contrary, who had nothing to depend on but his army, and the present favourable dispositions of the people of Rome, was bent upon pushing his point, with all possible celerity. From Auximum, where we left him, he traversed the whole country of Picenum,^o as far as Cingulum, with only one legion. He was joyfully received in all parts by the inhabitants, who were dazzled undoubtedly by the splendour of his victories, and the reputation of his generosity: and they furnished his army with every thing necessary. Even Cingulum itself, a town founded by Labienus, and built at his own expense, sent deputies to him with an offer of their submission and services; and he demanded from it a certain number of soldiers, which were immediately sent to him. There he was joined by the twelfth legion, and, with this additional force, he continued his march to Asculum, of which Lentulus Spinther had taken possession, with ten cohorts. Lentulus, on the first news of his approach, quitted the place, and, in his retreat, was almost entirely deserted by his men: he joined, with the few that remained, Vibullius Rufus, whom Pompey had sent into Picenum, to encourage his followers in those parts. This commander, understanding the state of affairs, and seeing himself unable to make head against Cæsar, drew together, from the neighbouring provinces, as many of Pom-

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

^o Picenum was reduced before the 8th of February, for Cicero, in a letter to Atticus of that date, (7. 21.) writes, "Picenum is lost; nobody knows it but myself, by letters I have received from Dolabella. I expect every moment to hear of Cæsar's being in Apulia, and Pompey on shipboard."

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.
403d con-
sulship.

pey's levies as he could meet with, and, among the rest, six cohorts under the command of Ulcilles Hirrus, who were flying from Camerinum, where they had been quartered; and, having formed, out of all these, thirteen cohorts, he posted by great journeys to Corfinium, where Domitius had already got together twenty-two, well-disposed to Pompey's cause.

Pompey's intention was not that those numerous cohorts should remain in Corfinium, and there become a prey to Cæsar: he wrote the most pressing letters to L. Domitius to bring them to him; and these, as their contents are both interesting and necessary for the understanding of Pompey's conduct, should not be omitted, I think, by any one who writes the history of these times.

CN. MAGNUS, PROCONSUL, TO DOMITIUS, PROCONSUL.

Ad Att.
8. 12.

“ I am surprised at my not hearing from you, and that all my public intelligence comes through other hands than yours. With forces so disunited as ours are, it is impossible for us to be a match for our enemies; but, were they united, I am in hopes we may be yet the means of saving our country, and providing for our own safety. Therefore, as Vibullius wrote to me, on the 9th of February, that you were about to march from Corfinium to join me with your army, I cannot comprehend why you have altered your resolution. The reason Vibullius intimated to me, viz. that you had intelligence of Cæsar's march from Firmum to the castle of Truentum, was a trifling one: for, the quicker the enemy's advances were towards you, your dispatch ought to have been the greater to join me, before Cæsar could have the means of either obstructing your march, or of cutting off my communication with you. I therefore, in the most earnest manner, entreat you again to take the very first opportunity of marching to Luceria, before the troops which Cæsar proposes to draw together can cut

off our communication with one another. Should any endeavour to persuade you to remain as a guard to their properties, you cannot refuse to send me the cohorts which came from Picenum and Camerinum, and which have left behind them all their fortunes.”

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

CN. MAGNUS, PROCONSUL, TO DOMITIUS, PROCONSUL.

“ M. Calenius brought me a letter from you the 16th of February, informing me, that you intended to observe Cæsar’s motions ; and, should he point his march for me by the sea, that you would forthwith join me in Samnium ; but, should he tarry about those parts, that you were resolved to check him, in case he should attempt to extend his quarters. I am sensible this resolution proceeds from your courage and magnanimity ; but we must be upon our guard, lest our being divided may give the enemy a superiority, as his army, which is already strong, is hourly increasing. It is inconsistent with your wisdom to have an eye only to the number of cohorts which Cæsar at present commands against you, without reflecting upon the great force of cavalry and infantry which he will, in a very short time, assemble. The letter I received from Bussenius is an evidence that his strength will be much more considerable soon ; for he tells me, and his intelligence is confirmed by many other correspondents, that Curio has drawn all the garrisons out of Umbria and Tuscany, and is marching at their head to join Cæsar. Now should all these troops join, and part of them be detached towards Alba, while part of them defile towards you, you must be shut up, as the enemy needs not fight you but upon his own terms : neither can you, singly, in the face of such an enemy, send out foraging parties to maintain your numbers. I therefore again earnestly conjure you forthwith to march all your troops hither, the consuls having come to the same resolution.

Ad Att.
8. 12.

“ I ordered Metuscilius to acquaint you, how neces-

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

sary it was for me to take care, that the two legions should not, without the Picentine cohorts, come in sight of Cæsar's quarters. You are, therefore, to give yourself no concern, if you shall hear that I retreat upon Cæsar's advancing against me. I must take care not to engage myself too far; for both the season of the year, and the dispositions of my soldiers, render it impracticable for me to form a regular encampment; nor would it be advisable for me to draw all our garrisons from the fortified places, lest I should be cut off from all retreat. I have, therefore, assembled no more than fourteen cohorts at Luceria. The consuls are either to join me with the troops they have drawn from the fortified places, or they are to go to Sicily. For we must either have an army strong enough to force our way through the enemy, or we must take possession of such passes as they cannot force. Now both these expedients are impracticable at this juncture, both because Cæsar is master of a great part of Italy, and because our army is neither so well provided, nor so numerous as his. We are, therefore, to be the more cautious in exposing the interests of the republic. I again conjure you instantly to join me with all your troops. We may yet restore the government, if we serve her in concert with one another; but, by being dissipated and disunited, we shall become weak. Such are my sentiments.

“P. S. When I had finished this letter, Sica delivered to me your letter and commission, exhorting me to march towards Corfinium; but that, I think, is what I cannot venture to do, especially as I put no great trust in the fidelity of the legions I command.”

Pompey, who had become sensible of the impossibility of defending Rome, and of his error in leaving the public money a prey to Cæsar,^o had sent, on the 7th of

^o “The leaving the public treasure at Rome a prey to Cæsar is censured more than once by Cicero, as one of the blunders of his friends: [See Ad Att. 7. 12. 15.]

February, the tribune C. Cassius to Capua with directions to the consuls to return to the city, which they were to leave, after taking all the money out of the sacred treasury. But one of the consuls wrote back to Pompey, that he should first make himself master of Picenum. The thing was now become impracticable: “Return to Rome (says Cicero), where is their convoy? Return from Rome, how shall they obtain leave?” Notwithstanding this testimony of Cicero, our modern historians commonly suppose that Lentulus did venture to go to Rome, and that it was on this occasion, that, frightened by a false report of Cæsar’s approach, he betook himself to flight without waiting till the inner door was opened, which is also contrary to the express testimony of Cæsar.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Ad Att.
7. 21.

Cæsar, having made himself master of Asculum, ordered the soldiers who had deserted Lentulus to be sought after, and new levies to be made. He remained there but one day, to settle what related to provisions, and pursued his march to Corfinium. His advanced parties found five cohorts employed in breaking down a bridge three miles distant from the town, who instantly retired upon the first attack; and Cæsar brought his legions under the very walls, where he pitched his camp.

As this was the first place which dared to make head against Cæsar, every body expected with impatience what would be the success of the enterprise. The Pompeians,^p both at Rome and in other parts of Italy, con-

but it is a common case in civil dissensions, for the honester side, through the fear of discrediting their cause by an irregular act, to ruin it by an unseasonable moderation. The public money was kept in the temple of Saturn, and the consuls contented themselves with carrying away the keys, fancying that the sanctity of the place would secure it from violence; especially when the greatest part of it was a fund of the sacred kind, set apart by the laws for occasions only of the last exigency, or the terror of a Gallic invasion.” Dr. Middl. p. 104. Cicero says that he advised the carrying away of this sacred treasure. [Ad Att. 9. 2.] And it was all along the intention of Pompey and the consuls so to do, and it would have been done, had not their fears deprived them of their senses.

^p “A letter from Philotimus informed me on the 9th of February, in the evening, that Domitius was at the head of a strong army, which had been joined by the cohorts from Picenum, under the conduct of Lentulus and Thermus; that Cæsar was

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

ceived great hopes, and did not doubt but Pompey would advance to the assistance of Domitius, to which he was earnestly pressed by that commander; who represented by letters, "That it would be easy in that close country to shut up Cæsar between two armies, and cut off all his provisions; and that, unless this course was followed, a great number of senators and Roman knights would be exposed to imminent danger." He, at the same time, made preparations for a vigorous defence: he disposed engines all round the walls, appointed every one his particular post, and, to animate his men, promised every soldier four acres of land out of his own estate, and in proportion to every centurion and volunteer.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. 1. 1.

Cæsar, who was not without apprehensions of being attacked by Pompey, employed the three first days after his sitting down before Corfinium in strongly fortifying his camp, and in procuring corn from the neighbouring towns. He did not, however, keep altogether within his intrenchments. Being informed that the people of Sulmona, a town seven miles distant from Corfinium, desired to put themselves under his protection, but were hindered by Q. Lucretius, a senator, and Attius, a Pelignian, who held them in subjection with a garrison of seven cohorts; he sent thither M. Antony with five cohorts, whose engines were no sooner descried from the walls, than the gates were thrown open, and the whole people in a body, both soldiers and townsmen, came out to congratulate Antony on his arrival. Lucretius and

apprehensive his communication would be cut off, which could be easily effected; and that the patriot party at Rome had recovered their spirits, and that the rebels were in a manner thunderstruck. Though I am informed that this good news is little better than visionary; yet this letter from Philotimus has brought to life M. Lepidus, L. Torquatus, and the tribune C. Cassius, who are with me at Formiæ. For my own part, I am afraid they are not so well founded as the accounts are of our being almost surrounded by the enemy, and that Pompey is retiring from Italy." *Ad Att.* 7. 23.

"At present I have a small gleam of hope, and it is chiefly occasioned by the letter which came from Rome concerning L. Domitius and the Picentine cohorts. Every thing since has put on a more cheerful aspect, and nobody thinks of flying, as they intended. Cæsar's threatening manifestoes are despised; in short, our reports concerning Domitius are good, those concerning Afranius still better." *Ibid.* Ep. 26.

Attius endeavoured to escape over the walls ; but Attius was taken. Antony returned the same day ; and Cæsar, having joined the cohorts to his army, set Attius at liberty. His army was now also considerably increased by the arrival of the eighth legion, with two-and-twenty cohorts of new levies, and about 300 horse from the king of Noricum. This obliged him to form a second camp on the other side of the town under the command of Curio, who had brought up these recruits, as Pompey had foreseen, and foretold to Domitius. He employed the following days in drawing a line with redoubts round the place ; which was nearly completed, when the messengers that had been sent by Domitius to Pompey returned with this answer :

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

CN. MAGNUS, PROCONSUL, TO DOMITIUS, PROCONSUL.

“ Your letter of the 17th of February came to my hands, advising me of Cæsar’s having encamped before Corfinium. I foresaw and forewarned you of what has happened ; that, as things now stand, he would not venture to fight you ; and that he would draw together all his forces to coop you up, to obstruct the communication between you and me, and to prevent your joining the well-affectioned troops you command with my suspected legion. Your letter alarms me the more, because I cannot stake the whole fortune of the republic upon the loyalty of the troops that serve under me ; nor am I yet joined by those the consuls have levied. I therefore recommend it to you to do all you can, if it is now possible, to disengage yourself, and immediately to join me, before the enemy’s junction can be completed ; for our new recruits cannot march time enough to this rendezvous ; and, though they were already come up, you are sensible how little dependance there is on raw men, who are strangers to one another, against a veteran army.” Pompey wrote at the same time the following letter to the consuls :—

Ad Att.
8.13.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

CN. MAGNUS, PROCONSUL, TO C. MARCELLUS AND L. LENTULUS,
CONSULS.

403d con-
sulship.

Ad Att.
8. 13.

“Being persuaded, that, while we remained scattered, we could neither serve the republic, nor defend ourselves, I wrote to L. Domitius, that he should make all haste to join me with his whole force ; and, if he had any apprehensions with regard to himself, that he should send me the nineteen cohorts, which were upon their march to join me from Picenum. It happened, as I dreaded, that Domitius was surrounded, without having with him forces sufficient for a regular encampment ; my nineteen cohorts and his twelve being quartered in three different towns (for he had stationed some of them at Alba, and some at Sulmo) ; nor, indeed, could he escape should he attempt it. Now, you must know, that this accident gives me the greatest disquiet imaginable. At the same time that I earnestly desire to deliver so many illustrious Romans from the danger of being besieged, it is impossible for me to relieve them ; because I judge it unsafe to march the two legions I command here into those quarters ; and of those two legions I can bring together no more than fourteen cohorts ; having thrown a garrison into Brundusium, and taken care of Canusium, which I did not think proper to leave without a sufficient force to defend it.

“As I was in hopes that our army would grow stronger, I charged Lælius with a request, if you thought proper, that one of you should repair to me, and that the other should go to Sicily with the troops you have raised at Capua or in its neighbourhood, and with the levies of Faustus ; that Domitius should join them with his twelve cohorts ; and that the rest of the troops should assemble at Brundusium, and be shipped over from thence to Dyrrachium. Now, as things are circumstanced, it is as much out of my power, as out of yours, to relieve Domitius, who cannot get off by the

mountains : and we are to take care that the enemy shall neither come up with those fourteen wavering cohorts, nor overtake me in my march. I therefore think proper, and I am joined in sentiments by Marcellus, and the other senators in this place, to march the troops I have with me here to Brundusium. I therefore request you to make all possible dispatch to join me there, with as many troops as you can get together. My opinion is, that you give to the troops you have with you, the arms you proposed to send to me ; and, if you have more than are requisite for that purpose, it will be of great service, if they can be conveyed in waggons to Brundusium. I beg that you will give our friends advice concerning that matter. I have sent to require the prætors, P. Lupus and C. Coponius, to join me, and to resign to you the command of their forces.”^q

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Domitius thought proper to dissemble the contents of the letter he had received from Pompey, and declared in council, that this general of the republic would speedily

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

^q In a letter from Cicero to Atticus, there is a short letter from Pompey to the consuls on this occasion, which was written before that which we have now transcribed : it runs thus : “I received a letter from L. Domitius on the 17th of February, of which I enclose you a copy. Now, though I had not written to you, I know you are sensible how important it is for the commonwealth, that, as soon as possible, there should be a general muster at one place of all our forces. Therefore, if you please, you will make all possible dispatch to join me ; and leave at Capua such a garrison as you shall judge sufficient.” Ad Att. 8. 6. Here Pompey conceals his answer to Domitius, and his resolution of leaving Italy. Cicero, who did not doubt but the rendezvous was in order to march forwards, is in great terror for the event on the meeting of the two armies. In the next letter he seems to have penetrated into Pompey’s design ; and, in the eighth, he reflects thus on Pompey’s conduct : “Disgraceful and therefore miserable measure ! for such are my sentiments, that what is disgraceful is the last, nay the only character of misery. He had fostered up Cæsar’s power ; of a sudden he begins to fear him, he discourages all advances to an accommodation, he neglects all preparation for war, he abandons the city, his misconduct loses Picenum, he pins himself up in Apulia, he prepares to go to Greece, he forsakes us without bidding us adieu, and utter strangers to those mighty, those monstrous resolutions. Well, all at once a letter comes from Domitius to him, and another from him to the consuls.—Pompey retires to Brundusium.” [Cicero is often too severe upon his friend Pompey even in regard to his military capacity : the letters above do not shew him to have been at this time so bewildered and out of his senses, as Cicero represents him in several of his epistles, for no other reason, perhaps, than because he did not think proper to make this timorous and talkative orator privy to his motions.] “Where or when are we to emerge, headed as we are by a general who knows so little of his profession, that he was a stranger to the important situation of Picenum ? his misconduct carries its condemnation upon its own face.—Even at this time I am ignorant of his designs, but am incessantly endeavouring to fish somewhat out of him by letters : nothing can be more unmanly or unmeaning than the whole of his management.” Ad Att. 7. 13.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

come to their assistance : and he exhorted his troops to behave with courage, and to obey those orders which were necessary for providing every thing for a vigorous defence. But as his looks and speech were found to disagree, and as he behaved not with his usual composure and firmness, and was observed, contrary to his custom, to be much in conference with his friends, it was not possible to conceal the truth. In the evening of the same day, the soldiers discovered that they were not to receive any succour, and that their commander was meditating his escape : and they began to mutiny, and by means of their under-officers to make known their thoughts to one another. “ They were besieged (they said) by Cæsar, who had already in a manner completed his works ; and their general Domitius, in whose promises of assistance they had placed their chief hope, abandoning all concern for their safety, was contriving to escape privately by flight : wherefore it was their business to look to their own preservation.” The Marsi, ignorant of the motive that prompted their companions to mutiny, at first opposed this resolution, and possessed themselves of the strongest part of the town ; and the dispute grew so warm that it almost came to be decided by the sword. But, as soon as they understood that Domitius was preparing for a private escape, they dropped their opposition, and joined in the sedition. The person of Domitius was then secured, and deputies were sent to Cæsar, to inform him, “ that the town and the garrison were ready to receive his orders.”

Though Cæsar was fully sensible of what great importance it was to get possession of the town immediately, and join so numerous a garrison to his own army, lest by largesses, promises of speedy relief, or false reports, any change should be produced in the minds of the soldiers ; yet fearing that, if he introduced his troops into it in the night, they would take that opportunity to plunder it, he sent back the deputies with thanks for

their proffer, and delayed the taking possession of it till the next day. But he caused the walls and the gates to be watched with the greatest care: he disposed his men along the works, not at certain distances, as usual, but in one continued range, so as to touch each other, and to form a circle; and he ordered the military tribunes and officers of the cavalry to patrol about the works, and not only to be upon their guard against sallies, but to take care to prevent the escape of any particular persons. Not a man in the camp closed his eyes that night: all were busy in executing the general's orders, and in conjecturing the fate of the Corfinians, of Domitius, Lentulus, and the other illustrious Romans confined in the town.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

About the fourth watch of the night, Lentulus Spinther called from the wall to the guard, and desired to be conducted to Cæsar. His request being granted, he came out of the town, attended by some of Domitius's soldiers, who never left him till he was in Cæsar's presence: "He begged Cæsar to spare his life, and pardon the injuries he had done him, in consideration of their former friendship. He owned the many great favours he had formerly received from him: that, by his interest, he had been elected into the college of priests, obtained the government of Spain, after the expiration of his prætorship, and that he had been assisted by him when he was candidate for the consulship." Here Cæsar, interrupting him, said, "that he was not come out of the bounds of his province with an intent to injure any one: but to repel the injuries done to him by his enemies; to revenge the wrongs of the tribunes; and to restore the Roman people, who were oppressed by a small faction of the nobles, to their liberty and privileges." Lentulus, encouraged by this speech, asked leave to return into the town; "where (he said) the assurances he had obtained of his own safety, would contribute not a little to the consolation of others, some of whom

Three in
the morn-
ing.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d. con-
sulship.

48,437l.
sterl.

Middl.
p. 79.

were so terrified, that they were ready to take desperate resolutions."

As soon as it was light, Cæsar ordered before him all the principal men. These were L. Domitius, P. Lentulus Spinther, L. Vibullius Rufus, Sextus Quinctilius Varus, quæstor, and L. Rubrius; who were of senatorian rank; and Domitius's son, and several young men of quality, with some Roman knights, and a few decurions or senators of the neighbouring municipal towns. When they appeared, he gave orders to secure them from the insults of the soldiery; and, addressing them in a few words, he reproached them with their animosity to him, which he said he had not deserved, and then set them all at liberty. He likewise restored to Domitius 6,000,000 of sesterces, which that general had brought with him to Corfinium, and had deposited in the hands of the two treasurers of the town. As this was public money assigned by Pompey for the payment of his forces, Cæsar might justly have seized it; but, he says, he was willing to shew himself generous as well as merciful. He ordered Domitius's soldiers to take the usual oath to him, and set out immediately for Apulia, in pursuit of Pompey; who, having now lost, by the rashness of Domitius, the half of his forces, and the only troops well-affectioned to his cause, was under the necessity of retiring with all expedition, and of abandoning Italy to his rival.*

Meanwhile, a notion universally prevailed among the Pompeians, of Cæsar's cruel and revengeful temper, from which horrible effects were apprehended: Cicero himself was strongly possessed with it, as appears from

* Cæsar made himself master of Corfinium 8. kal. Mar. or the 22d of February, of the Roman year: according to Usher, the 11th of the Julian December; but really on the 26th of January. Cælius, in a letter written to Cicero, while Cæsar was marching from Corfinium to Brundisium, says: "Look upon Cæsar's troops, my friend, and tell me whether one would not imagine, by the gaiety of their countenances, that, instead of having fought their way through the roughest and coldest countries in the hardest winter, they had been regaling themselves in all the delicacies of ease and plenty?"—"Quid est? nunc tibi nostri milites, qui durissimis et frigidissimis locis, teterrima hieme, bellum ambulando confecerunt, malis orbiculatis esse pasti videntur?" Ep. Fam. 8. 15. Melm. 7. 7. Weiske, p. 216.

many of his letters; where he seems to take it for granted, that he would be a second Phalaris, not a Pisis-tratus; a bloody, not a gentle tyrant. This he inferred from the violence of his past life; the nature of his present enterprise; and, above all, from the character of his friends and followers; who were, generally speaking, a needy, profligate, audacious crew; prepared for every thing that was desperate. It was affirmed likewise with great confidence, he had openly declared, that he was now coming to revenge the deaths of Cn. Carbo, M. Brutus, and all the other Marian chiefs, whom Pompey, when acting under Sylla, had cruelly put to death for their opposition to the Syllan cause. His generous and magnanimous behaviour to his most inveterate enemies, taken at Corfinium, allayed all these vain suspicions and fears, and confirmed what he had always given out, that he sought nothing by the war, but the security of his person and dignity. The following letter to Oppius and Balbus was published at that time, and expresses the motives of his conduct.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

CÆSAR TO OPPIUS AND BALBUS.

“ I am extremely glad at your expressing under your hands, your great approbation of what has passed at Corfinium: I will follow your advice with the greater pleasure, that it was always my own disposition to act with the utmost lenity, and to court an accommodation with Pompey. Let us try whether it be possible, by this means, to regain the affections of mankind, and to make our successes durable; since others by cruelty fell into detestation: and none of them, excepting Sylla, whom I don't choose to imitate, enjoyed his successes long: let us shew the world a new method of conquering; and let clemency and munificence be my only guards. I have already formed some schemes; and many more may be formed, for effecting this. I desire you to turn your thoughts to the same subject.

Ad Att.
9. 7.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

“ I took prisoner Cn. Magius, one of Pompey’s masters of the works ; but, according to the plan I laid down, I instantly dismissed him. He is the second master of the works who has fallen into my hands, and whom I have dismissed. If they want to shew their gratitude, they will exhort Pompey to prefer my friendship to that of those men, who have ever shewn themselves both his and my enemies ; and by whose practices the public is reduced to its present state.”

This conduct gave a considerable turn to his affairs ; while the behaviour of Pompey, on the other hand, appeared every day more and more despicable. He fled perpetually before an enemy whom his pride and perverseness were said to have driven to the necessity of taking arms ; and he was continually throwing out threats against those who did not follow him : before he set out from Brundisium, he talked of nothing but proscriptions, and of acting in imitation of Sylla ; and

Ad Att.
8. 13.

“ Are you not sensible (says Cicero to Atticus), what a discerning, what a vigilant, what a resolute commander the commonwealth has to do with ? By heavens ! if he does not imbrue his hand in blood, or stretch it out in rapine, he will become the darling of those who dreaded him most. I have had a great deal of talk with our townsmen and a great deal with our country-gentlemen in these quarters : and, take my word for it, they have no concern but about their lands, their farms, and their money. You see what a pass things are come to. They fear the man they trusted ; they love the man they feared. It is with anguish that I recollect the miscarriages and misconduct that have brought us to this.”

Middl.
p. 81.

From this first experiment of Cæsar’s clemency, Cicero took occasion to send him a letter of compliment, and to thank him particularly for his generous treatment of Lentulus, who, when consul, had been the chief author of his restoration ; to which Cæsar returned the following answer :

“ You judge rightly of me, for I am thoroughly known to you, that nothing is farther removed from me than cruelty ; and, as I have a great pleasure from the thing itself, so I rejoice and triumph to find my act approved by you : nor does it at all move me, that those, who were dismissed by me, are said to be gone away to renew the war against me : for I desire nothing more, than that I may always act like myself ; they like themselves.* I wish that you would meet me at the city, that I may use your counsel and assistance as I have hitherto done in all things. Nothing, I assure you, is dearer to me than Dolabella ; I will owe this favour therefore to him, nor is it possible for him indeed to behave otherwise, such is his humanity, his good sense, and his affection to me. Adieu !” Ad Att. 9. 16.

* Domitius retired to his country-house at Cosa, in Tuscany ; and having manned some ships with his own servants, set sail for Marseilles ; which he held for Pompey, with consent of the inhabitants, and defended it, as we shall soon see, against Cæsar. Ad Att. 9. 6. Cæsar de Bell. Civ. lib. 2. Lentulus went secretly to his house at Puteoli ; and after concealing himself for some time, he joined Pompey. Vibullius Rufus went also to Pompey, who sent him into Spain, charged with orders to his lieutenants there, and Varus sailed for Africa.

his future conduct sufficiently answered these early professions.

As soon as he got intelligence of the surrendry of Corfinium, he retreated from Luceria to Canusium, and from thence to Brundusium.^t Here he ordered all the

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

^t Pompey was now obliged to declare what he had never before owned, his design of quitting Italy, and carrying the war abroad; he gave notice of it to Cicero, and wrote two letters to him at Formiæ, to press him to come away directly; but Cicero, already much out of humour with him, was disgusted still the more by his short and negligent manner of writing, upon an occasion so important: the second of Pompey's letters, with Cicero's answer, will explain the present state of their affairs, and Cicero's sentiments upon them.

CN. POMPEIUS MAGNUS, PROCONSUL, TO M. CICERO, EMPEROR.

"If you are in good health, I rejoice: I read your letter with pleasure: for I perceived in it your ancient virtue by your concern for the common safety. The consuls are come to the army, which I had in Apulia; I earnestly exhort you, by your singular and perpetual affection to the republic, to come also to us; that, by our joint advice, we may give help and relief to the afflicted state. I would have you make the Appian Way your road, and come in all haste to Brundusium. Take care of your health." Ad Att. 8. 11.

M. CICERO, EMPEROR, TO CN. MAGNUS, PROCONSUL.

"When I sent that letter, which was delivered to you at Canusium, I had no suspicion of your crossing the sea for the service of the republic, and was in great hopes that we should be able either to bring about an accommodation, which to me seemed the most useful, or to defend the republic with the greatest dignity in Italy. In the meantime, before my letter reached you, being informed of your resolution by the instructions which you sent to the consuls, I did not wait till I could have a letter from you, but set out immediately towards you, with my brother, and our children, to Apulia. When we were come to Theanum, your friend, C. Messius, and many others, told us, that Cæsar was in the road to Capua, and would lodge that very night at Æsernia; I was much disturbed at it; because, if it was true, I not only took my journey to be precluded, but myself also to be certainly a prisoner. I went on, therefore, to Cales, with intent to stay there, till I could learn from Æsernia the certainty of my intelligence: at Cales, there was brought to me a copy of the letter which you wrote to the consul Lentulus, with which you sent the copy also of one that you had received from Domitius, dated the 18th of February, and signified that it was of great importance to the republic that all the troops should be drawn together, as soon as possible, to one place; yet so as to leave a sufficient garrison in Capua. Upon reading these letters, I was of the same opinion with all the rest, that you were resolved to march to Corfinium with all your forces; whither, when Cæsar lay before the town, I thought it impossible for me to come. While this affair was in the utmost expectation, we were informed at one and the same time both of what had happened at Corfinium, and that you were actually marching towards Brundusium; and, when I and my brother resolved, without hesitation, to follow you thither, were advertised by many, who came from Samnium and Apulia, to take care that we did not fall into Cæsar's hands; for that he was upon his march to the same places where our road lay, and would reach them sooner than we could possibly do. This being the case, it did not seem advisable to me, or my brother, or any of our friends, to run the risk of hurting, not only ourselves, but the republic, by our rashness: especially when we could not doubt, but that, if the journey had been safe to us, we should not then be able to overtake you. In the meanwhile I received your letter, dated from Canusium, the 21st of February, in which you exhort me to come in all haste to Brundusium; but, as I did not receive it till the 29th, I made no question but that you were already arrived at Brundusium; and all that road seemed wholly shut up to us, and we ourselves as surely intercepted as those who were taken at Corfinium: for we did not reckon them only to be prisoners, who were actually fallen into the enemy's hands, but those too not less so, who happen to be enclosed within the quarters and garrisons of their adversaries. Since this is our

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

new levies to join him; and, arming 300 slaves and shepherds, he furnished them with horses. The prætor, L. Manlius, in his retreat from Alba, with six cohorts, and the prætor Rutilius Lupus, from Terracina, with three, perceiving Cæsar's cavalry at a distance, commanded by Bivius Curius, were extremely disconcerted; and, while they meditated what step to take, their soldiers deserted them and joined the troops under the conduct of Curius. Several other parties, flying different ways, fell in, some with Cæsar's foot, others with

case, I heartily wish, in the first place, that I had always been with you, as I then told you, when I relinquished the command of Capua, which I did not do for the sake of avoiding trouble, but because I saw the town could not be held without an army, and was unwilling that the same accident should happen to me, which, to my sorrow, has happened to some of our bravest citizens at Corfinium; but, since it has not been my lot to be with you, I wish that I had been made privy to your councils; for I could not possibly suspect, and should sooner have believed any thing, than that, for the good of the republic, under such a leader as you, we should not be able to stand our ground in Italy; nor do I now blame your conduct, but lament the fate of the republic; and, though I cannot comprehend what it is which you have followed, yet I am not the less persuaded that you have done nothing but with the greatest reason. You remember, I believe, that my opinion always was, first, to preserve peace, even on bad conditions: then about leaving the city; for as to Italy, you never intimated a little to me about it; but I do not take upon myself to think that my advice ought to have been followed: I followed yours; nor that for the sake of the republic, of which I despaired, and which is now overturned, so as not to be raised up again without a civil and most pernicious war. I sought you; desired to be with you; nor will I omit the first opportunity which offers of effecting it. I easily perceived, through all this affair, that I did not satisfy those who are fond of fighting: for I made no scruple to own, that I wished for nothing so much as peace; not but that I had the same apprehensions from it as they; but I thought them more tolerable than a civil war: then, after the war was begun, when I saw that conditions of peace were offered to you, and a full and honourable answer given to them, I began to weigh and deliberate well upon my own conduct, which, considering your kindness to me, I fancied that I should easily explain to your satisfaction; I recollected that I was the only man who, for the greatest services to the public, had suffered a most wretched and cruel punishment; that I was the only one, who, if I offended him, to whom, at the very time when we were in arms against him, a second consulship and most splendid triumph were offered, should be involved again in all the same struggles; so that my person seemed to stand always exposed as a public mark to the insults of profligate citizens: nor did I suspect any of these things till I was openly threatened with them: nor was I so much afraid of them, if they were really to befall me, as I judged it prudent to decline them, if they could honestly be avoided. You see, in short, the state of my conduct while we had any hopes of peace; what has since happened deprived me of all power to do any thing: but to those whom I do not please I can easily answer, that I never was more a friend to C. Cæsar than they, nor they ever better friends to the republic than myself: the only difference between me and them is, that as they are excellent citizens, and I not far removed from that character, it was my advice to proceed by way of treaty, which I understood to be approved also by you; theirs by ways of arms: and, since this method has prevailed, it shall be my care to behave myself so, that the republic may not want in me the spirit of a true citizen, nor you of a friend. Adieu." Ad Att. 8. 11. The expostulations in the latter part of this letter were certainly useless, unfriendly, and ill-timed. His excuses in the first part were all false; for he owns to Atticus, that, in truth, he was willing to consider a little longer what was right and fit for him to do.—8. 12.

his cavalry. Cn. Magius, of Cremona, Pompey's master of the works, or chief engineer, being taken in his way to Brundisium, was brought to Cæsar, who sent him back to Pompey with this message: "That, as he had not yet obtained an interview, his design was to come to Brundisium, there to confer with him in relation to the common safety; because they soon would be able to dispatch, in a personal treaty, what, if managed by the intervention of others, might run into a tedious negotiation." It appears, by a letter of Cæsar to Oppius,^u that Pompey sent back Magius, as soon as Cæsar arrived before Brundisium, with some proposals which we know nothing of; nor of those in return which were then made by Cæsar. Young Balbus was sent also after the consul Lentulus, to endeavour to engage him to stay in Italy, and to return to the city, by the offer of every thing that could tempt him; and Cicero seems to think that Lentulus might have complied with the invitation, if Balbus and he had met; but the consul had sailed before Balbus could come up with him.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

In fine, Cæsar was so bent upon an accommodation, that seeing Magius^x did not return to him, as he ex-

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

^u "On the 9th of March, I arrived at Brundisium, and have invested it. Pompey is within the place. He sent Magius to me, to treat of peace. I answered him as I thought proper. I was willing you should be instantly informed of this. When I shall have any prospect of an accommodation, I will let you know without loss of time." Ad Att. 9. 13. "I have no copy (says Cicero) of the proposals you ask for, sent by Cæsar to the consuls and to Pompey: while I was upon the road, I sent you those brought by Ægypta; by which, I suppose, you may gather the substance of the others." Ad Att. 9. 15.

^x M. Crevier, (vol. 13. p. 255.) taking it for granted that Cæsar means to say in this place that Magius was never sent to him by Pompey, makes a very severe and hasty reflection upon his veracity. "Cæsar" [to use the words of this historian] "says, in his Commentaries, that Magius brought him back no answer from Pompey; but we have a letter from Cæsar to Oppius and Balbus, which proves the contrary. 'Pompey (says he) has sent Magius to me, with overtures of peace, and I have answered him what I thought proper.' It is difficult to reconcile these contradictions, but by supposing that Cæsar has not been scrupulously faithful as to facts in his Commentaries; particularly in what regards the civil war. Asinius Pollio, who accompanied him in several expeditions, expressly accused him of it. So that this great man, this generous, elevated soul, disdained not to dishonour himself by falsehood, and to suppress the truth in a work destined for posterity." The letter cited by M. Crevier, and which is copied above, proves that Cæsar expected Magius again. His first message by him, when taken prisoner, was only in general terms, to demand an interview; he made no proposals. Cæsar has neglected to mention Magius's first visit; or, perhaps, as in many other places of his Commentaries, there are some lines wanting.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

pected, he dispatched Caninius Rebilus, one of his lieutenants, a relation and intimate friend of Scribonius Libo, to confer with him on the subject. His orders were to exhort Libo, in the most earnest manner, to procure an interview between him and Pompey : to represent to him that, by this means, peace might be concluded upon reasonable terms ; and that the honour of it would redound to him by whose mediation both parties should be prevailed with to lay down their arms. Libo, after conferring with Caninius, waited on Pompey, and returned with this answer: "That the consuls were absent, without whom Pompey had no power to treat of an accommodation." Pompey's aversion to all negotiations was known to his party;^y and, lest the consuls should engage in one against his will, he was all along very desirous of sending them out of Italy.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

Cæsar sat down, on the 9th of March, before Brundisium, with six legions; three of which were composed of veteran soldiers, and the rest of new levies drawn together upon his march. He had sent Domitius's troops directly from Corfinium towards Sicily, not caring to bring them near Pompey's quarters. The consuls had sailed on the 4th with thirty cohorts, and there were still twenty in the town with Pompey. Nor was it certainly known whether he continued there for want of shipping to transport his troops, or with the design to keep possession of Brundisium, that he might be master of the whole Adriatic sea, the farthest parts of Italy, and the country of Greece, in order to make war on both sides the gulf. Cæsar, having lost all hopes of an accommodation, and fearing that it was his intention to keep footing in Italy, resolved to push the war with vigour, and to deprive him of the advantages he might reap from the port of Brundisium. The following

^y "Your last letter is dated the 1st of March; and in it you wish for an interview, and do not despair of an accommodation between Cæsar and Pompey; but, in my present way of thinking, I cannot believe that there will be any interview; or, if there is, that Pompey will agree to any terms." Ad Att. 8. 15.

works were contrived by him for this purpose. He carried on a mole on each side of the haven where the entrance was narrowest, and the water shallow. But as this undertaking could not be carried quite across the port, by reason of the great depth of the sea, he prepared double floats of timber, thirty feet square, which were each secured by four anchors, to enable them to resist the fury of the waves. These, which were to extend all the way between the two moles, were covered over with earth and fascines, that the soldiers might pass and repass with ease, and have firm footing to defend them. The front and sides were armed with a parapet of hurdles; and every fourth float had a tower of two stories, the better to keep the enemy's ships at a distance, and to guard the work from fire and the shocks of vessels.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Against these preparations Pompey made use of several large ships, upon which he raised turrets three stories high; and, having filled them with engines and darts, he let them loose upon Cæsar's floats in order to break through the staccado, and interrupt the progress of the works. Thus daily skirmishes happened with darts, arrows, and slings, at a distance; and Cæsar had spent nine days in these works, and had half finished the staccado, when the ships employed in the first embarkation were sent back by the consuls. Pompey, either alarmed at Cæsar's works, or because from the first he had resolved to abandon Italy, immediately prepared to carry off the rest of his forces: and, the better to secure his retreat, and to hinder the enemy from breaking into the town during the embarkation, he walled up the gates, barricaded the streets, or cut ditches across them, which he filled with pointed stakes, and covered with hurdles and earth. The two streets which led to the port, and which he left open for the passage of his men, were fortified with a double pallisado of very strong well-sharpened stakes. After these precautions,

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

he ordered the soldiers to embark in silence, having placed on the walls and towers some select archers and slingers, who were to wait till all the troops had got aboard ; and were then, upon a signal given, to retire to some small ships that waited for them at a convenient distance.

The inhabitants of Brundusium, dissatisfied with Pompey's soldiers, and provoked by the damage done to their town by his works, found means to give notice to Cæsar of his departure, from the tops of their houses. He immediately, upon this intelligence, ordered scaling-ladders to be prepared, and the soldiers to repair to their arms, that he might not lose any opportunity of acting. Pompey weighed anchor a little before night, and gave the signal for recalling the soldiers that were upon the walls, who retired with all possible expedition to the ships prepared for them. At the same time the scaling-ladders were applied to the walls, and Cæsar's troops entered the town : but, being informed by the Brundusians of the snares and ditches provided for them by the enemy, they were obliged to take a circuit ; which gave Pompey time enough to put to sea. Two transports only, impeded by Cæsar's mole, were taken with the troops on board.

Thus Pompey, on the 17th of March, abandoned all Italy to his rival. It is the opinion of many, that he saw from the beginning he should be reduced to this necessity ; but had kept the secret to himself, and had humoured his party in the contrary notion, often talking big to keep up their spirits. In this view, after the desertion of Labienus, he wrote to Cicero, " That in a few days he would have a firm army, with which he would march against Cæsar into Picenum ; so that the senate might have an opportunity of returning to the city." Cicero may be quoted as of this opinion. In a letter to Atticus, he writes to the following purpose : " Pompey and Cæsar are rivals in power——Pompey did not aban-

Ad Att.
8. 11.

don Rome because it was untenable, nor Italy because he was driven out of it; it had all along been his intention to move earth and sea, to rouse barbarous monarchs, to introduce the troops of barbarous nations into Italy, and to levy numerous armies. He has many to second him in what he has long thirsted for, a species of Sylla's tyranny." But Cicero writes not always to his friend his real sentiments; he says and unsays: he is now all love, and the moment after all indignation. He begins the tenth letter of the ninth book with these words: "I have nothing to write to you; because, since I answered yours, the day before yesterday, I have had no fresh intelligence. But as fretting not only keeps me from sleeping, but gives me the greatest pain while I am awake; I set myself down to scribble somewhat or other, in which I have no manner of meaning, but to converse as it were with you, who are my only comfort." And I do not perceive any thing in the history of the commencement of this war, but what convinces me that Pompey thought himself capable of defending Italy; in which opinion he was certainly confirmed by Labienus, who would never have quitted Cæsar, if he had thought otherwise. He gave the strongest assurances to his party before the rupture, that Cæsar would never dare to proceed in a hostile manner; and that, if he was mad enough to do so, he held him in the utmost contempt. He had provided himself with two legions of veteran troops, and ordered levies all over Italy sufficient to form eight other legions: and he sent his officers with troops to stop Cæsar's progress. But he was greatly disappointed in every thing he relied upon, and his spirits were sunk by these disappointments. The sudden panic that seized the town on the first news of Cæsar's march, and made the two consuls and all the senators of Pompey's faction fly out of it, put a stop to all levies there. In the southern parts, on whose affection Pompey depended so much,

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Ad Att.
8. 3.

the levies went on but slowly: the people shewed a great backwardness to enlist. The northern parts shewed themselves, contrary to his expectation, to be in Cæsar's interest, and surrendered to him upon the first summons: even many towns declared for him before they were summoned. The Pompeian commanders were deserted every where by their troops, which inspired Pompey with a just diffidence of the two legions that had been taken from Cæsar; and which constituted, in reality, his chief strength. Lastly, Cæsar's astonishing celerity baffled all his attempts to preserve Italy: for, from his setting out at Ravenna with one legion, though he was forced to take in all the great towns on his road, and spent seven days before Corfinium, and nine before Brundisium; yet in two months he marched the whole length of Italy, entered Brundisium with six legions, and was master of four more at least in different parts of the country.

Middl.
p. 73.

A very ingenious and justly-admired writer, to whose performance we are much indebted, but to whose opinions we are not always disposed to subscribe, speaks in the following manner of Cæsar's enterprise: "If we consider the famous passage of the Rubicon, abstractedly from the event, it seems to have been so hazardous and desperate, that Pompey might reasonably contemn the thought of it, as of an attempt too rash for any prudent man to venture upon. If Cæsar's view indeed had been to possess himself only of Italy, there could have been no difficulty in it: his army was undoubtedly the best which was then in the world; flushed with victory, animated with zeal for the person of their general, and an overmatch for any which could be brought against it into the field: but this single army was all that he had to trust to; he had no resource: the loss of one battle was certain ruin to him: and yet he must necessarily run the risk of many before he could gain his end: for the whole empire was armed against him; every pro-

vince offered a fresh enemy, and a fresh field of action, where he was like to be exposed to the same danger as on the plains of Pharsalia. But, above all, his enemies were masters of the sea, so that he could not transport his forces abroad without the hazard of their being destroyed by a superior fleet, or of being starved at land by the difficulty of conveying supplies and provisions to them: Pompey relied chiefly on this single circumstance, and was persuaded that it must necessarily determine the war in his favour: so that it seems surprising how such a superiority of advantage, in the hands of so great a commander, could possibly fail of success; and we must admire rather the fortune, than the conduct of Cæsar, for carrying himself safe through all these difficulties to the possession of the empire.”

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

But it must be remembered, on the other hand, that a certain destruction would have attended Cæsar, if he had submitted to the decree made against him by the senate. He would thereby have been disarmed at once, and reduced to the condition of a private citizen: and Pompey, with all the power of the state in his hands, would easily have disappointed him of the consulship. He intended, it is certain, to do so, and even to bring him to trial, as Cato and others were continually threatening him: and, of this last circumstance, Cæsar, according to Suetonius, was really apprehensive. “He engaged in the war (says that historian), because he was afraid of being called to an account for what he had done in his first consulship, contrary to the religion, the laws, and the authority of the tribunes: for Cato often declared, and with an oath too, that he would impeach him as soon as he disbanded his army: and it was commonly talked, that, if he returned a private person, he would, like Milo, be tried with a guard to attend the court. This circumstance Asinius Pollio has confirmed, when he says that Cæsar, upon viewing his enemies slaughtered and put to flight upon the plains of Phar-

Suet. in
Cæs. 30.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

salia, spoke these words: 'They would have it so: I Caius Cæsar, who have performed such great things, must have undergone a sentence of condemnation, had I not desired the assistance of my army.' "

If it was so evident [as Dr. Middleton will have it] that Pompey could not defend Italy, this threw at once an immense power into Cæsar's hands, and put him in possession of the fortunes of all his enemies: which consideration he might think sufficient to induce them not to pursue their scheme of depriving him of his government; and it certainly would have had this effect, if Pompey had not deceived the senate by assuring them that he had an army sufficient to defend the city. This is very plain from the many reproaches which were thrown on Pompey, when things went contrary to the general expectation.

Cæsar, with an army of martial and experienced soldiers, and possessed of Italy, Gaul, and the adjacent islands, was an overmatch for the rest of the world. For what was the fighting world? Truly, six legions of veterans in Spain, and an army of new levies out of Italy and the oriental provinces, with two legions that had served under Cæsar, and three more dispersed in Asia. But Cæsar, it is said, must run the risk of many battles, all the empire was armed, and every province offered a fresh field of action: this, however, was not the case: it was, on the contrary, most evident from the beginning, that one general engagement would decide the fate of the two chiefs; and, with regard to the provinces, it must be observed, that they were quite indifferent in the quarrel, and could not stop, if they intended it, the progress of the conqueror.

See Middl.
p. 74.
Ad Att.
9. 13.

In fine, Cicero does not always represent Cæsar's enterprise as a kind of madness. Here is his account to his friend Atticus: "I perceive Cæsar to be very strong in infantry, in cavalry, in shipping, and in auxiliary Gauls; whose numbers Matius, I believe, exaggerated,

when he said they had offered to maintain for him, at their own expense, 10,000 foot, and 6,000 horse. But, supposing this to be a vaunt, yet it is certain that he is very strong; and he will not, like Pompey, be obliged to maintain his forces upon extraordinary imposts; for he will have the riches of all Rome at his command: and add to this Cæsar's enterprising spirit, and the weakness of our patriots, who are grieved at war for no other reason, than because they have incurred Cæsar's resentment.—Cæsar, however, has been more moderate than he appeared to be at setting out, and the common people have lost the great affection they had for Pompey, and seem fond of him. The situation, therefore, of Cæsar is such, that, supposing he cannot conquer, yet I cannot see how he can be conquered.—I do not understand whom you call patriots: I know of none: I mean I know of no order of men deserving that appellation: take them man by man, they are very worthy gentlemen: but, in civil dissensions, we are to look for patriotism in the constituent members of the body politic. Do you look for it in the senate? Let me ask you by whom were the provinces left without governors?—Do you look for patriotism among the farmers of the revenue? Alas! they never were steady, and now they are entirely devoted to Cæsar. Do you look for it in our trading, or in our landed interest? They are fondest of peace. Can you imagine that they have any terrible apprehensions of living under a monarchy; they, to whom all forms of government are indifferent, provided they enjoy their ease?—When his stream of power was weak, it might have been easily stopped. But now he is master of eleven legions [of veterans] and as much cavalry as he pleases to draw into the field. Think upon the towns beyond the Po, the mob of Rome, upon so great a majority of the tribunes, upon a profligate rising generation, upon a general, with such sagacity to contrive, and such boldness to execute.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Ad Att.
7. 7.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Ad Att.
8. 3.

Middl.
p. 67.
Ad Att.
7. 9.

“ It was with reluctance I undertook that commission at Capua ; not that I would have declined it, had we been acting upon any concert : but I could see no declared, sincere concern for their country in any of our public bodies ; nor in reality among private persons. Our patriots were without spirit and activity, as usual, and as I had foreseen ; while the mob discovered a manifest bias to Cæsar ; and most of them were fond of a change.” These extracts from Cicero seem to contain a very natural and true description of the times ; and this description leads us to consider the justice of Pompey’s or Cæsar’s cause. The ingenious author above-cited has given his decision on this head, in the following passage from Cicero ; which we must beg leave to accompany with our remarks. “ You have held [Cicero had been speaking of Cæsar] your government ten years, not granted to you by the senate, but extorted by violence and faction : [Was not this the case with every other grant at this time ? Was the Gabinian, or the Manilian, or the Messian law, more legally preferred ? The government of Gaul was given to Cæsar by a law of the people, which the senate thought fit to confirm by a decree of their own] the full term is expired, not of the law, but of your licentious will : but allow it to be a law ; [Cicero allowed it to have been such, and voted for it ; and he himself engaged Cœlius to propose, in favour of Cæsar, another bill to dispense with his presence in suing for the consulate during the continuance of the law in question] it is now decreed, that you must have a successor : [By whom ? By the people ? No : By decree of the senate ? No : for the tribunes interposed : By a vote of the senate ? Yes : but of the senate awed illegally by the power of Pompey] you refuse ; and say, have some regard to me : do you first shew your regard to us : will you pretend to keep an army longer than the people ordered, and contrary to the will of the senate ?” To this passage from Cicero Dr. Middleton has added : “ But Cæ-

sar's strength lay not in the goodness of his cause, but of his troops :——The flight of the tribunes gave him a plausible handle to begin, and seemed to sanctify his attempt : but his real motive, says Plutarch [in Ant.] was the same that animated Cyrus and Alexander before him to disturb the peace of mankind : the unquenchable thirst of empire, and the wild ambition of being the greatest man in the world ; which was not possible, till Pompey was first destroyed."

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d consulship.

In this state of the merit of Cæsar's cause, we have two assertions which require a particular consideration. It is affirmed, that the full term appointed for Cæsar's government of Gaul was expired ; and that he continued to hold his province against law in defiance of the senate and of the people of Rome : and Dr. Middleton has said, P. 45. in another place, that the 1st of March of the year 703 was the term prescribed to it by law. Secondly, Cæsar is condemned as guilty of an impudent and treacherous behaviour in not obeying the orders of the senate.

Now, as to the first point, Dr. Middleton is certainly L. 39. mistaken, and contradicts Cicero himself, when he supposes that Cæsar's government was to last but eight years, and ended on the 1st of March, 703. Dio Cassius indeed says, that Cæsar's government was only prolonged to him for three years ; but he is in this contradicted by every other historian, and by indubitable facts. Cæsar, in his harangue to his soldiers at Ravenna, tells them, that they had served under him for nine years ; and it appears by what he mentions soon afterward, that, beyond the period fixed by the decree of the senate for disbanding his forces, there wanted six months to complete the time allotted to him by law. The complaints of the tribunes of the people against the senate, for pretending to abrogate a law of the people, were evidently grounded upon this supposition. What could mean the privilege granted him in the year 701, when Pompey was sole consul, of suing for the consulship in his ab-

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Ad Att,
7. 7.

sence, if his government was to expire before he could legally present himself as a candidate? And it would have expired, if it had not been decennial. In fine, Cicero owns, in other places, that Cæsar had law on his side: “Yet, such is the general we are either to encounter, or we are to gratify him in what he can already claim by law.” And Monsieur l’Abbé Mongault has thus remarked on the passage of Cicero cited above: “Cicero writes here in the Pompeian style, or he means only that Cæsar’s government would nearly expire about the time of the elections of the next consuls; and that, therefore, he might well consent to leave it, in order to come and stand candidate in person, as was required of him: or, perhaps, Pompey’s faction began to reckon the years of Cæsar’s government, from the very moment that the law was passed at Rome, allotting that province to him; but the general and legal method was to reckon from the day in which the governor entered his province.”

As to the second point, I shall not interpose my judgment: the reader, who has had the whole evidence laid impartially before him, will, probably, have determined for himself. I shall, however, beg leave to insert a paragraph or two from the spirited performance of our late poet laureat.

The cha-
racter and
conduct of
Cicero
considered
from the
history of
his life, by
Dr. Mid-
dleton,
p. 183.

“After several difficulties, doubts, debates, and political schemes, to make bad matters worse, at last the senate, without any notice taken of the people’s right to confirm or reject it, came to this bold resolution, that Cæsar should dismiss his army by a certain day, or be declared an enemy, &c. Does not the very menace in this vote imply a doubt or apprehension of its not being obeyed? and whence could that doubt come, but from a consciousness of their severity in taking his command from Cæsar, before the time of its legal duration was expired? Was this a treatment that the high spirit of Cæsar could comply with or quietly bear? Or, indeed,

if he would have borne it, where, at that time, was the policy of it? What good was the senate or the public to reap by it? Would they have less reason to be afraid of Pompey's power, because Pompey then must have had less reason to be afraid of Cæsar? while they were both rivals, they could be but candidates for empire; but, when one of them was destroyed, the other of course became equal to their master duly elected. Could they then imagine that Cæsar, whose strength (says Dr. Middleton) lay not in the goodness of his cause, but of his troops, would choose to come from the head of them merely to humble himself into a private innocent man, and to depend upon the favour of Pompey for his future preferment? Or, if this was really what their wisdom proposed by their sage and sober vote, why, at least, when they knew Cæsar was so formidable in the field, would they not previously choose to soften him into obedience, by giving him a reasonable hope that some such great and gracious honour should be secured to him? But, perhaps, the neglect of this civility might be owing to the *sic volo* of Pompey, whose disregard of Cæsar might not as yet have given them his orders to make him any such proposal; his orders, I call them, because, whatever at this time was proposed in the senate went but very slowly forward, that had not an eye to the interest or good-liking of Pompey. It would be, therefore, the greatest absurdity, to suppose so rash and enterprising a vote could have come from them *ex mero motu*, as the free and voluntary act of their own pious care of the public. No, had that been their case, had they been their own masters, it can admit of no doubt but that Pompey, as well as Cæsar, would have had the same disbanding vote passed upon him too. But, Cæsar being then abroad and Pompey at home, they naturally chose to be most afraid of the danger that was nearest to them."

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cicero, we may remember, in the account he gives of

Vid. supr.
chap. 1.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cibber,
p. 186.

his interview with Pompey, tells us, that, as to public affairs, Pompey talked in such a strain, as if a war was inevitable, without giving the least hopes of an accommodation.

“ While such [continues our laureat] was the disposition of Pompey’s mind, we can be no longer in doubt from whence came this peremptory vote upon Cæsar.

“ Thus the government *de jure* having utterly lost its power, the only debatable question now was, whether Pompey or Cæsar should be the sole governor *de facto*. A melancholy election for liberty! Nor had it a better appearance to Cicero, who tells us, that which side soever got the better, the war must necessarily end in tyranny: the only difference was that, if their enemies conquered, they should be proscribed; if their friends, be slaves.

“ This being the most equal light that the cause of Pompey or of Cæsar can stand in, we must either suppose, that had Cæsar, in obedience to the senate, disbanded his army, the public liberty would have been of course restored; or that, if it would not (as there is not the most distant pretence to say it would), it then must follow, that whether Pompey or Cæsar had prevailed, it could have wrought no different consequence to the Roman liberty; the ruin of which, under the sole dominion of either, must (as Cicero confesses) have been equally inevitable: let this be granted, and neither the virtue, nor the critical learning of posterity, will ever think this cause a disputable point, or give the least preference to the pretensions of either of these celebrated competitors. It is true, they may tell us, that Pompey had the fairer appearance in the senate’s support. Yes, but in nothing more than appearance; not by their free and independent choice, but by the palpable terror of his arms; nor from their opinion of his better intentions to the public, than they conceived of Cæsar’s; but the plain truth is, that in this situation, they rather chose to

let Pompey's orders seem to be their own, than that any thing should appear to be transacted without their authority. If Cæsar then was not so tame as the senate in yielding up his liberty, or refused to obey the mandate of an intimidated authority ; rather choosing, if he could not live like a Roman, to die like Cæsar : will this stand in no excuse for him ? or, will it be too partially favourable, should we call his slighting such a senate an almost laudable ambition ? for never surely can it be urged, that Cæsar's disobeying them was a more criminal infringement of the public liberty than was Pompey's keeping them in fear of him. And yet, again, if the presumption of either their disobeying or commanding could be mitigated by appearances, Cæsar, by his offering to lay down his arms, provided Pompey might be under the same obligation at the same time, made an advancement to the patriot, which Pompey had not virtue enough to dissemble. And though it may have been objected, that this compliance of Cæsar was all but grimace, without the least intention of his making it good ; yet as this is but an imaginary charge, it ought at least to have been brought to a proof before Cæsar could be justly condemned upon it. But Pompey's absolutely, and without hesitation, refusing the proposal, was an open declaration, that no peaceable terms should prevail upon him to part with a grain of his power. While Pompey, therefore, lies under this imputation, he stands in a less favourable light, or was, rather, a more notorious offender than Cæsar."

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar, after settling every thing in the south of Italy, and taking measures to secure Sicily and Sardinia, sets out for Rome. In his way he has a conference with Cicero, who soon after retires to Pompey's camp. At Rome he seizes the public treasures, and, finding the senate unwilling to act any part, he takes upon himself the public administration. After a stay of six or seven days, he sets out for Spain.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

CÆSAR was very sensible, that, to put a speedy end to the war, the best plan he could follow was to pass the sea immediately, and endeavour to come up with Pompey and the consuls in their present defenceless state, before they could draw the transmarine forces together. But the execution of this design was at present absolutely impracticable; for all the ships had been carried off the coast; and to gather others from Picenum, Sicily, and the coasts of Gaul, was a tedious business, and in the winter season subject to great uncertainty. Dreading, therefore, this delay and loss of time, he determined to go to Spain, whither also a very interesting consideration called him. It appeared of dangerous consequence to suffer a veteran army to strengthen themselves in his rival's interest by new levies of horse and foot, and to prepare a sure resource for their general, when driven out of Greece and Asia: and he could never have a more favourable opportunity of conquering Spain, and the legions there, than when Pompey was at such a distance from them, and unable to give them any assistance. He resolved therefore upon this expedition, saying, he would go first to find an army without a general, and then return to a general without an army. It is commonly supposed, that Pompey committed a capital error in not going to Spain, and in neglecting to put himself at the head of the best troops he had, in a country devoted to his interest, and commodious for the operations of his naval force; and Cicero is cited, as being so much of this opinion, that, when he first heard of Pompey's resolution to go to Greece, he called it monstrous. But, it is to be considered, that

Middl.
p. 118.

Pompey had at this time no fleet in readiness ; and, if he had sailed for Spain directly, he would not have had influence enough in the east to have raised the fleets and armies, which, by his presence there, he was enabled to collect. Cæsar would have been beforehand with him ; and, by transporting a few legions into Greece, would have awed all the states of the east, who were most of them very indifferent about this quarrel : and Pompey, in the meantime, would have been cooped up in Spain, and precluded from every province of the empire besides Africa.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cæsar, before he left Brundisium, sent orders to all the municipal towns upon the several coasts to assemble all the vessels they could, and send them to that port : and, knowing of what importance it was to his credit, that Italy should be abundantly supplied with provisions, which Pompey was determined to cut off by every possible method,^z he immediately dispatched Valerius, one of his lieutenants, into Sardinia, with one legion ; and Curio into Sicily with three ; commanding him, as soon as he had mastered this island, to pass over into Africa. Then, having put his legions into winter-quarters in the towns along the coast, at Brundisium, Tarentum, Sipontum, and other places, in such a manner as to lock up all the passages by sea, and having ordered levies over the whole country, he set out for Rome.

Cæsar de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

Ad Att.
9. 15.

Ib. 19.

In the midst of his military operations, he had neglected no means of gaining over to his party all those who were not his avowed enemies. As soon as he was informed that the senators had left Rome, he wrote to many of them to return, and desired Trebatius to write

Ib. 7. 17.

^z (Ad Att. 9. 9.) "I perceive a most destructive war ready to break out, which Pompey will begin by famishing Italy ; and yet I mourn for not taking part in this war ; a war ! so detestable, that, though there is nothing more unnatural than not to assist our parents, yet have the leaders of it taken their measures for famishing the most venerable, the most sacred of all parents, I mean their country. My apprehensions are not founded upon conjecture, but upon what I have heard from themselves. This fleet that is gathering from Alexandria, Colchis, Tyre, Sidon, Aradus, Cyprus, Pamphylia, Lycia, Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium, Lesbos, Miletus, Smyrna, and Coos, is designed to intercept the provisions of Italy, and to seize the coasts of the corn countries."

Year of
R O M E
704.
B C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 90.

Ad Att.
9. 6.

to Cicero, to beg of him not to absent himself from the city; and, after Cicero had left it, he employed all their common friends to use their endeavours to induce him to imitate the conduct of some other consulars, who had determined to preserve a neutrality. Cicero, upon these applications, keeping at a distance from Pompey, Cæsar imagined they had made an impression upon him; and he began to attempt another point with him, viz. to persuade him to come back to Rome, and assist in the councils of the senate, which he designed to summon at his return from following Pompey. With this view, in the hurry of his march towards Brundusium, Cæsar sent him the following letter.

CÆSAR, EMPEROR, TO CICERO, EMPEROR.

“When I had but just time to see our friend Furnius, nor could conveniently speak with, or hear him, was in haste, and on my march, having sent the legions before me; yet I could not pass by without writing, and sending him to you with my thanks: though I have often paid this duty before, and seem likely to pay it oftener, you deserve it so well of me. I desire of you, in a special manner, that, as I hope to be in the city shortly, I may see you there, and have the benefit of your advice, your interest, your authority, your assistance in all things. But to return to the point: you will pardon the haste and brevity of my letter, and learn the rest from Furnius.” To this very polite letter Cicero made the following answer.

CICERO, EMPEROR, TO CÆSAR, EMPEROR.

“Upon reading your letter, delivered to me by Furnius, in which you pressed me to come to the city, I did not so much wonder at what you there intimated, of your desire to use my advice and authority, but was at a loss to find out what you meant by my interest and assistance: yet I flattered myself into a persuasion, that,

out of your admirable and singular wisdom, you were desirous to enter into some measures for establishing the peace and concord of the city ; and in that case I looked upon my temper and character as fit enough to be employed in such a deliberation. If the case be so, and you have any concern for the safety of our friend Pompey, and of reconciling him to yourself, and to the republic, you will certainly find no man more proper for such a work than I am, who, from the very first, have always been the adviser of peace both to him and the senate ; and, since this recourse to arms, have not meddled with any part of the war, but thought you to be really injured by it, while your enemies and enviers were attempting to deprive you of those honours which the Roman people had granted you. But as at that time I was not only a favourer of your dignity, but an encourager also of others to assist you in it ; so now the dignity of Pompey greatly affects me : for many years ago I made choice of you two, with whom to cultivate a particular friendship, and to be, as I now am, most strictly united. Wherefore I desire of you, or rather beg and implore with all my prayers, that, in the hurry of your cares, you would indulge a moment to this thought, how by your generosity I may be permitted to shew myself an honest, grateful, pious man, in remembering an act of the greatest kindness to me. If this related only to myself, I should hope still to obtain it from you : but it concerns, I think, both your honour and the republic, that by your means I should be allowed to continue in a situation the best adapted to promote the peace of you two, as well as the general concord of all the citizens. After I had sent my thanks to you before on the account of Lentulus, for giving safety to him who had given it to me ; yet, upon reading his letter, in which he expresses the most grateful sense of your liberality, I took myself to have received the same grace from you, which he had done : towards whom, if by this you perceive me

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

to be grateful, let it be your care, I beseech you, that I may be so too towards Pompey.”^a

^a (Middleton, p. 92.) Cicero was censured for some passages of this letter, which Cæsar took care to make public, viz. the compliment on Cæsar’s admirable wisdom; and, above all, the acknowledgment of his being injured by his adversaries in the present war: in excuse of which he says: (Ad Att. 8. 9.) “that he was not sorry for the publication of it, for he himself had given several copies of it; and, considering what had since happened, was pleased to have it known to the world how much he had always been inclined to peace; and that, in urging Cæsar to save his country, he thought it his business to use such expressions as were the most likely to gain authority with him, without fearing to be thought guilty of flattery, in urging him to an act for which he would gladly have thrown himself even at his feet.”

He received another letter on the same subject, and about the same time, written jointly by Balbus and Oppius, two of Cæsar’s chief confidants: “The advice, not only of little men, such as we are, but even of the greatest, is generally weighed, not by the intention of the giver, but the event; yet, relying on your humanity, we will give you what we take to be the best in the case about which you wrote to us; which, though it should not be found prudent, yet certainly flows from the utmost fidelity and affection to you. If we did not know from Cæsar himself, that, as soon as he comes to Rome, he will do what in our judgment we think he ought to do, treat about a reconciliation between him and Pompey, we should give over exhorting you to come and take a part in those deliberations; that, by your help, who have a strict friendship with them both, the whole affair may be settled with ease and dignity: or if, on the contrary, we believed that Cæsar would not do it, and knew that he was resolved upon a war with Pompey, we should never try to persuade you to take arms against a man to whom you have the greatest obligations, in the same manner as we have always intreated you, not to fight against Cæsar. But since, at present, we can only guess, rather than know, what Cæsar will do, we have nothing to offer but this, that it does not seem agreeable to your dignity, or your fidelity, so well known to all, when you are intimate with them both, to take arms against either; and this we doubt not but Cæsar, according to his humanity, will highly approve: yet, if you judge proper, we will write to him, to let us know what he will really do about it; and, if he returns us an answer, we will presently send you notice what we think of it, and give you our word, that we will advise only, what we take to be most suitable to your honour, not to Cæsar’s views: and are persuaded that Cæsar, out of his indulgence to his friends, will be pleased with it.” Ad Att. 9. 8.—This joint letter was followed by a separate one from Balbus: “Immediately after I had sent the common letter from Oppius and myself, I received one from Cæsar, of which I have sent you a copy; whence you will perceive how desirous he is of peace, and to be reconciled with Pompey, and how far removed from all thoughts of cruelty. It gives me an extreme joy, as it certainly ought to do, to see him in these sentiments. As to yourself, your fidelity, and your piety, I am entirely of the same mind, my dear Cicero, with you, that you cannot, consistently with your character and duty, bear arms against a man, to whom you declare yourself so greatly obliged: that Cæsar will approve this resolution, I certainly know from his singular humanity; and that you will perfectly satisfy him, by taking no part in the war against him, nor joining yourself to his adversaries; this he will think sufficient, not only from you, a person of such dignity and splendour; but has allowed it even to me, not to be found in that camp, which is likely to be formed against Lentulus and Pompey, from whom I have received the greatest obligations: it was enough, he said, if I performed my part to him in the city and the gown, which I might perform also to them, if I thought fit; wherefore I now manage all Lentulus’s affairs at Rome, and discharge my duty, my fidelity, my piety to them both: yet, in truth, I do not take the hopes of an accommodation, thought now so low, to be quite desperate, since Cæsar is in that mind in which we ought to wish him: one thing would please me, if you thought it proper, that you would write to him, and desire a guard from him, as you did from Pompey, at the time of Milo’s trial, with my approbation: I will undertake for him, if I rightly know Cæsar, that he will sooner pay a regard to your dignity, than to his own interest. How prudently I write these things, I know not; but this I certainly know, that, whatever I write, I write out of a singular love and affection to you; for, (let me die, so as Cæsar may but live) if I have not so great an esteem for you, that few are equally dear to me. When you have taken any resolution in this affair, I wish

In his way to Rome, Cæsar had a conference with Cicero, at Formiæ, on the 29th of March; of which the latter gives the following account to his friend Atticus. “My discourse with him (says he), was such as would rather make him think well of me than thank me. I stood firm in refusing to go to Rome; but was deceived in expecting to find him easy; for I never saw any one less so: he was condemned, he said, by my judgment; and, if I did not come, others would be the more backward: I told him that their case was very different from mine. After many things said on both sides, he bad me come, however, and try to make peace: ‘Shall I do it (says I), in my own way?’ ‘Do you imagine (replied he), that I will prescribe to you?’ ‘I will move the senate then (says I), for a decree against your going to Spain, or transporting your troops into Greece, and say a great deal besides in bewailing the case of Pompey.’ ‘I will not allow (replied he), such things to be said.’ ‘So I thought (says I), and for that reason will not come; because I must either say them, and many more, which I cannot help saying, if I am there, or not come at all.’ The result was, that, to shift off the discourse, he wished me to consider of it; which I could not refuse to do, and so we parted. I am persuaded, that he is not pleased with me; but I am pleased with myself; which I have not been before of a long time. As for the rest, good gods, what a crew he has with him! What a hellish band, as you call them!^b—— What a deplorable affair! What desperate troops! What a lamentable thing, to see Servius’s son, and Titinius’s,

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

that you would let me know it, for I am exceedingly solicitous that you should discharge your duty to them both, which in truth I am confident you will discharge.” Dr. Middleton is of opinion, that the offer of a guard was insinuated to deprive him of the liberty of retiring: but, considering Cæsar’s most generous behaviour, even to his enemies, this suspicion seems to be entirely groundless.

^b “There was a time [says Cibber, p. 192.] when these followers of Cæsar were all heroes with Cicero, they being still the same ragamuffins that had done glorious business abroad for the republic under the same command of Cæsar, and did as effectually (valiant rascals as they were) as if they had been all saints or patriots.” Has not the illustrious consul, who saved Rome, condescended to sing their exploits in Greek verse?

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

with many more of their rank in that camp, which besieged Pompey ! He has six legions ; wakes at all hours ; fears nothing ; I see no end of this calamity. His declaration at the last, which I had almost forgot, was odious ; that, if he was not permitted to use my advice, he would use such as he could get from others, and pursue all measures that were for his service."

Cicero fancied to himself, that Cæsar deemed his presence in the city as of the greatest importance to his cause, and meant to get a decision from him, that, in the absence of the consuls, the assembly for the elections of the new magistrates might be held by a prætor : but Cæsar, it is probable, did not think his presence of so much use, and certainly never intended to force him into a compliance, but to win him by address, and the counsels of his friends.

Middl.
p. 97.
Ad Att.
10. 4. 5. 7.

While Cæsar was on the road to Rome, young Quintus Cicero, the nephew, a fiery, giddy youth, privately wrote to him to offer his service, with a promise of some information concerning his uncle ; upon which, being sent for, and admitted to an audience, he assured Cæsar, that his uncle was utterly disaffected to all his measures, and determined to leave Italy and go to Pompey. The boy was tempted to this rashness by the hopes of a considerable present, and gave much uneasiness by it both to the father and the uncle, who had reason to fear some ill consequence from it ; but Cæsar, desirous to divert Cicero from declaring against him, and to quiet the apprehensions which he might entertain for what was past, took occasion to signify to him, in a kind letter from Rome, that he retained no resentment of his refusal to come to the city, though Volcatius Tullus and Servius Sulpicius [two consular senators] had complained that he had not shewn the same indulgence to them. And Curio told him, a few days after, that, when Dolabella was earnestly solicitous that he should come to Rome, Cæsar, in an answer, returned him many thanks, and

told him, that he was not only satisfied, but pleased, at his not coming. He assured him also that Cæsar would have made no difficulty in granting him the favour he had granted to Philippus, that of remaining neuter: that he might act as if the thing was agreed on with Cæsar himself; and that he would write to him, that matters were so settled between them: he added, that, if he pleased, he might leave Italy, and pass through Sicily to go into Greece. Yet Cicero's behaviour and residence in those villas of his, which were nearest to the sea, gave rise to a general report, that he was waiting only for a wind to carry him over to Pompey; upon which, Cæsar sent him another pressing letter to try, if possible, to dissuade him from that step.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

CÆSAR, EMPEROR, TO CICERO, EMPEROR.

“ Though I never imagined that you would do any thing rashly or imprudently; yet moved by common report, I thought proper to write to you, and beg of you, by our mutual affection, that you would not run to a declining cause, whither you did not think fit to go while it stood firm. For you will do the greatest injury to our friendship, and consult but ill for yourself, if you do not follow where fortune calls: for all things seem to have succeeded most prosperously for us, most unfortunately for them: nor will you be thought to have followed the cause (since that was the same, when you chose to withdraw yourself from their councils), but to have condemned some act of mine; than which you could do nothing that could affect me more sensibly, and what I beg, by the rights of our friendship, that you would not do. Lastly, what is more agreeable to the character of an honest, quiet man, and good citizen, than to retire from civil broils? from which some, who would gladly have done it, have been deterred by an apprehension of danger: but you, after a full testimony of my life, and trial of my friendship, will find nothing

Ad Att.
10. 8.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

more safe or reputable, than to keep yourself clear from all this contention. The 16th of April, on the road."

403d con-
sulship.

Antony, also, whom Cæsar left to guard Italy in his absence, wrote to him to the same purpose, and on the same day.

ANTONIUS, TRIBUNE OF THE PEOPLE AND PROPRAËTOR, TO
CICERO, EMPEROR.

Ad Att.
10. 8.

"If I had not a great esteem for you, and much greater indeed than you imagine, I should not be concerned at the report which is spread of you, especially when I take it to be false. But, out of the excess of my affection, I cannot dissemble, that even a report, though false, makes some impression on me. I cannot believe that you are preparing to cross the sea, when you have such a value for Dolabella, and your daughter Tullia, that excellent woman, and are so much valued by us all, to whom, in truth, your dignity and honour are almost dearer than to yourself: yet I did not think it the part of a friend not to be moved by the discourse even of ill-designing men, and wrote this with the greater inclination, as I take my part to be the more difficult on the account of our late coldness, occasioned rather by my jealousy than any injury from you. For I desire you to assure yourself, that nobody is dearer to me than you, excepting my Cæsar, and that I know also that Cæsar reckons M. Cicero in the first class of his friends. Wherefore, I beg of you, my Cicero, that you will keep yourself free and undetermined, and despise the fidelity of that man who first did you an injury, that he might afterward do you a kindness; nor fly from him, who, though he should not love you, which is impossible, yet will always desire to see you in safety and splendour. I have sent Calpurnius to you with this, the most intimate of my friends, that you might perceive the great concern which I have for your life and dignity."

Coelius also wrote to him on the same subject; but finding, by some hints in Cicero's answer, that he was actually preparing to run away to Pompey, he sent him a second letter, in a most pathetic, or, as Cicero calls it, lamentable strain, in hopes to work upon him by alarming all his fears.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Ad Att.
10. 9.

CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

“Being in a consternation at your letter, by which you shew that you are meditating nothing but what is dismal, yet neither tell me directly what it is, nor wholly hide it from me, I presently wrote this to you. By all your fortunes, Cicero, by your children, I beg and beseech you not to take any step injurious to your safety: for I call the gods and men and our friendship to witness, that what I have told, and forewarned you of, was not any vain conceit of my own, but after I had talked with Cæsar, and understood from him, how he resolved to act after his victory, I informed you of what I had learned. If you imagine that his conduct will be always the same, in dismissing his enemies and offering conditions, you are mistaken: he thinks and even talks of nothing but what is fierce and severe,^c and is gone away much out of humour with the senate, and thoroughly provoked with the opposition which he has met with, nor will there be any room for mercy. Wherefore, if you yourself, your only son, your house, your remaining hopes be dear to you; if I, if the worthy man, your son-in-law, have any weight with you; you should not desire to overturn our fortunes, and force us to haste or to relinquish that cause in which our safety consists, or to entertain an impious wish against yours. Lastly, reflect on this, that you have already given all the offence which you can give, by staying so long behind; and now to declare against

Ep. Fam.
8. 16.

^c It is evident that Coelius writes thus to frighten Cicero, whom he knew to be a coward. Curio told him also, in his way to Sicily, that Cæsar's clemency flowed not from his natural disposition, but because he thought it popular; and that, if he once lost the affections of the people, he would be cruel. Ad Att. 10. 4.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

a conqueror, whom you would not offend, while his cause was doubtful, and to fly after those who run away, with whom you would not join while they were in a condition to resist, is the utmost folly. Take care that, while you are ashamed not to approve yourself one of the best citizens, you be not too hasty in determining what is the best. But, if I cannot wholly prevail with you, yet wait at least till you know how we succeed in Spain, which, I now tell you, will be ours as soon as Cæsar comes thither. What hopes they may have when Spain is lost, I know not; and what your view can be in acceding to a desperate cause, by my faith I cannot find out. As to the thing, which you discover to me by your silence about it, Cæsar has been informed of it; and, after the first salutation, told me presently what he had heard of you: I denied that I knew any thing of the matter, but begged of him to write to you in a manner the most effectual to make you stay. He carries me with him into Spain; if he did not, I would run away to you, wherever you are, before I came to Rome, to dispute this point with you in person, and hold you fast even by force. Consider, Cicero, again and again, that you do not utterly ruin both you and yours; that you do not knowingly and wilfully throw yourself into difficulties, whence you see no way to extricate yourself. But, if either the reproaches of the better sort touch you, or you cannot bear the insolence and haughtiness of a certain set of men, I would advise you to choose some place remote from the war, till these contests be over, which will soon be decided: if you do this, I shall think that you have done wisely, and you will not offend Cæsar.”^d

^d The conclusion, the partial conclusion of Dr. Middleton, p. 106, from these letters, is as follows: “these letters give us the most sensible proof of the high esteem and credit in which Cicero flourished at this time in Rome: when in a contest for empire, which force alone was to decide, we see the chiefs on both sides so solicitous to gain a man to their party, who had no peculiar skill in arms, or talents for war; but his name and authority was the acquisition which they sought; since, whatever was the fate of their arms, the world, they knew, would judge better of the cause which Cicero espoused. The same letters will confute, likewise, in a great measure, the common opinion of his want of resolution in all cases of difficulty, since no

The substance of his answers to these letters from Cæsar, Antony, and others, is contained in the follow-

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

man could shew a greater than he did on the present occasion, when, against the importunities of his friends, and all the invitations of a successful power, he chose to follow the cause which he thought the best, though he knew it to be the weakest."

403d consulship.

The same elegant panegyrist of Cicero has laid open, in the following manner, the motives of his conduct at this time, P. 109, 110, 113. "From the time of his leaving the city, together with Pompey and the senate, there passed not a single day in which he did not write one or more letters to Atticus, the only friend whom he trusted with the secret of his thoughts. From these letters it appears, that the sum of Atticus's advice to him agreed entirely with his own sentiments, that, if Pompey remained in Italy, he ought to join with him; if not, should stay behind, and expect what fresh accidents might produce. This was what Cicero had hitherto followed; and as to his future conduct, though he seems sometimes to be a little wavering and irresolute, yet the result of his deliberations constantly turned in favour of Pompey. His personal affection for the man, preference of his cause, the reproaches of the better sort, who began to censure his tardiness, and, above all, his gratitude for favours received, which had ever the greatest weight with him, made him resolve at all adventures to run after him; and though he was displeased with his management of the war, and without any hopes of his success; though he knew him before to be no politician, and now perceived him, he says, to be no general; yet, with all his faults, he could not endure the thoughts of deserting him, nor hardly forgive himself for staying so long behind him.—What held him still awhile longer, was the tears of his family, and the remonstrances of his daughter Tullia, who entreated him to wait only the issue of the Spanish war, and urged it as the advice of Atticus.—Pursuing at last the result of all his deliberations, and preferring the consideration of duty to that of his safety, he embarked to follow Pompey on the 11th of June."

Mr. Melmoth has given a quite different, and, I think, a truer account of Cicero's motives. He thinks that his conduct, during this important crisis, evidently shews the strength and measure of his patriotism: "Upon the news that Cæsar was marching into Italy, Pompey was appointed general in chief of the republican forces: and the principal magistrates, together with those who were invested with proconsular power, were distributed into different cantons in Italy, in order to raise troops for the defence of the common cause. Cicero had his particular district assigned him among the rest; but, instead of executing this important commission with spirit and vigour, he remained altogether inactive at his several villas in that part of Italy. And this he signified to Cæsar, by means of their common friend Trebatius; who had written to him in Cæsar's name, in order to prevail with him to return to Rome: 'I answered Trebatius, that what he required of me was impracticable at this juncture: but that I lived in my own farms, and did not concern myself in the new levies of troops, or any public business.' Ad Att. 7. 37. Pompey, in the meantime [a month after] was pressing Cicero to join him: but he excused himself by representing, that, while he was actually on the road for that purpose, he was informed that he could not proceed without the danger of being intercepted by Cæsar's troops. Epist. 2. Cic. ad Pomp. apud Epist. ad Att. 8. Cicero, however, is so ingenuous as to acknowledge, in the same letter to Pompey, that, so long as there were hopes that the negotiations for a peace would be attended with success, he thought it a justifiable piece of prudence not to be too active in forwarding the preparations that were carrying on against Cæsar, remembering, he says, how much he had formerly suffered from the resentment of the latter in the affair of his exile. This was explaining at once the true principle of his whole conduct: and he avows it more expressly in a letter to Atticus: 'Then say you, why did not you go beyond seas with Pompey? I tell you, it was out of my power to do it: and I refer you to the days and dates of our letters. At the same time I will frankly confess, what I might have easily conceived; I was, perhaps, in the wrong, in laying too great a stress upon a certain circumstance, in which I was deceived. I have flattered myself with the hopes of an accommodation: should that happen, I was unwilling to have Cæsar for my enemy, when he was reconciled with Pompey. I was sensible that they were still the same men: and it was this that occasioned my indecision.' Ad Att. 10. 8. Pompey, however, had no sooner set sail for Greece, than Cicero was struck with the consciousness of his having acted an unworthy part: 'Hitherto I was vexed and

Cic. Lett.
b. 7. 17.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Ep. Fam.
2. 16.
Melm.
7. 14.

ing letter to Cœlius, which is written with particular care.

CICERO TO MARCUS CÆLIUS.

“ I should have been extremely affected by your letter, if reason had not banished from my heart all its disquietudes, and despair of seeing better days had not long since hardened it against every new impression of grief; yet, strong as I must acknowledge my despondency to be, I am not sensible, however, that I said any thing in my last, which could justly raise the suspicion you have conceived. What more did my letter contain than general expressions of dissatisfaction at the sad prospect of our affairs? A prospect, which cannot, surely, suggest to your own mind less gloomy apprehensions than it presents to mine. For I am too well persuaded of the force of your penetration to imagine, that my

uneasy, because unable to come to any resolution. But, now that Pompey and the consuls have left Italy, it is no longer vexation and grief, it is anguish and distraction.—I am not, believe me, in my senses, so overwhelmed am I with the infamy, I think, I have incurred.’ Ad Att. 9. 6. After several deliberations, therefore, he was determined, he tells Atticus, to follow Pompey, without waiting for the event of Cæsar’s arms in Spain. Ad Att. 9. 19. 10. 8. This resolution, nevertheless, soon gave way to a second: for, having received some accounts which contradicted a former report that had been spread concerning the advantageous posture of Pompey’s affairs, Cicero renounced his intention of joining him, and now purposed to stand neuter. Ad Att. 10. 9. But a new turn in favour of Pompey seems to have brought Cicero back to his former scheme. For, in a subsequent letter to Atticus, wherein he mentions some reasons to believe that Pompey’s affairs went well in Spain, and takes notice, likewise, of some disgust, which the populace expressed towards Cæsar in the theatre; we find him resuming his design of openly uniting with Pompey. And accordingly, he resolved to join those who were maintaining Pompey’s cause in Sicily. Ad Att. 10. 12. It does not appear, by any of his letters, upon what motive he afterward exchanged his plan, for that of sailing directly to Pompey’s camp in Greece: which, after various debates with himself, he, at length, executed. There is a passage, however, in Cæsar’s Commentaries, which, perhaps, will render it probable, that the news which, about this time, was confidently spread at Rome, that Cæsar’s army had been almost totally defeated in Spain, was the determining reason that sent Cicero to Pompey. The fact was, that Afranius and Petreius had gained some advantages over Cæsar: but, as they magnified them, in their letters to Rome, much beyond the truth, several persons of note, who had hitherto been fluctuating in their resolutions, thought it was high time to declare themselves, and went off immediately to Pompey.” De Bell. Civ. 1. 55. Cicero very well knew from the beginning, which was the most honourable part for a man of his political principles to act under his connexions with the chiefs of the aristocracy, and his formal engagements to Pompey; but the prudential part was not so clear a point. He dreaded Cæsar’s resentment, but he was still more afraid of the resentment of Pompey: “ I find I am either way in danger; from the one party in not doing my duty, and from the other by doing it; and so distracted are public affairs, that I can steer no course but what is full of perils.”

judgment can discover consequences which lie concealed from yours. But I am surprised that you, who ought to know me perfectly well, should believe me capable of acting with so little policy as to abandon a rising fortune, for one in its decline, at least, if not utterly fallen; or so variable, as not only to destroy at once all the interest I have established with Cæsar, but to deviate even from myself, by engaging at last in a civil war, which it has hitherto been my determined maxim to avoid. Where then did you discover those unhappy resolutions you impute to me? Perhaps you collected them from what I said of secluding myself in some sequestered solitude. And, indeed, you are sensible how ill I can submit, I do not say to endure, but even to be a witness of the insolences of the successful party: a sentiment, my friend, which once, I am sure, was yours no less than mine. But in vain would I retire, whilst I preserve the title with which I am at present distinguished [of imperator], and bear about this embarrassing parade of lictors. Were I eased of this troublesome honour, there is no part of Italy so obscure, in which I should not be well contented to hide myself. Yet these, my laurels, unwelcome as they are to myself, are the object both of the envy and the raillery of my malevolent enemies.^e Nevertheless, under all these temptations of withdrawing from so disgusting a scene, I never once entertained a thought of leaving Italy without the previous approbation of yourself and some others. But you know the situation of my several villas: and as it is among these that I am obliged to divide my time, that I may not incommode my friends; the preference I give to those which stand on the sea-coast has raised a suspicion

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

^e Cicero, undoubtedly, gave upon this occasion but too much colour to the censure of his enemies: for it could not but have a very strange appearance, that he should preserve the thoughts of a triumph, at a time when his country was bleeding with a civil war. But as he was extremely ambitious of this honour, he was greatly unwilling to renounce it; still flattering himself, perhaps, that some accommodation between Cæsar and Pompey would afford him an opportunity of enjoying what he so strongly desired. Melmoth.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

that I am meditating a flight into Greece. If peace, indeed, were to be found in that country, I should not perhaps be unwilling to undertake the voyage : but to enter upon it, in order to engage in a war, would be altogether inconsistent, surely, with my principles and character ; especially, as it would be taking up arms not only against a man who I hope is perfectly well satisfied with my conduct, but in favour of one whom it is now impossible I should ever render so. In a word, as I made no secret to you, when you met me at my Cuman villa, of the conversation which had passed between Ampius and myself, you could not be at a loss to guess my sentiments upon this head : and, indeed, you plainly saw how utterly averse I was to the scheme of Pompey's deserting Rome. Did I not then affirm, that there was nothing I would not suffer, rather than be reduced to follow the civil war beyond the limits of Italy ? And has any event since happened, that could give me just reason of changing my sentiments ? On the contrary, has not every circumstance concurred to fix me in them ?^f

“ Be assured (and I am well persuaded 'tis what you already believe), that the single aim of my actions, in these our public calamities, has been to convince the world, that my great and earnest desire was to preserve the peace of our country ; and, when this would no longer be hoped, that there was nothing I wished more than to avoid taking any part in the civil war. And I shall never, I trust, have reason to repent of firmly persevering in these sentiments. It was the frequent boast, I remember, of my friend Hortensius, that he

^f Notwithstanding Cicero's strong assertions, that he had no thoughts of joining Pompey, he had actually determined to do so a few days before he received the preceding letter from Cœlius ; as appears by an epistle to Atticus, wherein he expressly tells him, that he was only waiting for a fair wind. But, before he wrote the present letter, he had received some news not altogether favourable to Pompey's party : in consequence of which, he renounced his former design, and was now determined (though he does not think proper to own it in this) to retire to Malta, as a neutral island. This resolution, however, he soon afterward rejected, and resumes his first intentions of following Pompey into Greece. And this scheme he at length executed. Ad Att. 10. 8, 9.

had never taken up arms in any of our civil dissensions. But I may glory in the same honest neutrality, with a much better grace: as that of Hortensius was suspected to have arisen from the timidity of his temper; whereas mine, I think, cannot be imputed to any motive of that unworthy kind. [Cicero seems to have been sensible that Cœlius intended to frighten him into a neutrality.] Nor am I in the least terrified by those considerations, with which you so faithfully and affectionately endeavour to alarm my fears. The truth of it is, there is no calamity so severe, to which we are not all of us, it should seem, in this universal anarchy and confusion, equally and unavoidably exposed. But if I could have averted this dreadful storm from the republic, at the expense of my own private and domestic enjoyments, even of those, my friend, which you so emphatically recommend to my care, I should most willingly have made the sacrifice. As to my son (who I rejoice to find has a share in your concern), I shall leave him a sufficient patrimony in that honour with which my name will be remembered, so long as the republic shall subsist: and, if it be destroyed, I shall have the consolation at least to reflect, that he will suffer nothing more than must be the common lot of every Roman. With regard to that dear and excellent young man, my son-in-law, whose welfare you entreat me to consider; can you once doubt, knowing, as you perfectly do, the tenderness I bear, not only for him, but for Tullia, that I am infinitely anxious upon his account? I am the more so, indeed, as it was my single consolation, amidst these general distractions, that they might possibly prove a means of protecting him from those inconveniences in which his too generous spirit had involved him.^g How much he suffered from

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

^g It should seem, by this passage, that Dolabella, who had contracted very considerable debts, was at this time under some difficulties from his creditors: from whom Cicero flattered himself that Cæsar's power would have protected him. Some commentators, however, instead of *liberalitate*, adopted in this translation, read *libertate*: and suppose that Cicero alludes to the prosecution in which Dolabella had been engaged against Appius. But, whichever be the true word, the sentiment is observ-

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

them during the time he continued in Rome, as well as how little that circumstance was to my credit, are points which I choose to leave to your own inquiry.

“ Affairs in Spain, I doubt not, will terminate in the manner you mention. But I neither wait the event of them, in order to determine my conduct,^h nor am I acting in any other respect with the least artifice. If the republic should be preserved, I shall certainly hold my rank in it: but, if it should be subverted, you yourself, I dare say, will join me in my intended solitude. But this latter supposition is, perhaps, the vain and groundless surmise of a disturbed imagination; and affairs, after all, may take a happier turn than I am apt to presage. I remember the despondency which prevailed in my earliest days amongst our patriots of more advanced years:ⁱ possibly my present apprehensions may be of the same cast, and no other than the effect of a common weakness incident to old age. Heaven grant they may prove so! And yet you have heard, I suppose, that a robe of magistracy is in the looms for Oppius; and that Curtius has hopes of being invested with the doubled purple: but the principal workman, it seems, somewhat delays him. I throw in this little pleasantry, to let you see I can smile in the midst of my indignation.

“ Let me advise you to enter into the affair, which I formerly mentioned concerning Dolabella, with the same warmth as if it were your own. I have only to add, that you may depend upon it I shall take no hasty or inconsiderate measures. But, to whatever part of the world I may direct my course, I entreat you to protect

able. For, surely it was utterly unworthy of Cicero to find the least consolation, amidst the calamities of his country, in the hope that they might prove a screen to Dolabella, either from the justice of his creditors, or the malice of his enemies. Melmoth.

^h The contrary of this was the truth: for Cicero was at this time determined to wait the event of Cæsar's expedition against the lieutenants of Pompey in Spain. And for this purpose he had thoughts of retiring to Malta: “ Melitum, opinor, capesamus (says he to Atticus) dum, quid in Hispania.” Ad Att. 10. 9. Melm.

ⁱ This alludes to the contentions between Sylla and Marius: which, notwithstanding the probability of their terminating in the total subversion of the constitution, the republic, however, survived. Melm.

both me and mine, agreeably to your honour and to our mutual friendship. Farewell."

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

Cicero tarried about two months in Italy, after Cæsar's departure, under continual perplexities, whether to stay or to go; to wait the issue of the Spanish war, or to depart before it; whether to sail to Sicily first, or to Malta, or to Pompey's camp. He resolved, at last, to cross the sea to Pompey; yet, knowing all his motions to be narrowly watched, took pains to conceal his intention, especially from Antony, who resided at this time in his neighbourhood, and kept a strict eye upon him. He sent him word, therefore, by letter, that he had no design against Cæsar; that he remembered his friendship, and his son-in-law Dolabella; that, if he had other thoughts, he could easily have been with Pompey; that his chief reason for retiring was to avoid the uneasiness of appearing in public with the formality of his lictors. But Antony (who saw through his finesse) wrote him a surly answer; which Cicero calls a laconic mandate, and sent a copy of it to Atticus, to let him see, he says, how tyrannically it was drawn.—“How sincere is your way of acting? for he, who has a mind to stand neuter, stays at home; he, who goes abroad, seems to pass a judgment on the one side or the other. But it does not belong to me to determine, whether a man may go abroad or not. Cæsar has imposed this task upon me, not to suffer any man to go out of Italy. Wherefore it signifies nothing to me to approve your resolution, if I have no power to indulge you in it. I would have you write to Cæsar, and ask that favour of him: I do not doubt but you will obtain it, especially since you promise to retain a regard for our friendship.”

403d con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 105.

Ad Att.
10. 10.

Antony, after this letter, he tells us, never came to see him, but sent an excuse, that he was ashamed to do it, because he took him to be angry with him, giving him to understand, at the same time, by Trebatius, that

Ad Att. 10.
12. 15.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

he had special orders to observe his motions.^k In these circumstances, while he was preparing all things for his voyage, and waiting only for a fair wind, he removed from his Cuman to his Pompeian villa beyond Naples, which, not being so commodious for an embarkment, would help to lessen the suspicion of his intended flight.^l He at last stole away on the 11th of June,^m with his son, his brother, and nephew, and arrived safely at Dyr-rachium.ⁿ

^k Cicero, in his letters to Atticus, vents his spleen against Antony. He thus describes his usual equipage in travelling about Italy: "He carries with him in an open chaise the famed actress Cytheris; his wife follows in a second, with seven other close litters full of his whores and boys. See by what base hands we fall; and doubt, if you can, whether Cæsar, let him come vanquished or victorious, will not make cruel work among us at his return." Among Antony's other extravagances, he had the insolence to appear sometimes in public, with his mistress Cytheris, in a chariot drawn by lions. But Cicero tells his friend that, though the beasts were fierce, the master himself was very tame. Pliny gravely reflects on this frolic, and speaks of it as a designed insult on the Roman people, as if, by the emblem of lions, Antony intended to give them to understand, that the fiercest spirits of them would be forced to submit to the yoke. Plutarch also mentions it, but both of them place it after the battle of Pharsalia, though it is evident, from Cicero's letters, that it happened long before. Ad Att. 10. 10. 13. Middl. p. 107.

^l Cicero, ad Att. 10. 12. writes: "I often propose to myself the example of Cælius Caldus." [A consular man of the Marian faction, who raised troops for Marius, when at war with Sylla, and was killed in the attempt to support him.] "Could I find an occasion of imitating him, I would not let it slip.—I perceive the legions, which Cæsar raised in Italy, are very ill affected to him. But he has not a greater foe than he is to himself. You rightly fear his abandoning himself to all excesses, which he certainly will, if he grows desperate. This is the reason why I ought to attempt something in the spirit of a Cælius, but, I hope, with better success." And, in Ep. 15. he says: "The opportunity for executing my project of imitating Cælius ripens every day: if a standard was erected, numbers would flock to it." Now, while he was at his Pompeian villa, his friend Ninnius brought him a message from the officers of the three cohorts, which were in garrison at Pompeii, to beg leave to wait upon him the day following, in order to deliver their troops and the town into his hands; but, instead of listening to the overture, he slipped away the next morning, before day, to avoid seeing them. "I reflected (says he) on the fate of Cælius." Ep. 16. "I do not blame (says Abbé Mongault) his circumspection; but why does he boast so much of his prowess?"

^m According to Usher's computation on the first of April, or thereabout, of the Julian year. Now, if Cicero set out so early in the year, it is not possible that he should have heard any thing of the affairs of Spain, as he certainly did; for it was about harvest-time, when Cæsar forced Pompey's lieutenants to capitulate; and he reduced them to this extremity in forty days, so that he had scarce got into Spain by the month of April of the Julian year. According to our calculation, he sailed about the 15th of May. In a letter dated the 16th of May of the Roman style, ad Att. 10. 17. he writes: "Nunc quidem æquinoctium nos moratur, quod valde perturbatum erat." Abbé Mongault and Mr. Guthrie, deceived by our learned primate, have translated these lines in this sense: "I wait for the equinox, the season of which is now in great confusion." But it is plain that the equinox was passed; "quod perturbatum erat:"—"The equinox, which has been very tempestuous, stops me." In the next letter, dated the 19th of May, he says he is detained by the dead calms more than by the guards that watch him: "Me mirifice tranquillitates adhuc tenuerunt." This description of storms and subsequent calms agrees very well with the month of April, in which, according to our computation, these letters were written, one on the 22d, the other on the 25th.

ⁿ We have no account of the manner and circumstances of his voyage, or by what

To make some amends for his past behaviour, and gain the greater authority with his party, he furnished Pompey, who was in great want of money, with a large sum out of his own stock, for the public service. But he met with nothing but disgust: he was reproached by some for coming so late; and Cato blamed him for coming to them at all, and deserting that neutral post, which might have given him the better opportunity of bringing about an accommodation. Pompey gave him no employment; and his counsels were slighted as timorous and cowardly; so that he soon repented of having embarked in the war, contrary to the advice of his best friends. In this disagreeable situation he resumed his usual way of raillery, and, what he could not dissuade by his authority, endeavoured to make ridiculous by his jests. By this conduct he is said to have provoked Pompey so far, that he told him, "I wish you would go over to the other side, that you may begin to fear us:" and it gave occasion afterward to Antony, in a speech to the senate, to censure the levity of his behaviour in the calamity of a civil war, and to reflect not only upon his fears, but the unseasonableness also of his jokes.^o Having paid this attention to the greatest civil character of his time, let us return to Cæsar, whom we left in his progress to Rome.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Ad Att. 11.
3. 13.

Cæsar, so vigorous in action, so temperate in victory, was now become the object of public admiration all over Italy. The municipal towns in the southern parts, who, the year before, had put up prayers for Pompey's re-

Ad Att. 9.
1. 5. 12.

course he steered towards Dyrrachium: for, after his leaving Italy, all his correspondence with it was in a great measure cut off, so that, from June, in which he sailed, we find an intermission of about nine months in the series of his letters, and not more than four of them written to Atticus during the continuance of the war. Ad Att. 11. 1—4.

^o Some of Cicero's sayings on this occasion are preserved by different writers. When Pompey put him in mind of his coming so late to them: "How can I come late (said he), when I find nothing in readiness among you?" And upon Pompey's asking him sarcastically, where his son-in-law Dolabella was; "He is with your father-in-law," replied he. To a person newly arrived from Italy, and informing them of a strong report at Rome, that Pompey was blocked up by Cæsar; "And you sailed hither therefore (said he), that you might see it with your own eyes." Vid. Macrob. Sat. 2. 3. Plut. in Cic. Middl. p. 116.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Ep. Fam.
8. 16.

Dio, l. 12.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

covery, were now as earnest to shew their zeal for his rival; and he every where received congratulations on his success. The people flocked to Rome, not only those whom particular favours had attached to his person, but those also, who, guided by their interest, thought, with Cœlius, that in civil contentions, when it came to arms, the stronger side was the best, because the safest. Several also of the nobles, of the honest, were more complaisant than Cicero; and did not think it advisable to disregard Cæsar's solicitations: among these were Servius Sulpicius, Volcatius Tullus, and M. Lepidus. The city neither wanted a senate, nor its magistrates, except the consuls: the prætors administered justice as usual; and the ædiles were making preparations for the public games. M. Antony and Q. Cassius, two tribunes of the people, the most zealous in Cæsar's interest, convoked, on his arrival, the senate in the suburbs, that he might be present without the infringement of the laws.

In his harangue to the house, after complaining of the injuries of his enemies, he said, "that he had never affected extraordinary and illegal honours,^p but waited patiently the time prescribed by the laws to solicit for a second consulship. That the people, with the concurrence of the whole college of tribunes, had allowed him to stand candidate, though absent, and that even in the consulship of Pompey; who might have prevented the passing of the decree, if he had disapproved of it; and who could now have no good reason to oppose it. That he had given proof of his moderation, by having voluntarily proposed, that both parties should lay down their

^p Pompey had been habituated to them from his youth, and made haughty and insolent by them: he would bear no equal, and Cæsar did not think himself obliged to acknowledge him for his superior:

"Nec quemquam jam ferre potest Cæsarve priorem,
Pompeiusve parem."—— Lucan.

Sure then Cæsar comes nearer to the commonwealth's man than Pompey. Pompey's no equal has a visible tincture of offensive ambition; while Cæsar's no superior, at most, aspires but to a share in commanding." Cibber, p. 183.

arms ; a measure which would have divested him of his government and command. That the malice of his enemies was such, that they sought to impose terms upon him, to which they would not submit themselves ; choosing rather to involve the state in a civil war, than to part with their armies and provinces. That he had been injured by having two of his legions taken away from him, and that the violation of the authority of the tribunes was oppressive and insolent. That he had frequently made offers of peace, and had often desired an interview ; and that all his efforts for an accommodation and the public good had been ineffectual." Upon all these accounts, he requested and conjured the senate to take the republic under their protection, and to assist him to govern it : and if they declined, he said, through fear, this important charge, he would take it wholly upon himself. He then proposed to send deputies to Pompey to treat of an accommodation. " Nor was he moved (he told them) by a reflection which Pompey had made lately in the house, that to send deputies was to acknowledge the superiority of him to whom they were sent, and a mark of timidity in the sender. This (he said) was a low way of thinking ; and, in the same manner as he had endeavoured at a superiority in action, he would also strive at a superiority in justice and equity." This proposal of a deputation was generally applauded ; but no one was found who would undertake the office : and three days were spent in debates and excuses upon this point. For Pompey had declared, before his departure, that he should look upon those who stayed behind in Rome equally guilty with those who were in Cæsar's camp.⁹

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

⁹ Cicero himself was not very forward to undertake the task of peace-making ; Ad Att. and others might very well be backward : he writes thus to Atticus : " But if Cæsar does not leave me at liberty to stand neuter, you advise me to declare myself publicly a mediator for an accommodation. No danger shall deter me from that : for, surrounded as I am with dangers, act how I will, why not expose myself to that which will do me the most honour ? But I am afraid lest this should gall Pompey, and engage him to give me a very bad reception. For our friend affects strangely the domination of Sylla. I know what I say, and he has never made less a secret of any

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

L. 41.
p. 160.
* About
2l. 10s.

Dio writes, that, having also assembled the people without the city, he harangued in the same strain, and promised to keep up plenty in Rome, by sending corn from Sicily and Sardinia, and to make a donative of 300 sesterces* to each of the poorer citizens; and that, in consequence of these pacific speeches, the Romans resumed the appearance of peace, which they had put off from the taking of Rimini; but were far from being easy. The great number of Cæsar's soldiers in the city; the little confidence to be put in a language which the circumstances of affairs might dictate; and the examples of Marius and Sylla, who had made as fair promises at first; all contributed to excite the anxiety and terror of the more deliberate and thoughtful.

Cæsar, finding that the senate was backward to take any resolution, and that his enemies had engaged Metellus, one of the tribunes, to oppose his designs, was not willing to waste his time to no purpose; and he resolved not to commit the same error his enemies had been guilty of, in leaving behind them the public money. He therefore ordered the treasury to be broke open, and seized the money for his own use. Metellus had the boldness to attempt to obstruct him in this measure; and Cæsar is said to have treated him with unusual roughness; telling him, that it was in vain to talk of laws in the midst of arms; and that he was master, not only of the money, but of the lives of all those whom he had conquered. The tribune, not being intimidated by these terrible words, and persisting in his opposition with the applause of some that were present, Cæsar

thing in his life, than he does of this. If such, say you, are his dispositions, would you follow him? Believe me, my friend, I follow him for the kindnesses he has done me, not as he is the head of a party. I befriend him as I did Milo, as I did —. Then, say you, you disapprove of his cause. No, it is an excellent one: but, remember what I say; he and his party will act scandalously. They will endeavour to starve Rome and Italy, then plunder and burn their country, and seize the properties of monied men.—If Pompey prevails, we will not leave in Italy one stone upon another.” And Ad Att. 9, 10. he says, “What threatenings against our free towns, against some of our patriots in particular, and against all those who stayed behind! How frequent was that saying in Pompey's mouth, ‘Could Sylla do such a thing, and cannot I do it?’”

threatened to kill him, adding, "Young man, consider it is harder for me to say it than to do it." Some people, says Plutarch, yet ventured to represent, that there was in the treasury a sacred fund, not to be employed but under the terror of a Gallic invasion: "I have entirely removed that scruple (replied Cæsar) by subduing the Gauls." He found there, according to Pliny's computation, 25,000 bars of gold, 35,000 of silver, and 40,000,000 of sesterces.^r

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d. con-
sulship.

About
322,916l.

Cæsar left the city immediately after this necessary but unpopular step, and, as Curio told Cicero, much disturbed to see the people disgusted with it. He had resolved to speak to them before he set out, but he durst not venture upon it for fear of some affront: and hurried away much discomposed, having made a stay of only six or seven days.

CHAP. IV.

The reduction of Sardinia by Valerius, of Sicily by Curio, and of Spain by Cæsar.

CÆSAR, before he set out for Spain, committed the care of the city to the prætor L. Æmilius Lepidus, who was afterward triumvir with Antony and Octavius: he appointed Antony to command the forces in Italy, named his brother C. Antonius to the government of Illyricum, and Licinius Crassus to that of Cisalpine Gaul. He also gave orders for the speedy fitting out of two fleets, the one to guard the coasts of the Adriatic, of which he made Dolabella admiral; the other, under the direction of Q. Hortensius,^s the son of the famous orator of that

^r Pliny has also related, lib. 3. 3. that Cæsar took out of the treasury 1,500 pounds of laser of Cyrene, a drug of great value among the ancients, and much esteemed by them, not only for medicinal use, but for sauce. This drug is, however, according to the opinion of an author much to be depended on in these matters, what we now call assafœtida, the taste and smell of which are scarce to be borne. The orientals are to this day very fond of it. Crevier.

Geoffroi
Mat. Med.
t. 2. p. 606.

^s Young Hortensius had been disinherited by his father, who left his great wealth to his wife Marcia. This lady had been married before to Cato, by whom she had several children; and was actually with child when he consented to let his friend have her. When she was a rich widow, Cato took her back again: which gave,

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

name, was to protect those of the Tuscan sea. He set at liberty, at the same time, the unfortunate Aristobulus, formerly king of the Jews, and sent him to Judea, to raise commotions there, and give disturbance to Scipio, who was gone to his province of Syria, to gather forces and money for Pompey.

Valerius and Curio had been appointed at Brundisium to pass over into Sardinia and Sicily; and they now set out with Cæsar for the execution of his orders, in which they met with no opposition. The inhabitants of Callaris, now Cagliari, the principal town in Sardinia, no sooner heard of Valerius's commission, than they drove out Cotta, who commanded there for Pompey, and who, finding the whole island in Cæsar's interest, fled precipitately into Africa.

Cato had been sent into Sicily by Pompey some weeks before he left Italy. On his arrival there, he applied himself with great diligence to gather forces for both the sea and land service. He refitted old ships and caused new ones to be built, and he ordered the several states of the island to furnish him with levies of horse and foot. He also sent his officers to raise troops in Lucania, and the country of the Brutii. But, perceiving that he was not to be supported by Pompey, and must trust entirely to his own strength, he did not think it expedient to defend his province: and, calling his officers together, he complained of Pompey, who, without any previous preparations, had involved the commonwealth in an unnecessary war; and who, when questioned by himself and others, in the senate, had assured them that he was in readiness to sustain it. Having declared, in this manner, his sentiments, he quitted the island on

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

says Plutarch, in Cat. an occasion to Cæsar to reproach him with covetousness and mercenary views. "For (said he) if he wanted a wife, why did he part with her? and, if he did not, why did he take her again? Unless he gave her only as a bait to Hortensius; and lent her when she was young, to have her again when she was rich." This behaviour of Cato did not inspire the young man with any zeal for his and Pompey's cause; and though the father was a pillar of the aristocratical faction, it is no wonder to see the son employed on the popular side.

the approach of Curio. Cicero was much scandalized at this conduct, being persuaded that he might have held his possession without difficulty, and that all honest men would have flocked to him, especially when Pompey's fleet was so near to support him. "I wish (says he) that Cotta may hold out Sardinia, as it is said he will; for, if so, how base will Cato's behaviour appear!" And he cites Curio as being of this opinion, who, he says, confessed, that, if Pompey's fleet had appeared upon the coast and begun to act, he would himself have run away the first.¹

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.
Ad Att. 10.
4. 7. 16.

Cæsar, on his arrival in Gaul, was informed that Pompey had sent Vibullius Rufus into Spain; who, not many days before, had been taken prisoner at Corfinium, and had been set at liberty; that L. Domitius, named by the senate to the government of Gaul, was expected at Marseilles; and that, to prepare the way for his reception, the Massilian deputies in Rome, young men of the first quality, had been sent home by Pompey, before he left the city; and had been exhorted by him to remain in their ancient attachment and fidelity to the senate, and not to suffer the memory of his past services to their country to be blotted out by those they had since received from Cæsar. The inhabitants of Marseilles, in consequence of these remonstrances, had determined to shut their gates against Cæsar, and called to their aid the Albici, a barbarous people, who had long been under their protection, and inhabited the adjoining mountains. They laid in stores of provisions, set up workshops for the making of arms, refitted their navy, repaired their

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

¹ Plutarch in Cat. and Appian de Bell. Civ. l. 2. relate, that Asinius Pollio, having brought over some troops to Messana before Curio's arrival, Cato sent to him to inquire, by whose authority, whether of the senate or the people, he had landed in his province: that Pollio answered, it was by the authority of him who was master in Italy: that Cato at the same time, being informed that Pompey had really sailed for Dyrrachium, said he could easily drive Pollio out of Sicily; but, as greater forces were coming to join him, he would not engage the island in a war; and after complaining, not of Pompey, as Cæsar relates, but of the gods, who gave Pompey success in every foolish and dishonest enterprise, and now abandoned him when he was defending his country, he advised the people of Syracuse to submit to Curio, and provide for their own safety.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Strabo, l. 4.
p. 179.

walls and gates, and neglected nothing to put their town in a state of defence.

The government of the city was aristocratical, the whole power being in the hands of a senate, consisting of 600 nobles, who held their places for life : but out of this number there was formed a council of fifteen for the execution of the laws and dispatch of business. Cæsar sent for these, and exhorted them to follow the example and authority of all Italy, which was now in his interest, rather than the will of one particular person and his adherents. The counsellors, returning into the city, assembled the senate on this important occasion, which sent back the following answer : “ That they saw that the Romans were divided into two parties, and that it did not belong to them to decide the quarrel. That at the head of these parties were Pompey and Cæsar, both patrons of their city ; the first having added to its dominion the country of the Volcæ-Arecomici and Helvii ; the other that of the Salyæ ; and that, as they were equally indebted to both, it did not become them to assist the one against the other ; but to remain in a state of neutrality, and to grant to neither an admittance into their town or port.”

This answer had just been given, when Domitius arrived at Marseilles, with a fleet of seven galleys, which he had manned with the slaves, freedmen, and peasants, who belonged to his lands in Tuscany. He was received, however, into the town, was appointed its governor, and charged with the administration of the war ; and by his order the Massilian fleet was sent out immediately to sail along the coasts, that it might seize and bring in all the merchant-vessels it could find, in order that they might be made fit for service, or taken to pieces to repair others. Cæsar was incensed at these proceedings, and, being sensible of the consequence of leaving behind him in the interest of his enemies a city which was the key of Gaul, he resolved to lay siege to it

directly both by sea and land. He appointed three legions for this purpose, and at the same time that he prepared towers and other works for the approaches by land, he had twelve galleys built at Arles; which, being completed and brought down the Rhone to Marseilles in thirty days, he gave the command of them to Decimus Brutus, and charged C. Trebonius with the conduct of the siege.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

The employment Cæsar found so unexpectedly at Marseilles delayed not his Spanish expedition. While preparations were making for the siege, he sent C. Fabius, with three legions that were quartered near Narbonne, to take possession of the passes of the Pyrenees, which were guarded by a party of Afranius's troops: and this commander, having forced these, advanced by long marches towards the main army. Pompey had three lieutenants in Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro: the first of these was at the head of three legions in the Nearer Spain: the other two, reckoning their new levies, had each two legions. Petreius commanded from the Castilian Forest to the Anas: Varro from the Anas quite through Lusitania and the territories of the Vettones. These lieutenants, upon the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, had consulted together, and agreed, that Petreius should join Afranius with his two legions, and that Varro should remain in Farther Spain and secure that province. They raised with all diligence eighty cohorts among the Spaniards, and 5,000 horse; and determined to make Ilerda the seat of the war, on account of its convenient situation, upon a rising ground, twenty miles from the Iberus, between the rivers Sicoris and Cinga.

Lerida.

Segre.

Cæsar sent after Fabius what other legions he had in Gaul not employed at the siege of Marseilles; which could not be more than two, unless he brought from Italy the three with which he had made himself master of it. To these legions he added 6,000 auxiliary foot, and 3,000 horse, who had served under him in all his

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

former wars; and he was now furnished with as many more. For, having heard that Pompey was coming with his whole force through Mauritania into Spain;^u he sent circular letters to all the Gallic states, inviting by name those of the most known and approved valour, and, in particular, a select body of mountaineers from Aquitania, where it borders upon the Roman province. And to assure himself the better of the fidelity of both officers and soldiers in his army, he borrowed sums of money of all his tribunes and centurions; which he distributed among the soldiers; by that means engaging his officers by their own interest, and the soldiers by his liberality. He soon followed himself, with 900 horse, which he had kept for a body-guard.

Fabius, before Cæsar's arrival, had left nothing unattempted for gaining the country round about to his party by his letters and ambassadors. He had already laid two bridges over the Sicoris, four miles distant from each other, for the convenience of foraging, having consumed all the pasture on his side of the river. Pompey's generals did the same, and with the same view; which occasioned frequent skirmishes between the horse. It happened, one day, that two of Fabius's legions, going out to guard the foragers, according to custom, had passed the river, and, the carriages and cavalry endeavouring to follow after, the bridge broke down on a sudden, and prevented them from joining the foot. This Afranius and Petreius perceiving, by the hurdles and other materials that came swimming down with the stream, immediately detached four legions, with all their cavalry, to attack the two legions. L. Plancus, who commanded the foraging guard, seized a rising ground, and, forming his men in two divisions, posted them back to back, and so made a double front to prevent their being surrounded by the enemy's horse. By this dispo-

^u It was reported at this time in Italy, that Pompey, at the head of a great army, had passed through Illyria into Germany: and this news, says Cicero, is grounded upon indisputable authority. Ad Att. 10. 9.

sition, though inferior in number, he was enabled to sustain the furious charge of the Pompeian legions and cavalry, till the colours of two legions, which Fabius sent over by the farther bridge to the assistance of his party, were descried at a distance. Their approach put an end to the engagement, and both armies returned to their several camps.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Two days after this engagement, Cæsar arrived in the camp:^x and he ordered the bridge that had broke down to be instantly repaired. The next day he took a view of the country, and, leaving six cohorts to guard the bridge and the camp, he marched with the rest of his forces in three lines to Ilerda, and stopped near Afranius's camp, where he remained under arms, and offered him battle on an even ground. Afranius drew out his troops and formed them half way down the hill. Cæsar, finding that he declined an engagement upon equal terms, resolved to encamp within 400 paces of the foot of the mountain; and, to hinder his troops from being alarmed or interrupted in their works by sudden incursions from the enemy, he ordered the soldiers of the third line, while those of the first and second continued in order of battle, to cut a ditch fifteen feet broad behind them, without throwing up a rampart, which would have been perceived by the enemy. Thus the front of his camp was secured by a ditch, before Afranius had the least suspicion of his design to encamp so near him. In the evening he made the legions file off by the two ends of the ditch, and brought them behind it, where he passed the whole night under arms. The day after, he carried his intrenchments quite round the camp: and, because materials for a rampart must have been fetched from a great distance, he contented himself for the present with a naked ditch; allotting a legion to each side of the camp, and keeping the rest of the troops under

^x Cæsar arrived at Marseilles before the end of the month of April: (Ad Att. 10. 10.) and he seems to have reached his army in Spain before the end of the month of May.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

arms to cover those employed in the works. The Pompeian generals came down with their troops as far as the bottom of the mountain, and threatened to give battle.

But Cæsar, trusting to the three legions under arms, and the defence of his ditch, did not call off his workmen; and Afranius, not venturing to come farther into the plain, after a short stay, wheeled off with his men. The third day, Cæsar added a rampart to his fortifications, and sent orders to the cohorts he had left behind to decamp, and come up to him.

Between the city of Ilerda and the hill, where Petreius and Afranius were encamped, there was a plain of about 300 paces; in the midst of which was a rising ground: and Cæsar perceived, that, by the means of this post, it would be easy for him to deprive the enemy of the convenience of their bridge, and their communication with the city, from whence they furnished themselves with all their subsistence. In order to get possession of it, he drew out three legions, and, having formed them in order of battle, commanded the foremost of them to run before and gain the place. Afranius, seeing his design, dispatched, by a nearer way, the cohorts that were upon guard to the same eminence. The fight was sharply maintained on both sides: but Afranius's men, who first got possession, obliged those of Cæsar to give ground; and, being reinforced by fresh supplies, put them at last to the rout, and forced them to fly for shelter to the legions. Cæsar ascribes the advantage which Afranius's troops had over his on this occasion to their manner of fighting. It was their method to come forward briskly against an enemy, and boldly possess themselves of some post; neither taking care to preserve their ranks, nor holding it necessary to fight in a close compact body; and, if they found themselves hard pressed, they thought it no dishonour to retire. In these particulars they followed the example of the Lusitani and the other barbarous nations of Spain. This manner of fighting, as it

was new and unexpected, disordered Cæsar's men, who, seeing the enemy come forward without regard to order, were apprehensive of being surrounded, while they were obliged to maintain their ranks, and not to abandon their ensigns.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cæsar, contrary to his expectation, finding the consternation like to spread through the whole army, encouraged his men, and, leading on himself the ninth legion to the assistance of those that fled, he soon put a stop to the vigorous and insulting pursuit of the enemy, obliged them in their turn to give way, and pursued them to the very walls of Ilerda. But the soldiers, elated with success, and eager to repair the loss they had sustained, followed the runaways, with so much impetuosity, that they were drawn into a disadvantageous place, and found themselves directly under the hill where the town stood; whence, when they endeavoured to retire, the enemy, facing about, charged them vigorously from the higher ground. The hill was rough and steep on each side, and the spot where they stood was so narrow, that only three cohorts could be drawn up in front, which could be neither reinforced in flank nor protected by the cavalry. The enemy's forces increased every moment, fresh cohorts being sent from the camp through the town, to relieve those that were fatigued: and Cæsar was obliged to detach also small parties to maintain the battle, and bring off the wounded.

The fight had lasted five hours, without intermission, when Cæsar's men, pressed by the multitude of the enemy, and having spent their darts, attacked the cohorts on the hill sword in hand, and, bearing down a few, obliged the rest to betake themselves to flight. The pursuit was continued to the very walls of Ilerda, and, a part of the enemy taking shelter within the town, Cæsar's men had an opportunity of making good their retreat. At the same time the cavalry found means to gain the summit of the mountain, and, riding between

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

both armies, hindered the enemy from harassing the rear. Thus the engagement was attended with various turns of fortune; and both sides, of consequence, laid claim to the victory: Cæsar's soldiers, because they had bravely maintained themselves for five hours in a disadvantageous post, and had, at last, driven the enemy into the town; and Afranius's soldiers, because they had kept possession of the hill which had occasioned the battle. The loss on both sides was but inconsiderable for so long and so fierce a contention. Cæsar lost the first centurion of the hastati of the fourteenth legion, with about seventy men: and above 600 were wounded. On the other side were slain five centurions and above 200 soldiers. Afranius, made sensible of the great importance of the disputed post, caused the place to be fortified, and placed in it a strong garrison for its defence.

This engagement was followed, two days after, by an accident, which brought Cæsar's whole army into the greatest distress and danger. A violent storm of rain, and the melted snow from the mountains, made the Sicoris overflow its banks, and break down, in the same day, the two bridges which Fabius had erected over it. Thus Cæsar found himself shut up in a compass of thirty miles, between two rivers, neither of which was fordable. The states that had declared for him could supply him with no provisions: the troops sent beyond the river to forage could not return to the camp; and the convoys he expected from Gaul and Italy could not get to him. It was almost harvest-time, and for that reason corn was become very scarce, and the more so, as Afranius had carried great quantities of it into Ilerda, and the rest had been consumed by Cæsar's troops. The cattle, which were the next resource in the present want, had been removed to a distance by the neighbouring nations, upon the breaking out of the war. The parties sent out to get provisions in the country that lay behind the camp, were perpetually harassed by

the Spanish infantry, who, being accustomed to pass the rivers on blown-up skins, pursued them every where.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

Cæsar endeavoured to repair his bridges, but to no purpose: the river was deep and rapid, and the enemy, stationed along the opposite bank, showered their darts upon the spot where the men attempted to work. While things were in this posture, a large convoy from Gaul arrived on the other bank of the river, at some distance above Cæsar's camp. It consisted of archers from the Rutheni, some Gallic horse, with many carts, and much baggage, and about 6,000 men of all sorts, with their domestics and slaves, who, being apprehensive of no danger, kept no order or discipline in their march. There were, likewise, along with it many young noblemen, senators' sons, and Roman knights, with the deputies from the states of Gaul, and some of Cæsar's lieutenants. Afranius, apprized of their arrival, set out in the night with three legions and all his cavalry; and, sending the horse before, attacked them, when they least expected it. The Gallic squadrons, forming themselves with great expedition, began the fight; and, though few in number, comparatively with the enemy, maintained their ground, and gave the rest of the convoy time to repair to the neighbouring mountains; whither they also retreated, as soon as they saw the legions advancing towards them. They lost only 200 archers, a few troopers, and some servants and baggage.

403d con-
sulship.

This event served to enhance the price of provisions: a calamity inseparable from present scarcity, and the prospect of future want. Corn was sold at fifty denarii a bushel: the soldiers began to lose their strength, and, the evil increasing every moment, Cæsar dismissed all the useless mouths. Afranius, on the contrary, abounded in all things: he had large magazines of corn, was continually receiving fresh supplies, and had plenty of forage.

About
1l. 10s.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

These circumstances were greatly exaggerated by Afranius and Petreius in their letters to Rome, where most people concluding, that the war was almost at an end, made public congratulations to the relations of the two generals on their great success. Many also of the nobility left Italy in order to join Pompey; some to carry the first accounts of this grateful news, others that they might not be so late as to subject themselves to the reproach of having waited for the event of things. Among the rest, Servius Sulpicius and C. Marcellus probably put to sea on this occasion, and, perhaps, Cicero himself; for intelligence of the battle of Ilerda, and of Cæsar's distress, might very well have reached him before the 11th of June.

The joy of Pompey's party was but short. Cæsar, seeing no possibility of repairing the bridges, gave orders for the building some of that sort of vessels, the use whereof he had learned in his British expedition. The keel and ribs of these boats were of light wood, and the rest of osier covered over with leather. When he had got a sufficient number, he sent them by night in wag-gons to a place twenty-two miles distant from his camp. There having embarked a good number of his soldiers, and carried them over the river, he took possession of a hill on the other side; threw up a fortification, and posted a legion in it before the enemy thought of obstructing him: and here, in two days' time, he laid a bridge over the Sicoris, by which means he recovered his foragers, secured the convoy, and opened a passage for future supplies.

The change of fortune was sudden and great. Cæsar being much superior in cavalry, the enemy was now reduced to confine their foraging within the neighbourhood of their camp; and to detach parties for that purpose in the night. Six considerable states^y also declared

^y The Oscenses, Calagurritani, Tarraconenses, Jacetani, Ausetani, and Illurgavonenses.

themselves in his favour, and agreed to furnish him with provisions. A cohort composed from one of them, which served under Afranius, deserted to him upon hearing the resolution of their countrymen. The other provinces more distant, seeing the rumour industriously spread of Pompey's march through Mauritania quite extinguished, renounced also their engagements with Afranius, and besought Cæsar's friendship.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

The bridge over the Sicoris was twenty-two miles from the camp, which obliged the cavalry to take this compass, when they went to forage; and Cæsar, to remedy this inconveniency, undertook to make the river fordable by turning its water into canals, thirty feet deep. When the work was almost completed, Petreius and Afranius, perceiving that they would be soon cut off from their provisions by a cavalry so superior to their own, took the resolution to carry the war into Celtiberia, a province where Pompey's fame was great, and where they expected to make new levies of horse and foot. They proposed by taking possession of some strong post to protract the war till winter. In order to execute this plan, they got together all the boats they could on the Iberus, and carried them to Octogesa, a town upon that river, about twenty miles from their camp. There they caused a bridge of boats to be made; and, having sent two legions over the Sicoris to fortify a camp with a rampart of twelve feet, they prepared to follow with the rest of their army.

Cæsar, informed of this motion by his scouts, laboured day and night at his drains, and lowered the water in the Sicoris to that degree that the cavalry could pass without difficulty; but it still took the infantry up to the shoulders, a depth, which, joined to the rapidity of the stream, seemed to render it impassable to them. On the other side, Afranius, seeing Cæsar's works in such forwardness, and having notice that the bridge over the Iberus was perfected, lost no time, but, leaving two

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d. con-
sulship.

auxiliary cohorts in Ilerda, he crossed the Sicoris with all his forces, and joined the two legions he had sent before. Cæsar had no means of stopping their march, but by harassing them with his cavalry; for he could not send his foot soon enough over his bridge, the distance was so great.

He ordered, therefore, his horse to pass the river, and they soon came up with Afranius, who had decamped at midnight. At break of day their motions were easily descried from the hills near the camp. They pressed extremely the enemy's rear, disordered their ranks, and obliged them to halt: then the cohorts facing about forced the cavalry to give ground; who, as soon as they began to march, renewed the attack. At this sight the legionary soldiers, running up and down the camp, loudly complained, that the enemy would escape, and that the war would be unnecessarily protracted: and they desired their officers to assure Cæsar, that they feared neither danger nor fatigue, and were ready to pass the river as the horse had done. Cæsar, moved by their alacrity, though he saw some danger in exposing his army in a deep and rapid stream, yet resolved to make a trial of the passage. Having first drawn from every company such as were weak of body, he left them with one legion to guard the camp. Then disposing a double line of cavalry above and below the ford, he carried over all his soldiers without the loss of one man. Those, who were borne down by the violence of the current, were saved by the horse below them. Cæsar began the pursuit without delay, marching in three lines; and such was the ardour of the soldiers, that, though they were forced to go six miles about, and had lost a great deal of time in passing the river, they came up with the enemy at three o'clock in the afternoon.

Afranius and Petreius, intimidated by an approach so sudden and unexpected, halted on an eminence, and put their troops in order of battle. Cæsar kept his in

the plain, being unwilling to hazard an action till his army had recovered their fatigue. But, the moment that the two generals began again to move on, he followed: and thus forced them to encamp much sooner than they intended. They took up their quarters in a range of mountains to avoid the insults of the cavalry; and, having placed parties in all the passes to stop Cæsar's progress, hoped by this means to get off safe to the Iberus. This, says Cæsar, was their great object, and what, above all things, they should have endeavoured to effect: but, being fatigued by a long march, and their continual skirmishes with the horse, they imprudently deferred it till the next day. Cæsar likewise encamped on a hill not far from them.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

About midnight, however, Cæsar's cavalry, having picked up some soldiers of the enemy, who had ventured too far from the camp in quest of water, were informed by them that Pompey's lieutenants had altered their resolution, and were decamping in deep silence. Immediately he ordered the alarm to be sounded, and the signal given for marching: which engaged the enemy to delay their retreat, as they would have had greatly the disadvantage in a nocturnal march, both on account of their heavy baggage, and the superiority of Cæsar's cavalry. Next day, Petreius went out with a party of horse to take a view of the country: and Decidius Saxa^a was detached by Cæsar with a squadron for the same purpose. Both made the like report, in their several camps, that the country for five miles together was level and open, but after that rough and mountainous; and that whichever army first got possession of the defiles might easily prevent the other from approaching.

Afranius and Petreius called a council of war to debate whether they should depart that night, or wait till the

^a This Decidius Saxa was afterward advanced by Cæsar to be tribune of the people, at which Cicero was much scandalized. In his thirteenth Philippic he says, "How can I omit this Decidius Saxa, a man brought from the farthest end of the world; whom we see tribune of the people, before we ever saw him a citizen."

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

morning. The greater number were for setting out in the dark, in hopes of reaching the defiles before Cæsar could have notice of their departure. Others argued against the possibility of decamping privately: they mentioned “the alarm given in Cæsar’s camp the night before; and observed, that the enemy’s cavalry were continually patrolling in the night, and had beset all the ways and passes; that a nocturnal engagement was to be avoided, because in a civil war the soldiers were more apt to listen to their fears, than to the obligations of the military oath; that shame, and the presence of the tribunes and centurions, the great instruments of obedience and military duty, could have their proper effect only in the light; and that therefore they should make their attempt by day; in which case, if they received a disaster, or small loss, yet the bulk of the army would escape, and be able to possess themselves of the post in question.” These reasons prevailed, and it was resolved to set out the next morning by break of day.

But Cæsar got the start of them, and marched with his legions as soon as it was light, taking a considerable circuit, and following no particular route: for the direct way to the Iberus by Octogesa lay through the enemy’s camp. He was obliged therefore to lead his men through deep valleys, and over steep rocks, which they could not climb, but by disencumbering themselves of their arms, and returning them afterward to one another. The soldiers, however, in the hopes of putting speedily a period to their labours, went on joyfully. As in this march Cæsar’s army seemed to turn their backs, and pursued at first an opposite course, Afranius’s soldiers, elated with this appearance, came forth from their camp, and insulted them on their supposed flight, imagining that the want of provisions forced them to return to Ilerda. Their generals applauded themselves upon the resolution they had taken of not decamping in the night; and were confirmed in the notion of Cæsar’s retreat, when they

saw that he had neither baggage nor carriages, which made them conclude that the scarcity must be exceeding great. But when they perceived his men soon after turn to the right, and that his advanced guard had already gained the ground beyond their camp, all immediately ran to arms, and, leaving a few cohorts to guard the baggage, they sallied out in a body, pursuing their way directly to the Iberus.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

All depended now upon dispatch. The difficulty of the ways was a great hinderance to Cæsar's troops; but his cavalry in return greatly incommoded the soldiers of Afranius; who, though he should succeed in getting first to the defiles, was yet certain of losing his baggage, and the cohorts which were left to guard it in the camp. But Cæsar outmarched him, such was the vigour and alacrity of his men; and, having got into the plain beyond the rocks, formed his legions in order of battle. The two generals, perceiving the enemy's infantry in front, and being attacked by his cavalry in their rear, halted upon a rising ground, from whence they detached four Spanish cohorts to take possession of the highest mountain that appeared in sight; thinking to open to themselves a way over the hills to Octogesa. The Spaniards, wheeling obliquely to take possession of the place, were perceived by Cæsar's cavalry, who, charging them furiously, broke them at the first onset, and surrounded and cut them to pieces in the view of both armies.

Cæsar had now a most favourable opportunity of giving his enemy a total overthrow; and he was sensible they could make but a faint resistance under their present consternation, surrounded on all sides as they were by his cavalry, and obliged to fight on an open and even ground. His officers, gathering round him, earnestly begged that he would not delay the engagement: they represented, "that the soldiers were eager for a battle, and that Afranius's army had given many marks of fear:

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

for they had neither dared to support their own detachment, nor come down the hill: and they had brought all their ensigns into one place, where they crowded confusedly round them, without observing rank or order." They added, "that, if he thought the enemy too advantageously posted, he would soon have an opportunity of attacking them in another place more favourable, the want of water laying them under a necessity of changing their camp." But Cæsar having cut them off from all provisions, was confident that he had it now in his power to reduce them without bloodshed: and he thought it better to gain the victory by his conduct, than by the force of arms. He therefore retired to a small distance, to give Afranius an opportunity to regain his camp: and then, placing troops in the mountains to guard all the passages to the Iberus, he lodged himself as near as he could to the enemy.

The next day, while Pompey's lieutenants were in council debating what measures they should follow, whether to return to Ilerda, or march to Tarraco, notice was given them, that Cæsar's cavalry had fallen upon the parties sent out in quest of water, and pressed them hard. Upon this intelligence, which called for all their attention, they immediately formed several corps of horse and foot intermixed with legionary cohorts, and began to throw up a rampart from the camp to the place where they watered. Afranius and Petreius divided this work between them, and went in person to direct it.

In the meantime, the soldiers of the two armies had an opportunity of conferring together; and those who belonged to Afranius and Petreius thanked Cæsar's troops for the generosity they had shewed in sparing them the day before, and testified their concern at being obliged to fight with their countrymen and relations. They then inquired, if they could trust to Cæsar's clemency, and even promised to join him, if the lives of

Petreius and Afranius were granted them : and they sent some of their principal officers to treat with Cæsar. These preliminaries being settled, the soldiers of both armies went to one another's tents, and a great number of centurions and military tribunes came to pay their court to Cæsar, and to beg his protection. The Spanish chiefs, who had been summoned to attend upon Afranius, and were detained in the camp as hostages, followed their example. Things were carried to such a length, that Afranius's son, a young man, treated with Cæsar, by the mediation of Sulpicius, for his own and his father's preservation. The joy was general; the Afranians thought themselves happy to have escaped such imminent danger; and the Cæsarians to have brought to a happy conclusion so important an enterprise without striking a blow. Cæsar, in the judgment of all, was upon the point of reaping the fruits of his clemency, and all unanimously applauded his late conduct.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Afranius, informed of what was transacting, quitted the work he was engaged in, and returned to the camp, not at all disturbed, and prepared for all events : but Petreius discovered a very different spirit. He armed his slaves, and joining to them a prætorian cohort and some Spanish cavalry, he flew to the rampart, and broke off the conferences of the soldiers, drove Cæsar's men out of the camp, and put all of them he could find to the sword. Those of them who had an opportunity to rally, wrapping their cloaks round their left arms, drew their swords; and, trusting to the nearness of their camp, defended themselves till they gradually retreated to the advanced guard, who screened them from any farther pursuit.

Then Petreius went through the whole camp, begging the troops, with tears in his eyes, to have pity on him and on Pompey their general, and not to deliver them up to the cruel vengeance of their enemies. The

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

soldiers followed him to the head-quarters ; and there he proposed to them to bind themselves by a new oath, not to abandon their commanders, nor to act separately, but with concert and unanimity for the public good. He himself took the oath first, then tendered it to Afranius, then to the military tribunes and centurions ; and, lastly, to all the companies of the army. At the same time an order was issued, that all who had any of Cæsar's troops in their tents should produce them, in order that they might be put to death in the sight of the whole army. A few obeyed ; but the greatest part, detesting this bloody decree, carefully concealed those who were under their protection, and procured them means to escape in the night. However, the terror impressed upon them by their generals, the severity shewn in punishing, and the new oath they had been obliged to take, defeated, for the present, all hopes of a surrender, and reduced the war to its former state. Cæsar, on his side, ordered diligent search to be made after the Afranians who had remained in his camp, and carefully sent them back. Some officers chose to stay with him ; and these he afterward treated with great distinction, promoting them to higher ranks, and honouring such of them as were Roman knights with the office of military tribune.

The army of Afranius had now no forage, and could not water but with much difficulty. The legionary soldiers, who had been ordered to take with them two-and-twenty days' provision, had some corn remaining : but the Spanish infantry and auxiliary troops had none : and, having no opportunity of supplying themselves, they deserted in great numbers to Cæsar. In this extremity, the expedient of returning to Ilerda appeared the safest, as they had still some provisions in that city ; and there they proposed to consult concerning the future management of the war. Tarraco was at a greater distance, and they would of consequence be exposed to greater hazards in the way. This resolution being taken, they de-

camped; and Cæsar followed, sending his cavalry before, which perpetually harassed the rear of the enemy. The manner of fighting was thus: some light-armed cohorts formed the rear-guard of Afranius's army; and these, where the ground was even, halted from time to time, and made head against the cavalry. When they fell in with an eminence, the very nature of the ground furnished them with the means of defending themselves; because those who were foremost could protect those who followed. When they came, however, to a descent, the van could give no assistance to the rear, and the cavalry annoyed them with their darts. To avoid this inconveniency, the legions halted, and, driving back the cavalry a good way, ran down the hill precipitately, and traversed the valley until they came to the opposite eminence. Their cavalry, which should have been of great use in this retreat, and of which they had a considerable number, were so terrified by their ill success in former engagements, that they had been placed in the midst of the army, in order to be defended by the infantry; and, if any of them dared to straggle out of this situation, they were immediately taken by Cæsar's horse.

During these perpetual skirmishes, in which the Afranians were often obliged to stop to disengage the rear, their march could not but be very slow. After advancing four miles, finding themselves hard pressed by the cavalry, they halted on an eminence, and drew a line before them, as if they meant to encamp; but did not unload their baggage: and when they saw that Cæsar had marked out his camp, pitched his tents, and sent his cavalry to forage, they suddenly, towards noon, resumed their march, hoping to be rid of the cavalry for some time. Cæsar, leaving a few cohorts to guard his baggage, followed with his legions, and sent orders for his cavalry to return with all speed. The cavalry observed his orders, and, coming up with the enemy be-

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

fore the close of day, fell upon their rear with such impetuosity that it was almost put to the rout. A great number of soldiers, and some centurions, lost their lives.

At the same time Cæsar appearing with his whole army, the enemy were threatened with a total overthrow, as they could neither continue their march, nor look out for a proper place for a camp. They were forced to halt in a very disadvantageous ground, and at a distance from water. Cæsar, constant in his purpose, did not offer to attack them, but kept all his troops under arms to be in readiness to pursue, if they should attempt to escape either in the day or night. Pompey's lieutenants, sensible of the disadvantage of their situation, employed the whole night in throwing up intrenchments, and in disposing their camp with an opposite front to Cæsar's army. The next day they continued at their works, and laboured from sunrise to the evening. But the farther they extended their lines in order to better their position, the farther they removed from water: and thus, to avoid one inconveniency, they fell into a greater. Cæsar, who wanted to oblige them to capitulate, by reducing them to extreme necessity, drew lines round their camp; and by this method he offered an obstruction to any sallies or eruptions which they might make. The scarcity of forage, and the view of performing their march with the greater expedition, soon induced them to kill all the beasts of burden which they could not feed: and two days were wasted in forming and executing this resolution. But, on the third, Afranius and Petreius, seeing Cæsar's works very much advanced, and being apprehensive of the consequences, drew all their forces out of the camp, and formed them in order of battle. Cæsar, aware of the hurt it might do his reputation, if, contrary to the inclination of his troops, and the general expectation, he still continued to decline an engagement, called in his workmen, assembled his cavalry, and put his army in a condition to receive them.

He resolved, however, to remain upon the defensive ; and the rather, because the distance between the two camps was so small, being only 2,000 feet, that, should he put the enemy to the rout, he could not flatter himself with the hopes of a complete victory.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Afranius's troops were ranged in a double line, consisting of five legions : the Spanish cohorts, which used to be stationed in the wings, formed the body of reserve. Cæsar's legions were drawn up in three lines : the first consisted of twenty cohorts, four out of each of his legions ; the second of fifteen cohorts, three out of each legion ; and the third of the same number. The archers and slingers were disposed in the middle, and the cavalry in the two wings. The army being drawn up in this manner, each general kept firm to his resolution ; Cæsar, not to engage unless forced to it ; and Afranius to prevent the progress of Cæsar's works. In this posture they continued till sunset, when both armies returned to their several camps. The next day Cæsar proposed to finish his lines ; and Pompey's lieutenants endeavoured to find a fordable place in the Sicoris ; but Cæsar had taken his measures against this attempt, and had sent his light-armed Germans with part of his cavalry over the river, and posted bodies of troops along the banks at a small distance from one another.

The two generals, having now no hope left, and being in want of wood, water, and corn, they demanded a parley, and begged that it might be in some place out of the sight of the soldiers. Cæsar consented to an interview, but the latter part of their request was denied them : and Afranius, having first given his son for an hostage, met Cæsar in the presence of both armies. He addressed them to this effect, with all possible marks of submission : “ That it was no just matter to blame, either in him or his soldiers, to have preserved their fidelity to their general, Pompey ; but that they had now sufficiently acquitted themselves of their duty, and suf-

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

ferred enough in his cause by the want of all kinds of necessities : that, like wild beasts caught in a toil, they were deprived of the most common enjoyments ; having their bodies oppressed with want, and their minds overwhelmed with ignominy ; and that therefore they acknowledged themselves to be vanquished, and besought and conjured him not to make a rigorous use of his victory, but to spare the lives of his unhappy countrymen." Cæsar replied, " That Afranius, of all men, had the least reason to complain of his present unfortunate situation, and the least pretensions to any favour ; for that every one else had performed their duty ; he himself, in declining to attack his army, though favoured by the advantages of time and place, in order that the way might be open to an accommodation : his army, in returning unhurt the men that were in their power, after injuries received, and the massacre of their comrades : and even Afranius's own troops, in endeavouring to conclude a peace whereon the common safety depended. That thus, when all orders had shewn an inclination to treat, Afranius and Petreius alone had opposed the steps to an accommodation ; refusing an interview, and barbarously murdering those whom the faith of a conference had enticed into their camp. That it had therefore happened to them, as it often happens to men of obstinacy and arrogance : and they were forced to have recourse to prayers, and earnestly to solicit the same terms which they had rejected with scorn. That he would not, however, take advantage of their present submission, or the favourable circumstances he was in, to insist upon any thing tending to the increase of his power : and that he only requested they would disband those troops which had been so long kept on foot against him : for, with what other view (he said) had six legions been sent into Spain ; a seventh levied there ; so many powerful navies equipped ; and so many able and experienced officers sent over ? That such mighty preparations could not be

meant against Spain, or to supply the want of a province, which, having enjoyed a long peace, had no occasion for such extraordinary forces: that their real end was his destruction; to effect which, a new species of power had been introduced into the commonwealth; and that, on this account, the same man had been appointed to command in Italy at the gates of Rome, and to hold for so many years, though absent, the government of the two most potent provinces of the republic. That, for this reason alone, the magistrates had been stripped of their prerogatives, the consuls and prætors not being suffered, as had been always the custom, to take the different provinces at the expiration of their offices; and particular governors were appointed by the choice and management of a faction. That, for this reason alone, he had been denied that justice which had never been refused to any general before him; and was not allowed to disband his army, and to return home with honour; or, at least, without ignominy, after having successfully served the public. That all these injuries he had hitherto borne, and still resolved to bear with patience; that it was not now his design to take from Afranius his soldiers, and to enlist them in his own service, which it would be easy for him to do; and that he only meant to prevent their being employed against him. That, therefore, Afranius must quit Spain, and disband his forces; that this was his determined resolution: and that these were the only terms of peace he would grant."

These conditions were very agreeable to Afranius's soldiers; who, instead of being punished, as they feared, were, in some sort, rewarded by the discharge procured them. They plainly shewed their satisfaction: for, while the place and time of their dismissal were under debate between Cæsar and Afranius, they signified by their gestures and cries from the rampart, that they desired to be immediately disbanded. After some discussion, it was determined that those who had houses and posses-

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

* The Var.

sions in Spain should be discharged upon the spot, and the rest, when they arrived at the Varus,* a river between Gaul and Italy. And Cæsar declared, that no person should be injured or forced into his service: and that all those who had lost any thing during the war should be indemnified. He also engaged to furnish them with corn till they got to the Varus. By this generous behaviour, he acquired the confidence of Pompey's army to such a degree, that he became the arbiter of all their disputes, either among themselves, or with their commanders: and when they were ready to mutiny about their pay, which Petreius and Afranius affirmed not to be yet due, the matter was referred to him, and he determined it to the equal satisfaction of both parties. One third of the army was disbanded during the two days they continued in their camp: the rest set out for the Varus, two of Cæsar's legions marching before, and the others following after, and encamping near them. Q. Fusius Calenus, one of Cæsar's lieutenants, presided over the march; and, when he arrived at the Varus, disbanded them; but the greatest part of them came over voluntarily to Cæsar: the two generals went to find out Pompey.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.

Thus did Cæsar, within forty days from his arrival in Spain, with five legions, and some auxiliary Gauls, reduce an army of five legions of veterans, eighty cohorts of Spaniards, and 5,000 horse: and now many reasons called upon him to return into Italy; but he did not think it advisable to leave Spain, till he had subjected the whole country to his obedience. M. Varro commanded two legions in Farther Spain, to which he had added thirty auxiliary cohorts: and he had formed great magazines of corn, not only for his own use, but with a view also of supplying Marseilles, and the army under Afranius and Petreius. The Gaditani had been ordered to furnish him with ten ships of war, and more had been built at Hispalis. He had put all his provisions into

The people
of Cadiz.

Seville.

Gades,* and had conveyed thither all the money and ornaments which he had found in the temple of Hercules: and, to guard this town, he gave it a garrison of six cohorts, under the command of C. Gallonius, a Roman knight. This commander had spoken upon every occasion with contempt of Cæsar's forces, and had frequently declared from his tribunal, that Cæsar had been worsted, and that his soldiers had gone over to Afranius. By these arts, he had struck such a terror into the Roman citizens who resided in his province, that he engaged them to promise him 190,000 sesterces, 20,000 weight of silver, with 120,000 bushels of wheat. The states well affected to Cæsar he loaded with heavy impositions, and quartered soldiers upon them: he harassed private men whom he thought averse to his cause with arbitrary judgments: he confiscated the estates of many, whom he accused of having spoken against what he called the commonwealth: and he obliged the whole province to take an oath of fidelity to himself and Pompey. Cæsar, who seems to give an account of this general's behaviour with a particular resentment, tells us, that in the beginning of the civil war, while his affairs went on successfully in Italy, Varro^a had affected to speak of him with great regard, and in a most friendly manner, saying, "That, indeed, he was under particular obligations to Pompey, who had made him his lieutenant, but at the same time was greatly indebted to Cæsar: that he was not ignorant of the duty of an officer employed by his general in an office of trust; but that he likewise knew his own weakness, and the attachment of the whole province to Cæsar." When he understood, however, that Cæsar was stopped by the siege of Marseilles; that Afranius and Petreius had executed the junction of their troops, which they had considerably increased; and that all Hither Spain had unanimously declared to support

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

* Cadiz.

^a He was probably the learned Varro, who had also served under Pompey in the war against the pirates.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cordova.

them ; he changed his behaviour and speech. Varro, therefore, having committed so many acts of hostility, resolved to persist in his measures, and prepare for war : and, being sensible that the whole province was in Cæsar's interest, he determined to shut himself up in Gades, where all his provisions and shipping lay ; hoping, by the strength of the town, which is an island surrounded by the sea, and with the help of his fleet, to draw out the war into length.

Cæsar sent against him Q. Cassius, tribune of the people, with two legions ; and he himself set out by great journeys at the head of 600 horse, for Corduba, whither he summoned the magistrates of the different states. All obeyed : every city sent its deputies, nor was there a Roman citizen of any note who did not repair to him. The senate of Corduba shut their gates against Varro, stationed guards and centinels along the walls, and detained two cohorts, called *Colonicæ*, which were accidentally marching that way, that they might serve to protect the town. At the same time, the people of Carmona drove out of their city, which is the most considerable in the whole province, three cohorts which Varro had left there, and shut their gates against them.

The apparent affection of the province for Cæsar determined Varro to make all possible dispatch to reach Gades before his march could be intercepted. But he had advanced but a little way, when he received letters, informing him, “ That, as soon as Cæsar's edict was known, the principal men of the town had conspired with the tribunes of the garrison to drive out Gallonius, and deliver up the city and island to Cæsar ; that, this agreement being made, they had warned Gallonius to retire of his own accord ; threatening, if he refused to comply voluntarily, to force him to it : and that this commander, terrified by so general a revolt, had thought proper to leave Gades.” Upon this intelligence, one of the legions, called *Vernacula*, took up their ensigns in

Varro's presence, quitted the camp, and marched directly to Hispalis, where they sat down in the market-place, without committing the least act of violence; a circumstance which so wrought upon the Roman citizens residing in the town, that every one was desirous of accommodating them in their houses. Varro, astonished and confounded at these proceedings, turned back with design to reach Italica, but was informed that its gates were shut. At last, finding himself surrounded on all sides, and the ways every where beset, he wrote to Cæsar, that he was ready to resign the legion under his command to whomsoever he would appoint to receive it. Cæsar sent Sextus Cæsar to take the command: and Varro, having delivered up the legion accordingly, came to him at Corduba; where, after giving an account of the state of the province, he faithfully resigned all the public money he had in his hands, and informed him of the quantity of corn and shipping he had prepared.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cæsar, in the assembly of the states at Corduba, having returned thanks to all those who had declared in his favour, remitted the tribute imposed by Varro upon the Roman citizens; restored their estates to those who had been deprived of them for speaking freely their thoughts; distributed rewards to a great many in public and private; gave all hopes to receive the like favours hereafter; and, after a stay of two days, went to Gades; where he restored to the temple of Hercules all the treasures and ornaments it had been spoiled of, and soon after procured this city the freedom of Rome. And, having committed the government of the province to Q. Cassius, with the command of four legions, he embarked for Terraco, on board the fleet which Varro had obliged the Gaditani to equip. There he found the deputies of all Nether Spain; and having, in like manner as at Corduba, thanked and rewarded them, both publicly and privately, he went by land to Narbonne, and so to the siege of Marseilles.

CHAP. V.

The siege of Marseilles. Caius Antonius and Dolabella, Cæsar's lieutenants in Illyricum, are defeated by M. Octavius and Scribonius Libo. Curio's unfortunate expedition into Africa.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. 1. 1.

WHILE Cæsar was employed in reducing Spain, C. Trebonius and D. Brutus had carried on the siege of Marseilles with great vigour; and the inhabitants had bravely defended themselves. The town of Marseilles was formerly washed by the sea on three sides; it could be approached by land only on the fourth; and the citadel, being very strong by nature, because of a deep valley that ran before it, required a long and difficult siege.^b It was of great importance to the besieged to command the sea: and, to beat off Brutus's fleet, they equipped seventeen galleys. To these they added a great number of smaller vessels, filled with archers and the mountaineers whom they had engaged in their service; and on board of which, Domitius put also his own domestics whom he had brought with him from Italy. With this force they sailed out to give battle to Brutus, who lay at anchor at an island over-against the town. His fleet was much inferior to that of the Massilians in the number of ships; but Cæsar had manned it with his best soldiers, chosen out of all the legions, and headed by centurions of distinguished bravery; and he had provided it with hooks and grappling irons, and offensive weapons of all sorts. Upon the first notice of the approach of the enemy, Brutus stood out to sea. The conflict was sharp and vigorous; for the mountaineers, a hardy race, habituated to arms, and trained up to war, yielded little in point of valour to the Romans. Domitius's vassals were animated with the hopes of liberty; and, fighting under the eye of their master, behaved gallantly. The townsmen

^b From this description it appears, says M. D'Anville, that the town did not then stand upon the same extent of ground as now: it only covered a triangle formed on one side by the port, and on the other by the coast of the great sea: whereas now it is built round the port. Notice de l'Ancienne Gaul, p. 440.

confided in the nimbleness of their ships and the skill of their pilots, and employed all their art to elude the shock of Brutus's vessels, and to baffle all their attempts. The enemy extended their line of battle in order to surround his fleet, or attack his ships singly with a number of theirs, or in running alongside, to sweep away a range of oars. When they were compelled to come to a closer engagement, they relied wholly on the bravery of their mountaineers and the Italian peasants. Brutus's fleet was but indifferently provided with rowers and pilots, who had been hastily taken out of some merchant-ships, and knew not so much as the names of the tackle. They were incommoded too by the weight and lumpishness of their vessels, which, being built with too much expedition and of unseasoned timber, were not so ready at tacking about. When an opportunity, however, offered of coming to close fight, they would boldly get between two of the enemy's ships ; and grappling them with their hooks, charge them on each side, board them, and cut to pieces the mountaineers and peasants who defended them. In this manner, they sunk part of the Massilian vessels, took some, with all the men on board, and drove the rest into the haven.

This loss was repaired with all possible expedition. The Massilians drew out of their docks, and rigged as many old ships as they had lost ; they also prepared a number of fishing barks, which they filled with archers and engines ; and thus they were in readiness to sail upon the first occasion. Pompey, who was sensible of what importance it was to keep Cæsar employed in these parts, sent L. Nasidius to the succour of Marseilles, with a fleet of sixteen ships, some of which were very strong, and armed with beaks of brass. This fleet passed the straits of Sicily unknown to Curio, and, in their way, put in at Messina, where their unexpected arrival caused so great a terror, that the town was deserted by the senate and the principal inhabitants : and Nasidius, enter-

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 2.

Messina.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

* Taurenti,
on the right
side of the
bay of Cio-
tat.

ing the harbour without any opposition, drew out one of the galleys, which he joined to his fleet. The Massilians, informed of his arrival, sailed out a second time to try their fortune, and rendezvoused at Taurentum,* a castle belonging to the town, where Nasidius lay with his whole squadron.

Brutus went to fight them with his fleet, which he had considerably increased by six ships which he had taken in the late action. The battle was maintained on both sides with determined courage. The Massilians had put on board their ships the choice of their youth, and the most considerable men of the city; who were all convinced, that on the issue of that day's engagement depended the safety and preservation of their country. But Nasidius was of no service to them: he left them during the engagement, and retired without hurt to the coast of Spain. Brutus obtained a second victory, having sunk five, and taken four of the enemy's ships.

These disasters at sea disheartened not the inhabitants of the town: they continued to defend themselves by land against Trebonius with great courage. This commander had attacked them in two places; on the side of the port where the docks were; and on the side towards the sea, near the mouth of the Rhone: and, having been furnished from all parts of the province with a great number of workmen and carriages, and with wood and other materials, he had greatly advanced his works. But so well was the town stored with all engines necessary for its defence, that no mantelets of osier were sufficient to withstand their violence. Their balistæ shot wooden beams, twelve feet in length, and armed with iron, with such force, that, after they had pierced four rows of hurdles, they entered a considerable way into the earth. To resist the violence of these machines, the besiegers were obliged to roof their galleries with pieces of wood of a foot in thickness, strongly compacted together. Under this cover the materials necessary for

raising the mount or terrass, which was to be opposed to the town wall, were conveyed; and a tortoise, sixty feet long, composed of strong beams, and every thing necessary to defend it against fire and stones, was carried before to level the ground. But, in spite of all endeavours, and the greatness of the works employed against them, the height of their wall and towers, and multitude of their machines, retarded the approaches of the besiegers. Besides, the mountaineers made frequent sallies, which greatly annoyed the workmen.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

The legionaries, who had the charge of the works on the right, perceived that a tower of brick, built at a little distance from the walls, would be of great service to shelter them from the frequent sallies of the enemy. At first they made it very low and small; and it served chiefly as a place of retreat, when they were repulsed. But they soon perceived that it would be of much more use if it were raised to a greater height. This they effected in the following manner: the tower was of a square form, thirty feet every way, allowing for the thickness of the walls, which was five feet. When it was raised to the height of one story, they laid a floor over it, the extremities of whose beams were concealed in the thickness of the wall, that they might not, by appearing on the outside, be liable to be set on fire. Then the wall was continued directly upwards as far as their mantelets would permit: and two beams were laid across each other, the ends of which almost reached the angles of the wall. These were for supporting the floor, which was to serve as a roof to the tower. Over these beams they placed the joists of the roof, and covered them with planks. These joists projected a little beyond the wall, in order to suspend from them what might be necessary to shelter the workmen. This floor they paved with tiles and mortar, to render it proof against fire; and it had besides a covering of mattresses to break the force of the darts and stones which might

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

be thrown against it by the enemy. At the same time, they hung from the beams of this roof, that projected beyond the wall, curtains, made of strong cables, woven to the depth of four feet, and which went round the three sides of the tower which were exposed to the engines; having formerly experienced, that this kind of cover was impenetrable to any dart or engine whatever. When the roof with its curtains was thus prepared, they removed the mantelets, and elevated the roof from the first story as far as the curtains would permit. Then, secure from all insult, they laboured at the brick wall: and, when they had raised it to the height of a second story, they again screwed up the roof; and under its defence, and of the curtains hanging from it, they continued the work, and laid the interjacent floors. In this manner they proceeded till they had completed six stories, leaving always holes in convenient places from which they could play their engines.

When, by means of this tower, they thought they had sufficiently provided for the security of the works around it, they undertook to build a moveable gallery, sixty feet long, of timber two feet in thickness, to extend from their brick tower to the walls of the town. The gallery they constructed in this manner: two beams of equal length were first laid upon the ground at the distance of four feet from one another: and upon these were erected pillars, five feet high, joined at the top by pieces of wood designed to support the roof of the gallery. Over these were placed rafters two feet square, fastened strongly with nails and plates of iron. The upper part of the roof was composed of square laths, four inches thick, to bear the weight of the tiles that were to be laid upon them; and a covering of hides was thrown over it to hinder the cement from being washed away by spouts of water. Over all were laid strong mattresses to screen the hides from fire and stones. This work was finished close by the brick for-

tress, under cover of four mantelets, and immediately carried forward upon rollers, till it unexpectedly reached the very tower of the enemy.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

The besieged, astonished at so threatening and unlooked-for a machine, pushed forward with levers the largest stones they could find, and tumbled them upon it. But the strength of the wood resisted their weight and violence, so that they fell to the ground without doing any hurt. Observing this, they poured down barrels of burning pitch and other combustible matter. But these likewise rolled along the roof without damage, and falling to the ground, were thrust away from the works with forks and long poles. Meanwhile the soldiers, under the protection of this gallery, were endeavouring to undermine the enemy's fortress; the gallery itself was defended by the brick tower, whence the engines played without intermission, insomuch that the enemy, driven from their battlements, were at last obliged to abandon their defence. By degrees the tower being undermined, part of it fell down, and the rest was so shaken that it could not stand long.

403d consulship.

The Massilians, dismayed, and dreading the plunder and devastation of their city, came out in the habit of supplicants, and besought the compassion of the army and generals, earnestly requesting that all farther operations should be suspended till Cæsar's arrival. They told them, "That, their tower being destroyed, they were sensible the city could hold out no longer; and therefore meant not to defend it. That in the meantime, no prejudice could arise to the besiegers from a short respite, because, if they refused to submit upon Cæsar's coming, he would have it in his power to treat them as he pleased." They added, "that, if the whole tower should be broken down, it would be impossible to hinder the soldiers from yielding to the desire of plunder, by breaking into and pillaging the town." Cæsar had earnestly recommended to Trebonius, by letter,

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

to prevent, if possible, the city's being taken by storm, lest the soldiers, irritated by its obstinate resistance, should put all the youth to the sword, which they threatened to do. The request of the Massilians was therefore complied with, though the soldiers murmured at the delay of a conquest which they looked upon as easy and certain.

But the Massilians were insincere, and aimed at nothing in all this, but to find a time and opportunity to deceive the Romans, and put in practice the perfidious design they had formed. For, after a few days, they suddenly sallied from the town, and, the wind being favourable, they set fire to the enemy's works. The flame, in a moment, spread itself on all sides, and the terrass, the mantelets, the tortoise, and the tower, with its machines, were entirely consumed, before it was possible to discover whence the disaster arose. The Romans ran immediately to their arms, every one taking what came first to his hands; and flew from the camp to their works, where they attacked the enemy with great fierceness; but their ardour was checked by the arrows and darts poured in upon them from the town. The besieged, now secure under their walls, destroyed without difficulty the brick tower, and the gallery connected with it. Next day, being favoured by the same wind, they attacked, with still greater assurance, another tower and terrass of the other attack. But Cæsar's lieutenant, grown wise by his late misfortune, had made all necessary preparations for their defence: so that the enemy, after losing many men, were obliged to retreat into the city without effecting their purpose.

Trebonius immediately resolved to repair his loss, and he was warmly seconded by his soldiers, who were greatly provoked to see their credulity had been abused, and that they were the jest of a perfidious enemy. All the wood in the neighbourhood of Marseilles had been already cut down: they were therefore obliged to raise

a terrass of a new kind, and such as history no where mentions before that time. They erected two walls of brick, each six feet thick, and of the same distance from each other with those of the former terrass. Over these they laid a covering which was supported by beams laid across: and, to make it firm, they placed pillars underneath between the walls. Hurdles, with brick and earth intermixed, served to make it proof against fire. The soldiers, thus sheltered over head, on the right and left by the walls, and before by mantelets, brought without danger the necessary materials for carrying on the works: and, by the eagerness with which they laboured, soon completed them; leaving doors at convenient places, from which they might sally out upon occasion.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

The townsmen seeing that the Romans had repaired in a few days what they imagined must have cost them the labour of many months; that there was no hope left either of deceiving them, or sallying out upon them with success; that all the approaches to the city by land might in like manner be shut up by a wall and towers, so as to render it impossible for them to appear upon their battlements; that they could neither discharge their javelins to any effect, nor make use of their engines, in which their principal hope lay; and that they were now reduced to the necessity of fighting upon equal terms; they were forced to have recourse again to the same conditions of truce they had so ill deserved before; and, on Cæsar's arrival, having no prospect of relief, they surrendered at discretion. Domitius, some days before, took the opportunity of a storm to sail out of the harbour with three vessels. They were chased by Brutus's ships, which kept constantly at anchor in the road, or before the port: and two of the three were obliged to return back, but that which carried Domitius made its escape. Cæsar spared the town, he says, more in regard to its antiquity and reputation, than to any real merit it could plead. He obliged the

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 2.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

citizens, however, to deliver up their arms, machines, and ships of war, to surrender all the money in their treasury, and to receive a garrison of two legions. The rest of his army he sent into Italy, and he himself set out for Rome.^c

Cæsar's arms were not equally successful when conducted by his lieutenants. "Fortune (says Florus) ventured to do something in Illyricum and Africa, against the absent general: but it was as if she meant, by some dark shades of adversity, to heighten the splendour of his own exploits." We have but few particulars of what passed in Illyricum, Cæsar's account being lost. We may gather from the historians, particularly Florus, that Dolabella and Antonius were suddenly surrounded by a superior number of men from Pompey's fleets, commanded by M. Octavius and Scribonius Libo: and that C. Antonius was obliged, for want of provisions, to surrender himself prisoner, with fifteen cohorts, in the island of Corcyra, off the coast of Dalmatia. An expression of Cæsar informs us, that the loss of the army was occasioned by the perfidy of Pulcio, one of his officers. Some of the troops attempted to escape in small flat-bottomed boats; but were stopped by a contrivance of the Cilician marines in Pompey's fleet. These had formed nets made of twisted ropes and chains, and extended them from rock to rock under water. However, of three boats, two got off by the working of the sea, but the third, filled with soldiers from a town beyond the Po, called Opitergium, could not be disengaged. It was surrounded on all sides: and the soldiers, after having defended themselves for a whole day, chose, in the night, at the instigation of one of their officers, to turn their swords against one another, and mutually kill themselves to the last man, rather than surrender to the enemy.

Oderzo.

^c Pompey, and the senate in his camp, to reward, in some manner, the fidelity of the town of Marseilles, gave the rights and privileges of a free city to Phocæa in Ionia, which was the mother-town of Marseilles. Dio.

The cause of Cæsar's loss in Africa was the rashness of Curio. This commander, who had conceived the highest contempt for the troops headed by Attius Varus, sailed from Sicily into Africa, with only two of the four legions, which had been put under his command by Cæsar, and 500 horse. Varus, after the loss of his cohorts at Auximum, had fled into Africa; which he had governed some years before, after the expiration of his prætorship. There, by his knowledge of the people and country, he levied two legions, and took the command of the province with the consent of the natives. Tubero, who had been named by the Pompeians to this command, arriving some time after with his fleet before Utica, was forbid the town and harbour: nor could he even obtain leave for his son to land, who was sick on board his fleet: and he was obliged to weigh anchor and return to Pompey. Curio, after two days and three nights' sailing, landed at a place called Aquilaria, twenty-two miles distant from Clupea; where L. Cæsar, the son, was waiting for him with ten galleys, which Varus had repaired at Utica and put under his command. But L. Cæsar, terrified at the number of ships Curio brought with him, stood in for the coast; where, running his galley on shore, he left her, and went by land to Adrumetum, a town possessed by C. Considius Longus, with a garrison of one legion. To this place likewise the rest of his fleet repaired. M. Rufus, the quæstor, who commanded for Curio twelve ships, towed the galley off the strand, and returned with the fleet to Curio.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Curio ordered him to sail directly for Utica; whither he followed with his land-army. After a march of two days, he arrived at the river Bagradas, where he left C. Caninius Rebilus with the legions, and advanced before with the cavalry to take a view of the spot called the Cornelian camp, because the first Scipio Africanus had encamped there. The situation was judged to be very advantageous. It was a high rock jutting out into the

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

sea, steep and rough on both sides, but with an easy descent where it fronts Utica. It lay little more than a mile from that town, in a direct line: but as there was a fountain about half way, which overflowed the plain and formed a morass, it was necessary to take a compass of six miles in marching to Utica. When he had taken a view of this post, he went and examined Varus's camp.

It was covered by the town of Utica itself on one side, and on the other by a kind of theatre that stood without the walls: and, the works round this theatre taking up a great extent of ground, they rendered the approach to the camp extremely difficult. While he was taking his survey, he saw all the roads crowded with people, who were carrying their valuable effects into the city: and he detached his cavalry to plunder them. At the same time Varus ordered 600 Numidian horse, with 400 foot, to their assistance. The Numidians, unable to stand the first shock, retreated immediately to their camp with the loss of 120 men. Meanwhile the port of Utica was deserted by all the merchant-ships that were there to the number of 200, in obedience to a proclamation Curio had published, in which he threatened to treat them as enemies, if they did not instantly repair to the Cornelian camp. By this means the army was at once plentifully supplied with every commodity: and Curio, upon his return to the camp at Bagradas, was saluted imperator by the joint acclamations of the soldiers.

Next day he led his army towards Utica, and encamped not far from the town: but, before he had made his intrenchments, he was informed by some parties of horse stationed near the camp, that a powerful body of infantry and cavalry had been sent by Juba, king of Mauritania, to its succour, and were marching towards it. At the same time was seen a cloud of dust, and soon after the enemy's van was in view. This king

inherited from his father an affection for Pompey, and he personally hated Curio, who, during his tribuneship, had proposed a law to deprive him of his kingdom. Curio immediately sent the cavalry to sustain their first charge and keep them in play : and he hastened to form the legions in order of battle. The horse engaged according to his orders, and with such success, that, before the legions could be drawn up, the whole body of the king's troops, which marched without order or apprehension of danger, falling into confusion, betook themselves to flight. The cavalry, wheeling nimbly along the shore, found means to escape with little loss into the town : but great numbers of the infantry were cut to pieces.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

The night following two centurions of the nation of the Marsi, with twenty-two soldiers, deserted from Curio, and went over to Attius Varus. These men assured him, that the whole army was extremely averse to Curio, and would infallibly revolt, if he would but shew himself, and come to a conference with them. Varus accordingly drew out his legions the next day : Curio did the same : and both armies stood facing one another in order of battle, with a small valley between them. Sextus Quinctilius Varus, who had been made prisoner at Corfinium, where he performed the office of quæstor to Domitius, and had been dismissed by Cæsar, was now in Attius's camp : and Curio had brought over the very same legions which had revolted from him and his general. He took occasion, from this circumstance, to try to debauch Curio's army, "and began with putting the soldiers in mind of their former oath to Domitius and to himself: he exhorted them not to bear arms against the old companions of their fortunes, who had shared with them all the hazards of the same siege ; nor fight in defence of a party which could not call them but by the ignominious name of deserters." To these considerations he added offers of a liberal recompence,

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

if they would follow his fortune, and that of Attius. Curio's soldiers returned no answer, nor made any declaration of their sentiments: but an uncommon panic spread itself suddenly among them, and the reflections which they communicated to one another served only to increase it.

Curio summoned a council of war to deliberate on the proper remedies for this evil. Some of the officers proposed to attack at all hazards Varus's camp, and deemed this the best expedient to free the soldiers of their alarms. "It was better (they said) to trust to valour, and try the fortune of a battle, than to see themselves abandoned by their men, and delivered up to the barbarity of the enemy." Others were for retiring during the night to the Cornelian camp, where they might at leisure cure the minds of the soldiers: and whence, in case of a disaster, they could with more safety and ease retire into Sicily by the means and under the protection of their fleet. Curio was averse to both these measures; the one, he thought, argued cowardice; the other an unjustifiable temerity. "With what hope (said he) can we attack a camp fortified by nature and art, and what advantage can we draw from an attempt whence we shall be obliged to retire with loss? Does not success always secure to a general the affection of his troops, whereas ill fortune is always followed with contempt and hatred? To change our camp would have the appearance of an ignominious flight, and might alienate from us the minds of the army: the dutiful ought not to know that we distrust them; nor the disaffected that we fear them, because our apprehensions would only augment the presumption of the one, and abate the zeal of the other. But if what is reported of the discontent of the army be true, which I am yet unwilling to believe, we ought, for that reason, rather to hide and dissemble our fears, than, by an unseasonable discovery of them, to add strength to the evil, and give

courage to the enemy. It is proposed to march away at midnight; this would only furnish a fairer occasion to the ill-affected to execute their purpose. For fear and shame are powerful restraints by day, but night entirely divests them of their force. In fine, I own that I am not so daring as to attack a camp without hopes of success; nor so blinded by fear as to be at a loss what measures to pursue. It is my opinion that we ought to try every thing, rather than follow either of these schemes; and I doubt not but, by your counsel, to fall upon some safe and honourable expedient, that will be attended with success."

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Then assembling the soldiers, he reminded them of the great obligations Cæsar had to them: "It was you that gave the example of submission at Corfinium, and all the municipal towns followed it; it was you that obliged Pompey to quit Italy, without being forced to it by the loss of a battle. Can you therefore make any doubt but that he hates you, or that Cæsar ranks you among his best friends; particularly, when you see he has committed my safety to your care, and entrusted you with the protection of Sicily and Africa, without which he cannot hold Italy? You are now in the presence of those who exhort you to abandon us: and indeed what can be more desirable to them, than at the same time to circumvent us, and fix upon you the stain of an infamous crime? What worse opinion could an enraged enemy conceive of you, than to suppose you capable of betraying those who own themselves indebted to you for all their success; and of throwing yourselves into the power of a party, who consider you as the authors of all their misfortunes? Are you strangers to Cæsar's exploits in Spain? He has defeated two armies, overcome two generals, and brought two provinces under subjection: and all this within forty days after he came in sight of the enemy. Is it likely that those, who with forces unbroken could not stand their ground, will be

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

able to resist, now that they have received such considerable losses? And will you, who followed Cæsar before fortune declared in his favour, now return to the vanquished, and lose the reward of your services? They charge you with having abandoned and betrayed them, contrary to the faith of oaths: but did you desert Domitius, or Domitius his soldiers? Were you not ready to have endured the last extremities, whilst he privately endeavoured to escape? Were you not betrayed by him, and saved by Cæsar's mercy? And how can the oath any longer oblige you, when he to whom you swore, laying down the ensigns of his office and authority, became a private person, and surrendered himself a captive to another? But perhaps, though you approve of Cæsar's cause, you dislike your general. I shall not insist on the obligations you have to me: they are much inferior to my own desire and your deserts: but you are not ignorant that the rewards of military service come not till after the conclusion of the war, and, I believe, you little doubt what will be the issue of the present one. Yet why should I decline taking notice of the diligence I have used, the progress I have already made, and the good fortune that has hitherto attended me? Have I not landed my army safe in Africa without the loss of a single ship; dispersed the enemy's fleet; worsted their cavalry; forced 200 of their merchant-ships to quit the port of Utica and join me; and reduced them to a situation where it is impossible for them to receive any supplies either by land or sea? Can you think of deserting a cause headed by such leaders, and attended with such success, to return to those who ignominiously delivered up Corfinium, fled from Italy, surrendered Spain, and have already suffered such losses in this African war? For my part, I desired no greater name than Cæsar's soldier; you have thought fit to give me that of imperator; which I am ready this moment to resign, if you repent of having

done me that honour. Give me again my former name, that it may not be said, that I was honoured, to be covered afterward with greater ignominy.”

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

This speech had its proper effect: the soldiers often interrupted him to express their grief at his suspecting their fidelity: and, when he retired, they all gathered round him, begging him to lead them to battle, and make a trial of their zeal and bravery. This behaviour of the troops entirely satisfied the officers, and, with the consent of them all, Curio determined to take the first occasion to engage the enemy. Accordingly, he drew out his men the next day, and Attius Varus did the same. The valley between the two armies, though not very large, was of difficult ascent: and each army waited till the other should venture to pass it, that they might engage with the greater advantage. At length all the cavalry of Varus's left wing, together with the light-armed foot, descended into it. Upon this, Curio immediately detached his horse, with two cohorts, to engage them: and the enemy, unable to sustain the first onset, returned with full speed to their main body; leaving the light-armed foot behind, who were surrounded and cut to pieces in sight of Varus's whole army. In that instant Caninius Rebilus (one of Cæsar's lieutenants, who had distinguished himself in the Gallic war, and whom Curio had chosen for his counsellor on account of his military capacity) cried out to his general, “Why do you delay seizing the favourable moment? You see the enemy is struck with terror.” Curio made no answer; only he desired his soldiers to remember what they had promised the day before: and, advancing himself before the rest, commanded them to follow him. The ascent on the other side of the valley was so steep, that the foremost could not get up but with the assistance of those that came after. The enemy, however, were so frightened with the rout and slaughter of their men, that they made no resistance: and, before a dart was thrown the whole

403d con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

army turned their backs, and fled to their camp, imagining themselves already surrounded by the victorious cavalry. Of Varus's army, about 600 were killed; and 1,000 were wounded at the gates of the camp, where the throng was so great, that many were crushed to death. Curio lost but one man, by name Fabius Pelignus, a centurion of the lowest rank in his army: as this man was pursuing the runaways, he called with a loud voice to Varus, who, hearing himself named several times, and taking him to be an officer of his own army, turned, and stood still, demanding who he was, and what he wanted. Fabius then aimed a blow at his shoulder, which was uncovered, and would have certainly killed him, if he had not been immediately surrounded and put to death.

Varus, seeing his army under the greatest consternation, and that many of the men had deserted the camp to take refuge in the town, brought all the rest at midnight within the walls: and Curio the next day began a line of circumvallation, resolving to lay siege to the place. Utica was filled with a great number of inhabitants, whom a long peace had rendered quite unfit for war, and, having formerly received many favours from Cæsar, stood well-affected to his cause. The magistrates were so terrified with the bad success they had met with, that they talked openly of surrendering; and begged of Varus not to ruin them with his obstinacy. But messengers from king Juba, who came while this affair was in agitation, made them alter their resolution. They brought the news that the king was himself coming to their assistance, at the head of a numerous army, and would soon appear. Curio received the same intelligence: but for some time, through too great a confidence in his good fortune, would give no credit to it. The news of Cæsar's success in Spain being now publicly known in Africa, he could not be persuaded that Juba would dare to attempt any thing against him.

But, being at last convinced by repeated accounts, that the king with all his forces was already arrived within twenty-five miles of Utica, he quitted his works, and retired to the Cornelian camp. It was conveniently placed near the sea, was well fortified by art and nature, was plentifully stored with water and salt, and the country around was covered with trees, and abounded with corn: here, therefore, he resolved to wait the arrival of the forces which he had left in Sicily.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Curio, however, did not long abide by this prudent resolution: some deserters bringing him an account that Juba had been obliged to return home to defend the borders of his kingdom, and compose the broils among the Leptitani, and had only sent forward Sabura with a few troops; he too hastily gave credit to this report: and, hurried away by his natural impetuosity, determined to march towards the enemy. He sent, in the beginning of the night, all his cavalry towards their camp, which was upon the river Bagradas: and he himself marched with the rest of the forces about three in the morning, leaving only five cohorts to guard his baggage. After a march of six miles he was met by his cavalry, who, having travelled all the night, had surprised Sabura's camp, killed a great number of his men, and made some prisoners. Curio asked these, who commanded at Begradas? They answered, Sabura. Upon this, without making any farther inquiries, he turned to the soldiers next to him, and said, "Do you not see that the report of the prisoners corresponds exactly with the intelligence given by the deserters? Juba is not with the army. It must consist but of a few troops, since they were not able to withstand the charge of a small body of horse. Let us hasten then to obtain victory, booty, and glory." The ardour of the army was equal to that of their general. On they marched precipitately, that they might come as soon as possible upon a frightened enemy. The horse were or-

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

dered to follow, but, fatigued with their late march, they halted, some in one place and some in another. Juba was only six miles behind Sabura, and, having notice of the last night's engagement, he detached to his assistance 2,000 Spanish and Gallic horse, of his ordinary guard, with that part of the infantry on which he chiefly relied. He followed leisurely with the rest of the troops, and about forty elephants; suspecting that Curio had sent his cavalry before, and was not far off with his army. Sabura, having drawn up his horse and foot, ordered them to give ground upon the enemy's attack. Curio, deceived by this behaviour, and not doubting but the enemy were preparing to fly, drew his army down into the plain from the higher ground. At length, having advanced a considerable way, he halted to give his men breath, who had now marched upwards of sixteen miles. That moment Sabura sounded the charge, led on his men in order of battle, and went from rank to rank to animate them; but he suffered the cavalry only to come to blows, keeping the infantry at a small distance, but in good order. Curio was not wanting on his part; he exhorted his men to place all their hopes in their valour: nor did the foot, though wearied with their march, or the cavalry, though few in number, and exhausted with the duty they had already done, betray any symptoms of fear. Of the latter there were only 200, the rest having halted by the way; yet wherever they charged, they obliged the enemy to give ground: but their horses were so tired that they could not pursue them far. On the other side the Numidian cavalry began to surround the Roman army, and to gall them in the rear. Whenever the cohorts issued out to charge them, the Numidians, being fresh, avoided the attack by their nimbleness, and, immediately returning, got behind the Romans, and cut them off from the army. Thus it was equally dangerous for them to keep their ground, or to advance to battle. Sabura's forces in-

creased continually by the reinforcements sent by Juba : Curio's, disabled by fatigue, and surrounded on all sides, had no place of safety to which they could retire or carry their wounded. Sensible of their extreme distress, they began to give themselves up to despair. Curio, perceiving the soldiers were in so great a consternation, as neither to give ear to his commands nor entreaties, gave orders, as the last resource, that they should endeavour to gain the neighbouring hills : but these were already possessed by Sabura's cavalry. Some of the Romans, attempting to escape by flight, were killed by the enemy's horse : others, seeing it useless to make any efforts to save their lives, threw themselves upon the ground. While affairs were in this desperate condition, Cn. Domitius, commander of the cavalry, having only a few of his followers left, advised Curio to save himself by retreating to the camp, and promised not to forsake him. But Curio could not think of surviving the loss of his army ; and continued fighting bravely till he was killed : a few of the cavalry escaped : and those of them who had stayed behind to refresh themselves, perceiving at a distance the rout of the army, retired with precipitation to the camp. Every man of the infantry was cut to pieces.

When the total overthrow and destruction of the army was known in the camp, M. Rufus, the quæstor who commanded there, entreated his men not to lose their courage. They insisted, however, to be transported to Sicily : and he ordered the masters of the ships to have them in readiness at night along the shore. But such was the general consternation, that some cried out that Juba was arrived with his troops : others that Varus approached with his legions, the dust of whose march they pretended to discern : and many declared that the enemy's fleet would be upon them in an instant. Confounded by their fears, they consulted every man his own preservation. Those who had embarked noisted

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

sail immediately, and their flight drew the transports after them. A few only of the boats would obey Rufus's orders : but the strand was so crowded, and every one so eager to get on board before the rest, that some of these vessels were sunk, and others were afraid to come nearer the shore. It thus happened that a small number of soldiers only got safe to Sicily. Those who remained, having sent their centurions that night as deputies to Varus, surrendered. These Juba claimed as his property the next day, commanded the greatest part to be put to the sword, and sent the rest into Numidia. In vain did Varus intercede for them, and complain of this breach of faith : he durst not make any resistance. The haughty king made his entrance into the city attended by a great number of senators : and, after regulating every thing according to his pleasure, returned triumphant with all his forces into his own kingdom.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar is created dictator : he returns to Rome, where he holds the assembly for the election of magistrates, and settles the affairs of the city. He follows Pompey into Greece. The disturbances raised by Cœlius and Milo are quieted. The famous campaign between Cæsar and Pompey before Dyrrhachium and in Thessaly. The battle of Pharsalia. Pompey's flight and death. The dispersion of his followers.

M. ÆMILIUS LEPIDUS, to whose care, as prætor, Cæsar had committed the government of the city in his absence, obtained, after the reduction of Pompey's army in Spain, an ordinance of the people for creating a dictator ; and, pursuant to it, he named Cæsar to that office.^d Cæsar received the news of his election on his arrival at Marseilles, but did not immediately set out for Rome. He spent the remainder of the year in Gaul and in the north of Italy, to strengthen his army, and give directions for the security of the provinces

Suet. in
Cæs. Dio.

^d Some nations, as the Syro-Macedonians, reckoned from this epocha the years of the Cæsars, or Roman emperors. See Usher's Annals, ad an. 3956.

which he was about to leave. It was in this interval that the ninth legion mutinied at Placentia, and demanded its dismissal. This was the first event of the kind that had ever befallen him. They said that they were worn out by labour, and deserved to have at last some rest: but their discontent proceeded from Cæsar's conduct since the commencement of the civil war, and particularly at the siege of Marseilles, where, notwithstanding the perfidious behaviour of the inhabitants, and the many provocations they had given him, he would not suffer them to be plundered. He brought this legion back to its duty, not by any mean compliance, but by his authority and resolution. After reproaching them with their ingratitude and folly, he told them, "that he had no occasion for their service, and that he should never want soldiers to share his prosperity and triumphs: and that, before he disbanded them, he would punish their crime, and order them to be decimated." These words broke the spirit of the mutineers: they threw themselves at his feet, and begged for pardon: and all their officers interceded for them. Cæsar was for some time inexorable; but at last, abating of his severity, he ordered them to deliver up to him 120 of the most guilty; of these twenty were appointed by lot for execution; and the officers managed it so that the lots fell on the most insolent. After this execution the soldiers were obliged to renew their entreaties for leave to continue in his service.

On his arrival at Rome, he held the comitia for the election of magistrates, and was himself appointed consul with P. Servilius Isauricus. Of the prætors, the most remarkable were C. Trebonius, whom Cæsar appointed prætor of the city, and M. Cœlius, who had the department of foreign affairs. It was the universal belief, and the wish of many in Cæsar's party, that there would be a general abolition of all debts. In consequence of this, the public credit was at a stand over all

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 1.
Dio. Suet.
in Cæs.

Year of
R O M E
704.
B. C. 48.

403d con-
sulship.

484l.

Italy, every one refusing to pay what he owed. But Cæsar put an end to this uncertainty, by decreeing that arbiters should be appointed to make an estimate of the possessions of all debtors, and to convey them in payment to their creditors, at the price they bore before the war. Suetonius adds, that he allowed the debtors to deduct from the principal what they had paid for interest. Dio Cassius says, that the creditors lost by this regulation a fourth of their due: and that, as many were suspected of concealing great sums of money, an ordinance was published, forbidding any body to keep above 60,000 sesterces. This extraordinary ordinance has no other voucher besides Dio.

Many of those who had been tried and condemned for bribery, while Pompey kept his legions in the city, resorted to him in the beginning of the war; and, that he might not be charged with ingratitude towards these men, nor accused of invading the prerogatives of the people, he now caused them to be restored in a legal manner by a law propounded to the people by the prætors and tribunes. The pretext was, that they had been condemned at a time when Pompey had influenced the judges. Milo, alone, seems to have been excepted from this general amnesty: he had made, perhaps, no advances to gain Cæsar's favour; who might have, besides, many other reasons to be dissatisfied with the enemy and murderer of his friend Clodius: he restored, at the same time, the sons of the proscribed to the rights of Roman citizens, from which they had been hitherto excluded by the cruelty of Sylla, and the injustice of the aristocratic faction. Having made these regulations, and celebrated the Latin festivals, he abdicated the dictatorship, after holding it but eleven days, and immediately set out for Brundisium, where he arrived before the end of December: and, on the 1st of January,^e he entered upon his office of consul in that city.

^e The 11th of October, according to Usher; but, really, the 25th of November.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR, II.

P. SERVILIUS VATIA ISAURICUS,

} Consuls.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

Pompey, having had a whole year to make his preparations, undisturbed by wars, and free from the interruptions of an enemy, had gathered a mighty fleet from Asia, the Cyclades, Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phœnicia, and Egypt: to all which places he had sent orders for the building of ships upon the first breaking out of the civil war; being persuaded, that he who was master of the sea, would certainly be superior also at land;^f and he had exacted great sums of money from the people of Asia and Syria, from the kings, tetrarchs, dynasties, and free states of Achaia, and from all the corporations of the provinces subject to his command. He had got together nine legions of Roman citizens; five he had brought with him from Italy; one had been sent him from Sicily, consisting wholly of veterans, and called Gemella, because composed of two; another, partly from Crete, and partly from Macedonia, of veteran soldiers likewise; who having been disbanded by former generals, had settled in those parts; and two more from Asia, levied there by Lentulus. Besides all these, he had troops from Thessaly, Bœotia, Achaia, and Epirus: which, together with the soldiers of C. Antonius, who had been obliged to surrender in Illyricum, he distributed among the legions by way of recruits. He expected also two legions which Scipio commanded in Syria. He had 3,000 archers from Crete, Lacedemon, Pontus, and other provinces; six cohorts of slingers, and two of mercenaries. His cavalry amounted to 7,000; 600 of which came to him from Galatia, under Deiotarus; 500 from Cappadocia, under Ariobarzanes; the like number from Thrace, sent by Cotus, under the command of his son Sadalis; 200

404th consulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 3.

^f "Pompeii omne consilium Themistocleum est: existimat enim, qui mare teneat, eum necesse rerum potiri." Ad Att. 10. 8.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

In Cat.

Plut. in
Pomp.
Dio.
Lucan. l. 5.

from Macedonia, under Rascipolis, an officer of distinction; 500 from Alexandria, consisting of Gauls and Germans, left there by Gabinius to serve as a guard to king Ptolemy, and now brought over by young Pompey in his fleet, together with 800 of his own domestics: Castor and Donilaus furnished him with 300; the first of these came himself in person, the second sent his son; and 200, most of them archers, were sent by Antiochus Comagenus, who lay under the greatest obligations to Pompey. He had likewise a great number of Dardanians and Bessians, with others from Macedonia, Thessaly, and the adjoining states, who completed his cavalry, and were partly volunteers, and partly mercenaries. To subsist this mighty army, he had taken care to amass vast quantities of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cyrene, and other countries; and he resolved to quarter his troops during the winter at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other maritime towns, to prevent Cæsar's passing the sea; for which reason, he ordered also his fleet to cruise perpetually along the coasts. Young Pompey commanded the Egyptian squadron; D. Lælius and C. Triarius, the Asiatic; C. Cassius, the Syrian; C. Marcellus and C. Coponius, the Rhodian; and Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius, the Liburnian and Achaian: but the chief authority was given to M. Bibulus, who was high-admiral. Plutarch tells us that Pompey had at first destined Cato to this important command, and had even made him a promise of it; but that he afterward changed his mind, lest that rigid republican, vested with so much power, should become troublesome to him after the defeat of Cæsar, and compel him to disband his soldiers, in order to restore the liberty of the commonwealth.

Before the end of the year, while Cæsar was holding the assemblies of the people in Rome for the election of magistrates, the consuls assembled at Thessalonica all

the senators who had followed Pompey, to the number of 200. There, after consecrating a place with augural ceremonies, they declared themselves the true Roman senate; and enacted, that all those who were then consuls, prætors, and quæstors, should retain their authority, and continue in the exercise of their several offices, under the names of proconsuls, proprætors, and proquæstors. Pompey they declared generalissimo of the republic: and honours and thanks were decreed to the kings and nations who favoured their cause; and, in particular, young Ptolemy, king of Egypt, was confirmed in the possession of his crown, in exclusion of his sister, the famous Cleopatra, though she had an undoubted title by the will of Ptolemy Auletes, their common father, who had left the succession to his eldest son and eldest daughter jointly.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Cæsar found at Brundisium twelve legions, and all his cavalry: but his legions were far from being complete. They had been considerably weakened by the Gallic war, by their long march from Spain, and by a general sickness, which had lately prevailed among them, during the autumn in the unhealthy climate of Apulia. Yet, the want of ships alone hindered him, he says, from putting a speedy end to the war. For, notwithstanding his orders to build and assemble as many ships as possible, he had scarcely a sufficient number to embark 20,000 men; who, in the present state of his army, formed seven legions and 600 horse. On his arrival at Brundisium, he harangued his troops, and told them, “that, as they were now upon the point of seeing an end of all their toils and dangers, they should make no difficulty to leave their servants and baggage in Italy, in order that they might embark with less confusion, and in greater numbers; placing all their hopes in victory, and in the generosity of their general.” The whole army having loudly testified their assent, he embarked with seven legions on the 4th of January, and

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. 1. 3.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship,

arrived the next day at the Ceraunian mountains, on the coast of Epirus; where, having found a tolerable harbour, he landed his troops at a place called Pharsalus. Lucretius Vespillo and Minutius Rufus were then at Oricum, with eighteen Asiatic ships; and Bibulus had 110 at Corcyra: but the first durst not hazard an engagement, though Cæsar had for his convoy no more than ten galleys, only four of which had decks; and Bibulus had not time to assemble his men and get his ships in order. For no account of Cæsar's approach had reached these parts, till his fleet was seen from the continent. Cæsar sent the fleet back the same night to Brundisium to bring over the rest of his forces. Fuscus Calenus had the charge of this expedition, with orders to use the utmost dispatch; but, setting sail too late, he lost the benefit of the wind, and fell in with the enemy. For Bibulus, hearing at Corcyra of Cæsar's arrival, forthwith put to sea, in hopes of intercepting some of the transports: and, meeting the fleet as it returned empty, took about thirty ships, which he burnt, with all that were on board. He imagined, by this example, to deter the rest of the troops from attempting the passage.^g He then stationed his fleet along the coast from Salona to Oricum, and remained himself on board, notwithstanding the rigour of the season; declining no fatigue nor danger, so that he might intercept Cæsar's supplies.

Cæsar, following the plan he had at first adopted, sent Vibullius Rufus (the same he had made prisoner at Corfinium, and afterward in Spain) to Pompey to treat of peace. He thought this man the properest person he could employ, as he had been twice indebted to him for his life, and was also much esteemed by Pompey, whom

^g Plutarch in Pomp. tells us, that in a council of war, in which Cato presided, a decree was passed, that no Roman citizen should be put to death but in battle, and that they should not plunder any city which was subject to the Roman empire; and that such moderation gained the affections of all people to Pompey's cause. Cæsar followed this rule, notwithstanding the greatest provocations; but, on Pompey's side, Cato's decree was very little regarded, and I doubt whether it was ever made.

he had served with great zeal and fidelity in the quality of chief engineer. He was commissioned to represent to Pompey, “ that it was now time to put an end to their quarrel, and not obstinately expose themselves any more to the precarious events of fortune : that the losses they had already sustained ought to fill them with just apprehensions of the future : that Pompey had been forced to abandon Italy, had lost Sicily and Sardinia, the two Spains, with about 130 cohorts of Roman citizens. That he himself had been a considerable sufferer by the death of Curio, the destruction of the African army, and the surrender of his forces under C. Antonius at Corcyra. That it was therefore incumbent on them to shew some regard to the sinking state of the commonwealth, and that the present moment was the most favourable ; because, not having yet tried one another’s strength, and considering themselves as equals, there was the more likelihood of their coming to an agreement, upon moderate terms : whereas, if one of them once got the least advantage, he would exact every thing from the other, and give up nothing himself. That, as hitherto they had been unable to settle the conditions of peace, they ought to refer them to the senate and people of Rome ; and, in the meantime, both swear to disband their armies in three days’ time. That a proposition of this nature should be equally agreeable to all ; since the two commanders, divested of their strength, would find themselves under a necessity of submitting to the decree of the senate and people. In fine, that, to give Pompey a proof of his readiness to perform these proposals, he would give immediate orders for the discharge of all his forces, both in garrison and in the field.” Vibullius, having received these instructions, hastened to Pompey’s camp with all diligence, frequently changing horses, and posting day and night ; but he was more solicitous to give him early notice of Cæsar’s arrival, and the condition of his army, than to execute the commission he was

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. 1. 3.

charged with. Pompey was in Candavia, on his way through Macedonia, to his winter-quarters at Apollonia and Dyrrachium : and, surprised and disturbed at news so unexpected, he hastened his march, that he might prevent the loss of the sea-coasts.

Cæsar, the very day he landed, brought his troops before Oricum, where L. Torquatus attempted to defend himself with a garrison of Greeks, called Parthinians; but they refusing to fight against the consul of Rome, and the inhabitants being entirely in the same sentiments, he surrendered. Thence Cæsar marched to Apollonia, whose citizens being also well affected towards him, L. Staberius, who commanded for Pompey, privately left the place : and the inhabitants sent their deputies to him, and received him into the town. The Bullidenses, Amantiani, with the neighbouring nations, and all Epirus, followed their example, and sent ambassadors to Cæsar to receive his commands. This rapid progress made Pompey march day and night to reach Dyrrachium : and, when he drew near to that place, a false report, that Cæsar was not far off, threw the whole army into such consternation, that many abandoned their colours and arms, and the march in general was continued in so disorderly a manner, that it had all the appearance of a precipitate flight. They had not even recovered their consternation when they had reached Dyrrachium, and were about to intrench themselves under its walls : which Labienus perceiving, he advanced, in the sight of all the soldiers, and solemnly swore never to abandon his general, but to share whatever fortune should befall him. All the other officers, and the whole army, took the same oath. Cæsar, finding that he was prevented in his design upon Dyrrachium, pursued his march more leisurely, and encamped on the river Apsus, in the territory of the Apollonians, that he might be able to protect the possessions of a state, which had declared warmly in his favour. Here

he resolved to wait the arrival of the rest of his troops. Pompey did the like; and, having encamped on the other side of the same river, assembled there all his legions and auxiliaries.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Salona, a town in Dalmatia, where Spalatro now stands, sustained a memorable siege about this time against M. Octavius, admiral of the Liburnian and Achaian fleets under Bibulus. It was built upon a hill, and advantageously situated for defence; but, as the fortifications were very inconsiderable, the Roman citizens residing there immediately surrounded the place with wooden towers; and, finding themselves too few to resist the attacks of the enemy, after many of them had been killed or disabled, they, in their last extremity, gave arms and liberty to their slaves, and the women gave their hair to make cords for the engines. Octavius, to conquer their obstinacy, blocked up the town on all sides with five different camps, resolving to harass them with continual attacks. The brave Salonians dreaded nothing but the want of corn; and, on Cæsar's arrival on the coast of Epirus, they sent to him to beg a supply. The siege had continued for some time; and, the besiegers not keeping a strict watch, they all sallied out at midday, leaving, for a show, their wives and children on the walls, and attacked the nearest quarters of Octavius. Having forced these, they ran to the next, and so successively to all the five camps; and, driving the enemy with great slaughter from every post, they compelled them to take refuge in their ships. Octavius, as winter approached, and his loss had been considerable, retired to Dyrrachium, and joined Pompey.

Calenus was charged, as we have related above, to bring over to Brundusium the rest of the forces; and, having embarked according to his instructions, he put to sea: but he had not sailed very far, when he met with an advice-boat from Cæsar, informing him, that every part of the coast was guarded, and he returned back into

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 3.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

the harbour. One ship, which was not under his command, continued its route, and fell in at Oricum with the fleet of Bibulus, who put all on board to death, not sparing even the freedmen, children, or slaves. The troops under Calenus, had it not been for Cæsar's dispatches, would have met with the same fate. If Bibulus thus deprived Cæsar of all supplies by sea, he was in like manner greatly incommoded by Cæsar at land: who, having disposed parties all along the coast, hindered him from getting either water or wood, or any thing else, except from the island of Corcyra; and, by this means, he was sometimes reduced to great difficulties. Notwithstanding therefore his high spirit, he condescended to let Libo enter upon parley with two of Cæsar's lieutenants, M. Acilius and Statius Murcus, who guarded Oricum, and the sea-coasts: and these, believing the proposals made to them to be serious, did not scruple to grant a truce.

Cæsar was then at Buthrotum, a town over-against Corcyra, whither he had gone with one legion to reduce some of the more distant states, and to get a supply of corn. Upon the first information of this transaction, he hastened back to Oricum, and invited Libo and Bibulus to a conference. Libo appeared, and made the following apology and declaration on the part of Bibulus; "That, being naturally hasty, and bearing a personal grudge to Cæsar, contracted during the time of his quæstorship and ædileship, he had declined the interview, lest his presence might be an obstacle to the success of so desirable a design. That Pompey was and ever had been inclined to lay down his arms, and terminate their differences by an accommodation; but, as yet, had not sent him sufficient powers to treat; which, however, he doubted not soon to receive, as the council or senate had intrusted him with the whole administration of the war. That if Cæsar, therefore, would make known his demands, they would be sent to Pompey, who would soon come to a re-

solution upon the matter : and, in the meantime, he desired that the truce might continue, and both parties abstain from acts of hostility, till an answer could be obtained." Cæsar, on his side, "demanded leave to send ambassadors to Pompey, and required that Libo and Bibulus would answer for their return, or undertake to convey them in safety. With regard to the truce, he said, that such were the present circumstances of the war, that their fleet kept back his supplies and transports, and his forces deprived them of all access to the shore and other conveniences. That, if they expected any abatement on his part, they must likewise abate in their constant guard at sea along the coast ; and that, while they persisted in their vigilance, he would not remit his attention and watchfulness. He added, however, that though they could not agree on this point, the treaty might still proceed." Libo declined receiving Cæsar's ambassadors, or answering for their safe return, and chose to refer the whole matter to Pompey ; yet insisted on the truce, which Cæsar constantly rejected ; perceiving, that his only aim was to extricate the fleet from its present distress. Bibulus soon after died on ship-board : he had contracted a dangerous illness by cold and perpetual fatigue ; and, as he could not have proper assistance at sea, and would not be prevailed upon to quit his post, he sunk under the violence of his distemper. Nobody succeeded him as admiral : each squadron was governed independently of the rest by its particular commander, under the general direction of Pompey.

Vibullius at last thought proper to deliver to Pompey, in the presence of Libo, L. Lucceius, and Theophanes, his most intimate counsellors, the commission he had from Cæsar. But scarce had he begun to speak, when Pompey interrupted him, and ordered him to proceed no farther : "What (said he) is my life and country to me, if I shall seem to be beholden for them to Cæsar ? And will it be believed that I am not indebted to him for

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

them, if he by an accommodation restores me to Italy?" Cæsar affirms that this speech of Pompey was reported to him after the conclusion of the war by those that were present. He assures us also, that notwithstanding Vibullius brought him no answer back to his message, and Libo refused to conduct his ambassadors to Pompey, yet he tried every other method to obtain peace. As the two camps were separated only by the river Apsus, the soldiers had frequent discourse among themselves, and committed no acts of hostility on these occasions. Cæsar laid hold on this circumstance, and ordered Vatinius to address himself to the officers and soldiers, and demand publicly and frequently, in the most serious and earnest manner, "whether it might not be permitted to citizens to send deputies to their fellow-citizens to treat about peace: that this was never denied even to fugitives and robbers, and ought much less to be opposed, when the design was to prevent a civil war, and the effusion of Roman blood." He was heard with great silence by both armies, and received this answer: "That Varro would next day appear at an interview; whither Cæsar's deputies might come in perfect security, and make known their demands." The hour of meeting was likewise settled; and multitudes flocked to the place, elated with the highest expectations. Labienus, advancing from the crowd, began in a low voice to confer with Vatinius, as if to adjust the articles of the treaty: but their discourse was soon interrupted by a flight of darts which came pouring in upon all sides. Vatinius escaped unhurt, by means of the soldiers, who ran to cover him with their shields; but Cornelius Balbus, L. Photius, L. Tiburtus, centurions, and some private men, were wounded. The brutal Labienus, then raising his voice, cried out aloud: "Leave off prating any more of peace: for none you shall have, till you have brought us Cæsar's head." This declaration, so extraordinary, is of a piece with the whole behaviour of that deserter, and corresponds also

very well with the haughty and cruel conduct of the whole party.

While the two rival generals lay during the winter on each side of the river Apsus, great commotions were raised in Rome and in some parts of Italy by M. Cœlius and the famous Milo. The first, who was prætor at Rome for foreign affairs, having met with some disappointments; or disobliged because Cæsar had given the more important charge of the city to his colleague C. Trebonius; or not relishing the law Cæsar had made in regard to the debtors, which might not answer his views; he engaged in the most rash and unjustifiable attempts. He had the boldness to undertake the cause of the debtors, and, on his entrance into office, ordered his tribunal to be fixed near that of Trebonius, declaring that he would receive the complaints of such as should appeal to him, in regard to the estimation of estates, and payments made in consequence of Cæsar's late regulation. But the law itself was so just, and Trebonius's judgments so moderate, that no pretence of appeal could be found. This magistrate admitted of every reasonable plea, taking into consideration the poverty of the debtors, their personal losses, the hardness of the times, and the difficulty of bringing their effects to sale: and no one was so divested of honesty and shame, as to own themselves in debt, and yet pretend to keep their estates entire. Thus this first attempt of Cœlius proved unsuccessful. His whole severity, therefore, was pointed now against those to whom the inheritances of the debtors were adjudged: and, having once embarked in the affair, that he might not seem to have engaged himself to no purpose in an unjustifiable cause, he proposed a law by which he allowed the debtors six years for the discharge of their debts, which they were to clear at equal payments without interest.^h

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 3.

^h This place in Cæsar is corrupted, and the commentators can make nothing of it. The sense above is according to Manutius's interpretation. Others say that Cœlius's law gave the debtors three years to acquit themselves, in six payments, one every six months; others, that it allowed but eighteen months, or one year and six months.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

But the consul Servilius and the rest of the magistrates opposed unanimously the project; nor was it received by the people with the favour he expected: and he dropped the affair. This disappointment only served to render him more furious: and now, determined to keep no measures, he proposed two other laws, which he foresaw would more effectually inflame the people; the one “to exempt all the tenants of Rome from paying rent;” the other, “for a general abolition of debts.” These laws took with the multitude; and Cœlius at their head attacked Trebonius in his tribunal, drove him thence, and wounded some persons about him. The consul Servilius complained to the senate of his riotous behaviour, and Cœlius, by a decree of the house, was interdicted the functions of his charge. In virtue of this decree the bills of his laws were torn down, admittance was refused him into the senate, his chair of office was broke, and he himself was driven from his tribunal, whence he was going to harangue the people. It was doubtless in these circumstances that he wrote the following letter to Cicero, which I insert, because it clearly indicates the character of the man.

M. CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam.
8. 17.
Melm. 7.
18.

“Was it for this that I followed Cæsar into Spain? Why was I not rather at Formiæ, that I might have accompanied you to Pompey? But I was infatuated: and it was my aversion to Appius, together with my friendship for Curio, that gradually drew me into this cursed cause. Nor were you entirely unaccessory to my error: for, when I called upon you that night I set out for Ariminum, why did you forget the friend, when you were gloriously acting the patriot; and not dissuade me from the purpose of my journey, at the same time that you commissioned me to urge Cæsar to pacific measures? Not that I have the least doubt of his success: but, believe me, perdition itself were preferable to being a wit-

ness of the insufferable behaviour of these his partisans. They have rendered themselves so generally odious, that we should long since have been driven out of Rome, were it not for the apprehension which people have conceived of the cruelty of your party. There is not at this juncture any order of citizens, or even a single man in Rome, except a few rascally usurers, who does not wish well to Pompey; and I have brought over to your cause, not only those among the plebeian families who were in the interest of Cæsar, but the whole populace in general. But you will ask, perhaps, what can this avail us now? Wait the event, my friend: I will render you victorious in spite of yourselves.* For surely a profound lethargy has locked up all the senses of your party: as they do not yet seem sensible how open we lie to an attack, and how little capable we are of making any considerable opposition. It is by no means from an interested motive that I offer my assistance, but merely in resentment of the unworthy usage I have received; and resentment is a passion which usually carries me, you know, the greatest lengths:—But what are you doing on the other side the water? Are you imprudently waiting to give the enemy battle? What Pompey's forces may be, I know not: but Cæsar's, I am sure, are accustomed to action, and inured to all the hardships of the most severe campaigns. Farewell."

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Cœlius had privately written to his old friend Milo to engage him to come into Italy, and join him with the remains of the gladiators, which he had bought for his public shows, and to make war on his enemy Clodius. Milo, exasperated by the treatment he had met with from Cæsar, who had not restored him with the other exiles, instantly obeyed the summons, and began to gather troops all over Italy. For that purpose he dispatched letters to all the colonies and free towns, intimating, that

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 3.

* Irritavi in me Catonem.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

what he did was in consequence of Pompey's authority, who had sent him his orders by Bibulus. He also endeavoured to draw to him the debtors, whose favour Cœlius had gained by his project for a general abolition of debts. But he met with no success, and all he could accomplish was to set some slaves at liberty. With these, and his gladiators, he had the hardiness to lay siege to Cosa,ⁱ in the territory of Thurium; where Q. Pædus commanded with a garrison of one legion; and there he was killed by a stone from a machine on the walls. Cœlius, when he understood that Milo was in the country of Thurium, set out from Rome, under the pretence of carrying his complaints to Cæsar, but with a view of putting himself at the head of a number of partisans he had in the south of Italy. At Casilinum, he heard that his ensigns and arms were seized at Capua; that his partisans were discovered at Naples; and that he was looked upon as a public enemy. Finding, therefore, that his project was defeated, and apprehensive of his safety, he gave out, on leaving Casilinum, that he was gone to Cæsar; but, turning from the high road, he went privately across the country to Thurium: where, notwithstanding the unhappy end of Milo, he endeavoured to debauch the inhabitants, and corrupt, by promises of money, some Spanish and Gallic horse, who had been left to garrison the place. These were deaf to his solicitations, and slew him.^k Thus, says Cæsar, these dangerous beginnings, which, by reason of the multiplicity of affairs wherewith the magistrates were

ⁱ Velleius Paterculus calls the place Compsa:—"Compsam in Hirpinis oppugnans, ictusque lapide, tum P. Clodio, tum patriæ, quam armis petebat, pœnas dedit; vir, inquit, et ultra sortem temerarius." Lib. 2. c. 68. (Krause, p. 332.)

^k The reader is perfectly acquainted with the characters of these two men, from what has been related of their behaviour: we have in Seneca, *De Ira*, 3. 4. Ruhkopf. vol. 1. p. 106. this anecdote concerning the temper of Cœlius: "Cœlium oratorem fuisse iracundissimum constat: cum quo, ut aiunt, cœnabat in cubiculo lectæ patientiæ cliens; sed difficile erat illi in copulam coniecto, rixam ejus, cum quo hærebat, effugere. Optimum judicavit, quicquid dixisset, sequi, et secundas agere. Non tulit Cœlius assentientem, sed exclamavit, 'dic aliquid contra, ut duo simus.'"—Velleius Paterculus, 2. 68. gives him the preference to Curio, both in eloquence and courage: "M. Cœlius vir eloquio animoque Carioni simillimus, sed in utroque perfectior."—

distracted, and the ticklish situation of the times, threatened great revolutions, and alarmed all Italy, were brought to a safe and speedy issue.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

The armies of Pompey and Cæsar were still in the same situation. The great object of the two generals was the army left at Brundisium: which Cæsar now expected with great impatience; and whose passage Pompey was greatly interested to prevent. He ordered Libo, with the fleet under his command, consisting of fifty ships, to sail to Brundisium, and possess himself of an island that lay before the harbour, judging it of more importance to secure a post, by which the enemy's transports must necessarily pass, than to guard all the havens and ports on the other side. As his arrival was unexpected, he surprised and burnt some transports, and carried off a vessel laden with corn: and the consternation was so great upon the coast, that, having landed some foot, with a party of archers in the night, he drove before him the cavalry that were upon guard. Elated with this, he sent word to Pompey, that he might draw the rest of the navy on shore, and order them to be careened: for that he alone, with his squadron, would undertake to cut off Cæsar's supplies. But Antony, who commanded in Brundisium, soon found means to dislodge him. He ordered sixty boats belonging to the fleet to be covered with hurdles and galleries; and having filled them with chosen soldiers, disposed them along the shore. To allure the enemy, he sent two three-benched galleys to the mouth of the harbour, as if with no other view than to exercise the rowers; and Libo, seeing them advance boldly, and hoping he might be able to intercept them, detached five four-banked galleys for that purpose. At their approach, Antony's galleys rowed back, and were inconsiderately pursued too far by the Pompeians: for now the boats, stationed along the coast, on a signal given, came pouring upon them from all parts; and, on the first charge, took one of the four-

404th con-
sulship.
Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 3.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

benched galleys, and forced the rest to save themselves by flight. Antony, also, by posting the cavalry all along the coast, effectually prevented the enemy from watering; and thus Libo was put to the shameful necessity of quitting the blockade.

Several months had now passed, and the winter was almost over; yet the passage of Cæsar's troops was not effected, and was every day more hazardous. Pompey was continually reproaching his admirals for their neglect in relation to Cæsar's first passage, and exhorting them to make amends for it, by preventing the supplies from coming over. His sea-officers exerted themselves, therefore, and were ever on the watch. Cæsar, on his side, could not but think that Antony and Calenus had lost some opportunities, the wind having stood often fair for them: and he sent them peremptory orders to sail with the first wind that offered for the coast of Apollonia; which, having few havens, was not so closely beset by the enemy.

All the historians, Suetonius, Plutarch, Appian, Florus, and Dio, tell us, that such was Cæsar's impatience at this time, that he resolved to go and fetch his troops himself; and, in the disguise of a slave, went on board a fisherman's bark at the mouth of the river Apsus, with a design to cross over to Brundusium. The master of the boat rowed off, it is said, with his men, but the wind rising made the water so very rough, that it seemed impossible to him to get out to sea, and he ordered his men to return back. Upon this, Cæsar discovered himself:

Lucan. l. 5. "Fear nothing (said he), thou carriest Cæsar and his fortune." The mariners, encouraged and awed by his presence, made fresh endeavours, and got out to sea; but the waves ran so high, and the danger was so imminent, that he permitted them to return to land. Cæsar's soldiers, informed of what had passed, ran to meet him in great multitudes, and told him, with much tenderness and affection, that he had greatly reflected

upon their courage by going in quest of new forces, when they were sure to conquer alone, as long as they acted under his direction.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

The pressing orders he had sent for his soldiers, who were sufficiently eager of themselves to cross the sea, determined Antony and Calenus to sail with a south wind, which was not the most favourable for their passage. They made for the coast of Apollonia, but were driven before Dyrrachium: whence, being descried by Coponius, he chased them with sixteen Rhodian galleys, and, the wind abating, the fleet had almost fallen into his hands. A brisk gale, however, arising, they made their way, and put into the port of Nymphæum, about three miles beyond Lissus. There they would have been in the greatest danger from the south wind, which had continued two days without intermission; but they were scarcely entered the port, when the wind changed to south-west. To this favourable circumstance they owed their safety. The fleet of Coponius was driven by the violence of the storm against the shore, and dashed to pieces. The greatest part of the soldiers and mariners perished among the rocks; a few only were taken up by Antony's soldiers; and these were afterward sent by Cæsar to their several homes. There were two, however, of the transports, which, unable to keep up with the rest, were overtaken by the night, and, not knowing where the fleet had put in, cast anchor over-against Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who commanded in that place, sent out some boats and small vessels to attack them, and to promise them quarter, if they submitted. One of these vessels carried 220 new-raised soldiers; the other less than 200 veterans: and, on this occasion, appeared, says Cæsar, what resource there is in valour, in the most imminent dangers. The new levies, frightened at the number of their enemies, and fatigued with sea-sickness, surrendered on promise of their lives; but were cruelly slain, as soon as they came before Otacilius. The ve-

404th con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

terans, on the contrary, though they had both the storm and the leaky vessel to struggle with, abated nothing of their wonted bravery ; they spun out the time till night, under the pretence of treating, and then obliged their pilot to run the vessel on shore ; where they found an advantageous post. At daybreak, Otacilius sent against them about 400 horse ; but they defended themselves with great bravery ; and, having slain some of the enemy, rejoined without loss the rest of the troops. The Roman citizens inhabiting Lissus, to whom Cæsar had formerly made a grant of the town, after having fortified it with great care, were entirely in their patron's interest ; and Otacilius, who well knew it, and dreaded the consequences of a revolt, quitted the place at this time, and fled to Pompey. As soon as he was gone, the inhabitants opened their gates to Antony, and furnished him with every thing he stood in need of. Antony, after landing his troops, which consisted of three veteran legions, one new-raised, and 800 horse, sent the most of the transports back again to Brundusium, to bring over the rest of the foot and cavalry, and retained only a few of Gallic structure, that, if Pompey, imagining Italy to be destitute of troops, should attempt to return thither, as was commonly rumoured, Cæsar might be able, in some measure, to follow him.

On the first news of Antony's landing, which the two generals received about the same time, they both set out from their camps on the Apsus ; Cæsar to join him as soon as possible ; Pompey to hinder the junction, and, if possible, to draw Antony into an ambuscade. Cæsar, who had the river to cross, was obliged to fetch a compass, that he might reach a ford. But Pompey, having nothing to obstruct his march, advanced by great journeys against Antony : and, understanding that he was not far off, he posted his troops on an advantageous ground, ordering them to keep within their camp, and light no fires, that his approach might not be perceived.

Antony, however, was apprized of it by the people of the country, and kept close for one day within his intrenchments; the next he was joined by Cæsar; and then Pompey retired to Asparagium, a town belonging to the Dyrrachians. Cæsar followed him, and, after a march of three days, during which he made himself master of the capital town of the Parthinians, he came in sight of the enemy's camp, and pitched his own at a small distance from it.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

The next day he drew out all his forces and offered Pompey battle. But Pompey stirred not, and from that moment Cæsar perceived that he must take other measures.

The day after Cæsar set out for Dyrrachium, taking a long circuit, and through narrow and difficult ways, hoping thereby either to oblige Pompey to follow him thither, or to cut off his communication with the town, where he had laid up his provisions and magazines of war. In this last design he succeeded. For Pompey, seeing him set out another way, imagined he had been obliged to remove for want of provisions, and did not raise his camp till the next day, when he was informed by his scouts whither Cæsar directed his course. He, however, hoped to reach Dyrrachium before him, by taking a nearer way: and though Cæsar gave his soldiers but little rest, and made them march with the greatest celerity, yet, when he arrived in the morning at Dyrrachium, Pompey's van began to appear at a distance. Cæsar intrenched himself without delay: and Pompey seized a hill called Petra, where there was a tolerable harbour, sheltered from some winds. Here he ordered a part of his fleet to attend him, and provisions to be brought to him from Asia and the other provinces subject to his command. And Cæsar, apprehending, on his side, that the war would run into length, sent his officers into Epirus and all the adjoining countries, where provisions could be picked up.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

In this situation of the two armies, Cæsar formed a project, which the nature of the country suggested. All round Pompey's camp, at a small distance from each other, were high and steep hills. He took possession of these, and built forts upon them; resolving, as the nature of the ground would allow, to draw lines of communication from one fort to another, and thus enclose Pompey within a circumvallation. By this means Pompey's cavalry, which was very strong, would no longer be troublesome to his convoys; they themselves would be distressed for forage; and Pompey's reputation would greatly suffer, when it was reported every where, that he had suffered himself to be imprisoned by Cæsar's works, and durst not hazard a battle to set himself at liberty. Pompey, who was determined neither to quit Dyrrachium and the sea, nor to give battle, contented himself with obstructing Cæsar's works, and giving his men as much trouble as he possibly could. For this end he extended his army, taking in a great many hills, and a large circuit of country. He raised twenty-four forts, and, in imitation of Cæsar, drew lines between them, which took in a circumference of fifteen miles, in which were arable and pasture lands to feed his horses and beasts of burden; and his works were perfected before Cæsar's, as he had more hands to employ, and a narrower circuit to enclose. When Cæsar endeavoured to gain any place near his works, he failed not to detach parties of archers and slingers, who galled his men in such a manner, that they were obliged to furnish themselves with tunics made of sackcloth or wool, or thick leather. Both parties disputed every post with the greatest obstinacy. Cæsar's purpose was to enclose Pompey in as narrow a compass as possible; and Pompey's business was to extend himself in order to weaken his enemy by dividing his forces. In one engagement Cæsar's ninth legion was in such imminent danger, that Pompey ventured to declare publicly, "that he consented

to be accounted no general, if Cæsar's men got off without considerable loss." This legion had taken possession of a hill, which they began to fortify: and Pompey seized on that which was opposite to it, and from thence sent his archers and slingers with a strong detachment of light-armed troops to attack them. He played, at the same time, his engines upon them. Cæsar soon perceived it to be impossible to make any fortification there, while he was so briskly attacked, and resolved to draw off the legion; but, as he was to make his retreat by the steep part of the hill, it proved a business very nice and dangerous. For the Pompeians, as soon as they observed Cæsar's men to retire, pressed on the more fiercely, not doubting but their retreat was the effect of the terror they had impressed upon them. Cæsar therefore ordered his men to stand their ground, and he formed a pallisado with hurdles on the ridge of the hill, and dug a ditch behind it. Then he made the legionaries file off, while some light-armed troops, posted on their flanks, protected them, and repulsed the enemy, with flights of darts and stones. But they had no sooner got behind the ditch, than the Pompeians, coming up to the hurdles, threw them into the ditch in such heaps, at convenient distances, as to make to themselves so many bridges; and, with great outcries and fierce menaces, they went pouring down the hill upon their enemies. Cæsar, sensible both of the dangerous situation of his men, and of the dishonour attending a retreat, which had all the appearance of a flight, ordered Antony, who commanded that legion, to encourage his men, and bravely fall upon the pursuers; which they did in such close order and so briskly, that notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground, they routed the Pompeians; who, while they endeavoured to escape, were not a little incommoded by the ditch and hurdles which had been designed to prevent their pursuit. Cæsar, seeing there was nothing now to fear from the ene-

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Plut. in
Pomp.

my's return, having killed a great number of them, and lost only five of his own men, retired leisurely, and, after enclosing some other hills, completed his circumvallation. It was a very extraordinary attempt for a general with an inferior army, which wanted bread, and was obliged to make use of a root called chara, pounded and kneaded with milk, to undertake the surrounding of an army much superior in number, and which abounded in every kind of provision and ammunition. Nothing certainly could shew so much the superiority of both the general and the army, than that they could dare to form such a plan, and had the industry and courage to go through with it. Such indeed was the spirit of this army, that, when their enemies reproached them with the famine they endured, they answered their insults in no other manner than by throwing among them their black loaves; glorying in their want, and declaring that they would eat the bark of trees sooner than suffer them to escape; a behaviour which struck Pompey with astonishment, and made him order the loaves of chara to be carefully picked up, and concealed as much as possible from his soldiery; saying, he never thought to have had to do with wild beasts.

This event had fully the effect which Cæsar had intended; it raised his credit all over the empire, and diminished that of his rival. Nobody doubted but that Pompey would draw off his troops into his ships, and remove the war to some distant place; and, upon this, Dolabella wrote the following letter to Cicero, who was in Pompey's camp.

DOLABELLA TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam.
2. 9.
Melm.
7. 19.

“ I shall rejoice to hear you are well; as I have the satisfaction to inform you, that both Tullia and myself are perfectly so. Terentia, indeed, has been somewhat indisposed; but is now, I am assured, perfectly recover-

ed. As to the rest of the family, they are all of them in the state you wish.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

“It would be doing me great injustice to suspect, that I have at any time advised you to join with me in the cause of Cæsar, or at least to stand neuter, more with a view to the advantage of my own party than of your interest. But, now that fortune has declared on our side, it is impossible I should be supposed to recommend this alternative for any other reason, but because the duty I owe you will not suffer me to be silent. Whether my advice therefore shall meet with your approbation, or not, you will at least be so just as to believe, that it proceeds, my dear Cicero, from an honest intention, and from a heart most sincerely desirous of your welfare.

404th con-
sulship.

“You see that neither the name of Pompey the Great, nor the credit of his former illustrious actions, nor the advantages he so frequently boasted, of having kings and nations in the number of his clients, have any thing availed him. On the contrary, he has suffered a disgrace which never, perhaps, attended any other Roman general. For, after having been driven out of Italy, and having lost both the Spains, together with a veteran army, he is now invested on all sides in such a manner, that he cannot execute what generals of the lowest capacity have often performed: he cannot even make an honourable retreat. You will consider well, agreeably to your usual prudence, what hopes can possibly remain either to him or to yourself: and the result will evidently point out the measures which are the most expedient for you to pursue. If Pompey extricates himself from this danger, in which he is involved, and takes refuge in his fleet, I entreat you to consult your own interest in preference to that of any other man. You have fully satisfied your duty, your friendship, and your engagements, to that party, which you espoused in the republic. What then remains for us but to sit down

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. 1. 3.

quietly under the republic as it now subsists, rather than, by vainly contending for the old constitution, to be absolutely deprived of both? If Pompey, therefore, should be driven from his present post, and obliged to retreat still farther; I conjure you, my dear Cicero, to withdraw to Athens, or to any other city unconcerned in the war. If you should comply with this advice, I beg you would give me notice, that I may fly to embrace you, if by any means it should be in my power. Such is our general's natural generosity, that you will find it easy to obtain from him any honourable conditions you shall demand: and I am persuaded that my solicitations will have no inconsiderable weight for this purpose."¹

But the war soon after took a very different turn, and Pompey, instead of making his escape, forced Cæsar, by an unexpected defeat, to retire towards Macedonia. Pompey, enclosed as he was, began soon to suffer great inconveniences from the want of water and forage. For Cæsar had not only turned the course of all the rivers and brooks which ran into the sea, but he had also taken the precaution to turn the current of the waters which, after a storm of rain, would fall from the mountains. This obliged the enemy to sink wells in the low and marshy grounds, which, lying at a considerable distance from some parts of the army, and being soon dried up by the heat, greatly increased the daily labour of the soldiers. As for forage, after consuming what was within the lines, they could have none, but by sea, which not coming in sufficient quantities, the horses and cattle died in great numbers. It was therefore time for Pompey to make the most vigorous efforts to force Cæsar's lines and set himself at liberty; and he made use of

¹ Velleius Paterculus informs us, that Cæsar still continued to solicit the chiefs of Pompey's party, and that Cornelius Balbus, at the peril of his life, entered privately Pompey's camp, several times, to gain the late consul Lentulus, his benefactor, who was wavering in his mind: "Tum Balbus Cornelius, excedente humanam fidem temeritate, ingressus castra hostium, sæpiusque cum Lentulo collocutus consule, dubitante, quanti se venderet, illis incrementis fecit viam, quibus non Hispaniensis natus, sed Hispanus in triumphum et pontificatum assurgeret, fieretque ex privato consul." L. 2. c. 51. 3. Krause, p. 272.

every stratagem to distress and fatigue his enemies. In the night he sent his archers wherever it appeared by the fires that their guards were, who, after pouring a flight of arrows upon them, retired instantly to their lines; so that Cæsar's men were obliged to have fires in one place, and keep guard in another. After several particular assaults, the two armies were engaged in six different actions at once; in three near Dyrrachium, and in three about the lines. We have lost the particulars of these several engagements, Cæsar's Commentaries being imperfect in this place. We gather from him, however, that the principal attack was at a fort garrisoned by a single cohort, commanded by the brave Scæva, who kept his ground for several hours against four legions, till P. Sylla brought to his assistance, by Cæsar's orders, two legions from the camp. The Pompeians were then repulsed; but they found it no easy matter to make good their retreat. Having advanced to the summit of a hill, they had reason to fear Cæsar's men would charge them in their descent; and Pompey, to sustain them, immediately took possession of an eminence out of the reach of the engines of the fort, where he threw up an intrenchment and brought more forces. But Sylla, who was intrusted with the care of the camp, satisfied to have disengaged his own men, had no intention to hazard a general battle, which might have been attended with ill consequences, and would have looked like arrogating the part of a general; and, checking the ardour of his soldiers, he brought them off from the pursuit. It was, however, generally believed, that, if he had pursued the enemy briskly, that day might have put an end to the war. "But his conduct (says Cæsar) cannot justly be censured: for there is a wide difference between a lieutenant and a general: the one is bound to act according to instructions; the other, free from restraint, is at liberty to lay hold of all advantages." In these six engagements Cæsar lost no more

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

About
645l.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 3.

than twenty men, whereas Pompey had above 2,000 of his legionaries killed, and several volunteers and centurions. In the fort, however, not a soldier came off without a wound, and four centurions lost their eyes. It appeared that 30,000 arrows had been shot into it; and Scæva shewed two-and-thirty holes in his buckler. Cæsar, to reward such heroism, presented him with 200,000 asses, and advanced him from the eighth rank of captains to the first. He also distributed military rewards to the officers and soldiers of the whole cohort, and assigned them, besides, double pay and a double allowance of corn. Pompey laboured all night at his fortifications, raised redoubts the following days, and having carried his works fifteen feet high, covered all that part of his camp with mantelets. He stayed there five days, and, taking advantage of a very dark night, he walled up the gates of this new camp, rendered all the avenues impracticable, and, drawing out all his troops in great silence, at midnight, returned to his former works.

Cæsar, after this success, drew up his army every day to insult Pompey, offering him battle; and, to provoke him to accept it, he advanced so near to his camp, that his van was within engine-shot of the ramparts. Pompey also drew out his legions, but posted them in such a manner that his third line touched the rampart, and the whole army lay under cover of the weapons discharged from thence: and in this situation Cæsar did not think proper to attack him. Pompey, induced by the scarcity of forage, had sent his horse to Dyrrachium; but there Cæsar soon laid them under the same constraint as in the camp: for, by drawing a line with forts round the town, he also effectually blocked it up. They therefore returned again by sea to the camp, where, having no forage but what was imported from Corcyra and Acarnania, the horses were often fed with leaves of trees and the roots of green reeds bruised. At

last, all expedients for their subsistence failing, Pompey resolved to set himself at liberty, if possible : and, in the execution of his design, he was greatly assisted by the counsels of two officers in Cæsar's cavalry, named Roscillus and Ægus, who, at this time, deserted to him. They were Allobrogians, the sons of Abducillus, who had long held the chief sway in his state, and, being men of singular bravery, who had done Cæsar eminent service in the wars of Gaul, he had greatly distinguished them, by raising them to the highest offices in their own country, and to a state of great wealth. These men, presuming on Cæsar's friendship, used their troopers ill, defrauded them of their pay, giving false musters, and secreted all the plunder for their own use ; a behaviour which alienated from them not only the minds of the Gallic cavalry, but of the whole army, with whom they had been in high esteem : and a general complaint was made against them. Cæsar, not thinking it a proper time for animadversion, and regarding them greatly on account of their valour, declined all public notice of the affair, and only reprimanded them in private ; admonishing them to expect every thing from his friendship, and to ground their future hopes on the experience of what he had already done for them. This rebuke, however, disgusted them greatly : and shame, a consciousness of guilt, and the fear, perhaps, of having entirely lost Cæsar's favour, made them resolve to try their fortune elsewhere, and to look out for new friendships. Having imparted their design to a few of their clients, whom they judged to be fit instruments for the execution of it, they first attempted to murder C. Volusenus, general of the cavalry, that, by so signal a piece of service, they might the more effectually recommend themselves to Pompey. But, finding that design attended with great hazard, and that no favourable opportunity offered for putting it in execution, they borrowed all the money they could, under pretence of reimbursing

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

the troops and making restitution, and having bought up a great number of horses, went over to Pompey, with those they had made privy to their counsels. As they were persons of noble birth, liberally educated, came with a great train of horses and servants, had been highly honoured by Cæsar, and were universally esteemed on account of their bravery, Pompey received them with great distinction, and ostentatiously carried them over all his camp, triumphing in this new and unexpected acquisition. For till then neither trooper nor foot-soldier had deserted to him, whereas scarce a day passed without some deserting from his army, especially among the levies in Epirus and Greece. The two brothers being well acquainted with the condition of Cæsar's camp and fortifications, where the defects of the lines lay, the particular times for every service, distances of places, strength and vigilance of the guards, with the temper and character of the officers who commanded in every post, made an exact report of all to Pompey.

Upon this intelligence, having already formed the design of forcing Cæsar's lines, he ordered the soldiers to make coverings of osier for their helmets, and provide themselves with fascines for filling up the trenches. This done, he embarked by night in boats a great number of light-armed troops and archers, with the fascines; and, having drawn together sixty cohorts from the greater camp and the forts, he led them towards that part of the enemy's line which lay nearest the sea, and was the farthest distant from their head-quarters. The boats and all the galleys that lay at Dyrrachium, filled with men and fascines, were ordered to the same spot. The place, which Pompey designed to attack, was commanded by Lentulus Marcellinus, quæstor, whose health being infirm, Fulvius Posthumus was to assist him; and it was defended by a ditch fifteen feet broad, with a rampart towards Pompey's lines, ten feet high and of equal thickness. Behind this, at the distance of 600

feet, was another rampart, somewhat lower than the former, and fronting the contrary way, designed as a defence against an attack from the sea. But the line that was to join the two ramparts, and run along the sea-shore, was not yet completed: and this Pompey being informed of, it was of fatal consequence to Cæsar. Pompey's sixty cohorts approached at break of day towards Cæsar's line, and, by their sudden appearance, greatly surprised the cohort of the ninth legion upon guard. They planted their scaling-ladders against the inward rampart, and, plying those who defended it with darts and engines, spread a general terror over all that part of the works, which was still increased by the multitude of archers that poured flights of arrows on all sides. In this extremity, the only refuge of Cæsar's men was to ply the enemy with stones; but these were prevented from doing much execution by the osiers with which the Pompeians had bound their helmets. At the same time the troops that came by sea assailed the exterior rampart, and soon discovering the defect in the lines, landed their men between the two ramparts, where the line of communication towards the sea remained unfinished: and thus, attacking in the rear the soldiers that defended them, they obliged them to withdraw from both.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Marcellinus, apprized of this disorder, detached some cohorts to sustain the flying troops: but, as the rout was become general, they could neither persuade them to rally, nor were able themselves to withstand the enemy's charge. The more supplies he sent, the greater confusion was created, and the means of escape became more difficult. In this action the eagle-bearer of the ninth legion, finding himself dangerously wounded, and that his strength began to fail, called to some troopers who passed by, and said: "I have carefully preserved, to the last moment of my life, this eagle, with which I have been intrusted; and now that I am dying, I return

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

it to Cæsar with the same fidelity : carry it to him, I beseech you, nor suffer his arms to experience, in losing it, an ignominy with which they have been hitherto unacquainted." Thus the eagle was preserved, but all the centurions, except one, of the first cohort was killed. The Pompeians, now bearing down all before them, approached the quarters of Marcellinus, when M. Antony, who commanded in the nearest forts, was seen descending, with twelve cohorts, from the higher grounds. His arrival put a stop to the enemy's progress : and soon after Cæsar came up in person with more troops, being informed of the attack by the smoke of the forts, the usual signal on these occasions. He perceived that Pompey had forced the lines, and had lodged himself on a spot from whence he could freely forage, and which allowed him a communication with the sea, and, altering entirely the project he had formed of enclosing him, he encamped as near to him as he could.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 3.

An eagerness to repair this loss was like to be the cause of his total ruin. No sooner were the intrenchments of his new camp finished, than he was informed by his scouts, that a certain number of the enemy's cohorts, which appeared to them to be a complete legion, were retired behind a wood, and seemed to be on their march to an old camp, which had been successively occupied and abandoned by Cæsar and Pompey. This camp bordered upon a wood, and was about 400 paces from the sea : it had been formed by Cæsar's ninth legion, when they were sent to oppose a body of Pompey's troops. Upon their removing to a greater distance, Pompey had taken possession of it, and, intending to lodge in it several legions, surrounded it with more extensive intrenchments, enclosing a small camp within one of a larger circumference. He likewise carried an intrenchment from the left angle of his camp to the river through the space of about 400 paces, which

enabled him to water freely and without danger ; but all these works he had thought proper to abandon. Hither the scouts reported they saw the standard of a legion carried, which was also confirmed by those who were stationed in the higher forts. The place was about 500 paces from Pompey's new camp, and Cæsar hoped, that, if he could get to the old camp, unperceived by Pompey, he would be able to surprise the legion and cut it off. He set out therefore as privately as possible with thirty-three cohorts, in which number was the ninth legion, that had lately lost so many of its centurions and soldiers : and, taking a circuit, arrived before Pompey had notice of his design. Though the intrenchments were strong, yet charging the enemy briskly with his left wing, where he commanded in person, he quickly drove them from the rampart : but they continued some time to defend the gates, which were secured by a barricade ; and here T. Pulcio, formerly an officer in Cæsar's army, and who had betrayed C. Antonius, gave signal proofs of his valour. At length Cæsar's men prevailed, cut down the barricade, broke into the greater camp, and pursued the legion into the inward and lesser one. But fortune, says Cæsar, which often effects mighty changes from trifling causes, and whose influence is never greater than in war, shewed its power on this occasion. For the cohorts of Cæsar's right wing, unacquainted with the situation of the camp, and mistaking the rampart which led to the river for one of its sides, marched on that way in quest of a gate ; but, perceiving their error, they got over the rampart, and were followed by all the cavalry. This delay saved the enemy : for Pompey, having notice of what passed, brought up a legion and a large body of horse to sustain his party ; which, being seen advancing by both sides, quickly changed the face of affairs. Pompey's legion, encouraged by this succour, bravely defended themselves, and

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

stood their ground : on the other hand Cæsar's cavalry, who had entered by a narrow breach in the rampart, foreseeing that a retreat would be extremely difficult, made off immediately. The right wing, which had no communication with the left, observing the consternation of the cavalry, and fearing they should be overpowered within the camp, retired the same way they had entered ; and many, to avoid being engaged in the narrow passes, threw themselves into the ditch ; where, the first ranks being trodden to death, their bodies afforded an easy passage for those that followed. The left wing, who, from the rampart whence they had driven the enemy, saw Pompey advancing against them, and their own men flying, fearing to be entangled in the defiles, as they had the enemy upon them both within and without the camp, began also to retreat. Nothing was to be seen but consternation and disorder : and all Cæsar's efforts to rally his men were fruitless. If he seized any of them, they struggled till they got away : if he laid hold of their colours, they left them in his hands : not a man could be prevailed upon to face about. In this calamity, what saved the army, says Cæsar, from entire destruction was, that Pompey, apprehending an ambuscade (probably because the success was beyond his hopes, as a little before he had seen his men worsted and put to flight), durst not for some time approach the intrenchments, and that his cavalry were retarded in the pursuit by the narrowness of the ways and the difficulty of passing the forts which Cæsar's soldiers were masters of. In these two actions Cæsar lost 960 soldiers, thirty officers, and several knights of note : most of whom died without wounds, being trodden to death in the ditch, or on the banks of the river. He lost also thirty-three colours. The prisoners were delivered up to Labienus, at his request ; and this deserter, brutal and cruel as usual, diverted himself with insulting

them in their calamity ; and, after asking them sarcastically, whether it was common for prisoners to run away, he caused them all to be put to death.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

Pompey was saluted imperator upon this occasion ; a title which he bore ever after ; but neither in his letters nor his consular ensigns did he think proper to assume the laurel. His party was so elated with this success, that they thought the war at an end, and proclaimed every where their victory with great exaggerations.^m

404th con-
sulship.

Cæsar, seeing all his projects disconcerted, called his troops from the several forts into his camp, where, having assembled them, he said, “ That they ought not to be any wise discouraged at what had happened, but should put in the balance with their present loss their many successful engagements ; and should consider how fortune had hitherto befriended them in the reduction of Italy, which they had effected without bloodshed ; in the conquest of the two Spains, though defended by warlike troops under the conduct of skilful and experienced leaders ; in the subjection of Epirus and the neighbouring provinces, whence they had been supplied with provisions ; and in their passing safe over the sea when the enemy covered it with their fleets, and were possessed of all the havens and coasts. If they were not successful in every thing, they must endeavour (he said), by prudence, to overcome the disappointments of fortune ; and attribute their late disaster to the caprice of that goddess, rather than to any fault on their side : for that he

^m Cicero does not appear to have been in the same humour. We have a letter from him to Atticus, written at this time from Dyrrachium, which is as follows : “ You complain of not hearing from me, but I have nothing to send you that is worth your notice : for I absolutely disapprove of every thing that is done, and every thing that happens here. I wish I had rather conferred with you, at a certain time, than corresponded by letters. I defend you here with our party as well as I am able, and so does Celer. I have hitherto declined all employment, and the rather, because I saw none in which I could act consistently with my character and situation.

“ You ask me what news : you may know from Isidorus what has lately happened : what remains to be done doth not seem more difficult.—My anxieties prey upon me so much, that I am reduced to a very low state of health : when I am somewhat recovered, I shall join our general, who is now very sanguine in his hopes. Our friend Brutus acts in this cause with great spirit. This is all I can say to you consistently with prudence. Adieu.” Ad Att. 11. 4.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

had led them on successfully, and had forced the enemy's camp; and, if some sudden consternation, the mistaking their way, or any other mishap, had snatched a certain victory out of their hands, they ought to exert their utmost endeavours to repair the disgrace: which would turn their misfortunes to a benefit, as it had happened at Gergovia, where those, who had been seized with a dread of the enemy, soon after earnestly urged him to lead them to battle." This artful speech was followed by the disgrace of some standard-bearers, who were reduced to the rank of private soldiers: but there was little occasion for severity; for the whole army was so grieved at their loss, and so desirous of expunging the stain their glory had received, that it was scarcely requisite for the officers to remind them of their duty. They begged with one voice to be led to the enemy, and some of the more considerable commanders entreated Cæsar to venture a battle; but he did not think it prudent to expose in the field, against an enemy elated with success, troops that had been just worsted, and in whom deep impressions might remain of their late fright. He therefore resolved to change his camp, and the whole plan of the war, and to give them time to recover themselves. As soon as night approached, he sent all the sick and wounded with the baggage to Apollonia, under the guard of one legion, ordering them not to stop till they had reached the place: and at three in the morning he made all his forces, except two legions, file out of the several gates of the camp, and follow the same route that the baggage had taken. Soon after, that his march might not have the appearance of a flight, and be known to the enemy as late as possible, he ordered the usual signal of decamping to be given, and, setting out with the rest of the troops, lost sight of the camp in a moment. Pompey, informed of his retreat, prepared to follow him without delay, and sent his cavalry to harass and retard his rear-guard: but Cæsar, having no baggage, marched

with such expedition, that they did not come up with him till he had reached the river Genusus. He sent his horse with some light-armed troops against them, who charged with such vigour, that they turned their backs and returned to Pompey, leaving a considerable number of their men dead upon the field. Cæsar, having crossed the Genusus and made a day's march, took up his quarters in his old camp at Asparagium; where he gave strict orders to the soldiers not to stroll without the rampart, and charged the cavalry, which he sent out, as it were to forage, to return without delay by the Decuman gate, which was the most remote from the enemy. Pompey also took up his quarters in the camp he had formerly made, where the works being entire, and the soldiers having nothing to do, some made long excursions in quest of wood and forage, and others, who had come almost without any baggage, having set out on a sudden, enticed by the nearness of their former camp, laid down their arms in their tents, and went to fetch what they had left behind. This dispersion rendered them unable to continue the pursuit, as Cæsar had foreseen; and about noon he gave the signal for decamping, and, by doubling that day's march, gained eight miles upon Pompey. The following days he set out at three every morning, and Pompey, after attempting for three days to overtake him, gave over the pursuit on the fourth, and began to think of other measures.

Both generals had at this time armies in Macedonia. Cæsar, when he was joined by M. Antony with the troops from Italy, received a deputation from Thessaly and Ætolia, with assurances of submission from all the states in those parts, on condition that he would send troops to defend them: He had accordingly dispatched L. Cassius Longinus into Thessaly with a legion of new levies and 200 horse; and C. Calvisius Sabinus into Ætolia with five cohorts: desiring them, as these provinces lay nearest his camp, to provide him with corn.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

The latter was well received by the Ætolians, and, having driven out the enemy's garrison from Calydon and Naupactum, possessed himself of the whole country. In Thessaly, there were two factions: Egeresetus, a man of years and of established credit, favoured Pompey: Petreius, a young nobleman, exerted his whole influence in behalf of Cæsar. About the same time, Cn. Domitius Calvinus was ordered into Macedonia, with the eleventh and twelfth legions and 500 horse: whither he had been also invited by Menedemus, a principal man of the country, who assured him of the general affection of the inhabitants. Pompey, on his side, sent messengers to Scipio in Syria to hasten his march, and come and join him with the legions under his command. Cæsar gives us a strange account of this proconsul's behaviour in his province, which corresponds, however, very well with the rest of his life. He tells us, that, after receiving some affronts and checks from the barbarous people of Mount Amanus, he assumed the title of imperator; that he exacted great sums of money from the neighbouring states and princes; obliged the farmers of the revenue to pay the two years' taxes which lay in their hands, and advance a third by way of loan; and sent orders to the whole province for levying cavalry. In his progress through Asia Minor, he found the natives in the greatest terror on account of the Parthians; and his soldiers declared, that, though they were ready to serve against a public enemy, they were not disposed to act against the consul and their fellow-citizens. But, to stifle their discontents, he not only made them considerable presents, but quartered them in Pergamus, and other rich towns, and gave up the whole country to their discretion. Heavy exactions, nevertheless, were made upon the province, and various new pretences devised to serve as a ground for them. Freedmen and slaves were subjected to a capitation tax: imposts were laid on pillars and doors of houses: corn, soldiers, mari-

ners, arms, engines, carriages, in a word, every thing that had a name, furnished a sufficient handle for extorting money: governors were appointed not only over towns, but over villages and castles; and he that acted with the greatest rigour and cruelty was accounted the worthiest man, and the best citizen. The province swarmed with lictors, overseers, and collectors, who, besides the sums imposed by public authority, exacted money likewise on their own account; colouring their iniquitous demands with a pretence that they had been expelled their country and native homes, and were in want of every thing. Add to all these calamities immoderate usury, an evil inseparable from such exorbitant exactions; for, when sums are called for beyond what a country is able to furnish, they are obliged to apply for a delay, which, at any interest, is still accounted a favour. Thus the debts of the province increased immensely these two years. Scipio had given orders to seize all the treasure of the temple of Diana at Ephesus, with all the statues of that goddess, when he received letters from Pompey, to lay aside all other concerns, and advance to him. Josephus relates, that, while he was in Syria, he beheaded Alexander, prince of the Jews, under the frivolous pretext of his having formerly occasioned some disturbances in Judea; but in truth, because he favoured Cæsar's cause, like his unfortunate father, Aristobulus, who had been poisoned a little before by Pompey's partisans, for the same reason.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Jos. Ant.
14. 13. and
15.

On Scipio's arrival in Macedonia, he found there Domitius, and advanced towards him by great marches; but, being come within twenty miles of him, he suddenly changed his route, and, leaving M. Favonius at the river Haliacmon, which separates Macedonia from Thessaly, with eight cohorts to guard the baggage, and there to raise a fort, he turned off in quest of Cassius Longinus, and marched so expeditiously, that he was actually arrived before Cassius had notice of his approach. At the same

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

time king Cotus's cavalry came pouring upon Cassius's camp, who, knowing that Scipio was not far distant, believed the cavalry to be his, and retired, in a fright, to the mountains that begirt Thessaly, and thence directed his course towards Ambracia. Scipio, when he was preparing to follow him, was called back by Favonius, who informed him that Domitius was marching towards him, and that it would be impossible for him to defend his post. Marching, therefore, day and night without intermission, he arrived so opportunely, that his advanced guards and the dust of Domitius's army were descried at the same time. Thus Domitius's care preserved Cassius, and Scipio's diligence Favonius. These two generals kept one another in play, during the blockade of Dyrrachium, without coming to any decisive engagement. During which time, also, Calenus, taking the command of Cassius's and Calvisius's troops, penetrated into Achaia, where Delphos, Thebes, and Orchomenus, submitted to him : but he was stopped in his conquest by a lieutenant of Pompey, Rutilius Lupus, who kept him out of the Peloponnesus.

Cæsar, from Apollonia, where he stayed but to provide for his wounded, pay his army, and garrison the towns in his interest, set out to join Domitius Calvinus. He perceived, that, if Pompey followed him, he must leave the sea and the ammunition and provision he had treasured up at Dyrrachium, and be reduced to engage him on equal terms ; and, if Pompey passed into Italy, he purposed to join Domitius and march to its defence, by the coast of Illyricum : in fine, if Pompey should fall upon Apollonia and Oricum, and endeavour to exclude him from the sea-coast, he intended to attack Scipio, and thereby force Pompey to come to his assistance. Cæsar, therefore, had dispatched couriers to Calvinus to acquaint him with his designs, and with orders how to act ; and, having left four cohorts at Apollonia, one at Lissus, and three at Oricum, marched through Epirus and Acar-

nania. Pompey, on his side, penetrating into Cæsar's views, made what haste he could to join Scipio, that, if Cæsar should march that way, he might prevent his being overpowered: but should he still keep near the sea, because of the legions and cavalry he expected from Italy, in that event he purposed to fall upon Calvinus with all his forces. Both generals, therefore, marched with the greatest expedition, as well to afford timely relief to their friends, as not to miss the opportunity of distressing their enemies. Cæsar, however, had been forced to turn off to Apollonia, and Pompey, taking the direct way through Candavia, arrived first in Macedonia: and fortune had almost thrown Domitius into his hands. For Cæsar's late defeat, which the Pompeians greatly exaggerated in their letters, having induced several states to throw off their allegiance, his couriers to Domitius were intercepted; and this general, having consumed all the provisions near his camp, had quitted it at this time, and was upon his march to Heraclea Sentica, a town of the Candavians. What saved him was, that his scouts met accidentally with some Allobrogians, servants of Ægus and Roscillus, who, either from ancient familiarity or from a motive of vain-glory, informed them of all that had passed, and of Pompey's approach: which news being immediately carried to Calvinus, who was not above four hours' march from the enemy, he instantly turned off, and joined Cæsar at Æginium, a town on the borders of Thessaly.

Year of
 R O M E
 705.
 B. C. 47.

404th con-
 sulship.

From Æginium Cæsar marched with all his forces to Gomphi, the first town of Thessaly on the side of Epirus. A few months before, the inhabitants of their own accord had sent him a deputation, to petition for a garrison, and make him an offer of what their country produced: but now Androthenes, prætor of Thessaly, choosing rather to be the companion of Pompey's good fortune, than a partner with Cæsar in his adversity, ordered all the people, whether free or slaves, to assemble in the town, and,

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

having shut the gates against Cæsar, sent letters to Scipio and Pompey to come to his assistance, intimating, that the town was strong enough to hold out if they used dispatch, but was by no means in a condition to sustain a long siege. Scipio was then at Larissa, and Pompey had not yet entered Thessaly. Cæsar, after fortifying his camp and preparing every thing for a sudden attack, called his soldiers together, and represented to them, “ of what consequence it was to make themselves masters of an opulent city, abounding in all sorts of commodities, and by the terror of whose punishment other states would be awed into submission : and this must be done before any succours could arrive.” His soldiers having shewed an uncommon ardour, he led them on to the assault at three in the afternoon, and was master of it before sunset. After giving it up to be plundered by his soldiers, he marched on to Metropolis, where he arrived before the inhabitants were apprized of the disaster of their neighbours. The Metropolitans proposed at first to stand upon their defence, but, being made acquainted with the fate of Gomphi, they opened their gates, and Cæsar suffered no harm to be done them. The other states of Thessaly, observing the different fates of these two cities, readily submitted ; except Larissa, which was awed by Scipio’s legions. Cæsar now resolved to encamp, and wait for Pompey. For this purpose he pitched upon a convenient spot near a town called Pharsalus : and the adjacent country being good, and covered with corn, which was now almost ripe,ⁿ he

ⁿ This circumstance determines nearly the time of the Julian year when Cæsar sat down in Thessaly, and that of the battle of Pharsalia, which was about a month after ; and as we know the day of the Roman year when this said battle was fought, it serves to determine the relation of the Roman with the Julian year. In a discourse of M. de la Nauze, printed in the 26th volume of the *Memoires de Literature*, of the Royal Academy of Paris, we find the following note : “ M. l’Abbé Belley a depuis communiqué, à l’auteur de ce memoire, l’extrait suivant d’une lettre écrite à M. Pellerin par M. de Clairambault, consul de France a Salonique, en date du 4 Janvier, 1755 : Suivant les informations que j’ai demandées en Thessalie, et suivant ce que m’en on rapporte ici les gens de ce pays-la, la moisson s’y fait dans le mois de Juin ; et du côté de Larissa et de Tricala, c’est dès les premiers jours de Juin ; et du côté de Jannina et des environs, ce n’est que du 15 au 20 du même mois.”

thought it a proper situation for the theatre of war, and for determining his quarrel with his rival.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

Pompey came soon into Thessaly, and, joining Scipio's legions with his own in one camp, he first thanked his own men for their late important services, and then exhorted Scipio's troops to claim their share of the booty to which his late victory had entitled them. He divided all the honours of command with Scipio, ordering a prætorian tent to be prepared for him, and the trumpets to attend him. This increase of strength, by the union of two powerful armies, raised to such a height the presumption of his followers, and their assurance of victory, that now all delays were considered in no other light than as an odious hinderance of their return into Italy: insomuch that, if Pompey on any occasion acted with slowness and circumspection, they complained, "that he industriously protracted the war, which could easily be brought to a conclusion in one day, in the view of gratifying his ambition for command, and keeping in his dependance such a number of consular and prætorian senators." They began to contend with one another about the dignities and priesthoods of the state, and disposed of the consulship for several years. They even sued for the houses and estates of those who followed Cæsar's party: and a warm debate arose in council, whether L. Hirrus, whom Pompey had sent ambassador to the Parthians, should be allowed, in the next election for prætors, to stand a candidate for that office in his absence. His friends implored Pompey to make good the promise he had made him at his departure, and not suffer him to be deceived by depending on his honour; while such as aspired to this office complained publicly that a promise should be made to any one candidate, when all were embarked in the same cause, and shared the like dangers. Great was the competition, and not without personal abuse, between Lentulus Spinther, L. Domitius, and Scipio, about the high-priesthood, with which Cæsar was

404th consulship.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

invested ; the first pleading his age, the second his dignity and interest in the city, the third his alliance with Pompey. Attius Rufus impeached Afranius before his general, charging him with being the cause of the loss of the army in Spain. L. Domitius moved in council, that, after Cæsar's destruction a commission, of the senators in Pompey's camp should be empowered to pronounce judgment upon those who had either stayed in Italy, or, after removing to countries under Pompey's command, had taken no share in the war ; and that three billets should be given to these judges—one for acquittal, one for condemnation, and a third for a pecuniary fine. Thus every one's thoughts were employed on the honours and profit he was to share, or the vengeance he hoped to inflict upon his enemies : but no one considered by what methods the victory was to be obtained, looking now upon Cæsar as a certain and easy conquest. This account of the behaviour of the Pompeian chiefs is not only given by Cæsar, but by all the other historians ; and well might Cicero conceive the greatest disgust for the company he was engaged with.* There is one cir-

* We have Cicero's account of things in a letter to M. Marius, written in the year 707 : " I resolved to sacrifice all considerations of personal safety to the dictates of my honour : and accordingly I joined Pompey in Greece. But I no sooner arrived in his army, than I had occasion to repent of my resolution ; not so much from the danger to which I was myself exposed, as from the many capital faults I discovered among them : in the first place, Pompey's forces were neither very considerable in point of numbers" [at the battle of Pharsalia, they were more than double of those of Cæsar], " nor by any means composed of warlike troops ; and, in the next place, excepting Pompey himself, and a few others of the principal leaders, they carried on the war with such a spirit of rapaciousness, and breathed such principles of cruelty in their conversation, that I could not think even upon our success without horror. To this I must add, that some of our most dignified men were deeply involved in debt ; and, in short, there was nothing good among them but their cause. Thus, despairing of success, I advised (what indeed I had always recommended) that proposals of accommodation should be offered to Cæsar ; and, when I found Pompey utterly averse to all measures of that kind, I endeavoured to persuade him at least to avoid a general battle. This last advice he seemed sometimes inclined to follow ; and, probably, would have followed, if a certain engagement, in which his troops behaved bravely, and he gained the victory, had not given him too great a confidence in them. From that moment, all the skill and conduct of this great man seem to have forsaken him : and he acted so little like a general, that, with a raw and unexperienced army" [he had at Pharsalia eleven legions of Roman citizens, of which eight were made up of veterans], " he imprudently gave battle to the most brave and martial legions. The consequence was, that he suffered a most shameful defeat ; and, abandoning his camp to Cæsar, he was obliged to run away unaccompanied even with a single attendant." Ad Fam. 7. 3. Melm. 8. 1. It is certain, therefore, that Pompey was not driven, as Dr. Middleton puts it, by a sense of shame, and

cumstance suggested to us by Cicero which had the greatest influence in determining Pompey's conduct at this time, his superstitious regard to omens, and the admonitions of diviners; to which his nature was strongly addicted. The Haruspices were all on his side, and flattered him with every thing that was prosperous; and, besides those in his own camp, the whole fraternity of them at Rome were sending him perpetual accounts of the fortunate and auspicious significations which they had observed in the entrails of their victims.^p

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

The two armies were now in sight of each other; and Cæsar, having provided for the subsistence of his troops, and given them some days' rest, thought it time to make a trial how Pompey stood affected to a general engagement. Accordingly, he drew out all his forces in order of battle, but first near his camp, and at a good distance from Pompey's; and each day he drew nearer and nearer to him; inspiring his men by this conduct with fresh courage, and a contempt of an army that dared not to leave the heights where they were encamped. His cavalry being much inferior in number to those of the enemy, he followed a method he had formerly put in practice with success to strengthen them. He singled out the stoutest and nimblest of his foot soldiers, and accustomed them to fight within the ranks of the horse; who were thereby so much emboldened, that, though but 1,000 in number, they would upon occasion sustain the charge of Pompey's 7,000; and in one skirmish they had actually the advantage, and killed Ægus, one of the Allobrogian brothers.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 3

Pompey, who was come to Pharsalia with a firm resolution to give battle, drew up his army at the foot of the

against his judgment, to the experiment of a decisive action: "Pompeius, longe diversa aliis suadentibus (quorum plerique hortabantur, ut in Italiam transmitteret: alii, ut bellum traheret, quod dignatione partium in dies ipsis magis prosperum fieret) usus impetu suo, hostem secutus est." Vell. Pat. l. 2. c. 52. 2. Kranse, p. 275.

^p "Hoc civili bello, Dii immortales!—quæ nobis in Græciam Roma responsa Haruspicum missa sunt? quæ dicta Pompeio?—etenim ille admodum extis et ostentis movebatur." De Div. 2. 24. Rath. p. 197.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

mountain, upon which his camp stood ; presuming, that such was Cæsar's eagerness and temerity, that he would venture to fight him in that disadvantageous situation. This Cæsar would in no manner consent to ; and, despairing to draw his adversary to battle on equal terms, he determined to move his camp, and to be always upon the march ; in hopes, that by frequently shifting his ground, he might the better be supplied with provisions, harass his enemy less used to fatigue, and find an opportunity of forcing them to a general action. But just as the order for marching was given, Cæsar perceived that Pompey had quitted his intrenchments, and advanced farther than usual with his army in array, on a spot where he could engage them without disadvantage : and, turning to his soldiers, " Let us no longer (said he) think of marching ; now is the time for fighting, so long wished for ; let us, therefore, arm ourselves with courage, and not miss so favourable an opportunity." Upon this, he immediately drew out his forces. Pompey's real design was to draw on a battle : he had taken his resolution, and, in a council of war, held two days before, he had declared, " that Cæsar's army would be defeated before the infantry came to engage." And when some expressed their surprise at this speech : " I know (said he) that what I promise appears almost incredible ; but hear the reasons on which I ground my confidence, that you may advance to battle with the greater assurance. I have engaged the cavalry to promise, that, as soon as the armies draw near, they shall fall upon Cæsar's right wing ; and, taking it in flank and rear, force it to recoil in confusion upon the main body, and thus throw the whole army into disorder before we have launched a dart. In this manner we shall obtain a complete victory without exposing the legions to any peril ; nor can there be any difficulty in the design, since we are so much superior to them in cavalry." He warned them at the same time " to be in readiness for battle ; and that, since per-

mission to fight the enemy, which they had so often demanded, was now granted them, to answer by their valour the expectation every one had conceived of them."

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

Labienuſ highly applauded this ſcheme; and, expreſſing the greateſt contempt for Cæſar's army, which he aſſured them was almoſt entirely made up of new levies, raiſed in Cisalpine Gaul, and eſpecially in the colonies beyond the Po, he took an oath, which he proffered to all thoſe that were preſent, never to return again to their camp, unleſs victorious. After theſe ſolemn engagements, they ſeparated, full of joy and expectation, aſſuring themſelves of victory; and relying entirely on the ability of their general, who, in an affair of that importance, would promiſe nothing, they were confident, without a certainty of ſucceſs.

404th con-
ſulſhip.

The two armies were drawn up in the following manner: Pompey, placed in his left wing, where he deſigned to command in perſon, the two legions taken from Cæſar in the beginning of the quarrel by a decree of the ſenate. Scipio was in the centre, with the legions he had brought out of Syria; and the Cilician legion, joined to the Spaniſh cohorts brought over by Afranius, formed the right wing. Theſe Pompey eſteemed his beſt troops. The reſt of his forces he diſtributed between the wings and the main body. He had in all 45,000 men, beſides two cohorts of volunteers who had ſerved under him in his former wars; and who, out of affection to their old general, though their legal time was expired, flocked to his ſtandard on this occaſion, and were diſperſed by him in different quarters of his army. His other ſeven cohorts were left to guard the camp and the adjoining forts. The Enipeuſ covered his right wing; and, on that account, he placed all the horſe with the archers and ſlingers in the left. Cæſar, obſerving his ancient cuſtom, placed the tenth legion in the right, and the ninth in the left wing; and, as this laſt was conſiderably weakened by the ſeveral actions at Dyrrachium, he joined

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

the eighth to it in such a manner, that they formed as it were but one legion, and had orders mutually to succour each other. His whole army amounted to fourscore cohorts, making in all 22,000 men ; besides two cohorts left to guard the camp. Domitius Calvinus was in the centre, M. Antony in the left wing, and P. Sylla in the right. Cæsar himself took his post opposite to Pompey, at the head of the tenth legion ; and, as he had observed that the disposition of the enemy was contrived to out-flank his right wing, to obviate that inconveniency, he made a draught of six cohorts from his rear line, formed them into a separate body, and opposed them to Pompey's horse, instructing them in the part they were to act, and admonishing them, that the success of that day would depend chiefly on their courage. At the same time he charged the whole army, and particularly the third line, not to advance to battle without orders, which when he saw it proper he would give by making the usual signal. In his harangue to them before the battle, after reminding them of the many favours received at his hands, he chiefly insisted “ on the injustice and obstinacy of his enemies, who had forced him to enter upon this war, and to prosecute it against his will. They themselves, he told them, had been witnesses of his earnest endeavours after peace, and that he had left nothing unattempted to avoid wasting the blood of his soldiers, and to spare the commonwealth the loss of her armies.” After his speech, observing the ardour of his soldiers for the fight, he ordered the trumpets to sound the charge. Among the soldiers in Cæsar's army was one Crastinus, a man of distinguished courage, who, the year before, had been first centurion of the tenth legion. This brave officer, as soon as the signal was given, called out to those next him, “ Follow me, you that were formerly under my command, and acquit yourselves of the duty you owe to your general. This one battle will restore him to his proper dignity, and us to the enjoy-

ment of our freedom." At the same time, turning to Cæsar, "General (says he), this day you shall be satisfied with my behaviour; and, whether I live or die, I will deserve your commendations." So saying, he marched up to the enemy, and began the attack with 120 select men who followed him.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Between the two armies there was space enough for them to move forwards upon one another, and form a shock, as is usual: but Pompey had given his troops orders to keep their ground, that Cæsar's troops might have all the way to make. In this, he is said to have been directed by the advice of Triarius, that the enemy's ranks might be disordered, and the soldiers put out of breath, by having so far to run. It was also thought, that the enemy's javelins would have less effect upon his troops at rest, than if they sprung forward to meet them. "But herein (says Cæsar), he seems to have acted contrary to reason; because there is a certain alacrity and ardour of mind naturally planted in every man, which is inflamed by the desire of fighting, and which an able general, far from repressing, will, by all the methods he can devise, foment and cherish; nor was it a vain institution of our ancestors, that the trumpets should sound on every side; and that the whole army should raise a shout, in order to animate the courage of their own men, and strike a terror into the enemy." However, Cæsar's soldiers entirely defeated Pompey's hopes by their good discipline and experience: for, perceiving the enemy did not stir, they halted of their own accord, in the midst of their career; and, having taken a moment's breath, put themselves a second time in motion, marched up in good order, flung their javelins, and then, as Cæsar had ordered, betook themselves to their swords. Nor did Pompey's men act with less presence of mind; for they bravely sustained their attack; and, having launched their javelins, immediately had also recourse to their swords. At this instant, Pompey's horse,

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Florus, l. 4.
c. 2.

supported by the archers and slingers, attacked Cæsar's; and, having compelled them to give ground, began to extend themselves in order to flank the infantry. Whereupon Cæsar gave the signal to the six cohorts, who fell on Pompey's cavalry with such fury, that they not only drove them from the field of battle, but even forced them to take refuge in the mountains. It is reported by some historians, that Cæsar ordered his soldiers to aim at the faces of the enemy; and that this contrivance served much to disorder the nice and effeminate knights, who could not bear the thoughts of being disfigured. He himself, however, has not mentioned this stratagem. The archers and slingers, deprived of the protection of the horse, were soon cut to pieces. The same cohorts, having thus driven the cavalry entirely out of the field, turned upon the enemy's left wing, and began to charge it in the rear. Cæsar at the same time brought up his third line, which had not been engaged. The left wing of the enemy, thus attacked in front by fresh troops, and in the rear by the victorious cohorts, made but a faint resistance, and fled to their camp. Pompey, upon seeing that part of his army, on which he chiefly depended, put into disorder, despaired of being able to restore the battle, had retired from the field to wait the event in his tent. Cæsar, though the battle lasted till noon, and the weather was excessively hot, yet, encouraging his soldiers, led them on, notwithstanding their fatigue, to attack the intrenchments of the vanquished. The camp was bravely defended by the cohorts left for its guard, and particularly by a body of Thracians and other barbarians. The soldiers who had fled from the battle were in too great a consternation to think of any thing but of making their escape. These fresh troops were overpowered however, driven from the rampart, and forced to fly to the neighbouring mountains.

Pompey, perceiving that all was lost, and that his intrenchments were forced, quitting his military dress for

a habit more suitable to his ill fortune, mounted his horse, and, withdrawing by the Decuman gate, rode full speed to Larissa. He would not enter the town, though invited by the citizens, that he might not expose them to the resentment of Cæsar: but, having called for what he wanted, he advised them to submit to the conqueror. Thence, continuing his flight day and night, without intermission, he arrived on the sea-side with thirty horse, and went on board a ship of burden; after complaining “that he had been so far deceived in his opinion of his followers, as to see those very men, from whom he expected victory, the first to fly, and betray him to his enemies.” His camp shewed how little he and his followers dreamed of the issue of that day. The tents of the grandees were adorned with branches of myrtle, and shaded with ivy; the tables were found covered, the sideboards loaded with plate; and, in a word, every thing gave proofs of the highest luxury, and the greatest assurance of victory.

Cæsar, not thinking his victory yet complete, earnestly entreated his soldiers to form a line of circumvallation round the mountain, whither a part of the conquered army had retired. But the Pompeians quickly abandoned a post which for want of water was not tenable, and endeavoured to reach the city of Larissa: whereupon Cæsar, dividing his army, left one part to guard Pompey’s camp, sent back another to his own, and, with four legions, taking a nearer road than that by which the enemy passed, he found means to intercept them, and after six miles’ march drew up in order of battle. However, the vanquished troops once more found protection from a mountain, at the foot of which ran a rivulet. Though Cæsar’s men were greatly fatigued by fighting the whole day, yet before night they flung up some works which were sufficient to prevent the enemy from having any communication with the rivulet: who, by this step, being cut off from all hopes of relief, or of

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Dio.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Plut. in
Pomp.

making good their retreat, sent deputies to treat of a surrendry. Affairs continued in this situation all that night, and some senators took the occasion to make their escape. At break of day they came down into the plain, and delivered up their arms; humbly imploring Cæsar's goodness, and suing for mercy. He not only granted them readily their lives, but spoke to them with the greatest humanity, and gave strict orders that nothing should be taken from them. He then sent for the legions that had passed the night in the camp, to relieve those he had employed in the pursuit: and, being determined to follow Pompey, he began his march, and arrived the same day at Larissa. Thus Cæsar, by his admirable skill, and the indefatigable industry of his soldiers, obtained the most complete and important victory. According to his own account, he lost but 200 men,^p with thirty centurions. To the body of Crastinus, who had been killed in the beginning of the engagement, he ordered particular honours to be paid. On Pompey's side there fell 15,000; of whom the greatest number were servants, and those who guarded the tents; only 6,000 soldiers were killed, ten senators and forty knights. Upwards of 24,000 were made prisoners; for the cohorts that garrisoned the forts surrendered to Sylla: 180 colours and nine eagles were taken. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, that mortal enemy to Cæsar, was overtaken in his flight, and put to death.^q Dio relates, that Cæsar caused all those to be slain, who, having been once pardoned, had a second time carried arms against him. But this circumstance may well be doubted, since all the historians are unanimous in extolling his clemency both in the battle and after it.^r As soon as he

^p Plutarch and Appian say 1,200.

^q Cicero (Philip. 2. c. 29. Weiske, p. 358.) accuses Antony of having killed Domitius, and some others whom Cæsar probably would have spared: "Fueras in acie Pharsalica antesignanus: L. Domitium, nobilissimum et clarissimum virum, occideras: multos, qui de prælio effugerant, quos Cæsar, ut nonnullos, fortasse servasset, crudelissime persecutus trucidaras." He commanded, probably, the forces sent after the runaways.

^r "Illud notandum est: ut primum C. Cæsar inclinatam vidit Pompeianorum aciem;

saw his enemies defeated, he cried to his soldiers to spare the blood of their fellow-citizens. Upon viewing the field of battle, he said with a sigh: "They have forced me to this sad necessity. Cæsar must have sought the assistance of his soldiers, or must have perished." He generously pardoned all those he had made prisoners: and Pliny and Seneca have observed that, having found in Pompey's tent a great many letters from several great men, in which, undoubtedly, they had expressed in the warmest manner their zeal for his party, he instantly gave orders to burn them. "Although (says the last of these writers) he was perfectly moderate in his anger, yet he rather chose to put it out of his power to resent such injuries, and thought that the most obliging manner of pardoning was to be ignorant of the nature of the offence." Dio himself tells us, that he pardoned all the kings and states who had assisted Pompey, and demanded nothing more of them than a sum of money; and considering, adds the historian, that he himself was little known to them, and that they were under many and great obligations to Pompey, he had more regard for those who had appeared in arms, than for the others who had deserted their benefactor. To the Athenians, who sent deputies to him to solicit their pardon, he granted it, with this reproach: "How long, having merited death by your degeneracy, will you owe your safety to the glory of your ancestors?"

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Suet. in.
Cæs.

Pliny, l. 7.
c. 25.

Sen. de
Ira, 2. 23.

This famous battle was fought on the 9th of August,^s

*neque prius, neque antiquius quidquam habuit, quam (ut) in omnes partes*** (ut militari, et verbo et consuetudine utar) dimitteret. Proh Dii immortales, quod hujus voluntatis erga Brutum suæ postea vir tam mitis pretium tulit! Nihil illa victoria mirabilius, magnificentius, clarius fuit; quando neminem, nisi acie consumptum, civem patria desideravit.* Vell. Pat. l. 2. c. 52. 5. Krause, p. 277.

^s The 9th of August of the Roman year, according to primate Usher, corresponded with the 6th of June of the Julian; but the battle, I should think, was fought later in the year. Cæsar encamped in the plains of Pharsalia, when the corn was almost ripe, "quæ prope jam matura erat:" it was therefore in the end of May, or beginning of June, of the Julian year. Pompey followed him a few days after, "paucis post diebus," but was in no haste to give him battle. Cæsar had time to exercise his troops, to teach his light-armed soldiers to fight among the cavalry, and to raise the spirit and courage of his men, by sending them daily to offer battle to the enemy, "continentibus diebus." There were several skirmishes between parties detached from the two armies. Appian and Lucan both tell us, that, before the battle, Cæ-

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 3.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Inscrip.
t. 1. p. 150.
and 305.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. 1. 3.

Plut. in
Cat. et Cic.

as appears by an inscription produced by the learned Muratori; a circumstance unknown in Lucan's time.

The news of Pompey's defeat was brought to Dyrrachium by Labienus, who escaped thither with the Gallic and German horse. Cato had been left governor of the town with fifteen cohorts, and with him were Cicero, the learned Varro, and some other senators. They all, immediately, in the greatest consternation, got on board the ships in the port with their troops, and repaired to the island of Corcyra, which was the general rendezvous of Pompey's followers. D. Lælius brought there his fleet from before Brundisium, where he was attempting to block up the port: C. Cassius, who had just burned two of Cæsar's fleets, one of thirty-five sail at Messana, commanded by M. Pomponius, and another at Vibo, under the orders of P. Sulpitius, consisting of five galleys, arrived there with the Syrian, Phœnician, and Cilician squadrons from Sicily; and thither also Octavius brought the ships under his command. Young Pompey and Coponius had been deserted by their forces, and arrived without them. Here a general council was held, and we are told by Plutarch, that Cato offered the command of his cohorts to Cicero, as the superior in dignity; and that upon his refusal and declaration, that he would join no longer in the war, young Pompey was so enraged, that he drew his sword, and would have killed him, if Cato had not interposed.^t There was no

sar's troops had been sent out to gather corn: and, in fine, Cæsar despairing to draw Pompey to an engagement, was preparing to march to another place; and one of his reasons was, the better to supply his army with provisions. So that we cannot allow less than a month between Cæsar's arrival in Thessaly and the battle. Now, the harvest in that country, as has been remarked above, does not come on before the beginning of June at Larissa, and the 15th or 20th at Jannina. The 9th of August, of the Roman year, must therefore have corresponded with the end, or 29th of June of the Julian year: and thus the battle was given a few days after the harvest; which agrees with Plutarch, who tells us that it was fought in the greatest heat of summer; and with Suetonius, who says, that Cæsar besieged Pompey four months at Dyrrachium, which he did not begin to do till the end of winter, when Antony brought him the remainder of his army.

^t It appears, that Cicero had at this time great reason to complain of his party. "I cannot (says he to Atticus), without the deepest sorrow, inform you what bitter, what heavy, what extraordinary motives have forced me to yield rather to a sudden impulse of passion than the counsel of my reason: these motives are such, that they have induced me to act as you see." Ad Att. 10. 5. In a letter to Terentia, he

scheme agreed upon, and all dispersed themselves severally, as their hopes and inclinations led them. Cicero went straight to Brundisium, committing himself to the mercy of the conqueror. Many retired into Achaia, to wait there the farther issue of things, and take such methods as fortune offered. M. Marcellus went to Mitylene : Cæcilius Bassus, a Roman knight, who acted a considerable part after Cæsar's death, and Libo, hid themselves in Tyre. Scipio, Labienus, and many others who had acted more violently against Cæsar, resolved at all events to renew the war, and sailed for Africa, to join Varus and king Juba. Octavius sailed with the Liburnian fleet to Illyricum, where he made war, as shall be related hereafter, with various fortune. Young Pompey and Cato followed the unfortunate general. C. Cassius sailed to Cilicia, where he waited Cæsar's arrival in a bay at the mouth of the river Cydnus, and there delivered up his fleet.^u Plutarch tells us, that M. Brutus, seeing

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

makes the same complaint. Ep. Fam. 14. 12. Melm. 7. 23. "May the joy you express at my safe arrival in Italy be never interrupted! but my mind was so much discomposed by those atrocious injuries I had received, that I have taken a step, I fear, which may be attended with great difficulties."

^u Cicero, Philip. 2. 11. tells us, that he lay there in wait for Cæsar, with a resolution to destroy him; which he would have effected, if Cæsar had not landed on the opposite shore, where he was not expected, and had not determined to land. This, however, it is thought, is a weak apology for Cassius; and the real motives of his conduct at this time are explained to us in a letter of Cicero to him, written in the year 706. Ep. Fam. 15. 15. Melm. 7. 36. "It was the hope, that peace would be restored to our country; and the abhorrence of spilling the blood of our fellow-citizens, that equally induced both you and myself to decline an obstinate perseverance in the civil war. But, though these sentiments were common to us both, yet, as I am considered as having been the first to inspire you with them, it is more my part, perhaps, to render you satisfied with having adopted them, than it is yours to perform the same friendly office towards me. But, to say the truth (and it is a circumstance upon which I frequently reflect), we mutually convinced each other, in the free conversations we held upon this subject, that a single battle, if it should not wholly determine our cause, ought to be the limits however of our particular opposition. And these sentiments have never seriously been condemned by any, but by those alone who think it more eligible that our constitution should be totally destroyed, than in any degree impaired. But my opinion was far otherwise: for I had no views to gratify by its extinction, and had much to hope from its remains. As to the consequences which have since ensued, they lay far beyond the reach of human discernment: and the wonder is, not so much how they escaped our penetration, as how it was possible they should have happened. I must confess, my own opinion always was, that the battle of Pharsalia would be decisive: and I imagined that the victors would act with regard to the common preservation of all, and the vanquished to their own. But both the one and the other, I was well aware, depended on the expedition with which the conquerors would pursue their success. And, had they pursued immediately, those who have since carried the war into Africa, would have experienced (and experienced too, if I do not flatter myself, by my in-

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. 1. 3.

Pompey's camp forced, stole out of one of the gates, and hid himself in a morass covered with reeds; from whence, having got safe in the night to Larissa, he wrote immediately to Cæsar, who not only forgave him, but treated him with the greatest affection. Even before the battle Cæsar had given particular orders, not to kill him on any account; and to make him prisoner, in case he was willing to surrender; but, if he refused, to let him go.

Pompey sailed first to Amphipolis, where he issued a proclamation, enjoining all the youth of the province, whether Greeks or Romans, to join him in arms: this he did, either with a design to keep footing in Macedonia, or to conceal his real intention of retreating much farther. He lay one night at anchor, sending to his friends in the town, and raising all the money he possibly could: but, being informed of Cæsar's approach,

tercession*) the same clemency with which the rest of our party have been treated, who retired into Asia and Achaia. But the critical opportunity (that season so important in all transactions, and especially in a civil war) was unhappily lost: and, a whole year intervening, it raised the spirits of some of our party to hope they might recover the victory; and rendered others so desperate as not to dread the reverse. Fortune, however, must be answerable for the whole train of evils which this delay has produced. For who could have imagined, either that the Alexandrine war could have been drawn out to so great a length, or that the paltry Pharnaces could have struck such a terror throughout Asia. But, though we both acted by the same measures, our present situations, however, are extremely different. The scheme which you thought proper to execute has given you admission into Cæsar's councils; and opened a prospect to you of his future purposes [this scheme must be the desertion of the Pompeian party, and the surrendry of the fleet to Cæsar]: an advantage, most certainly, that must spare you all the uneasiness which attends a state of doubt and suspense. Whereas for myself, as I imagine that Cæsar would, immediately after the battle of Pharsalia, have returned into Italy, I hastened thither, in order to encourage and improve that pacific disposition which he had discovered, by his generosity to so many of his illustrious enemies: by which means, I have ever since been separated from him by an immense distance. Here, in truth, I sit, the sad witness of those complaints that are poured forth in Rome, and throughout all Italy: complaints which both you and I, according to our respective powers, might contribute somewhat to remove, if Cæsar were present to support us. I entreat you, then, to communicate to me, agreeably to your wonted friendship, all you observe and think concerning the present state of affairs: in a word, that you would inform me what we are to expect, and how you would advise me to act. Be assured I shall lay great stress upon your sentiments: and, had I wisely followed those you gave me in your first letter from Luceria, I might, without difficulty, have still preserved my dignities."

* It appears, by this flow of spirits, that this letter was written after Cicero had been comforted by Cæsar, and his terrors dispelled by the assurance of his pardon, in the kindest terms: and what follows shews it to have been penned before Cæsar's return into Italy.

he departed, and sailed for Mitylene, where he had left his wife Cornelia.* Here he was detained two days by the badness of the weather, and, having increased his fleet with a few galleys he sailed to Cilicia, and thence to Cyprus. In this island he had intelligence that the people of Antioch and the Roman citizens, who traded there, had, with joint consent, seized the castle, and sent deputies to such of his followers as had taken refuge in the neighbouring places, not to approach that town; L. Lentulus, the late consul, P. Lentulus Spinther, and some of the other principal men of his party, had been refused admittance into the island of Rhodes, and had been ordered to withdraw immediately. These accounts made him lay aside his design of going into Syria; and seizing the money in the public bank, and borrowing as much more as he could of his friends; providing great quantities of brass for military uses, and raising 2,000 soldiers; he set sail for Pelusium, to implore the assistance of Ptolemy, king of Egypt. This prince, yet in his minority, was there at the head of a considerable army, making war against his sister Cleopatra, whom he had expelled the throne, to which by her father's will she had an equal right with him. Pompey sent to demand his protection, and a safe retreat in Alexandria, in consideration of the friendship that had subsisted between him and his father. The messengers, after discharging their commission, began to converse freely with

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

* Plutarch in Pomp. is very diffuse in describing this lady's disappointment and inexpressible grief: she bitterly complained of her ill destiny, which allied her to Crassus first, and afterward to Pompey, only to cause the ruin of two illustrious families. The same writer tells us, that the stoic philosopher Cratippus came to pay his compliments in Mitylene to Pompey, and that Pompey could not refrain from complaining to him of the dispensations of Providence. The philosopher declined, through politeness and humanity, to enter upon the subject: but he might have answered, says Plutarch, "that the disturbed state of Rome required now an absolute monarchy, as a necessary remedy to the public disorders." And he might have added, "by what proof may we be induced to believe, that, if the victory had been yours, you would have made a better use of it than Cæsar?"

† Plutarch in Pomp. says, that it was deliberated among his followers, since no province of the empire could afford them protection, to what foreign power it was most expedient to repair: that Pompey was strongly inclined to take refuge in Parthia; that others advised him to put himself under the protection of Juba; but that Theophanes determined him to go to Egypt. See Lucan, l. 8.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Plut. in
Pomp.
Appian.
Dio.

the king's troops, many of whom had served formerly under Pompey, and had been left in Egypt by Gabinus; and they exhorted them not to despise their old general in his adverse fortune. The king's ministers, who, during his minority, had the administration in their hands, either out of fear, as they afterward pretended, that Pompey should debauch the army, and thereby make himself master of Alexandria and all Egypt, or despising his low condition, gave a favourable reception to the deputies in public, and invited Pompey to court; but dispatched, at the same time, Achilles, captain of the king's guards, and Septimius, a military tribune, with secret orders to murder him before he came into the king's pretence.^z They put off from the shore in a small bark, with a few guards, and made towards Pompey's ship. When on board, they accosted him with an air of frankness, and invited him into the boat. Pompey, after taking leave of Cornelia, ordered two centurions, one of his freedmen named Philip, and a slave, to enter the boat with him: and, as Achilles gave him his hand to assist him in coming out of the ship, he turned to his wife, and repeated two verses of Sophocles, signifying, that whoever goes to the court of a king, becomes a slave from that moment. During the passage from the ship to land, nobody spoke to him a single word, or shewed the least mark of friendship or respect; Pompey broke the silence, and looking Septimius in the face, "Methinks (said he), I remember you to have formerly served me." Septimius gave only a nod with his head, without uttering a word, or denoting the least civility. Whereupon Pompey took out a speech which

^z Plutarch in Pomp. tells us, that one Theodotus, preceptor to the king, seeing the council divided in their opinions concerning the reception it was proper to give Pompey, some advising to receive him with honour, others to order him away immediately, he maintained, "that both proposals were equally dangerous: that to admit Pompey was making him their master, and drawing upon themselves the resentment of Cæsar: and, by not receiving him, they offended the one without obliging the other. That therefore the only expedient left was to let him land, and then kill him, which would be doing Cæsar a good service, and ridding themselves of all apprehensions on Pompey's account; 'because (said he) dead dogs do not bite.'"

he had prepared in Greek for the Egyptian king, and began to read it. In this manner they came near the land; and, when Pompey rose to go out, Septimius stabbed him in the back, and was immediately seconded by Achillas. Pompey, without making any resistance, or saying a word, covered his head with his robe, and resigned to fate. At this sad sight, Cornelia and her attendants weighed anchor and made off to sea. His murderers cut off his head, leaving the body on the shore. His freedman Philip stayed by it, and, while he was gathering up some pieces of a broken boat for a pile, he was thus accosted by an old soldier, who had served under Pompey: "Who art thou, that art making these sad preparations for the funeral of Pompey the Great?" Philip answered him, "One of his freedmen." "Thou shalt not (replied he) have all this honour to thyself: let me partake in an action so just and sacred. It will please me, amidst the miseries of my exile, to have touched the body, and assisted at the funeral, of the greatest and noblest soldier Rome ever produced." In this manner were the last rites performed to Pompey.^a His ashes, according to Plutarch, were carefully collected, and carried to Cornelia, who deposited them in a vault in his Alban villa.^b The Egyptians, however,

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

^a This is Plutarch's story: who does not tell us what became of the two centurions and the slave Pompey took into the boat with him. Lucan relates that the body was flung overboard into the sea, and dragged out from thence in the night, and burnt by one Cordus, who had been Pompey's quæstor in Cyprus. Aurelius Victor de Vir. Illustr. calls him Servius Codrus.

"Now 'gan the glitt'ring stars to fade away,
Before the rosy promise of the day,
When the pale youth th' unfinish'd rites forsook,
And to the covert of his cave betook.
Ah! why thus rashly would thy fears disclaim
That only deed which must record thy name?"

Lucan, b. 8. v. 1065.

Aurelius Victor and Lucan say, that upon his tomb was inscribed: "Hic situs est Magnus Pompeius." And Appian has given us a Greek inscription to this purpose: "How poor a tomb covers the man who had so many temples erected to his honour!"

^b Every circumstance relating to the end of this great man is uncertain, except what we have in Cæsar's brief account. Lucan supposes that Pompey's ashes remained in Egypt:

"And thou, oh Rome! by whose forgetful hand
Altars and temples rear'd to tyrants stand,

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Middl.
p. 132.
Ad Att.
11. 6.

afterward raised a monument to him on the place, and adorned it with figures of brass, which, having been defaced by time, and buried almost in sand and rubbish, was sought out and restored by the emperor Adrian.

Such was the end of Pompey the Great, on the 28th of April, in the 58th year of his age. It did not surprise Cicero, as we find by the short reflection that he makes upon it. "As to Pompey's end (says he), I never had any doubt about it: for the lost and desperate state of his affairs had so possessed the minds of all the kings and states abroad, that, whithersoever he went, I took it for granted that this would be his fate."^c How happy

Canst thou neglect to call thy hero home,
And leave his ghost in banishment to roam?
What though the victor's frown and thy base fear
Bade thee, at first, the pious task forbear;
Yet now, at least, oh! let him now return,
And rest with honour in a Roman urn.
Nor let mistaken superstition dread,
On such occasions, to disturb the dead:
Oh! would commanding Rome my hand employ,
This impious task should be perform'd with joy:
How would I fly to tear him from that tomb,
And bear his ashes in my bosom home!"

B. 8. v. 1140.

^c Cicero adds, "I cannot, however, help grieving at it; for I knew him to be an honest, grave, and worthy man: 'Hominem enim integrum, et castum, et gravem cognovi.'" "This (says Dr. Middleton) was the short and true character of the man from one who perfectly knew him; not heightened as we sometimes find it by the shining colours of his eloquence, nor depressed by the darker strokes of his resentment." Yet the same ingenious writer has thought proper to draw more at large the character of a man who was Cicero's god upon earth, and indeed the above short and true character is but a scanty panegyric for one in Pompey's high station: and, as this history includes a sort of critical examination of the life of Cicero, we will not scruple to present the reader with it, together with some short observations:

"Pompey had early acquired the surname of Great, by that sort of merit, which, from the constitution of the republic, necessarily made him great: a fame and success in war superior to what Rome had ever known in the most celebrated of her generals." [The surname of Great, according to Plutarch, was a compliment of Sylla, after the good services Pompey had done him in Italy, Sicily, and Africa. Though young Pompey had been bred to war in the camp of his father, a man of great military capacity, and had shewn his talents in the support of Sylla's party, he had not yet properly acquired or merited that surname by a success in war, superior to what Rome had ever known. Livy, or his abbreviator, says, that this surname was given him after his victories in Asia.] "He had triumphed at three several times over the three different parts of the known world, Europe, Asia, Africa; and, by his victories, had almost doubled the extent, as well as the revenues of the Roman dominion; for, as he declared to the people, on his return from the Mithridatic war, he had found the Lesser Asia the boundary, but left it the middle of their empire." [If Pompey made this declaration, he was guilty of an unpardonable gasconade, for he added to the Roman empire only Pontus, Bithynia, and Syria: but, if he did not double the revenues of the commonwealth, he greatly multiplied his own; for he received every month from Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, alone, above 6,393*l*. which was almost all that poor king could raise. See Ad Att. 6. 1.] "He was six

had it been for him to have died in that sickness, when all Italy was putting up vows and prayers for his safety!

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

years older than Cæsar; and, while Cæsar, immersed in pleasures, oppressed with debts, and suspected by all honest men, was hardly able to shew his head, Pompey was flourishing in the height of power and glory, and by the consent of all parties placed at the head of the republic." [This is not a fair representation of the fortunes of these two men: Pompey was raised to all his power and wealth against the will of the senate; who was ever envious and jealous of him: and Cæsar not only dared to shew his head, but was ever so much the darling of the city, that he carried every thing he stood for, by almost the unanimous votes of the people, notwithstanding the opposition of the same senate.] "This was the post that his ambition seemed to aim at, to be the first man in Rome; the leader, not the tyrant of his country: for he more than once had it in his power to have made himself the master of it without any risk, if his virtue, or his phlegm, at least, had not restrained him." [This is a groundless assertion. Pompey, after the Sertorian war, kept his army in Italy; and so did Crassus, to check him; till they both disbanded their troops by agreement: neither of them dared then to act the tyrant. After the Mithridatic war, the opposition Cæsar and Metellus, who openly courted Pompey, met with, plainly shewed how jealous the city was of Pompey's power; and that same jealousy prevailed after his arrival, notwithstanding all the favour and credit his victories had procured him. He could not depend upon his army in an enterprise against his country, when he had no motive of revenge to stimulate them with, nor indeed any other that he could avow with common decency. Cæsar and Crassus were willing to associate with him against the aristocracy, but not to become his servants.] "But he lived in a perpetual expectation of receiving, from the gift of the people, what he did not care to seize by force, and, by fomenting the disorders of the city, hoped to drive them to the necessity of creating him dictator. It is an observation of all the historians, that while Cæsar made no difference of power, whether it was conferred or usurped; whether over those who loved, or those who feared him; Pompey seemed to value none but what was offered; nor to have any desire to govern, but with the good-will of the governed." [Velleius, 2. 29, says indeed of Pompey, '*Potentia quæ honoris causa ad eum deferretur, non ut ab eo occuparetur, cupidissimus*:' but I do not see any difference between Pompey and Cæsar in this respect. As long as power was offered to Pompey, he did not undertake to seize it by an armed force; neither did Cæsar; but no sooner did Pompey foresee that Cæsar would become his equal, than he armed, illegally, the whole empire, to preserve his own superior power: and this is allowed by the same historian: '*Civis in toga, nisi uti vereretur, ne quem haberet parem, modestissimus*.' A power, maintained all along by the most open and scandalous bribery, cannot be deemed a power offered by the good-will of the governed: and a man who employs such means, in defiance of the laws, cannot, with any propriety, be called a man of integrity: '*Virum integrum cognovi*.'] "What leisure he found from his wars, he employed in the study of polite letters, and especially of eloquence, in which he would have acquired great fame, if his genius had not drawn him to the more dazzling glory of arms. Yet he pleaded several causes with applause, in the defence of his friends and clients; and some of them in conjunction with Cicero. His language was copious and elevated; his sentiments just; his voice sweet; his action noble and full of dignity. But his talents were better formed for arms than the gown; for though in both he observed the same discipline; a perpetual modesty, temperance, and gravity of outward behaviour; yet, in the licence of camps, the example was more rare and striking. His person was extremely graceful and imprinting respect; yet with an air of reserve and haughtiness, which became the general better than the citizen. His parts were plausible rather than great; specious rather than penetrating; and his views of politics but narrow; for his chief instrument of governing was dissimulation; yet he had not always the art to conceal his real sentiments. As he was a better soldier than a statesman, so what he gained in the camp he usually lost in the city; and, though adored when abroad, was often affronted and mortified at home; till the imprudent opposition of the senate drove him to that alliance with Crassus and Cæsar, which proved fatal both to himself and to the republic. He took in these two not as the partners, but the ministers rather of his power;" [They had more interest in the city than he, and he could not compass his ends without their assistance; they were therefore necessary allies, not ministers of his power:] "that, by giving them some share with him, he

404th consulship.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Or, if he had fallen by the chance of war on the plains of Pharsalia, in the defence of his country's liberty, he had died still glorious, though unfortunate; but, as if he had been reserved for an example of the instability of human greatness, he, who a few days before commanded kings and consuls, and all the noblest of Rome, was sentenced to die by a council of slaves; murdered by a base deserter; cast out naked and headless on the Egyptian strand; and, when the whole earth, as Velleius says, had scarce been sufficient for his victories, could not find a spot upon it for a grave.^d

might make his own authority uncontrollable: he had no reason to apprehend that they could ever prove his rivals: since neither of them had any credit or character of that kind, which alone could raise them above the laws; a superior fame and experience in war, with the militia of the empire at their devotion: all this was purely his own; till, by cherishing Cæsar, and throwing into his hands the only things which he wanted, arms and military command, he made him at last too strong for himself, and never began to fear him till it was too late." [That Pompey helped Cæsar, during the triumvirate, will be easily granted, but that he owed all to Pompey is not true: and Pompey was at least as much indebted to Cæsar, as Cæsar to him. Would Pompey have condescended to marry the daughter of the man whom he suspected to have debauched his wife Mucia, the mother of Cnæus and Sextus Pompey, and whom for this reason, during the civil war, he used to call Ægisthus, if his alliance had not been deemed absolutely necessary to support his credit? and indeed he could never have supported himself in that long reign of his during the Gallic war without Cæsar's interest. This is evident from the whole history of the times.] "Cicero warmly dissuaded both his union and his breach with Cæsar;" [So Cicero says in his second Philippic; but his letters shew that he greatly approved of the breach between Cæsar and Pompey, till the prospect was darkened, and the civil war was ready to break out with great advantage on Cæsar's side. If Cicero did not approve of their union at first, he cemented it afterward, and was very subservient to the confederate chiefs. See his apologetic letter, p. 114.] "And after the rupture, as warmly still, the thought of giving him battle: if any of these counsels had been followed, Pompey had preserved his life and honour, and the republic its liberty." [*Pace opus est: ex victoria cum multa mala, tum certe tyrannus existet.* Ad Att. 7. 5.—*Depugna, inquis, potius, quam servias: Ut quid? Si victus eris, proscribere? Si viceris, tamen servias?* Ad Att. 7. 7.—*Hoc Cnæus noster cum antea nunquam, tum in hac causa minime cogitavit; Dominatio quæsitâ ab utroque est: non id actum, beata et honesta civitas ut esset.*—*Genus illud Sullani regni jampridem appetitur [a Pompeio], multis, qui una sunt, cupientibus.* Ad Att. 8. 11. It appears then that Cicero was not of Dr. Middleton's opinion. He thought also that Pompey's victory would have been a very cruel one: *Tanta erat in illis crudelitas, ut non nominatim, sed generatim proscriptio esset informata; ut jam omnium judicio constitutum esset, omnium vestrum bona prædam esse illius victoriæ; vestrum, plane dico: nunquam enim de te ipso, nisi crudelissime, cogitatum est.* Ad Att. 11. 6.] "But he was urged to his fate by a natural superstition, and attention to those vain auguries with which he was flattered by all the Haruspices: he had seen the same temper in Marius and Sylla, and observed the happy effects of it: but they assumed it only out of policy, he out of principle. They used to animate their soldiers, when they had found a probable opportunity of fighting: but he, against all prudence and probability, was encouraged by it to fight to his own ruin." [I should think that Pompey was not altogether so credulous as Dr. Middleton makes him. Cicero in his Letters, and Cæsar in his Commentaries, assign other reasons for Pompey's confidence, as we have seen above: and these reasons influenced not only Pompey, but Labienus and all the generals in his army, whom we cannot suppose to have been all addicted, in a great degree, to superstition.]

^d "Qui si ante biennium, quam ad arma itum est, perfectis muneribus theatri et ali-

Lentulus, the late consul, landed in Egypt a few days after his general, and was immediately seized and put to death. Plutarch, or the author whom he copied, to make his story more interesting, supposes that Lentulus landed just upon the spot where the body of Pompey had been burned the day before; and, seeing a little pile which yet smoked, broke out into these words, "Who is the wretch to whom are paid these last offices? Perhaps, alas! it is you, great Pompey!" Lentulus Spinther is said to have found in Egypt the same fate.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Cato, conjecturing that Pompey had retired to Egypt or Libya, took that way. He first sailed from Corcyra to Patræ, where he picked up Faustus Sylla, Petreius, and some other fugitives. Then, doubling the cape of Malea, and coasting the isle of Crete, he came to Palinurus, a promontory of the Cyrenaïca: whence he marched to Cyrene, which opened its gates to him. Here he was met by Cornelia and Sextus Pompeius, Pompey's youngest son; who had first fled to Cyprus, but, finding themselves too near Egypt, and fearing lest they should meet with Cæsar, steered towards the west, and put in at the same place to which Cato had brought the fleet. The news of Pompey's death occasioned a fresh division among his fugitive friends: many who were attached personally to him, and had held out in hopes of seeing him again at their head, determined to have recourse to the conqueror's clemency. Cornelia returned to Italy, well knowing that she had nothing to apprehend from Cæsar. Cato, with Pompey's two sons, remained in Africa and marched by land to join Varus and Juba: and we shall see immediately how they re-

Dio, l. 42.

Liv. 1. 12.

orum operum, quæ ei circumdedit, gravissima tentatus valetudine decessisset in Campania (quo quidem tempore universa Italia vota pro salute ejus, primi, omnium civium, suscepit); defuisset fortunæ destruendi ejus locus, et quam apud superos habuerat magnitudinem, illibatam detulisset ad inferos." Vell. Pat. 2. 48. Krause, p. 259. "Princeps Romani nominis, imperio arbitrioque Ægyptii mancipii, jugulatus est. Hic post tres consulatus et totidem triumphos, domitumque terrarum orbem, sanctissimi ac præstantissimi viri, in id evecti, super quod adscendi non potest, duodesagesimum annum agentis, pridie natalem ipsius, vitæ fuit exitus: in tantum in illo viro a se discordante fortuna, ut, cui modo ad victoriam terra defuerat, deesset ad sepulturam." Id. 2. 53. Krause, p. 280.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

newed the war, and exposed the conqueror to new fatigues and dangers.

CHAP. VII.

Cæsar follows Pompey into Egypt. The Alexandrian war. The war against Pharnaces. Illyricum saved by Vatinius. Cæsar returns to Italy. Cicero's disquietudes at Brundisium during Cæsar's absence. Cæsar puts an end to the disturbances raised by Dolabella in the city: he quells a mutiny in his army, and sets out for Africa.

CÆSAR, sensible that all the hopes of the vanquished party were lodged in the person of Pompey, pursued him with the utmost diligence at the head of his cavalry, having first given orders to one of his legions to follow. He heard at Amphipolis, that Pompey had left Greece; but, having no ships, he was under the necessity of marching by land to the straits of Hellespont, that he might only have that short passage by sea into Asia. Here, while he was crossing in a small vessel after his troops, he fell in with a squadron of the Pompeian fleet, commanded by Cassius, consisting, according to Suetonius, of ten ships of war,^e and which was sailing to the Bosphorus. Cæsar, making up to him, ordered him to surrender; he obeyed; and, coming on board the little boat, threw himself at Cæsar's feet. Cæsar, with these ships, and those he found on the coast of Asia, continued his route by sea. At Ephesus, he saved a second time the treasure of Diana's temple, which J. Ampius was going to plunder for Pompey. After a short stay in Asia, hearing that Pompey had been at Cyprus, and thence conjecturing that he had gone for Egypt, on account of the interest he had in that kingdom, and the advantage it could afford him; he sailed first to Rhodes, where, having joined to his fleet the Rhodian galleys, he set out for Egypt with two legions, one of which he had ordered to follow him from Thes-

Suet. in
Cæs. 63.
Dio, l. 42.
App. 482.

^e Appian says seventy. It may be observed, that authors have distinguished this Cassius from the Cassius who was one of the conspirators against Cæsar.

saly ; the other he had detached from Fusius Calenus in Achaia. These two legions did not make up above 3,200 foot, and 800 horse : but Cæsar depended on the reputation of his exploits, and the terror of his name.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

Cæsar, on his arrival at Alexandria, was informed of Pompey's death : and, according to some authors, was presented by the king's order with the head and ring of his rival.^f These sad remains of so great a man, with

404th con-
sulship.

Liv. 112.

Plut. in

Cæs. Dio,
l. 42.

whom he had lived so long in the strictest friendship, as the husband of his beloved Julia, and his partner in power, very naturally drew tears from him.^g He caused the head to be burned with the most costly perfumes, and placed the ashes in a small temple, which he dedicated to Nemesis, the avenging power of cruel and inhuman deeds. He took up his quarters in the royal palace, where he kept a strict guard : for upon his landing he had been received in a clamorous manner by the garrison, and he observed that the mob appeared dissatisfied to see the fasces carried before him, which they interpreted as a degradation of the royal authority. During several days disturbances and tumults happened, and many Roman soldiers were murdered in different parts of the city. The Etesian winds, which blew at that time, were contrary to any passage by sea from Alexandria :^h and Cæsar thinking it belonged to him, as chief of the Roman empire, to take cognizance of the quarrel between Ptolemy and his sister Cleopatra, which had broken out into an open war ; he began to interfere

App. 448.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 3.

^f Plutarch in Pomp. tells us, that Theodotus, a Greek rhetorician, one of the king's counsellors, who had determined the council to kill Pompey, was charged to carry Cæsar this present, and to compliment him on the success of his arms ; and that Brutus, after Cæsar's death, caused him to be executed for it with the most cruel torments. Aurelius Victor, de Vir. Illustr. c. 77. says it was presented by Achilles. Lucan says,

“ Dira satelles
Colla gerit Magni, Phario velamine tecta.”

L. 9.

^g Dio is positive, that these tears were counterfeit ; and Lucan takes occasion from them to rail bitterly at Cæsar. See the end of the ninth book.

^h The Etesian winds are northerly winds, which begin to blow about the summer solstice, and do not cease till about the end of August.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Plut. in
Aut.

in this dispute, not foreseeing the many difficulties and hazards in which this conduct was to involve him.

Ptolemy Auletes, who died in the year 702, left four children: two sons, who were both called Ptolemy; and two daughters, the famous Cleopatra and Arsinoë. According to the established custom in the Ptolemean family, he had ordered that his eldest son should marry his eldest daughter, and reign with her. For the more certain execution of this his will, he implored the protection of the Roman people; and sent a copy of it by ambassadors to Rome to be deposited in the public treasury; which, however, in the confusion of the times, had been left with Pompey. The original was kept at Alexandria. The brother and sister did not live long in harmony: Cleopatra was seventeen years old, and her brother only thirteen; and she claimed a right to govern her young consort. On the other hand, the guardians of the young prince, the chief of whom was the eunuch Pothinus, were ambitious to govern under his name and authority. This division had not yet produced an open rupture, when Pompey's eldest son came to Alexandria to demand succours for his father. Cleopatra even then is said to have prostituted her person to this young Roman to gain Pompey's interest: but Pothinus succeeded better, and obtained at the senate held at Thessalonica a determination in favour of Ptolemy. Cleopatra was banished Egypt, and forced to retire with her sister Arsinoë into Syria, where she assembled an army, and advanced as far as Pelusium. Ptolemy marched with his troops to oppose her, and the two armies were in sight of each other near Mount Casius, on the borders of Egypt, when Pompey came there to meet his unhappy fate. Things remained in the same situation till Cæsar's arrival; and he admonished the contending parties, that it was their duty to remit their respective pretensions to his determination. They both immediately repaired to him; and Cleopatra seems to have dismissed her army,

for we hear no more mention made of it. We are told by some historians that, in order to get into Alexandria, which was in the possession of her enemies, she went on board a small vessel, and, landing in the evening near the palace, was wrapped up in a bundle of clothes, and thus carried by one of her attendants into Cæsar's bed-chamber. The day after Cæsar sent for the king, who, being strangely surprised to see his sister with the consul of Rome, fled from the palace to the market-place, crying out that he was betrayed; and, in the excess of his grief and passion, tore the diadem from his head. He was siezed by the Roman soldiers, and brought back: but this occasioned a great alarm in the city, and, the people having assembled tumultuously about the palace, Cæsar signified to them that his intention was no other than to execute the late king's will, and to declare the brother and sister king and queen of Egypt. Dio adds, that he promised also to give the isle of Cyprus, an ancient appendage of the kingdom of Egypt, to the younger Ptolemy and Arsinoë, his sister: but this circumstance is very improbable: and the authority of this historian is not much to be depended on, when unsupported by other testimonies.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Plut. in
Cæs.

Flor. l. 4.
c. 2.

Lucan.
b. 10.

Dio, l. 42.

Pothinus, governor and chief minister to the king, Cleopatra's declared enemy, complained bitterly to his friends, that the king should be treated in this manner; and, finding them disposed to support him, he privately sent for the army at Pelusium, and gave the command of it to Achilles, the same who murdered Pompey, and was then captain of the king's guards. This army was numerous and formidable, and Cæsar's forces were insufficient to keep the field against it. The only course therefore left for him was to secure the most convenient ports of the town, till he was informed of the designs of the Egyptian general. He admonished the king to send some persons of weight to forbid his approach. Dioscorides and Serapion, accordingly, who had both been

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 3.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. 1. 3.

ambassadors at Rome, and in great credit with Ptolemy the father, were deputed to him: but no sooner did they come into his presence, than, without giving them a hearing, or inquiring after their message, he ordered them to be seized and put to death. One was killed upon the spot, and the other, having received a dangerous wound, was carried off for dead by his attendants. Such an enormous behaviour was a warning to Cæsar. He took care to secure the king's person, whose name would authorize his proceedings, and make Achillas and his associates pass among the people for rebels to their prince.

Achillas's army consisted of 18,000 foot and 2,000 horse, all brave and experienced soldiers. Many of them were Romans, who had been brought into the country by Gabinius, when he came to settle Auletes on the throne; and who, having married and settled at Alexandria, were devoted to the Ptolemean interest: the others were mercenary troops from Syria and Cilicia, and fugitive slaves, who found protection in Egypt by entering into the service. These troops were accustomed to give the law to their sovereign: Cæsar tells us, that they had often taken upon them to put to death the king's ministers, plunder the rich, invest the royal palace, banish some and send for others home, with other liberties of the like nature. This description of the Alexandrian militia accounts for the continual changes remarkable in the government of that city. Such will always be the fate of princes, who choose to rely upon a mercenary soldiery rather than the affections of their subjects. Achillas, trusting to the valour of this army, and despising the handful of men Cæsar had brought with him, quickly made himself master of Alexandria, the palace only excepted, where Cæsar had fortified himself, and which the Egyptian general attacked briskly, though without success. The greatest efforts were made on the side of the harbour: had Achillas got possession of it and the shipping, he might have cut Cæsar off from

all communication with the sea, and consequently from all hopes of receiving supplies either of victuals or forces. This made both the Egyptians and the Romans exert themselves with incredible vigour. At length Cæsar carried his point, and not only burnt all the vessels in the harbour, which amounted to fifty-five galleys, with twenty-two guard-ships, but also those that were in the arsenals : in all 110. The flames unfortunately extended themselves to the Alexandrian library : and that valuable monument of the magnificence of the Ptolemies, and of their taste for learning, was almost wholly consumed.¹

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Cæsar, during the action, transported a body of troops into the isle of Pharos, so called from a tower of prodigious height and wonderful workmanship, built by Ptolemy Philadelphus. This island lay over-against Alexandria, and both formed and commanded the port, the entrance on each side of it being very narrow. A mole or causey, 900 paces long, ran through the middle of the port : at the two ends of this mole were two bridges, through the arches of which vessels could pass from one side of the port to the other. Many Egyptian seafaring men had built houses in the Pharos, and lived chiefly by pillaging the ships that were thrown in upon their coast. By getting possession of this place, Cæsar secured the reception of the supplies he had sent for from all sides. In other quarters of the town the fight was maintained till night with equal advantage, and little loss, neither party losing ground. Cæsar's next care was to make fortifications round the king's palace and the theatre adjoining to it, of which he made a kind of citadel : and he thus put it out of the power of the Alexandrians to force him to a battle against his will. He then employed himself in enclosing the narrowest part of the town, which lay between the port and a lake towards the south : by which means he could have provi-

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 3.

¹ According to Livy, cited by Seneca de Tranq. Anim. c. 9. there were in this library 400,000 volumes. According to Aulus Gellius, 6. 17. and Ammianus Marcellinus, 24. 17. 700,000.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. 3.

sion of water and forage. On the other side the Alexandrians were extremely active and industrious in making all sort of preparations proper for their own defence, and for forcing Cæsar's quarters.

While these works were carrying on, Cæsar ordered Pothinus to be put to death, having discovered a secret correspondence between him and Achilles, whom he encouraged to a vigorous prosecution of his enterprise. According to Plutarch, he had formed a design of killing Cæsar at table; and the conspiracy was discovered by a slave, whose exceeding timidity prompting him to be continually upon the watch, and to listen at every door, he had overheard Pothinus and his associates. About the same time Arsinoë, the youngest sister, found means to escape from the palace to Achilles's camp, under the conduct of Ganymed, her governor; hoping, in such confusion, to get into the throne herself, in the place of Cleopatra. But she soon disagreed with Achilles, and they endeavoured to supplant one another, and to gain by bribes and promises the affection of the mercenary soldiers. At length Arsinoë prevailed, and caused Achilles to be slain: and Ganymed, under the name and authority of Arsinoë, was vested with the supreme power, and proved not less bold and enterprising than his predecessor.

Alexandria was supplied with water from the Nile; but, this water being generally muddy, and unwholesome, every house was provided with a cistern, where it remained till it became fit to be drunk. Ganymed being master of that part of the town where the river lay, and consequently of all the conduits, he undertook to taint all the cisterns in Cæsar's quarter, by pouring into the aqueducts a great quantity of sea-water, raised by the help of machines: and, at the same time, to preserve his own untainted, the aqueducts on his side were stopped up. The cisterns in the nearest houses soon began to taste salter than usual, while no change could be ob-

served in those that were more remote. However, the saltness soon became general, and the water was every where unfit for use. The Roman army, greatly discouraged at this unexpected event, began to complain against Cæsar for not abandoning the place; but he soon found means to remove the inconveniency that so much alarmed them, by sinking a great number of wells; and, with little difficulty, obstructed the laborious attempts of the Alexandrians.

Year of
R O M E
705.
B. C. 47.

404th con-
sulship.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR, Dictator II.

M. ANTONIUS, Mag. Eq.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

During these transactions the thirty-seventh legion, composed of Pompey's veterans, who had surrendered to Cæsar after the battle of Pharsalia, were driven upon the coast of Africa, a little above Alexandria: where, being detained for several days by an easterly wind, and being pressed for want of water, they sent to inform him of their arrival and situation. Cæsar, upon this intelligence, immediately went on board one of the ships in the harbour, and ordered the whole fleet to follow, leaving the land-forces to defend the works. Being arrived at a port of the coast called Chersonesus, he sent some mariners on shore to fetch water. These venturing too far into the country, for the sake of plunder, were intercepted by the enemy's horse, and from them the Egyptians heard that Cæsar himself was on board without any soldiers. Upon this information, they thought that fortune had thrown a fair opportunity in their way of attempting something with success. They got together all the ships that were in a condition to sail, and met Cæsar on his return at four in the afternoon. The Roman general was very desirous to avoid an engagement so late in the day, which probably would be continued in the dark, when the Alexandrians would have the advantage by the knowledge they had of the coast; and he would not be able to encourage his men,

405th con-
sulship.
Hirtius de
Bell. Alex.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

and be witness of their behaviour, a circumstance upon which he always greatly relied. He therefore drew all his ships as near the shore as possible, where he imagined the enemy would not venture to follow him. But, contrary to his inclination, he was engaged to fight by the temerity of a Rhodian galley of the right wing, which stood out at a considerable distance from the rest, and was immediately attacked by four galleys and several open barks. Cæsar, not to suffer the disgrace of seeing her sunk before his eyes, was obliged to advance to her relief. The Rhodians, distinguished at all times by their valour and experience in naval engagements, exerted themselves on this occasion to the utmost, and gained a complete victory. One four-benched galley was taken, another was sunk, a third was disabled, and the whole fleet would have been destroyed if night had not put a stop to the chase. Cæsar, after giving this defeat to the enemy, took his transports in tow, and returned to Alexandria.

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

The Alexandrians were much disheartened at this bad success, and at finding themselves so much outdone by the Rhodian mariners. But Ganymed raised their dejected spirits by the strongest assurances of his being able to fit out, in a very short time, a fleet much superior to that which had been lately defeated. Having gathered all the ships stationed at the mouth of the Nile, for receiving the customs, he opposed again to the Romans twenty-two four-benched galleys and five quinqueremes, with a great number of open barks. Cæsar's fleet consisted in all of nine Rhodian galleys (for, of the ten he had brought with him, one had been shipwrecked on the coast of Egypt), eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, and twelve from Asia. Of these, however, only ten were quadriremes, and five quinqueremes: the rest were of an inferior bulk, and for the most part without decks. Cæsar, notwithstanding this inferiority of his fleet in number and strength, resolved to give the enemy

battle: and, sailing round the Pharos into that part of the port which the Alexandrians were masters of, he drew up his ships in the following order. His nine Rhodian galleys he placed in his right wing: the eight of Pontus in the left; leaving between them a space of 400 paces to serve for the extending and working the vessels: and the rest of the fleet he destined as a reserve, and disposed them behind the two wings in such a manner that every ship followed that to which she was appointed to give succour. The Alexandrians, who came forth with great confidence, had placed their twenty-two quadriremes in front: their other ships were arranged behind in a second line: and they had a number of smaller vessels which carried fire and burning weapons, by which they meant to strike a terror into the Romans. This regular disposition did not hold long. Between the two fleets, there were certain flats; and each side hesitated which should first pass them: because, in case of any misfortune, they would be a great obstruction to a retreat; and it was difficult to draw up in order of battle beyond them in the presence of an enemy. Euphranor, the Rhodian admiral, a man of distinguished courage and experience, perceiving Cæsar's perplexity, addressed him to this effect: "Great general! it appears you are apprehensive lest by passing these shallows first, you should be forced to engage, before your whole fleet is drawn up: we beg of you to put your confidence in us, and we promise to maintain the fight till the whole fleet gets clear of the shallows. It is greatly dishonourable and afflicting, that the enemy should so long continue in our sight with that air of triumph." Cæsar encouraging him in his design,^k gave the signal of battle: and four Rhodian ships, having

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

^k This brave admiral was soon after sent out to cruize off Canopus; an expedition in which he perished. He had begun an engagement with some Alexandrian ships, and had sunk the first he attacked; but, pursuing another too far, and not being sustained by the rest of the fleet, his galley was surrounded and shattered to pieces. Hirt. de Bell. Alex.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

passed the flats, were immediately assailed on all sides by the Alexandrians, but the Rhodians worked their vessels with so much skill, and disengaged themselves with so much address, that they never suffered any of the enemy's ships either to strike their flanks with their beaks, or to run alongside of them in order to sweep away or break their oars: they always found means to oppose beak to beak. Thus they maintained the fight till the rest of the fleet came up: and, art now becoming useless, the whole success depended upon valour. Both sides fought in sight of their friends at land; who, laying aside their work, and all thoughts of attack or defence, gave their whole attention to what was going forward at sea. The Romans risked more than the Alexandrians by this battle: a defeat would have deprived them of all resource either by sea or land, and victory would not much better their condition: the Alexandrians, on the contrary, if success attended them, gained every thing, and, though defeated, could still maintain the war. On the side of the Romans, every thing depended on the bravery of a few: this Cæsar had often before the battle represented to his officers and soldiers, and they now repeated it to one another. They were animated by the difficulty and importance of their situation, and fought with such determined resolution, that neither the art nor efforts of the Alexandrians, nor the multitude of their ships and boats, could any ways avail them. In this action the Romans sustained not the loss of one vessel: but two Alexandrian galleys, one of five benches of oars, and another of two, with all the soldiers and mariners on board, were taken, and three others were sunk. The rest fled towards the town, and took shelter under the mole and forts, whither the Romans could not pursue them.

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

Cæsar, to deprive the enemy of this resource, resolved to make himself master once more of the mole and the island, which had been retaken by the Egyptians, while

he was employed in the more necessary works within the town. For the execution of this design, he put into boats and small vessels ten cohorts, a select body of light-armed infantry, and such of the Gallic cavalry as he thought most proper for his purpose, and sent them against the island. He himself, at the same time, to cause a diversion, attacked it on the other side with his fleet. The attack was brisk, and the Pharians defended themselves at first with vigour. They annoyed the Romans from the tops of their houses, and gallantly maintained their ground along the shore ; which was in most parts steep and craggy, and which, in the places of easier access, was skilfully defended by small boats properly stationed for the purpose. But when, after examining the approaches and shallows, a few of the Romans had found means to land, they were followed with so much expedition by others, that the Pharians, abandoning their ships and coast, fled into the town. There they might easily have defended themselves ; for the buildings were very high, and joined together so as to form a strong wall, and the Romans had neither ladders nor any other instruments for assault : but such was their consternation, that they dared not to engage from a height of thirty feet ; and, throwing themselves from the mole into the sea, they endeavoured to gain Alexandria, though above 800 paces distant. Many were slain, and 600 were made prisoners in this fight. Cæsar gave the plunder of the place to the soldiers, and demolished all the houses. The castle, however, at the end of the bridge next the island, he fortified, and placed a garrison in it. The other castle, which was next the town, was much the strongest, and was still held by the Alexandrians. This he attacked the next day ; because, by getting possession of both forts, he would be entirely master of the port, and would be able to prevent any sudden incursions. By means of the arrows and darts launched from his engines, he quickly forced the gar-

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

rison to abandon the place and retire into the town ; and, having landed upon the mole three cohorts, which was all that the spot could well contain, he disposed the rest of his troops in his ships to sustain them. Things being in this forwardness, he ordered the arch of the bridge that joined the mole to the town, and through which the Alexandrians used to send their fire-boats against his vessels, to be entirely stopped up ; and, at the same time, he began to raise a fortification upon the bridge. The Alexandrians, however, brought all the troops they could out of the town before this fortification could be finished, and posted them in an open area before it ; and, having placed also a number of transports all along the mole, they began to attack the Romans by launching their javelins. While Cæsar, attentive to what passed, was exhorting and directing his troops, a number of rowers and mariners of his fleet, quitting their ships, threw themselves upon the mole, partly out of curiosity, and partly to have some share in the action. At first, with their slings, they forced the enemy's ships from the mole, and seemed to do great service ; but, soon after, when a few of the Alexandrians, having ventured out upon the mole, attacked them in flank, they fled with precipitation. The Alexandrians, encouraged by this success, landed in greater numbers, and vigorously pushed the Romans, who were now in great confusion. Those that were in the galleys, perceiving this, removed the ladders, and put off from the mole to prevent the enemy's boarding them. The three cohorts, who were fortifying and defending the bridge at the head of the mole, where they had much business upon their hands, hearing a clamour behind them, and seeing the general rout of their friends, immediately interrupted their work : and, fearing to be surrounded, and precluded from a retreat, ran with all speed towards the galleys. Some, getting on board the nearest vessels, overloaded and sunk them ; others making head against

the enemy, and uncertain what course to take, were cut to pieces: a few, throwing their bucklers over their shoulders, swam to the ships which were at the smallest distance from them. Cæsar endeavoured to stop his men, and bring them back to the defence of the works; but finding them giving ground universally, he retreated to his own galley; whither such a multitude followed and crowded after him, that it was impossible to work her. Foreseeing, therefore, what must happen, he flung himself into the sea, and swam to a ship that lay at some distance.¹ Hence, dispatching boats to succour his men, he preserved a few. His own galley perished, with all that was on board; and he lost in this action 400 legionary soldiers, and somewhat above that number of rowers and sailors. The Alexandrians secured the fort by strong works, and a great number of engines: and having cleared away the stones with which Cæsar had filled up the arch of the bridge, they had, thereby, a free passage into that part of the port where Cæsar's fleet lay.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

This misfortune, far from discouraging the Romans, served only the more to exasperate them; and they made their enemies sensible of the spirit and fury that transported them, by pushing on their attacks with greater vigour; insomuch that their general was more employed in restraining their ardour than in inciting them to action.

The Alexandrians, who now began to think it would be of great service to them to have their king at their

¹ Some ancient writers have finely embellished this story, and M. Crevier has extracted from them what is most curious in their several tales: "It is remarkable, that, having stripped off his coat of mail (his general's cloak), which would have been an encumbrance to him in swimming, he drew it after him with his teeth, to prevent its falling into the enemy's hands; and, as he had some papers in his left hand, he constantly held it above water, at the same time swimming with the right, by which means the papers were not wetted. However, his coat of armour got from him, which proved of service to him; for, being purple, and distinguishable by the brightness of its colour, it sustained all the fury of the enemy's shot, at the same time that Cæsar saved himself without being observed or known. The Alexandrians took it, and made it the principal ornament in the trophy they erected on the place of the engagement." The authorities for these particulars are Suetonius, Florus, Plutarch, Appian, and Dio. But no authorities can make one believe, that Cæsar carried his papers upon the mole of Alexandria, or in plunging into the sea did not wet them. The other circumstances are equally absurd.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

head, sent deputies to Cæsar, beseeching him to restore him to them, and representing it as the only means to bring about an accommodation. Cæsar, perfectly well acquainted with the false and perfidious character of the Alexandrians, was not to be imposed upon by this plausible pretext. He determined, however, to comply with their demands, being sensible that the whole hazard was to them and their king; for, as to what concerned himself, if, at first, he thought it might be of service to him to detain the young prince, in order to prevent a rebellion; now that it was not only broken out, but had been obstinately maintained for several months, such a prisoner created him more trouble than real advantage; and he perceived, that it would be more for his honour to make war with the king himself, than with Arsinoë, and her eunuch Ganymed. He therefore, having exhorted Ptolemy to put an end to the misfortunes of his country, and to save from total ruin its metropolis, took him by the hand to conduct him out of the palace. The young prince, who was already an adept in the art of dissimulation, entreated Cæsar with tears not to send him back; for that he took more pleasure in his company than in the possession of his crown. Cæsar told him, that if such were his real sentiments, they should quickly see one another again. Ptolemy took his leave, and had no sooner regained his liberty, than he carried on the war with so much fierceness, that the tears he shed at parting appeared to be tears of joy. Cæsar's officers and soldiers were highly diverted with the event: imagining, that, through his easiness of temper, he had let himself be duped by a boy.

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

Cæsar, in the beginning of this Alexandrian war, had sent Mithridates of Pergamus,^m to raise troops in Syria and Cilicia. This general, having acquitted himself of

^m This Mithridates was probably the son of Mithridates king of Pontus. His mother, though married, was one of the mistresses of that monarch. The king of Pontus shewed a singular affection for him, gave him a royal education, and for many years kept him at his court, and in his army.

the commission with great fidelity and expedition, was now upon the borders of Egypt with a numerous army ; in which were 3,000 Jews, commanded by Antipater, father of Herod, and minister of Hircan, king of Judea. Mithridates took Pelusium by storm the day he arrived before it, notwithstanding Achillas had placed a strong garrison in it, as it was the key of Egypt on the Syrian side. The shortest way from Pelusium to Alexandria was to keep a parallel line with the sea ; but all the country is so traversed by the Nile and its canals, that Mithridates found the march equally fatiguing and hazardous. This obliged him to march up the river as far as the head or point of the Delta, a province of Egypt, so called from its similitude to the Greek letter of that name. There the Nile divides itself into two great branches. The young king, understanding that Mithridates approached this place, and knowing he must pass the river, sent a considerable body of troops against him to crush him, if possible, before his junction with Cæsar, at least to oppose his march. Part of this detachment, which formed the van, made what haste they could to engage him, that they alone might have all the honour of the victory ; but Mithridates had intrenched himself with great care ; and, after keeping some time upon the defensive, he sallied out upon them from all parts, put a great number of them to the sword, and dispersed the rest. Cæsar and the king of Egypt had both information of this event, and set out at the same time to the assistance of their friends : the king, having a shorter cut, and the advantage of the river, got there first, but was not able to attempt any thing before Cæsar's arrival, who found no difficulty in joining Mithridates. The Roman general, seeing himself now at the head of a powerful army, resolved to put an end to the war by an assault upon the enemy's camp.

The king had intrenched himself in a place well fortified by nature : it was a rising ground, surrounded by

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th consulship.

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

a plain ; and three of its sides were secured by different fences ; one adjoined to the Nile, the other was steep, and of very difficult access, and the third was defended by a morass. About seven miles from it ran a narrow river, but with very high banks, which discharged itself into the Nile : and as it lay between the two armies, Ptolemy sent all his cavalry and a select body of light-armed troops to prevent Cæsar from passing it. The legionary troops, however, found means to get over by throwing across from bank to bank a number of large trees, and some German cavalry ventured to pass it by swimming where the banks were lowest. These attacked the detachment from Ptolemy's camp, and with such fury, that very few escaped to the king, with the news of his enemy's approach. Cæsar, willing to strike a terror into the Alexandrians, encamped as near to them as possible ; and the next day he attacked a fort which lay at a small distance, and which Ptolemy had joined to his camp by a line of communication. He employed his whole army in this attack, with a design of falling immediately upon the camp itself, during the consternation and disorder which the loss of the fort would occasion. The Romans accordingly pursued the garrison of the fort to the works of the camp ; and these they attempted to force by the two only approaches by which it seemed possible to attack them ; the one by the plain, the other by a narrow pass between the camp and the Nile : but the former was bravely defended by a numerous body of their best troops ; and the latter was not only protected from the rampart, but from the river, where a great number of archers and slingers made a continual discharge from the ships stationed there. Cæsar observing that, though his troops fought with the greatest ardour, yet they made no progress, he ordered a few cohorts, under the command of Carsulenus, a brave officer, to wheel round the camp, and to climb up the steepest side of it, which he perceived to be unguarded ; the whole army having crowded

to the attacks, or giving their whole attention to them Carsulenus, having executed his general's orders, soon put an end to the fight, by falling down upon the rear of the enemy. The Alexandrians fled on all sides in the greatest consternation, and, endeavouring to escape to the ships on the Nile, threw themselves over the rampart on that side. The king, during the confusion, got on shipboard, but the vessel was overloaded and sunk by the multitudes which followed him. Such was the end of this perfidious prince. His body was afterward found, covered with mud, and known by the golden cuirass, which it was customary for the Ptolemies to wear in battle.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th consulship.

Flor. 4. 2.
Oros. 6. 16.

Cæsar marched immediately to Alexandria, at the head of his cavalry, by the shortest way, confident that the inhabitants and troops, left in the town, would not dare to make any resistance. On his approach the whole city came out to meet him in the habit of suppliants, preceded by all their priests with the sacred symbols of their religion. The victorious general received their submission with his wonted humanity, and rode triumphant through the enemy's works into his own quarters.ⁿ Thus, Cæsar, in a few months, extricated himself from a war, in which all manner of difficulties seem to have been combined to put his prudence, courage, vigilance, and activity, to the test. In the midst of winter, and absolutely unprepared, and in want of every thing, he maintained himself at land and sea, within the very walls and port of an artful enemy, supplied with every commodity, and who brought against him a disciplined and warlike army, four times as numerous as that with which he had been forced to begin the war.

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

He now banished Arsinoë the kingdom, and settled the crown, in conformity to Auletes's will, upon the

ⁿ It appears by an old marble calendar, cited by Gruterus, Inscript. t. 1. p. 133, that Cæsar entered Alexandria, 6. cal. Ap. or 27th of March; which, according to Usher, was the 14th of January of the Julian year; but rather about the middle of February; Suetonius in Cæs. 35. says the war was carried on in winter, *hyeme anni*.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

only surviving son and Cleopatra: and he left with them the greatest part of his troops, to support their authority over subjects, who, upon his account, were greatly disaffected to them. It seemed also for the honour and interest of the people of Rome, that the Roman forces should remain there to protect them, while they continued faithful; and to check them, if they should fall off from their allegiance. Suetonius tells us, that what deterred Cæsar from reducing Egypt, at this time, into a province of the empire, was, that he was apprehensive, lest an ambitious governor, master of a country so opulent, and of such difficult access, should be tempted to revolt. Others ascribe it to his love for Cleopatra, who, not long after his departure, was delivered of a son to him, whom she named Cæsario, and whom Cæsar is said to have owned.^o But, whatever passion he may be supposed to have had for Cleopatra, it certainly engaged him in no act of injustice, and never drew his attention from concerns of greater importance. As soon as affairs were settled in Egypt, and the season was open for military operations, he set out by land for Syria, with the sixth legion, in his way to Pontus, where Pharnaces, king of the Bosphorus, during the Alexandrian war, had made a great progress, and was likely to give him much uneasiness.^p

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

This prince, at the breaking out of the civil war, thought he had a fair opportunity, while all was in such

^o So Antony gave out after Cæsar's death: though Oppius, it may be observed, thought it worth his while to write a book to confute his testimony, and to prove that Cæsario was not Cæsar's child.

^p "Cleopatra's charms (says M. Crevier) must have been very bewitching, since they had the power to retard Cæsar's activity. After having confined himself nine months in Alexandria, during which time the whole business of Rome and Italy was at a stand, and whereby the vanquished party found means to get strength, and become formidable in Africa, Cæsar, instead of quitting Egypt, with all expedition, to go where honour and the affairs of state required his presence, abandoned himself to pleasure, and passed whole nights in feasts and other debaucheries with Cleopatra: and at last set out with her to make a tour round the country. They went on board a ship richly ornamented, and took their course up the Nile, attended by 400 vessels. Cæsar's design was to have gone to Ethiopia, but he was prevented by his army, who began to dislike his proceedings." Suetonius, Appian, and Dio, are cited to confirm these particulars; but one has occasion for a very small share of penetration to perceive their improbability.

confusion, and the Romans employed in their mutual destruction, to reconquer the dominions of his ancestors. He began by taking Phanegoria, which Pompey had declared free: he next subdued Colchis; then, entering Pontus, he made himself master of Sinope, the ancient residence of its kings. Elated by this success, he had seized upon the Lesser Armenia, which belonged to Deiotarus, and carried his arms into Cappadocia, the kingdom of Ariobarzanes. Deiotarus found affairs in this situation, on his return from Pharsalia: and had recourse to Domitius Calvinus, whom Cæsar had appointed commander in those parts. Domitius was very sensible that the republic was not less interested in this war than Deiotarus and Ariobarzanes, and that it was dishonourable to the Roman people, to Cæsar, and to himself, to suffer the dominions of their friends and allies to be invaded by a foreign prince: he therefore sent ambassadors to Pharnaces, and required of him, “to withdraw immediately out of Armenia and Cappadocia, and no longer to insult the majesty of the Roman republic.” At the same time, to give more weight to his embassy, he assembled what troops he could, and ordered them to rendezvous at Comana. Of the three legions which Cæsar had left with him, he had sent two to Egypt, one by sea, the other with Mithridates: the thirty-sixth alone remained with him. He received, however, two legions from Deiotarus, and one had been lately raised in Pontus. These four legions, with some Cilician recruits, and 200 horse, made up his whole army. Pharnaces made answer, “that he had quitted Cappadocia, and that the Lesser Armenia was his own by the right of inheritance; but that he would submit to the decision of Cæsar.” Domitius, who understood that he had left Cappadocia for no other reason than because, Armenia lying contiguous to his kingdom, he could more easily defend it, sent him word, that he had no better right to Armenia than to Cappadocia, and that he must renounce

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

acquisitions to which his sword alone had entitled him. Pharnaces endeavoured in vain to amuse him with a negotiation, and by sending deputies after deputies with presents. The Roman general advanced to Nicopolis, and a battle ensued. In this battle Deiotarus's two legions gave ground on the first onset, the legion raised in Pontus was cut to pieces, and the legion alone of Pompey's veterans, after sustaining the whole shock of the action, retreated in good order with the loss of only 250 men. Domitius, assembling his scattered soldiers as well as he could, retired as far as Asia; while the king entered Pontus as conqueror, and committed all kinds of enormities. Affairs were in this situation, when Cæsar left Egypt.

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

On his arrival in Syria, he received advice from all hands, that every thing was in confusion at Rome; that the contests of the tribunes produced daily seditions; that the officers kept up no discipline among the soldiers; and that his presence was necessary to give the laws their proper authority. However, he thought it necessary first to regulate the affairs of the eastern provinces, and take vengeance on Pharnaces. The kings and petty princes in and about Syria came from every side to wait on him, and were graciously received. He confirmed Hircan in the high-priesthood of the Jews, notwithstanding the solicitations of Antigonus, son to Aristobulus; and gave him leave to build the walls of Jerusalem, which Pompey had ordered to be pulled down: he likewise supported Antipater in the command he had for a long time exercised in Judea, under Hircan's name; which greatly strengthened the authority of that prince. From Syria, where he left the command in the hands of Sextus Cæsar, a young relation, he sailed for Cilicia: and, having convened the states of that province in Tarsus, and settled its affairs, he set out with the greatest expedition towards Pontus. At Comana he conferred the priesthood of Bellona on Lyco-

medes of Bithynia, who claimed it in right of his ancestors, and, according to Appian, dispossessed Arche-laüs, the son of him whom Pompey had invested with that dignity. On his approaching the frontiers of Gallo-græcia, he was met by Deiotarus, who had not only divested himself of all marks of royalty, but had taken that of a suppliant “to beg forgiveness for having assisted Pompey, at a time when Cæsar could give him no protection : urging that it was his business to obey the governors who were present, without pretending to judge of the disputes of the Roman people.” Cæsar, who was well acquainted with what zeal and spirit he had served against him, after some reproaches, and refuting his excuses, restored him his royal habit, and commanded him to join him with all his cavalry and troops.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

Pharnaces observed the same conduct with Cæsar as with Domitius : he pretended to sue for peace, but was fully resolved to push the war. Cæsar saw through his design : and, though his army was very inconsiderable, both as to the number and quality of his troops, consisting only of the sixth legion (now reduced to 1,000 men) and the remains of Domitius’s army, he resolved to give battle. He advanced therefore within five miles of the enemy. The country where the king was encamped was filled with hills, separated from each other by deep valleys : and, opposite to that eminence where Pharnaces had intrenched himself, was another at the distance only of one mile, and there Cæsar intended to pitch his camp. With this design, having ordered his men to prepare every thing necessary for throwing up a rampart, he set out in the night to take possession of it. Pharnaces was greatly surprised to see him there, at sunrising, employed in making his fortifications, and immediately took the resolution to attack him. The approach was so very difficult and dangerous, that Cæsar concluded the king’s intention was no other than to retard his works by keeping a great number of his men

Year of
B O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

under arms: and, shewing therefore his first line in order of battle, he commanded the rest of the army to go on with the works. But the king, encouraged by favourable omens, and by reflecting that in this very place Triarius had been overcome by his father Mithridates, and having conceived an utter contempt for so small an army, made up, for the most part, of troops he had already defeated in the field, had determined upon a battle, and to that end began to cross the valley. Cæsar laughed at his foolish attempt in crowding his army into so narrow a place, where no general in his right senses would have entered; and did not think of calling his soldiers from their work. But, seeing him push on and ascend the hill, he found himself obliged, to his great astonishment, to post his army in order to receive him. An attack so sudden and unexpected caused some disorder at first, which was increased by the chariots armed with scythes, which, sent before the enemy's first line, fell in with Cæsar's ranks before they were quite formed: but the multitude of darts, which were launched against them, soon put a stop to their career. The army, which followed them close, began the battle by a shout; and the engagement was sharp and long. At last the Romans, by the advantage of their situation, repulsed the assailants: the victory began in the right wing, where the veterans of the sixth legion were posted; and, the troops in the centre and in the left wing gaining soon a like superiority, the whole army of Pharnaces was driven precipitately down the hill. In the flight great numbers were slain and crushed by their own troops, and those who escaped were obliged to throw away their arms, so that, having crossed the valley, and got to the opposite ascent, they could not face about, nor derive any benefit from the advantage of the ground. The Romans pursued them, and without allowing them to rally, attacked and took their camp. It was during this attack that Pharnaces made his escape. Almost his

whole army was destroyed or made prisoners. It is reported by Appian, that Cæsar, astonished at the ease with which he gained this victory, cried out: "Happy Pompey! such then are the enemies by whose defeat you acquired the surname of Great:" and in a letter to one of his friends at Rome, giving an account of this action, he described the rapidity of his conquest in these three words, *Veni, vidi, vici*; "I came, I saw, I conquered."^q And, when he triumphed afterward on this occasion, he caused a tablet to be carried in the procession, with these very words inscribed in capitals. Hirtius tells us, that no victory ever gave him more joy, as he, at one blow, in so critical a conjuncture, put an end to a dangerous war, which he was afraid would detain him a long time from Rome, where his presence was necessary. Pharnaces, having retired to Sinope, was pursued thither by Domitius, who forced him to leave the country. In the Bosphorus, Asandar, whom he had left regent of his kingdom, had revolted and set up for himself, during the expedition into Pontus; so that, when the fugitive king returned home, he found a rebel in a condition to dispute with him the possession. A battle ensued, in which Pharnaces lost his life. Such was the end of this parricide son of the great Mithridates.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

During the war in Egypt and in Pontus, Greece and Illyricum had been pacified by Calenus and Vatinius. The first made himself master of all Peloponnesus without much difficulty. In Illyricum the struggle was greater. Cæsar, upon his expedition against Pompey, had left Q. Cornificius to command in that province with two legions, and this lieutenant had kept the barbarians in subjection. After the battle of Pharsalia,

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

^q "Rex Pharnaces magis discordiæ nostræ fiducia, quam virtutis suæ, infesto in Cappadociam agmine ruebat: sed hunc Cæsar aggressus, uno, et, ut sic dixerim, non toto prælio, obtrivit; more fulminis, quod uno eodemque momento venit, percussit, abcessit. Nec vana de se prædicatio est Cæsaris, ante victum hostem esse, quam visum." Flor. l. 4. c. 2. 63. Duker. p. 695.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

Cæsar, being informed that many of the vanquished party had fled that way, and that Octavius had brought the fleet which he commanded upon the coast, he sent orders to Gabinius, who was then in Italy, to march with the new-raised legions to the succour of Cornificius. Gabinius, imagining that the province was better stocked with provisions than it really was, and depending on the terror impressed upon the inhabitants by Cæsar's late victory, marched into Illyricum in the middle of winter, and, not finding sufficient subsistence in a province already exhausted, and partly ill-affected, he was obliged to make war upon the inhabitants for provisions, and to besiege them in their strong holds; and receiving, on these occasions, many checks, he was brought into such contempt, that the people of the country ventured to attack him upon his march to Salona, and killed 2,000 of his soldiers, thirty-eight centurions, and four tribunes. He escaped with the remainder to Salona, and died there of a disorder, which the toil of a winter-campaign and grief had occasioned. Octavius entered immediately into an alliance with the barbarians, and would soon have reduced the whole country, if Vatinius had not flown to its assistance with the same spirit he had fought Cæsar's battles in Rome at the head of the mob. Neither the sickness he then laboured under, nor the hardships of the season, stopped him. He sent to Calenus for a squadron of galleys, but, these not coming with that dispatch the affairs of Illyricum required, he fastened beaks to all the vessels he found in the port of Brundusium, and, putting on board the veterans whom Cæsar had left sick in those parts, and who had since recovered, he sailed with this stout fleet in quest of Octavius. He found him before Epidaurus, which he was besieging both by sea and land. Octavius immediately raised the siege, and retired to Tauris, whither Vatinius, having joined to his army the garrison of the place, followed him. The Pompeian admiral, in-

formed of the condition of the enemy's fleet, resolved to give battle, and, upon their approach, sailed out of the harbour. Vatinius, though part of his ships had been dispersed by a tempest, and the enemy was superior both in number and strength of vessels, gave the signal for battle, and began it himself by driving his quinquereme upon Octavius's four-benched galley, which it shocked with such violence, that it lost its beak. The battle raged with great fury among the rest of the ships, but chiefly round the two admirals. As the ships on each side advanced to sustain those that had engaged, a close conflict ensued in a very narrow sea. Nothing could have happened more favourably for Vatinius; for his veterans leaped into the enemy's vessels, and, forcing them to an equal combat, soon mastered them by their superior valour. Octavius's galley was sunk; and many others had the same fate, or were taken. Octavius himself got into a boat, which sinking under the multitude that crowded after him, he swam to a neighbouring ship; where, being taken up, and night coming on, he spread all his sails and fled towards Greece. He thence continued his route for Africa, followed by a few that escaped out of the battle. Vatinius entered the town, whence Octavius had sailed to fight him, without the loss of one vessel, and, having refitted both his own ships and those taken from the enemy, he sailed to the island of Issa; whither he was informed Octavius had retired. Here he was certified of Octavius's motions, and thus, having restored peace to Illyricum, he returned triumphant with his army and fleet to Brundusium.

Cæsar, after his victory over Pharnaces, was at liberty to return to Rome: and, the day after he had obtained it, he set out with a guard of light horse, having sent home Deiotarus's troops, and ordered the sixth legion to follow him into Italy, there to receive the recompence due to their services. He took his way through Gallogræcia and Bithynia into Asia, giving judgments, as he

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

Hirt. de
Bell. Aex.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

passed, in all controversies of moment, and settling the limits and jurisdictions of the several kings, tetrarchs, and states. Mithridates of Pergamus was appointed to succeed Pharnaces in the kingdom of the Bosphorus, and the tetrarchate of Gallo-græcia was added to it, claimed now by Mithridates, in right of inheritance, though it had been possessed for some years by Deiotarus. Cicero tells us that Cæsar had a particular hatred to this prince, that he also exacted large sums of money from him, and deprived him of Armenia, bestowing it on Ariobarzanes. Nor is it difficult to account for his severity to Deiotarus. This prince had been remarkable for his zeal for Pompey, and by this means had obtained several unjust grants from the senate. Cæsar stayed no where longer than the necessity of his affairs required, and, making the greatest dispatch, arrived in Italy in the month of September, much sooner than was expected.

Cicero, who had been, in a manner, a prisoner at Brundusium ever since the battle of Pharsalia, and lived there in perpetual uneasiness,^r upon the first no-

Middl.
p. 127.

^r “Cicero no sooner returned to Italy than he began to reflect, that he had been too hasty in coming home before the war was determined, and without any invitation from the conqueror; and, in a time of that general licence, had reason to apprehend some insult from the soldiers, if he ventured to appear in public with his fasces and laurel; and yet to drop them would be a diminution of that honour which he had received from the Roman people, and the acknowledgment of a power superior to the laws: he condemned himself, therefore, for not continuing abroad, in some convenient place of retirement, till he had been sent for, or things were better settled. (Ad Att. 11. 6. and 9.) What gave him the greater reason to repent of this step, was a message that he received from Antony, who governed all in Cæsar’s absence; and with the same churlish spirit, with which he would have held him before in Italy against his will, seemed now disposed to drive him out of it; for he sent him the copy of a letter from Cæsar, in which Cæsar signified, that he had heard that Cato and Metellus were at Rome, and appeared openly there, which might occasion some disturbance; wherefore he strictly enjoined, that none should be suffered to come to Italy without a special licence from himself. Antony, therefore, desired Cicero to excuse him, since he could not help obeying Cæsar’s commands: but Cicero sent L. Lamia to assure him, that Cæsar had ordered Dolabella to write to him to come to Italy as soon as he pleased; and that he came upon the authority of Dolabella’s letter. So that Antony, in the edict which he published to exclude the Pompeians from Italy, excepted Cicero by name: which added still to his mortification; since all his desire was to be connived at only, or tacitly permitted, without being personally distinguished from the rest of his party.” (Ad Att. 11. 7.)

“He had several other grievances of a domestic kind, which concurred also to make him unhappy; his brother Quintus, with his son, after their escape from Pharsalia, followed Cæsar into Asia, to obtain their pardon from him in person: and Quintus, in order to make his own peace the more easily, resolved to throw all the

tice of his landing at Tarentum, set out on foot to meet him. Cæsar no sooner saw him than he alighted, ran to embrace him, and walked with him alone, conversing very familiarly for several furlongs.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

On his arrival at Rome, he found the city in the greatest ferment. He had been created dictator, after the battle of Pharsalia, for the following year; and Antony, as his master of horse, had governed in his absence. Dolabella had got into the tribunate, which he was no sooner invested with than he revived the laws

405th consulship.

Dio, l. 42.

blame upon his brother; and, for that purpose, made it the subject of all his letters and speeches to Cæsar's friends, to rail at him in a manner the most inhuman. Cicero was informed of this from all quarters, and that young Quintus, who was sent before towards Cæsar, had read an oration to his friends, which he had prepared to speak to him against his uncle." (Ad Att. 11. 8—10.) Middl. p. 128.

"But what gave him the greatest uneasiness was to be held still in suspense, in what touched him the most nearly, the case of his own safety, and of Cæsar's disposition towards him; for, though all Cæsar's friends assured him not only of pardon, but of all kind of favour; yet he had received no intimation of kindness from Cæsar himself. To ease his mind in this respect, some of his friends at Rome contrived

Middl.
p. 137.

to send him a letter in Cæsar's name, dated the 9th of February, from Alexandria, encouraging him to lay aside all gloomy apprehensions, and expect every thing that was kind and friendly from him: but it gave him little satisfaction, as he suspected what he afterward found to be true, that it was forged by Balbus and Oppius on purpose to raise his spirits, and administer some little comfort to him. All his accounts, however, confirmed to him the report of Cæsar's clemency and moderation, and his granting pardon without exception to all who asked it; and with regard to himself, Cæsar sent Quintus's virulent letters to Balbus, with orders to shew them to him, as a proof of his kindness, and dislike of Quintus's perfidy. But Cicero's present despondency, which interpreted every thing by his fears, made him suspect Cæsar the more, for refusing grace to none; as if such a clemency must needs be affected, and his revenge deferred only to a season more convenient; and, as to his brother's letters, he fancied that Cæsar did not send them to Italy, because he condemned them, but to make his present misery and abject condition the more notorious and despicable to every body." (Ad Att. 11. 16, 17. 20. 22.)

Ib. p. 142.

"He had fears also from another quarter: Cæsar's enemies had greatly strengthened themselves in Africa, and it was reported, that they would bring into Italy a powerful army before Cæsar could return from Alexandria; Cicero, in this case, was sure to be treated as a deserter: for while Cæsar looked upon all men as friends, who did not act against him, and pardoned even enemies, who submitted to his power; it was a declared law, on the other side, to consider all as enemies who were not actually in their camp; so that Cicero had nothing now to wish, either for himself, or the republic, but, in the first place, a peace, of which he had still some hopes; or else that Cæsar might conquer; whose victory was like to prove the more temperate of the two." (Ad Att. 11. 6. 12. 19.)

Ib. p. 140.

"After a long series of perpetual mortifications, he was refreshed at last by a very obliging letter from Cæsar, who confirmed to him the full enjoyment of his state and dignity, and bade him resume his fasces and style of emperor as before. Cæsar's mind (adds Dr. Middleton) was too great to listen to the tales of the brother and nephew [which, however, contained a great deal of truth], and, instead of approving their treachery, seems to have granted them their pardon on Cicero's account, rather than their own: so that Quintus, upon the trial of Cæsar's inclination, began presently to change his note, and to congratulate with his brother on Cæsar's affection and esteem for him." (Ep. Fam. 14. 23. Pro Ligar. 3. Ad Att. 11. 23.) Middl. p. 142.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

Suet. in
Cæs. 42.

proposed the year before by Coelius for an abolition of debts, and to exempt tenants from paying, in the present confusion, any rent to their landlords. We are told, that at first he was favoured by Antony, who found this project very suitable to his own circumstances ; but, having discovered an intrigue between his wife Antonia and the young tribune, he put her away, and from that moment sided with the senate and two of the tribunes in opposing Dolabella. The multitude favoured the scheme ; the tribune was obstinate in the pursuit of it ; and, in the absence of Antony, who was obliged to make a tour to appease the mutiny of the veteran legions, the disorder became extreme. The creditors on one side, and the debtors on the other, formed two camps in the city, and alternately attacked each other with fire and sword. We are told that the vestals, not thinking themselves safe in their temple, removed from thence with the sacred relics. Antony upon his return was charged by the senate to take care the republic received no detriment. Dolabella grew desperate ; and, having fixed a day for the passing of his laws, he barricaded the avenues to the Forum, erected wooden turrets to prevent the approach of any person against his will, and made such dispositions as are usual where a siege is to be maintained. Antony, on his side, brought a number of troops to the Capitol, forced the barriers, broke to pieces the tables on which the laws were inscribed, and, having taken some of the ringleaders of this sedition, he threw them down the Tarpeian rock. Notwithstanding this exertion of dictatorial and despotic power, the troubles continued till Cæsar's arrival. He did not think fit to take notice of any thing done in his absence by his friends ; but, being desirous to gain the affection of the several parties, regulated affairs as much as possible to every one's satisfaction. He refused to listen to the clamours of the people, who demanded the abolition proposed by their

tribune, telling them, that he was as much encumbered with debts as any one, yet had no design of defrauding his creditors. However, besides the mitigation already granted by him, he farther indulged the debtors by a discharge of all arrears since the commencement of the civil war: and, with regard to the tenants, he eased the poor citizens by an order, importing that all, not renting above 2,000 sesterces annually in Rome, should be exempted from payment of a year's rent, and of a quarter's only in the other parts of Italy.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th consulship.

Dio, l. 42.

About 16l.

Q. FUFIVS CALENVS, } Consuls for the three
P. VATINIUS, } last months of the year.

Having thus settled the affairs of the city, and made Vatinius and Fufius Calenus consuls for the remaining months of the year, he caused himself to be created consul, and continued in the dictatorship, for the year following; taking, for his colleague in the consulship, and his master of the horse, M. Lepidus; and he applied himself to raise the money necessary for the expedition to Africa, where the progress of the Pompeians called for his presence. Dio tells us, that as it had been customary to present crowns of gold and erect statues to victorious generals, Cæsar received under this pretence great sums from the corporations in Italy, and at the same time borrowed of them still greater. But the sale of the estates of the contrary faction was probably his chief resource. Pompey's estate, houses, and goods, were sold at this time, and purchased by Antony: and it was undoubtedly one way of recompensing a great number of his followers to make over to them the effects of the vanquished at an under rate. P. Sylla, as well as Antony, was one of the most forward and eager purchasers.

Dio, l. 42.

When every thing for his expedition to Africa was ready, a violent sedition broke out among his old legions. They had been very mutinous ever since their return to Italy, being disappointed in not receiving im-

Suet. in
Cæs.
Appian.
Dio, l. 42.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

Above 32l.

mediately the rewards that had been promised them, and which they had so highly merited; and when they perceived that Cæsar meant to employ them again in a dangerous war, they grew furious. Before Cæsar's return, the twelfth legion had treated their officers with contempt, and pelted with stones such of them as had dared to remind them of their duty: and now the tenth, so favoured by their general, and so much attached hitherto to his person, gave the signal of revolt, and was followed by the others in Campania. Cæsar sent to them Sallust, whom he had lately appointed prætor, and to whom he destined the government of Africa, with instructions to let them know, that, as soon as he had put an end to the African war, besides the distributions of land and money already due to them, he would add 1,000 denarii to each man as a recompence for this last campaign. These offers, so wide of the soldiers' expectations, greatly exasperated them. Sallust was obliged to save himself by flight; and, in the extremity of their resentment, they marched to Rome, plundering all in their way, and killed several people of distinction. Cæsar, under apprehensions for the city, ordered the gates to be shut, and sent to its defence what troops he had about him: but when he heard of their arrival, and that they had sat down in the Campus Martius, the entreaties of his friends, concerned for his safety, could not prevail with him to defer a moment going in person to speak with them. He boldly mounted his tribunal, and, with a menacing tone of voice, asked the soldiers, "What had brought them thither, and what they wanted?" This intrepid and imperious behaviour began to disconcert them: they were ashamed to reproach him with having delayed their promised rewards, but represented that, being worn out by fatigue, and weakened by the wounds they had received in his service, they were in hopes that he would have given them their discharge. "I give it you," replied Cæsar; and, after a short

silence, added, “and, when I shall have triumphed with other troops, I nevertheless will fulfil my engagements with you.” They were thunderstruck with these words:

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

and the dictator was about to retire, when he was stopped by the officers attending him; who conjured him to treat the companions of his victories with less coldness and severity. He consented to speak to them once more, and began by addressing them with the word *quirites*, citizens. This expression, instead of that of *commilitones*, or comrades, which he commonly used, quite overcame them, and brought them back effectually to their duty. They interrupted him, and insisted that they were still his soldiers, and begged he would consider them as such, offering to follow him into Africa, and every where else.^s He pardoned them, but soon after took the first occasion to punish the licentious behaviour and the rapines of some of the officers. C. Avienus, a military tribune of the tenth legion, when he set out from Sicily, having filled a ship entirely with his own equipage and servants, Cæsar summoned all the military tribunes and centurions to appear before his tribunal the next day, and addressed them in these words: “I could have wished that those, whose insolence and licentious carriage have given me cause of complaint, had been capable of amendment, and of making a good use of my clemency. But, since they know not how to keep within bounds, I shall make an example of them according to the law of arms, that others may be taught a better conduct. You, C. Avienus, when you were in Italy, instigated the Roman sol-

405th consulship.

^s This event has been embellished with many circumstances which cannot be true. We are told, that the soldiers desired to be decimated, and that Cæsar refused them that honour, telling them, that he would treat them according to their deserts, and break them: that he continued inflexible towards the tenth legion: who, not being able to obtain their pardon, followed him of their own accord and without orders into Africa; where Cæsar made indeed use of them, but employed them always in hazardous enterprises in order to get rid of them: and that after the war, when returned to Italy, he deprived the few that remained of one-third of their reward in punishment of their mutiny. Dio, l. 42. But we see that in the battle of Thapsus, and afterward at Munda, they had the place of honour as usual, in the first line of the right wing. Suet. in Cæs. 70.

Year of
R O M E
706.
B. C. 46.

405th con-
sulship.

diers to mutiny, against the republic; you have been guilty of rapine in the municipal towns: and you have never been of any real service, either to the commonwealth, or to your general: lastly, in place of soldiers, you have crowded the transports with your slaves and baggage: so that, through your fault, the republic fails in troops, which at this time are not only useful, but necessary. For all these reasons I break you with ignominy, and order you to leave Africa this very day. In like manner I break you, A. Fonteius, because you have behaved yourself as a seditious officer, and as a bad citizen. You, T. Salienus, M. Tiro, C. Clusinas, have attained the rank of centurions, through my indulgence, and not through your own merit; and, since you have been raised to that rank, have neither shewn bravery in war, nor good conduct in peace. Instead of behaving according to the rules of modesty, your whole study has been to stir up the soldiers against your general. I therefore think you unworthy of continuing centurions in my army: I break you, and order you to quit Africa as soon as possible." Having concluded this speech, he delivered them over to some centurions, with orders to confine them separately on board a ship, allowing each of them but one single slave: and this seems to have been the only punishment he inflicted on those seditious troops.

END OF VOL. V.

B S B
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